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
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**THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES.**



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Plato

THE  
PLATONIC DIALOGUES

FOR ENGLISH READERS.

BY

WILLIAM WHEWELL, D.D.

VOL. III.

*THE REPUBLIC AND THE TIMÆUS.*

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## PREFACE.

WHEN I published the first volume of my *Platonic Dialogues for English Readers*, it was done as an experiment to ascertain whether I was right in supposing that a large portion of the Platonic Dialogues could, by combining translation and comment, be made intelligible and even interesting to ordinary readers of English literature. The reception which that publication met with was such as to encourage me to publish other Dialogues of which I had already, for my own gratification, made translations in the same manner; and even to go on to translate some additional Dialogues, for the purpose of continuing the series. In this manner I have been led to the laborious and difficult task, which I should not at first have had the courage to contemplate, of translating and commenting the *Republic* and



the *Timæus*; and these I here offer to those who study Plato, whether in Greek or in English, hoping that I have done something to make these remarkable works intelligible.

These Dialogues differ in their aim and substance from those which I have already published, in that they are not negative but positive, not critical merely but constructive. Two previous Classes of these Dialogues—the Dialogues of the Socratic School, and the Anti-Sophist Dialogues—are employed in analysing and disproving definitions and opinions there propounded; and the other Class, the Dialogues connected with the Trial and Death of Socrates, contains hardly any positive doctrine except that of the Immortality of the Soul. The Dialogues now presented, on the other hand, are full of positive doctrines, ethical, political, and physical, given along with their professed proofs. The *Republic* contains, especially, a theory respecting the foundations of morality which, if true, supplies an answer to many of the questions discussed in the previous Classes of Dialogues. In those previous Classes, Plato was in search of ethical definitions and ethical truths: in the *Republic*, he conceives himself to have found such definitions and such truths.

There he was an enquirer and a critic: here he is a theorist and a moralist.

The *Republic*, being thus mainly didactic, loses one of the principal charms of the previous Dialogues, the lively drama of conversational debate: except in the First Book of the *Republic*, the *Thrasymachus*, which is really a Dialogue of the Antisophist class. But the reader who has been interested by Plato's questions and objections in other Dialogues will, I think, notwithstanding this less lively character of the *Republic*, be interested by it, as containing the answers which Plato gave to his own questions, and the doctrines which he embraced after his earlier doubtings. That these doctrines are very important in the history of Moral Philosophy, I have endeavoured to show in commenting on them; and the Books contain besides an abundance of curious matter which I have ventured to arrange as Digressions.

I cannot but believe that the English reader, though he may sometimes be disappointed with the results of Plato's speculations, will find, in that portion of the Platonic Dialogues which I have now completed, a very striking body of writings. It appears to me also that these writings become more striking by being taken in the order in which I have

presented them. The points discussed in the *Laches*, the *Charmides*, the *Lysis*, the *Rivals*, the *Alcibiades*, though involving weighty questions, are in a great degree juvenile puzzles, belonging to an early stage of Moral Philosophy. After these, the fine dramatic delineations of other moral teachers and disputants, Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippias, Gorgias, Polus, Ion, Thrasymachus, form an extraordinary gallery of philosophical portraits. And this depiction is further graced by a lofty tone of virtuous resolve, as in the *Gorgias*, and by a thorough enjoyment of literary beauty and literary playfulness, as in the *Phædrus*; while through all there runs a steadfast assertion of the great doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, presented as the belief of Socrates in the great tragedy of his death, the *Phædo*, and again urged in various mythological forms in the *Gorgias*, the *Phædrus*, and the *Republic*; add to this, subtle speculations concerning the soul and its faculties, anticipating the most acute analyses of modern psychologists:—and we have, I think, matter in which the English reader may find grounds for an admiration of Plato, and a pleasure in reading him, not altogether disproportionate to the reputation which belongs to his name.

That Plato's arguments are sometimes inconclusive, sometimes unfair, and his dramatic representations of opponents sometimes caricatures, are criticisms to which he has been subjected from his own day to ours; and the justice of them will not be denied, I think, by any one who undertakes to make sense of what he has written. I am aware that there have been persons who have explained all seeming inconsistencies and weaknesses in him by ascribing to him a habit of writing ironically. To suppose that Plato is an author whose habit is to lay traps for unwary readers by saying the opposite of what he means, would be to make him the dullest of jesters: and I should hope there are few of his Greek readers who have so poor an opinion of him.

The *ethical* system of Plato is completed in the Dialogues which I have now published. There are other Dialogues of great interest, as the *Banquet*, the *Cratylus*, the *Theætetus*, which I have not yet translated. Whether I shall venture to undertake these, circumstances must determine.

In translating the *Republic*, I have in several parts availed myself of assistance from the translation of Messrs. Vaughan and Davies. Their plan and object is so different from mine, that they



cannot regard me as a rival; and they will, I hope, look with no dissatisfaction on the liberties which I have thus taken.

My translation of the *Timæus* is in many parts a mere abridgment of that most curious system of the universe. M. Theodore Henri Martin's *Études sur le Timée* contain profound discussions of all the principal questions raised by this extraordinary work.

TRINITY LODGE,  
May 30, 1861.

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**THE REPUBLIC.**

**PLAT. III.**

**B**

The title of this Dialogue in Diogenes Laertius, *The Polity, or Of Justice*, indicates the combined political and ethical character of the Dialogue ; its object being to propound an ideal constitution of a state, and hence to illustrate the moral constitution of man and the nature of human virtue.

## INTRODUCTION TO THE REPUBLIC.

THE title of this Dialogue might be more properly rendered *The Polity*: since, as M. Cousin observes, it does not describe or single out any particular kind of constitution, such as the term *Republic* indicates. This Polity is no more a Republic than a Monarchy or an Aristocracy; and Plato repeatedly calls it by both these names. But we are so familiar with the name of *The Republic of Plato*, that I have retained it as the general title, for fear that the ordinary reader might be misled, and might not recognize in this Polity the Republic of which he has probably heard and read already.

I have divided the ten Dialogues which compose the Republic into *Parts*, of which the separation and arrangement contains, I hope, in itself evidence of its being conformable to the conception and intention of the work. These Parts are so distinct in their subjects that they may be regarded as separate Dialogues; and thus the *Republic* forms, in itself, a Class of the Platonic Dialogues; the fourth Class following the three which I have already published.

The First of these Parts, *Thrasymachus*, might, as I have already said in the Preface to the *Antisophist Dialogues*, have been included in that Class, if it had not been undesirable to dismember the Republic. It is remarkable for the same dramatic vivacity which we find in most of the *Antisophist Dialogues*; and we may regard the *Clitophon* as a prelude to it, as I have already remarked in speaking of that Dialogue.

The Second Part, which I have entitled *Of the Ideal Polity and of Virtue*, is really the cardinal and essential part of the work; describing, as I have already said, Plato's idea of a Perfect State, and illustrating, by means of that, the moral constitution of a virtuous man. And accordingly this Part ends (at the end of Book IV.) with a formal conclusion. But the Third Part, *Of Bad Polities and of Vices*, illustrates negatively what the second Part had illustrated positively, and ends (at the beginning of Book IX.) with a still more formal conclusion.

The Fourth Part, which I have called the *Sequel to the Ethics of the Polity*, appears to me, for reasons which I have there given, to have been written later. The same is probably the case with the discourse on the *Immortality of the Soul*, which I make the Fifth Part.

The Digressions which follow, are taken from the remaining parts of the ten Dialogues of the *Republic*. That these are digressions from the main subject will be evident to the reader. They, or most of them, may have been written or delivered after the main scheme of the Polity had been propounded. They look, in many places, like the work of an author returning again and again to the various branches of his subject, and following them out as new thoughts arose. We

can easily believe that such resumption and expansion of the subject was an habitual employment of the Platonic school in the shades of **Academus**.

I now proceed to translate in the same manner as in former volumes, though with fewer omissions.



# THE REPUBLIC.

## PART I.—THRASYMACHUS.

(*Republic*, B. I.)

**S**OCRATES narrates his own proceedings and the consequent Dialogues.

1 “Yesterday I went down to the Piræus, with the double purpose of offering my prayers to the goddess, [Diana, who under the name of Bendis was a special object of worship there,] and of seeing the mode in which they celebrate the festival [called from her name, Bendidia;] this being the first time that it has been celebrated. And undoubtedly the processions of the companies of our own citizens appeared to me very splendid; but that which came as a deputation from Thrace [from which country this especial worship was imported] was not less splendid.

“When we had offered our prayers, and seen the spectacle, we were departing back to the city: and thereon Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, who from a distance saw us setting out to go home, told his boy to run on to us and tell us to wait for him; so the boy came behind me and plucked me by the cloak, and said, ‘Polemarchus bids you wait

for him.' I turned round and asked where he was. 'He is coming after you,' said he; 'stay for him.' 'Well, we will stay,' said Glaucon. And in a short time Polemarchus came, and Adeimantus the brother of Glaucon, and Nikeratus the son of Nikias, and some others, as persons returning from the procession in which they had taken part. And Polemarchus said, 'You look, Socrates, as if you were setting out to go away to the city.' 'You guess rightly,' said I. 'But,' said he, 'do you see what a strong body we are?' 'Of course I do.' 'Well, you must either master us or stay here.' 'But,' said I, 'there is a third way open to us. We may perhaps persuade you to let us go away.' 'But,' said he, 'can you persuade those who will not hear you?' 'By no means,' said Glaucon. And Adeimantus said, 'Do you not know that in the evening there is to be a torch-race by men on horseback in honour of the goddess?' 'By men on horseback?' said I. 'That is something new. Are the men on horseback to pass the torches from hand to hand? or how?' 'Even so,' said Polemarchus; 'and moreover there will be a festival lasting all the night, which will be worth seeing. We will rise after supper, and go and see this night-festival; and we shall find a number of young men there with whom we may converse. So pray stay, and do not think of going.' And Glaucon thereupon said, 'It seems that we must stay.' 'If we must,' said I, 'it is to be done.'"

This kind of pleasantry, in which the persons manifest their love of the society of their friends by threatening to detain them by force, and by submitting to such threats, we have in other parts of the Platonic Dialogues; for instance, in the *Phædrus*. The scene then shifts to the house of Polemarchus, where the main Dialogue is held.

2 “So we went with Polemarchus to his house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus the brothers of Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, and Charmantides the Pæonian, and Clitophon the son of Aristonymus. There was in the house, too, Cephalus the father of Polemarchus, and a very old man he seemed to me to be, for it was a long time since I had seen him. He sat in a kind of arm-chair, with a chaplet on his head, as he had been performing sacrifice in the hall of the house; and we sat down near him, for there were chairs there placed in a circle.”

Of the persons here introduced, Thrasymachus sustains the principal share as the opponent of Socrates in the Dialogue. He was a noted “Sophist,” or professor of philosophy and education; and Clitophon, here mentioned with him, was an admirer of his, who in the Dialogue of that name is represented as complaining that Socrates convinced men that they were wrong, but did not lead them on in what was right, and declaring that he should betake himself to Thrasymachus. The conversation begins between the aged Cephalus and Socrates. Socrates says:

“Cephalus, seeing me, saluted me, and said, ‘Socrates, you do not often come down to us here in the Piræus; and yet you ought to do so. If I were still active so as to be able to go to the city without inconvenience, I should not ask you to come here: we would have come to you. But as matters are, you ought to come here more frequently. For I assure you that in my case, in proportion as the pleasures of the body fade away, the desire and pleasure of conversation increase. Do not then desert us, but be friends with these youths, and visit us habitually as friends and near connections.’

“ And I said, ‘ I assure you, Cephalus, I have great pleasure in conversing with very old people. It seems to me that one may inquire of them, as of persons who have already passed along a road which we, too, may have to travel, what kind of road it is; whether rough and difficult, or smooth and easy. And I would gladly ask how this seems to you: seeing you are already at that point when a man may be said to be on the threshold of old age, as the poets speak. Do you report that that part of life is hard, or how do you say?’

“ ‘ On my faith, Socrates, I will tell you how <sup>3</sup> it seems to me. For there are several of us, of nearly the same age, who often come together, according to the old proverb [about birds of one feather]; and when we meet, most of us are full of lamentations, wishing to call back the pleasures of youth, remembering bodily enjoyments, and eating and drinking, and the like; they are vexed to miss these things, as being something precious, and hold that life was then sweet, but that now life is not life. Some, too, complain of the ill-usage which old persons meet with from their relatives, and bewail old age as the cause of all their ills. But these persons, Socrates, seem to me not to lay the blame in the right place. For if it were so, I should have had to complain of the same things, and so would all others who are come to the same age. Now I have met with persons who were not in this frame of mind: and, not to speak of others, I was once present when Sophocles was asked by one whether he was still capable of sensual pleasure: and he said, ‘ Man, do not use language so irreverent. I congratulate myself that I have survived such desire; it is like escaping from a rabid and furious master.’ I then thought that he said well: I now think so no less. In old age we are soothed into

peace and freedom from all such servitude. When the desires are no longer excited, when their tension is over, it happens as Sophocles said: and this is really a liberation from a crowd of mad masters. And both with regard to such matters and our condition as to our relatives, the cause is one and the same: it is not old age, Socrates; it is a man's disposition. If they are placid and good-tempered, age is not very burthensome; if they are otherwise, both age and youth are ill to bear.

4 "I was delighted with this discourse, and wanted to make him go on talking; so I kept the subject alive, and said:

"I suppose, Cephalus, that the greater part of persons, when you say these things, do not believe you; they think that you bear old age easily, not on account of your disposition, but because you have plenty of money: they say that rich men have many consolations and comforts."

"You say truly," said he; "they do not believe me; and what they say is true, though not in the sense in which they mean it. What Themistocles said applies here. When a man of the isle of Seriphos was railing against him, and saying that he had his reputation not on his own account, but on account of the city to which he belonged; he replied, that it was true, he would not have been famous if he had been a Seriphian, and the other would not if he had been an Athenian. Those who are not rich and who do not bear age well, may be fitly addressed in the same manner: the placid man would not bear age easily, if combined with poverty; and the unquiet man, even if he were to become rich, would not become sweet-tempered."

"Pray, Cephalus," said I, "did you inherit the greater part of your property, or did you acquire it yourself?"

"I acquired part, Socrates," said he. "I was, in regard to wealth, in an intermediate condition between my father and my grandfather. My grandfather, who bore the same name as myself, inherited about as much as I now have, and made it many times as much: but Lysanias my father made it much less than what it now is. I am content if I leave it to these youths, not less than I received it, perhaps a little greater."

"The reason why I asked you," said I, "was that you do not seem to me to be extravagantly fond of money: whereas those who make their money themselves, are twice as fond of it as other people. As poets love their own poems, and fathers their own children, so those who make money are delighted with it as being a work of their own, and not merely for its use, like other people. And accordingly, they are difficult to converse with, as they have no good word for anything but wealth." "You say truly," said he.

"And now," I said, "pray tell me another 5 thing. What is the greatest good which you conceive you have derived from being rich?"

"One," said he, "which perhaps few will believe, when I mention it. But believe me, Socrates, that when a man thinks that he is near his end, he feels fear and solicitude about matters which did not trouble him before. The mythes about Hades, that those who have done injustice here on earth have to suffer punishment for it there below, laughed at till then, do then take hold of his soul, with the fear that they may be true; and the man, whether through the weakness of age, or because he is now nearer to those things, sees them more strongly. He is full of apprehension and fear, and casts in his mind and considers whether he has wronged any man. And

he who finds that he has, in the course of his lifetime, committed many wrongs, is affrighted like a child wakened out of his sleep, and looks forwards with an evil apprehension. He who is conscious of no wrong, has sweet hope for his companion and the nurse of his old age, as Pindar says. He, Socrates, sings very beautifully that, for the man who has lived his life uprightly and holily,

Hope, the sweet nurse of age, still cheers his heart;  
 Hope, which best turns to good the thoughts of man.

“It is wonderful how true this is. And I add, that the possession of wealth is a valuable thing, not so much to men in general, as to the upright and just man. Not to have wronged any man, even unwillingly, not to have neglected any religious duty to God or left unpaid any debt to man, when we have to depart *thither*, this is a great advantage, which wealth can give. Wealth has many conveniences; but I should say for a thoughtful man, this is one of the greatest.”

- 6 “Excellently said, Cephalus,” I replied. “But about that which you have mentioned, Justice, shall we say that it is really what you have said; to restore what any one has taken from another? or is that a thing which may sometimes be just and sometimes unjust?”

So far all goes smoothly, and the Dialogue presents to us as its principal purpose an example of placid and contented old age. But the controversial character of the Dialogue soon begins to appear; and it is led to by Socrates in a manner which shews that he already had it in his mind. He had predetermined that there should be a discussion about Justice, or as we should say, about the nature of Right and Wrong. Cephalus had said, as we have seen, that the real value of wealth is that it enables us to make restitution

when we have done any wrong, and thus we need not have to accuse ourselves of defrauding or deceiving any one. Socrates immediately fastens upon the expressions of Cephalus, and inquires whether the things which have been assumed as identical, or at least, nearly connected, are so; namely, Justice and Restitution; Justice being introduced in its abstract form, *Dikaiosyne*, though only suggested as involved in the remedy of wrong-doing, which Cephalus had described. Cephalus had said, "It is good to be rich because then you can make restitution when you have taken anything wrongfully from any man:" and Socrates immediately says: "Yes, but what is Wrong and Right? Is it always right to make restitution? or rather, does Rightness consist in returning to each man his own?" It is plain that a man who takes up a subject in this manner is ready for a controversy upon it.

And this appears still more evidently by the next step which Socrates takes in the Dialogue; which is to put an extreme case of the question which he had so suddenly introduced. "It cannot be," he says, "that Rightness may always be defined the returning to a man what is his own: for if a friend who had committed to your care weapons when he was in his senses, should demand them again when he was mad, it would not be thought right to give them to him." Of course, we should think it simply sufficient to such a case to say that moral rules and definitions do not apply to our dealings with madmen. But the objection is allowed to overturn the definition in this form, in order to lead on to the discussion of other definitions of Rightness or Justice.

Cephalus does not allow himself to be entangled in this abstract controversy. He retires to



resume his religious rites, saying, as he does so, that he leaves the discussion in their hands. "And," said I, "Polemarchus is your heir, is he not?" meaning the heir of your share in the controversy, as well as of your property. He smiling says, "By all means;" and withdraws to his religious offices.

Polemarchus had referred to Simonides as agreeing with something which Socrates had said. On the departure of Cephalus, Socrates says to Polemarchus, "Now, you the heir of the controversy, tell us what is it that Simonides says on this subject, and says rightly." Polemarchus quotes a line in which the poet says,

"To give to each his due is just."

And we have then (as in the *Protagoras*, § 72) the expressions of Simonides made the occasion of discussing the subject in various forms. Polemarchus, being pressed for an explanation of the passage, is led to explain, that to give to each his due, is to do good to friends, harm to enemies.

This is to be refuted, which is accordingly done by means of some of the usual Socratic arguments. But in fact, the introduction of these arguments is a subordinate move, intended only to excite the impatience of Thrasymachus and to lead him to take hold of the discussion in his own way. The objections, however, to the doctrine that justice consists in doing good to friends and harm to enemies, are brought out with great acuteness, by the usual method of induction.

7 "Well," said I, "if any one asked Simonides, Of the arts which give to parties their due, what is it that the art of medicine gives, and to whom?"

"It gives due meats and drinks to men's bodies."

“And what does the art of cookery give, and to whom?”

“It gives due seasoning to each dish.”

“What then does the art of justice give, and to whom?”

“According to the leading of our argument, it gives good to friends, and harm to enemies.”

And then we have a further step of the same inductive kind.

“Good and harm of what kind? In matters of health, if we have to do men good or harm, who can best do it?” “The physician.” “In the matter of making a voyage, who?” “The pilot.” “Then in what kind of matters will the just man best do his special office of doing good and harm?”

Then Polemarchus answers less confidently: but he answers, “In alliances of those who have to attack and defend—fighting in common.”

Here the flaw is obvious. To attack or defend! But if we have not to attack or defend? To those who have no disease, the physician is unneeded. To those who make no voyage, the pilot is unneeded. So to those who have no war, your just man, as you have described him, is useless.

Polemarchus is not prepared to acquiesce in this result. He says, that for people at peace, as well as for people at war, justice is useful. “Well but,” asks his unremitting questioner, “in what cases useful? Agriculture is useful in peace; namely, useful in procuring the fruits of the earth. Shoemaking is useful; namely, useful in producing shoes. Well then: in the same way, for what purpose is justice in a state of peace useful?” “Useful in regulating associations,” says Polemarchus. But still another branch of inquiry is opened by this answer. Associations for what?

"If there be an association for building, the architect is the best associate. If there be an association for harp-playing, the harpist is the best associate. In what kind of association is the just man a better associate than those?" "In associations about money matters," answers Polemarchus.

But still Socrates finds an opening for his inductive search: "Money matters, good: but money how employed? If we have to buy a horse with money, the man knowing in horses is the best adviser. If we have to buy a ship, the shipwright is so. When, then, we have to use money, we can find better advisers than your just man. In what case, then, is the just man the best adviser about money?" Polemarchus answers, "When it is placed in deposit: then the just man keeps it safely."

And then Socrates has a little triumph in the conversation. "So," he says, "when money is of no use, justice is useful in dealing with it. And so if a pruning-hook, or a shield, or a lyre are to be kept useless, justice is useful in dealing with them; but if they are to be used, we need other arts, the art of the vine-dresser, or of the soldier, or of the musician. And so in all cases, when a thing is of no use, then justice is useful in dealing with it: but when it is used, justice is useless. Justice, then, cannot be a thing of any great value."

8 And then they go to another argument, jocosely rather than seriously, that the art of keeping anything must be closely connected with the art of getting it; and that he who can keep money best can get money best: and so the just man who can keep money so well for others is also clever in getting money from others: and thus the just man does really the same thing which the thief does;

and accordingly Homer praises Odysseus for his skill in this way; and says of him that he

All mankind in fraudulent oaths excelled.

And so Homer and Simonides agree that justice is something nearly allied to thievery.

Polemarchus acknowledges himself puzzled by this reasoning: but still holds to his thesis, that justice consists in doing good to our friends and harm to our enemies.

This thesis is then attacked on another ground. Men may be mistaken in their judgment of who are their friends and who are their enemies;—who are good and who are bad; and so justice, according to the definition given, might consist in doing good to the bad and bad to the good. And so Polemarchus is made to amend his definition, and to say now, that it is just to do good to a friend who is good, and harm to an enemy who is bad.

But then an objection to this definition is 9 again taken on broader grounds. "We have talked of a just man doing harm to bad men: but can a just man do harm to any man? If you do harm to anything, you make it worse, not better. If you do harm to horses or dogs, you make them worse, *as* horses and *as* dogs. If then we do harm to men, do we not make them worse *as* men? And thus if justice were what you say, we should have a human virtue which makes men worse as men. But as we cannot by applying the art of music make men unmusical, as we cannot by the equestrian art make men bad horsemen, so we cannot by using the virtue of justice, make men worse men, that is, unjust men. This is impossible; as it is for heat to make men cold, or for cold to make men hot.

“And so, Polemarchus, a just man, a good man, cannot do harm to any man, friend or enemy: to do that, is the office of the unjust man. And so if any one says it is just to give to each his due,—meaning by that to do harm to enemies and good to friends,—he talks not wisely. He says what is not true.” This Polemarchus now assents to.

“Well then,” said I, “we make common cause, you and I, against any one who says this, whether he ascribe it to Simonides, or Bias, or Pittacus, or any of the wise men of ancient times.” Polemarchus agrees to this. “But,” says Socrates, “this maxim, that it is just to do good to friends and harm to enemies, whom do you think I ascribe it to? It is the maxim of Periander the tyrant of Corinth, or Perdiccas the despot of Macedon, or Ismenias the traitor of Thebes, or some other despotical person greedy of power.” “Most true,” says Polemarchus. “Well, but as justice is not this, what are we to say that it is?”

It cannot be denied that these arguments, though ingenious and subtle, are, partly at least, technical and unconvincing; and likely to appear puerile and frivolous to a person accustomed to the rude vigour of practical debates. Such a person might be impatient at hearing such discussions so long protracted; and I have considerably abridged them. Accordingly Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, who has already been mentioned as present in the house of Polemarchus (Sect. 2), and who was a sophist or public debater of considerable note, at this point gives way to his impatience.

10 “Thrasymachus,” says Socrates, “had several times, while we were thus speaking, been on the point of interrupting us and taking the discussion into his own hands; and had been withheld by

those who sat by him, and wanted to hear the argument to the end. But when we came to a sort of pause, and I had said what I have mentioned, he no longer contained himself, but gathering himself up like a wild beast for a spring, he darted at us as if he would tear us in pieces; I and Polemarchus shrank away in a fright. And he, speaking aloud to the company, said: 'What childish folly possesses you all this while, O Socrates? and why do you go on with this child's play of mutual concessions? If you really want to know what justice is, do not ask people questions, and then show your cleverness in refuting their answers. You know very well that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them. Do you answer yourself, and tell us what you think justice to be; and do not tell me that it is what is right, or what is useful, or what is advantageous, or what is profitable, or what is expedient: but give me your answer clearly and distinctly, for I shall not accept such nonsensical replies as those.'

"These words filled me with consternation. I looked at him with terror; and think if he had fixed his eye upon me before I fixed mine upon him, I should not have been able to speak a word. But I had turned my look to him when he burst out in his anger: and I said in a tremour:

"O Thrasymachus, be not too hard upon me. If I and my friend here go wrong in our inquiry, be well assured that we go wrong without intending to do so. If we were in search of gold, we should not be willing to defer to one another so as to make our search useless: and you may be well assured that as we are in search of justice, a treasure much more precious than gold, we shall not make foolish concessions to one another, instead of earnestly trying to find what we seek.

Do not believe it, my friend. But you see we lack power. You clever persons ought then rather to be sorry for us than angry with us."

11 "At this he burst into a loud Sardonic laugh, and said:

'O Hercules! this is the usual irony of Socrates! I knew it would be so, and told these persons here, that you would not be willing to answer questions; that you would make all kinds of pretences and all kinds of jests after your manner, rather than answer the questions which were asked you.'

"I replied: You are very clever, Thrasymachus. You know very well that if you were to ask any one how many is twelve, and were at the same time to say to him: Now do not begin to tell me, my man, that twelve is twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three; for if you give me those nonsensical answers, I will not take them: it must be evident to you that the man would not answer questions so asked. And if he were to say to you: O Thrasymachus, how do you say? Am I not to give any of the answers which you mentioned, not even if one of them be the right answer? Am I to give you an answer which is not true? Or how do you say? What would you reply to this?"

"As if forsooth," said he, "this case was like that!"

"How is it not like?" said I. "But even if it be not like, yet if it appear so to the person who is thus questioned, do you not suppose that he will answer as the matter appears to him, whether we forbid his doing so or do not?"

"Well then," said he, "will you do what you say? Will you give one of the answers which I prohibited?"

"I should not wonder," said I, "if upon consideration one of them appeared to me the right one."

"And what then," said he, "if I should produce an answer to the question, What is justice? far better than any of those, what would you think that you deserved?"

"Exactly," said I, "what ignorant persons deserve;—that they should be instructed by those that know better. I think I ought to be punished that way."

"You are pleasant," said he; "but besides learning a lesson, you must pay me a fee."

"Yes, when I have money," said I.

"There is money to be had," said Glaucon. "So far as money goes, O Thrasymachus, give us your definition. We will all make up a purse for Socrates."

"Yes," said he, "that Socrates may follow his usual plan; may evade answering questions himself, and may cavil at and pull to pieces the answers given by others."

"But, my excellent sir," said I, "how can any one answer questions, in the first place, on points which he does not know, nor pretend to know; and, in the next place, when, if he has any opinion about them, he is forbidden to say what he thinks, by a person of great authority? It is much more suitable that you should speak: for you say that you have the knowledge, and are able to deliver it in words. Pray do this: and do me the favour to answer me; and do not grudge your instruction to Glaucon and these others."

The representation here given of the impetuosity and vehemence of the opponent of Socrates is lively enough; but the effect of the calmness and temper of Socrates in resisting this attack is



represented as equal to the occasion. The controversial lists are now duly marked out; and the hearers, as usual, watch the event with inexhaustible interest. Perhaps the definition of Justice which Thrasymachus gives had really been propounded by him or by some person of note. In discussing it, we may expect that Socrates, as usual, will allow himself the use of verbal objections and pleasantries, as well as of solid arguments. The account of the logical duel now proceeds.

12 "On my saying this, Glaucon and the others begged him to do what I had proposed. And Thrasymachus was, in fact, obviously very desirous of having the discourse in his own hands, that he might show his cleverness: being persuaded that he had an admirable answer ready: though he pretended to make objections, to the effect that I should be the respondent: but at last he yielded, and said:

"And so this is that wisdom of Socrates which is talked about! He will not himself tell anything, but goes about hearing what he can from others; and does not even give them any return for what he gets."

"In saying that I learn from others," I replied, "you say truly, Thrasymachus: but not so, when you say that I give them no return. I give them the best return I can; I can only give them my praises; for I have no money. How cordially I praise when any one seems to me to speak well, you will hereafter know; you will know immediately, if you will answer; for I think that you will speak well."

"Listen then," said he. "I say that what is *just* is nothing else than what is *good for the stronger man*. Now, why do you not praise me? You will take care not to do that."

"I must first," said I, "know what you mean. At present I do not. You say that what is just is what is good for the stronger man. What do you mean to say? You do not mean this: that if Polydamas the boxer is a stronger man than you or I, and if beef-steaks are good for him, that the same kind of food is just and proper for us, the weaker men."

"You are offensive, Socrates," he said; "and take what is said in the way in which you can make it look absurd."

"By no means, my excellent Sir," said I: "but explain more clearly what you mean."

"You know," said he, "that some states are governed by a despot, some by the democracy, some by the aristocracy."

"Of course, I know."

"And the governing part of each state is the strongest."

"It is."

"And in each state the governing part makes laws for its own good: a democracy makes democratical laws; a despot, despotical; and the rest in like manner: and by doing this they imply that it is just that the governed should conform to what is good for *them*; and if any one deviates from this line, they punish him as a transgressor of the law and a violator of justice. And so I say that this is what in every state is just:—that which is good for the established government. And the established government is the stronger party; so that any man who can reason must see that what is just is universally what is advantageous to the stronger party."

"Now," said I, "I understand what you mean: but whether it is true or not, I will try to make out. As it appears now, you say that what is just

is what is advantageous; though a little while ago, you prohibited me from giving such an answer: but you add to the expression *advantageous*, the further expression, *to the stronger party*."

"And that I suppose," said he [ironically], "is a small addition."

"Truly, it does not yet appear whether it is great or small. But as I too assert justice to be something which is advantageous, and you add, to the stronger party, and I am not clear about this, we must examine the point."

"Examine," said he.

The doctrine, that what is called Justice means merely the interest of the strongest, is a doctrine which has often been maintained both in ancient and in modern times. It is otherwise expressed by saying that there is nothing which is right or wrong by nature; that rights are matters of human institution, and are instituted so as to establish the interest of the strongest party: in short, that *Might is Right*. This doctrine was commonly current in the time of Plato; and it was one of the main objects of his philosophy to establish, in opposition to this doctrine, that Justice is a real thing, independent on man's will;—that right and wrong exist by nature, and are not framed by human institution, or dependent on man's advantage;—that justice and right are things eternal and indestructible. To advance arguments, clear and simple, which may refute those of Thrasymachus against the reality of justice, is the object of this First Book of the Republic. When by this means it has been shown what justice is *not*, the succeeding Books are occupied in showing what, according to Plato, it *is*.

When Thrasymachus says that *that* is just which is good for the strongest, and Socrates asks

whether if beef be good for the strong man, it is therefore just that we, the weaker, should live on beef; this is of course intended as a provoking quibble, which is to make the impatient Chaldeonian still more impatient, as well as to lead to a clearer explanation of what he means to say. But the arguments which follow are intended as a refutation of this doctrine, and we must endeavour to seize their logical import. For that purpose I shall, as on other occasions, omit many of the short interlocutions, and put the arguments in a more continuous manner. When Thrasymachus, to Socrates's declaration that he must examine whether the account given of justice be true, has tauntingly said, "Examine," Socrates goes on:

"I shall so do. And now tell me: do you <sup>13</sup> say that it is just and right to obey the Rulers of the state?"—"I do."—"But are the Rulers in each state infallible; or are they liable to error?"—"Undoubtedly," he said, "they are liable to error."—"Then when they set about making laws, they make some rightly, and some not rightly?"—"So I think."—"But to make laws rightly, is to make such as are advantageous to themselves: to make them not rightly, is to make such as are not advantageous? Or how do you say?"—"Exactly so."—"But the laws which they make are to be obeyed by the governed, and to do so is just and right?"—"Of course it is."—"Then according to what you say, it is not only just and right to do what is advantageous to the stronger party, but also the contrary, what is not advantageous?"

Thrasymachus here finds himself caught: he starts at this. "How do you say?" he asks.

"I say what you say, as seems to me. But let us examine more carefully. Are we not agreed

that the Rulers, in making rules for the governed, sometimes mistake as to what is best for themselves: but that what the Rulers command, it is just and right that the Governed should do? Are we not agreed on this?"—"I think so," said he. "Do you not think then that it is just and right to do what is *not* advantageous to the Rulers, the stronger party, when the Rulers, not intending it, command what is evil for themselves? for you say that it is right that they, the Governed, should do what those ordain? Must not then, O most clever Thrasymachus, this come to pass, that it is right to do the contrary of what you said at first: for in the case which we are supposing, that which is not for the advantage of the stronger, is commanded for the weaker to do?"

This is a palpable hit; it is shown that the definition given by Thrasymachus of what is right, is untenable in its plain and obvious sense. Indeed it is plain, that he who asserts that the will of the Ruler makes right, but that the Ruler may judge wrongly, exposes himself to an easy refutation. The bystanders here take up the dispute, Polemarchus on one side, and Clitophon on the other.

"Certainly, Socrates," said Polemarchus; "that is very clear."

"Yes, if your testimony is to be taken," said Clitophon.

"But what need is there of testimony?" said I. "For Thrasymachus himself allows that the Rulers may sometimes ordain what is evil for themselves; and that it is just and right that the Governed should do *that*. For, O Polemarchus, Thrasymachus defined it to be right and just to do what is ordered by the Rulers. And, O Clitophon, he defined that to be right, which is commanded by the stronger party. And having laid

down these two definitions, he confessed that the stronger party may sometimes command the weaker ones to do what is not for its own advantage." And from this confession, it would no more be right to do what is for the advantage of the stronger party than what is for its disadvantage.

"But," said Clitophon, "by what is for the advantage of the stronger party, he meant what the stronger party *thought* to be for its advantage: and this the weaker must do: and this he defined to be justice and right."—"But," said Polemarchus, "that was not what he said."

"It makes no difference, Polemarchus," said I. "If Thrasymachus now says so, let us take him so."

"And tell me, Thrasymachus: was this what you meant to say was justice and right; that which seemed to the stronger party to be advantageous to it, whether it be so or not? Are we to understand you to say this?"

Thrasymachus here takes a new line of defence. He gives up the notion of the Ruler as merely the stronger person, liable to err in judgment. He takes an ideal Ruler, who is not fallible: this refinement of his argument he delivers in a very overbearing way. To Socrates's inquiry, he replies:

"No, I do not say *this*. But do you think that I call *that* man the stronger, who errs in judgment, at the very time that he does err?"

"I thought," said I, "that you did say so, when you confessed that Rulers are not infallible, but sometimes make mistakes."

"You are a quibbler, Socrates. Do you call *him* a physician, who makes mistakes about a disease? do you call him a physician at the very time that he is wrong on a matter of physic? Do

you call a man a logician, who makes a mistake in reasoning, at the very moment of his mistake? We do use such expressions indeed, and say that the physician went wrong, and the logician went wrong: but either the one or the other, so far as he is what we call him, never goes wrong. In exact language—you are very fond of exact language—the master of any art never errs. It is by *want* of his art that he errs who errs. So far he is no longer a master of his art. No artist, or man of science, errs so far as he is such. No Ruler errs, so far as he is a Ruler: though in common language we may say that the physician errs and the Ruler errs: and such language I used to you a little while ago. But it is more exact to say that the Ruler, so far as he is a Ruler, does not err;—and so commands what is best for himself: and this the persons governed must perform. And so, as I said at first, what is for the advantage of the stronger party is that which it is just and right to do.”

This move of Thrasymachus, introducing an ideal Ruler, master of a science of Ruling, as the Physician is master of Physic, is an adoption of Platonic grounds; and it is not likely that Plato will shrink from a discussion ‘on such grounds. Socrates replies:

“Good,” said I, “Thrasymachus. You think I quibble then?”

“Atrociously,” said he.

“You think it was with an insidious design that I asked you those questions, that I might wrest your discourse awry?”

“I know it very well now,” said he: “but you will get nothing by it. You will not pervert what I say without my detecting you; and will not be able to put me down when you are detected.”

“My dear Sir,” said I, “I should never think of attempting such a thing. But that we may not again run into the same confusion, define clearly whether, in speaking of the Ruler and the Stronger Party, (as you just now did), whose advantage it is right that the weaker should conform to, you mean the Ruler in ordinary language, or the Ruler in the exact sense of the term.”

“In the most exact sense of the term,” said he: “and so you may quibble and twist my words if you can. I ask for no indulgence from you. But you are not clever enough to do *that*.”

“Do you think,” said I, “that I am so insane that I should try to shave a lion, or to quibble with Thrasymachus?”

“You have tried,” said he, “and you made nothing of it.”

“Enough,” said I, “of such talk: but tell me now about the physician in the strict sense of the term, that we were speaking of.”

We then have an argument which is supposed to reduce Thrasymachus to self-contradiction, and thus, to irritate him into extreme rudeness. It is difficult to give this argument so that it shall be felt by the English reader cogent enough to produce this effect. It may, however, be stated thus; divesting it of the form of a series of questions to which Thrasymachus replies with growing impatience and sullenness.

The physician, in the strict sense of the term, is not a money-maker, but a healer of the sick. The ship-captain is not a sailor, but a commander of sailors. He sails in the ship, but that does not make him a sailor properly—properly he is a commander of sailors. And in each of these cases, the art of him who is master of the art is directed to a certain advantageous end. The physician’s



art is directed to make the body whole. If this end be obtained no further end is aimed at. If the physician's art required, to complete it, some other art, [as the art of making money for himself], that art would require another to complete it, and so on in an infinite succession. Each art is complete and entire in itself, in that exact use of terms which we are to follow. And so the art of physic does not aim at advantage to the physician, but to the body. The art of horse-training does not aim at advantage to the trainer, but to the horse. And so every art to its proper subject, and not to the masters of the art.

And each art has its subjects under it. And thus no art aims at the advantage of the master, but of the subjects of the art;—of the weaker party.

“He assented to this after some opposition, trying to make a fight at this point: and when he had given his assent, I said:

“And thus the physician, in so far as he is a physician, does not aim at the advantage of the physician, nor command what tends to *that*, but what is for the advantage of the *sick man*; for the physician, properly speaking, is not a money-maker, but a healer of the sick. Or is this agreed between us?” He grants it.

“And thus the captain of a ship, strictly speaking, is a commander of a ship, and does not seek his own advantage, but that of the sailors who are under him.”

He granted this with reluctance.

“And thus,” said I, “O Thrasymachus, no master of any art, in so far as he has others under him, seeks his own advantage, nor gives command with that view; but seeks the advantage of those under him who are the subjects of the art. And

looking at that, as becomes him, he says what he says, and he does what he does."

This is represented as irritating Thrasymachus so much, that he gives vent to his spleen in an attack so rude, as to be comparable only with the ingenious scurrility which rough boys use towards each other in the streets. The expressions are so coarse that I hesitate to translate them; but they must be understood, I conceive, as implying a charge of the childishness which is not yet out of the hands of female attendants, and of an education neglected even as to the lowest decencies of life. Socrates says:

"When we had arrived at this point of the 16 discussion, and it was evident to all that the account of justice was turning about so as to be opposite to what Thrasymachus had said, he, instead of answering, cried:

"Tell me, Socrates, have you a nurse?"

"Why?" said I. "Is it not rather proper to answer me, than to ask such questions?"

"Because," said he, "she does not take proper care of you, and lets you snivel and drivel. You have not learnt from her that there are such things as shepherds and their flocks."

"How is that?" said I.

"You think, it seems, that shepherds and cowherds aim at the good of their flocks of sheep and their herds of cows; that they fatten them and tend them, aiming at some other end than the good of their masters and of themselves. And do you think that the Rulers of States, who are really Rulers, have any other view of their States than the master of a herd of cattle has of it; or consider any thing else, day and night, than how they may get their advantage out of them?"

Here, at least, Thrasymachus appears to have

the favourite Socratic argument of induction in his favour; and accordingly he goes on in a triumphant declamation. But in doing this, he shows that he considers justice, as he has defined it, to be a quality fit for the weaker party only: and bestows all his admiration, frankly and by name, upon the Unjust Man, who is superior to such restraints. He asks in his taunting vein:

“Have you made so little progress in your knowledge of the Just and of Justice, of the Unjust and of Injustice, as not to know that Justice and Just action is really the good of another,—the advantage of the stronger Party, the Ruler; but is the harm and damage of him who obeys and subserves that purpose: while Injustice, on the contrary, rules over the simple ones who are just: and they under its control, promote the advantage of the Unjust Man who is the stronger, and by their ministrations make him, the stronger, happy, but themselves in no degree. My most simple Socrates, you are to consider, that the Just man always comes off worse than the Unjust. In the first place, in every transaction in which they are partners, where they have to share anything between them, you will always find that in the winding-up of the affair, the just man never gets more than the unjust, but less. And then as regards their relation to the public, when anything is to be contributed, the Just man, in equal circumstances, contributes more, the Unjust less; and when anything is to be got from the public, the former gets nothing, the latter, much. And when the one and the other have to serve any office, the Just man, if he suffer no other loss, at least suffers by having to neglect his private affairs, and gets nothing from the public, precisely because he is Just; and besides this, becomes odious both to friends and

acquaintance, because he will not grant them any favours which Justice does not authorize. While in the case of the Unjust Man, everything happens contrary to this. By the Unjust Man, here I mean such an one as I have already described, him who has the power to take to himself the greater share. Fix your attention on such a one, if you wish to judge how far it is for his private advantage to be unjust rather than just. And you will see this most easily if you take the case of the most complete injustice, in which the Doer of Injustice is made most happy, while those who suffer injustice and will not *do it*, are made most miserable. This case is the case of a successful Tyrant, who takes to himself everything, private and public, sacred and secular, not partially and in detail, but openly and wholesale. For if any one deals unjustly with a partial matter merely, and is detected, he suffers punishment and extreme disgrace. Those who do such things on a small scale are called Temple-robbers, Kidnappers, Burglars, Swindlers, Thieves, according to the nature of their acts. But when a man, besides getting possession of the property of the citizens, makes the citizens themselves his slaves, instead of being called by these hard names he is termed Happy and Favoured; not by the citizens only, but by strangers also, who hear that the man has thus practised Injustice in its full dimensions. For it is not from fearing to do Injustice, but from fearing to suffer it, that men give it hard names. And so, Socrates, Injustice, as you see, is a stronger and freer and more masterful thing than Justice: and, as I said at first, Justice is that which is for the advantage of the stronger, Injustice is that which is for its own advantage and profit."

"When Thrasymachus had said this, he was 17

about to depart; like a bathing man who had poured his flood about our ears. But those present would not suffer him to do this; they compelled him to remain, and to render an account of what he had said. I also was very earnest in asking him to do so; I said:

“Most excellent Thrasymachus, after giving us such a discourse, do you think of departing before making us understand fully, or letting us make you understand, whether the case is really so or not? Do you think it is a small matter which you have undertaken to define, when it really is the whole course of human life? the question what life each of us is to lead, so as to live to most advantage?”

“Well,” said Thrasymachus, “do I think otherwise?”

“It would seem so,” said I; “or else you care little for us; and have no consideration whether we shall live well or ill, in our want of that knowledge which you profess to have. My good friend, be kind to us, and teach us too your lore. If you render a service to us, numerous as we are, it will be none the worse for you.

“I tell you, for my part, that I am not convinced, and that I do not think Injustice more profitable than Justice, not even if it be uncontrolled and allowed to do all that it pleases. Let there be such an unjust man as you have described; and let him be able to do his Injustice, either by escaping detection or by overcoming opposition. Still you will not convince me that his course is more profitable than Justice. And perhaps there are others of this opinion, not I alone. Convince us then thoroughly, my good sir, that we are not in the right, when we esteem justice above injustice.”

"And how," said he, "am I to convince you? If you are not convinced by what I have said, what am I to do? Shall I take my arguments and thrust them into your understanding?"

"No, for heaven's sake, do not do that. But in the first place, when you have said a thing, stand to it; or if you change your ground, change it openly, and do not lead us wrong. But now you see, Thrasymachus—for we must go back and give a further consideration to what we were saying before—that though you have defined the true physician exactly, you did not think proper to adhere to the same exactness with regard to the shepherd, but spoke of him as tending his sheep, (even in so far as he is a shepherd,) not for the good of the sheep, but as a man whose object is to make them fit for food, and to make a banquet of them, or to make money by selling them; thus acting the part of a money-maker, not of a shepherd."

When Thrasymachus has thus been kept in his place, to stand a public assault from Socrates, we should expect that the arguments adduced against him should be such as have some new cogency; but instead of this, we have merely a further prosecution of the Socratic technical doctrine, in which Thrasymachus had involved himself,—rashly as it would seem, and without being master of such subtleties,—that each art has its special object by which it is defined; and in so far as it is such art, cannot have any other object, and consequently cannot have the gain of the master of the art for its object. And so the shepherd's art, *Poimenikè*, exactly taken, must have for its object the good of the sheep. And this, 18 it is argued, is not disproved, though any art attains some other object, as well as this its technical object. The Pilot's art, *Kubernetikè*, has

for its object to cross the sea safely. A man by doing this may improve his health; but this does not make Navigation and Physic the same art. And so if men make money by any art, this is because the art of money-making, Mitharneutikè, is added to their special art. Architecture has for its object to build houses; and if the architect makes money, it is because he adds art Mitharneutic to art Oikodomic. If the master of the art exercise his art gratis, the art is not the less complete in itself, and not the less promotes the good of the subject, though it brings no gain to the master. And thus, every art, as we said before, promotes the good of its subjects, the weaker party, not of the stronger.

Thrasymachus assents with reluctance to this reasoning, as feeling that it refutes his thesis. Socrates goes on to say that no one takes the part of a Ruler willingly, and manages other people's affairs, without requiring payment in some shape: either money or honour, or penalty for not doing so.

This introduces the Socratic tenet,—so often dwelt upon in these Dialogues, and acted upon in a great measure by Socrates and Plato, as to the public affairs of Athens,—that no wise man meddles with affairs of state if he can help it. The assertion of the tenet in this form calls forth an expression of surprise from Glaucon, the admirer of Socrates. He says:

- 19 “How do you mean this, Socrates? I know two of the kinds of payment of which you speak, money and honours; but I do not know what penalty you mean, which you rank among the motives to undertake the office of Ruler.”

Socrates explains that to undertake such office for the sake of money or honour is base, as it

is generally held discreditable: men who do so are called avaricious and ambitious. The great motive which induces good men to take such offices, is to avoid being ruled by the bad. If there was a state composed entirely of good men, they would struggle as hard to avoid the office of Ruler as men now do to get it. Every one would prefer having his advantage promoted by others, rather than take that trouble himself. But this he says he will consider another time.

And then he turns back to the assertion of Thrasymachus, that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just man. "*That,*" says he, "appears to me a greater matter; and you, Glaucon, which part do you choose? which side appears to you the more true?"

"I think," says Glaucon, "that the life of the just man is the more advantageous."

"You have heard," said I, "how many advantages Thrasymachus has enumerated in the life of the unjust man?"

"I have heard," said he, "but I am not convinced."

"And do you wish that we should convince him, if we can find the way to do it, that he is wrong?"

"How can I help wishing it?" said he.

"But if we try to do this by a counter-enumeration of the advantages of the just man, and then he makes another enumeration on his side, and again we on ours, we shall have to count and measure these advantages on each side, and shall want an umpire to decide the preponderance in the end. But if we go on as we have hitherto done, coming to an agreement on the grounds of our opinion, we shall ourselves be the advocates and the umpire."



"Even so," said he.

"And which way do you like best?" said I.

"The latter," said he.

Socrates then again applies himself to Thrasymachus: but so far as the argument depends on the terms used, it is difficult to express it in English, as indeed Plato allows that it is difficult in Greek. For Thrasymachus so far deviates from all received usage of language, that he refuses to acknowledge that Justice is a Virtue and Injustice a Vice. "It is very likely," he says ironically, "that I shall acknowledge this, my pleasant friend, when I say that Injustice is profitable, and Justice not so."—"How then?" says Socrates.—"The contrary," said he.—"What? do you call Justice a Vice?" "Not exactly, but a magnanimous Simplicity."—"Then I suppose you call Injustice a Duplicity."—"No, I call it Prudence." He goes on to say that the unjust are sagacious and clever, provided only their injustice is on a grand scale, so that they bring under their sway cities and nations. "You perhaps," he says, "think that I mean pickpockets. No! That employment too has its gainful results, if the man escape detection; but that is a small matter compared with such courses as I speak of."

Socrates is, of course, perplexed by this utter rejection of the common moral judgments, and inversion of the common moral language usual among men; he says:

"I am aware that you intend to say what you have just said. But what I marvel at is, that you place injustice in the province of wisdom and virtue." "But," says Thrasymachus doggedly, "I do so place them." "That makes our task harder, my friend, and it is difficult to see what any one can say. If you said that injustice was

gainful indeed, but still acknowledged it to be wicked and disgraceful, as some others do, we might have said something according to the usual views of morality. But now it is clear that you will say that injustice is beautiful and strong, and has all the attributes which we ascribe to justice."—"You guess rightly," says Thrasymachus.

Still Socrates does not lose courage. "Well," he says, "I must not give it up, so long as I conceive you to think what you say. And really, Thrasymachus, you seem to me to be not in jest, but in earnest."—"But what difference does it make to you," said he, "whether I am in earnest or not, while you do not confute me?"—"No difference," said I.

And then Socrates sets about the task which he has acknowledged to be so difficult, of refuting the bold immorality of his opponent. He begins thus:

"Try to answer me this question, in addition to what you have already answered: does a just man wish to get the better of a just man?"

But I do not think it would be possible to make this part of the meaning intelligible to the English reader by following the interlocutions. I will try to give the reasoning in a direct form.

The reasoning is exceedingly subtle and general; and yet Thrasymachus is represented, when it draws near its conclusion, as becoming aware of his approaching defeat, answering reluctantly and sullenly, sweating profusely, and even blushing; "which," says Socrates, "I never saw him do before" (§ 22). We must attempt therefore to put this argument in a shape in which its force may appear, so far as the different habits of expression and thinking of the Athenians of that day, and our own, will allow us to do.

“A wise and skilful man in any art,” Socrates argues, “does not try to do something different from other wise and skilful men in the same art. The accomplished musician does not attempt, in the tension of strings, or relation of acute and grave, to go beyond other good musicians. The good physician does not try to exceed other good physicians in his doses, or in his treatment of the patient. The man ignorant of music might indeed try to go beyond both musical and unmusical persons in his futile attempts at harmony. The man ignorant of medicine might try to go beyond both the learned and  
 21 the unlearned in his essays. And thus a man who is good and skilful in anything, though he may try to excel the ignorant, and to go beyond them, does not aim at excelling the good and skilful, but at being on even terms with them. Now the just man, in like manner, though he may hope to excel the unjust in justice, and so to get an advantage over him, does not hope to excel the just man, but is content to be on even terms with him: while the unjust man tries to get an advantage over just and unjust men alike, and is not content with being on even terms with anybody. And thus the just man agrees in his habits and aims with the wise and skilful or virtuous man, while the unjust differs entirely from him. And thus Justice, and not Injustice, is to be ranked with Wisdom and perfect Skill and Virtue.”

This argument can hardly fail to appear to us forced and farfetched. It depends upon a notion of something which Plato calls<sup>1</sup> *going beyond men, getting an advantage over them*, and the like: which notion is understood so widely, that it applies alike to the bungling attempts of the unmusical man at harmony, and the selfish schemes of the unjust

<sup>1</sup> ἰθέλειν πλεον ἔχειν—πλεονεκτεῖν.

man for gain. Plato elsewhere uses the same phrase so as to associate with it in like manner both an action towards a person, and a relation to a standard. Thus in the third Book of the Laws, he says that the early kings of Greece fell, because they wished *πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν νόμων*, to get an advantage over the laws as opponents, and to go beyond the laws as a rule. It is difficult for us to put this argument of Socrates in any form in which we shall compel conviction: but this may be considered as really the amount of it:—Every art and every definite course of action implies a rule, a standard of action, an ideal completeness, at which the artist or actor aims. He who is not an artist in any true sense, or a person acting on any real principle, may have no rule; he may be governed by mere desire of gain or pleasure, or by caprice, and may conform to no rule, but follow arbitrary courses. But those who act as wise and skilful artists, or men, have a standard and a rule given by their art; which, because it is a rule and a standard, is the same for all, and is tacitly recognized by all as the same. Now a just man is a man who in moral action owns such a standard and rule of action, and in this agrees with all other just men: while the unjust man acknowledges no rule, but seeks the objects of his desires wherever they offer themselves. And thus the just man acts as wise and skilful men act, and Justice is to rank with Wisdom and Skill in the regulation of human life.

I do not think we need hesitate to allow validity to this line of argument, although it is founded upon that confusion of skill in some Art with Moral Rectitude, on which I have elsewhere remarked. But though it might have its effect upon a metaphysical Athenian who was accustomed to arrange human actions according to the arts to

which they belonged, and was familiar with the metaphysical as well as primary senses of *πλεονεκτηεῖν*, it appears to me that its probable effect upon Thrasymachus is much exaggerated in the representation which the dialogue gives. It would have appeared very natural if Thrasymachus, instead of following Socrates's interrogations with his reluctant and sullen answers, had exclaimed, that there was no resemblance between a man's trying to get gold and treasure from another, and a man trying to tune his harp higher or lower than another. But in this, as in other cases, the Socratic saw of question and answer is supposed to be worked under a sort of fascination. They who have once laid their hands upon it cannot quit their hold, but go working on till the block is sawn through.

23 There are still two arguments which the dialogue contains, directed to the question of whether Injustice is, as Thrasymachus had said, more advantageous than Justice. The first of these arguments is a plain and common one: that when persons are confederated for any purpose, even if the common purpose be unjust, it is requisite that the confederates behave justly to one another. If they do not, then ensue discord, strife, disunion and weakness: and thus Injustice is a manifest disadvantage.

But the main purpose of this argument is to lead to an extension of it, which is rather indicated than fully explained in this Book, and which indeed it is the business of the succeeding Books fully to explain. I mean, the argument that Injustice is a Discord of the Soul in itself, and therefore an unhappiness. This doctrine is somewhat abruptly introduced in sequence to that which I have already noticed, that Injustice is a cause of  
24 strife among confederates. For Socrates goes on

to infer that, as it produces this discord and consequent weakness in a body of confederates, or a state, or a company even of two only, it must have the same nature when it exists in one person. Even in a single person its nature will appear. It will produce a discord in the man's self, which will weaken his powers of action. Each part of the soul does its proper work; as a pruning-knife prunes, so the soul governs and rules. This view becomes much more distinct, as I have said, in the subsequent Books of this Dialogue, in which the parts of the Soul are distinguished from each other, and thence, the image of a discord or strife of the soul becomes more plain and intelligible, and is followed out into very remarkable passages of description.

This assertion that Injustice is the cause of an internal discord, and therefore, of unhappiness in a man's being, is finally further supported by an argument which is a kind of corollary from what had been already said, that Justice is the virtue and Injustice the vice of the Soul. For the Soul is that by which we live. This is the especial function of the Soul. As therefore the Soul is virtuous or vicious, we must live well or ill, that is, happily or unhappily. And this, even Thrasymachus is unable further to gainsay.

And Socrates ends this part of the Dialogue by reminding Thrasymachus that this is the contrary of what he had asserted; and Thrasymachus retorts that he supposes Socrates has had the enjoyment of a feast in the conversation which has led to such a result.

Soc. "And so, most excellent Thrasymachus, Injustice is never more profitable than Justice."

"And let this," said he, "be your Bendidian banquet."

“A banquet provided by you, since you became gentle to me, and ceased to be angry with me. But my feast has been but a poor one, not by your fault, but by mine. I have been like a glutton who throws himself greedily upon every fresh dish as it comes to table, without having duly enjoyed what was there before. Just in the same way, before I had made out our first subject of inquiry, What is Justice? I left it to run to consider whether Justice is Vice and Folly, or Virtue and Wisdom; and then, when the new proposition was started, that Injustice is more profitable than Justice, I did not command myself, but left the former and turned to that: and so the end of the discussion is, that I have made out nothing. When I know what Justice is, I shall easily make out whether it is Virtue or not, and whether he who has it is or is not happy.”

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### REMARKS ON THE THRASYMACHUS.

THE extravagant representation which this Dialogue contains of Thrasymachus's rude and overbearing manner suggests the notion that Plato intends the picture to be that of a real person, a rival of his own. Philostratus remarks (*De Vit. Sophist.*), that when Plato says to his adversary, “Do you think I am so mad as to set about shaving a lion or quibbling with Thrasymachus?” he does not treat him like a sophist merely. And we have seen, in the *Clitophon*, Thrasymachus brought forward as a teacher, in opposition to Socrates, who might be expected to supply what Socrates left wanting; the subject in discussion being, in

that Dialogue as in this, *Dikaioisyne*, Justice. The supposition that personal satire as well as argument is intended in this Dialogue, is further supported by the disproportion, as it appears to us, between the arguments of Socrates and the effect produced by them upon Thrasymachus : as when he is going to run away, having deluged the hearers with a flood of declamation ; and where he turns sulky, and sweats, and even blushes. It looks very personal when Socrates says, " I never saw *him* do *that* before."

The historical Thrasymachus of Chalcedón is mentioned by Cicero, Quintilian, and other ancient authors, as a writer rather than a speaker. He appears to have been a contemporary of Gorgias, and therefore too old to be a personal rival of Plato.

The doctrine asserted by Thrasymachus, and the arguments by which it is opposed, are not very different from the doctrine maintained by Calicles in the *Gorgias*, and the arguments urged against that. But, as Mr Grote has observed, though the doctrine of Thrasymachus is opposed to the common notions of morality, the more offensive feature of his conversation is the rudeness, insolence and brutality with which his opinions are delivered. When divested of these accompaniments, his arguments are (in the next Book) adopted by Glaucon and Adeimantus ; at least as a way of provoking Socrates to expound *his* views,



# THE REPUBLIC.

## PART II.—OF THE IDEAL POLITY AND OF VIRTUE.

(*Republic*, B. II. § 1—15. B. III. § 19—21.  
B. IV. § 1—17.)

**T**HE first Book of the Republic, the Thrasymachus, is employed, as I have said, in establishing what Justice is not: in the subsequent part of the Dialogue Socrates has to define what it is, and to prove its advantages. But before he is allowed to do this, his two friendly auditors, Glaucon and Adeimantus, propound to him the disadvantages which belong to the Just Man's condition, in a manner not less forcible than his rude opponent Thrasymachus had done; and after this we have Socrates's exposition of the nature of Justice, or as we may rather say, Virtue, by the analogy of an Ideal City. To these objections and the consequent answers we now proceed.

1 "When I had said this, I thought I had done with the discussion; but as it turned out, this was only a beginning. For Glaucon, who is always full of courage, showed it then, and did not acquiesce in Thrasymachus's acknowledgment of defeat. He said:

"Now, Socrates, whether do you wish merely to make believe that you convince us, or really to

convince us that Justice is in all respects better than Injustice?"

"I should certainly like to convince you really," I said, "if it depended upon me."—"Then," said he, "you do not do what you wish."

Glaucon then proceeds to expound his objections somewhat methodically, in a way which I must abridge.

"There are," he says, "good things which are desired for their own sake, not for their consequences, as joy and innocent pleasures, which have no evil sequel. There are things which we desire both for the sake of themselves and of their consequences; as our reason, our sight, our health. There is a third class of good things, as exercise, and medical diet, and medical treatment, and professional work. These we regard as laborious or troublesome, but useful. We should not take to them on their own account; but we take them for their rewards and consequences."

To all this Socrates assents.

"Now to which of these three classes of good things does Justice belong?"

"I think," said I, "to the best class; the things which are desired both for their own sake, and for their consequences."

"But," said he, "that is not the opinion of the many. They think that it belongs to the laborious class, which is to be pursued for the sake of reward and good reputation, but is itself hard and repulsive."

"Yes, I know," said I, "that it seems so; and I have been hearing a great deal from Thrasy-machus in condemnation of Justice on this account, and in praise of Injustice; but I suppose I am slow to take in such things, for I am not convinced."

“Well,” said he, “listen to me and understand. Thrasymachus appears to me to have yielded too soon to your powers of fascination. I am not satisfied with the way in which either side has been managed. I want to be told what Justice and what Injustice is, and what effect each produces upon the soul when it is there; I would have nothing said of rewards and consequences. Do this then. I will take up again the thesis of Thrasymachus. I will first show what Justice is, and what is its origin. Next I will show that those who adopt it, take it, as a necessary evil, not as a good: for, as they say, the life of the unjust man is happier than that of the just man. They say this. I, Socrates, do not think so. But I am stunned by hearing such things perpetually from Thrasymachus and a thousand others; and I have never yet heard the case of Justice pleaded, and its superiority over Injustice shown, in the way that I could wish. I wish to hear it praised on its own account; and I especially wish to hear this from you. So I shall state the case in favour of an unjust life; and by that you will see in what manner I want you to establish the case in favour of Justice. Do you like this proposal?”

“Of all things,” said I. “What subject could be more agreeable to a man of any sense?”

“Good,” said he. “Then listen first about what I first spoke; what Justice is, as they say, and whence it has its origin.”

He then delivers the doctrine of those who hold that the origin of Rights, and thence, of Justice, is merely self-protection.

“They say that to do wrong is a good, to suffer wrong an evil; but that the evil of wrong-suffering is greater than the good of wrong-doing; so that when men have had experience of both, as

they find they cannot choose the one and reject the other, they think it best to make an agreement among themselves that they shall neither do nor suffer wrong. And hence they make Contracts and Laws, and call that which the Laws command lawful and just. And this is the origin of Justice. It is an intermediate condition between the best, which is to do wrong and not to be called to account for it, and the worst, which is to suffer wrong and to have no redress. Justice, thus an intermediate state, is acquiesced in, not as good in itself, but as recommended by the inability to do wrong with impunity. For if a man could do that, he would never be so mad as to make such an agreement. And this, they say, is the nature and origin 3 of Justice.

“And that they who practise Justice, do so unwillingly, because they cannot practise Injustice with impunity, we shall best see, if we imagine a case in which each, the Just and the Unjust, has power to do what he likes, and then follow them in thought, and see where their desires lead them to. We should find the just man caught in the fact of following, as well as the unjust man, the universal desire of having a greater share than others; a desire which is led to acquiesce in an equal division only by law and by force.

“As a case in which a man would have such a power, we may take the story of Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus king of Lydia. He, it is related, was a common shepherd in the service of the then ruler of Lydia; and where he fed his flocks, it happened, in consequence of a wet season, that a great chasm in the earth was opened. He went into this chasm, and there he saw many wonderful things, and among the rest a horse of brass, hollow, and with a door into the hollow. Into this door

he looked, and saw within the gigantic corpse of a man; and this corpse had nothing on it except a gold ring on its hand, which he drew off and took away. And when the monthly meeting the shepherds took place, at which they prepared their report to the king, he came to the meeting with the ring on his finger, and sat down, having, as it happened, the stone of the ring turned to the inside of his hand; and then he found that he was invisible to those who were there, for they talked of him as if he were absent. And he, wondering at this, turned the stone of the ring to the outside, and then he became visible. And revolving this in his mind, he made trials of the ring, and found that when he turned the stone inwards he was invisible, and when he turned it outwards he was visible. And upon this, he managed to be sent as one of the deputation which went to the king. And when he came there, he seduced the queen, and conspired with her, and killed the king, and became king himself.

- 4 "Now if there were two such rings," Glaucon goes on to say, "and if one were given to the just and one to the unjust man, the conduct of the two, as your opponents assert, would be the same. There is no one so *adamantine* in his virtue, that he would refrain from using such a power, when he might take from any house or shop whatever he pleased, enter whose bed he pleased, put to death or bring out of prison whom he pleased; and in short be like a god among men. And so, he would do exactly what the unjust man would do; there would be no difference between them. Now this, it is urged, is a clear proof that men are virtuous only by compulsion. Virtue is not prized for its own sake. When a man can do wrong with impunity, he does it. Every man thinks that to

do wrong is more advantageous to him than to do right; and he thinks truly, as they say. And if any one, having such a power as we have spoken of, did not use it for his own advantage, he would really be thought a wretched and foolish person, though men might praise him to one another, for fear of the wrong that might come to them. This is what *they* say."

The case, thus stated, seems strongly put; but Glaucon goes further.

"Let us take Justice and Injustice nakedly in themselves, without any accessories. We must suppose each to be perfect in its way. And so we must suppose the Unjust Man to be a perfect master of his art. As a perfect pilot or a perfect physician knows, with regard to things within the province of his art, what is possible and what is not, and attempts only what is possible; or, if he makes a mistake is able to rectify it; so the consummate Wrong-doer must have the art of concealing his wrong-doing. If he is detected he is a bungler. And the summit of his art is to seem a just man. In order to make him complete, then, we must allow him this. We must suppose, that while he commits extreme wrong, he gets himself the reputation of being entirely a just man;—that if anything goes wrong in his plans, he can set it right by eloquence or by force; for we suppose him to be eloquent, and brave, and well-furnished with friends.

"And side by side with him we place the really Just Man; a man simple and open, and, as Æschylus says, one who aims to *be* good, not to seem. For if he seem to be a just man, he will gain honours and rewards by his seeming; and so, we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice, or for the sake of these rewards. And so

we must strip him of all except his justice. We must make him the opposite of the former case in every respect. We must suppose that though he does no wrong, he is held to be a great wrong-doer; in order that his firmness in the cause of virtue may be tried by evil repute and its consequences. He must be constant even to death. And then let any one say which of the two, the Just or the Unjust, is the happier."

5 The case is strongly put, as Socrates notices.

"Bless us!" said I, "my dear Glaucon, how clearly and distinctly do you put before us the images of these two men."

"I do it as well as I can," said he. "And the two men being such as I have described them, it is not, I think, difficult to go on to the end, and to see what fortune awaits each of them. And in doing this, if I say anything which appears too strong, do not think, Socrates, that it is I who say it, but those who praise Injustice above Justice. Now they will say that the Just Man, being such as has been described, will suffer stripes, bonds, the rack, will have his eyes burnt out, and after all other sufferings, will be crucified. And then he will know how much better it is to *seem* than to *be* Just. The Unjust Man, on the other hand, will succeed in everything—in marriage, in friendships, in public life, in acquiring wealth. And so, he is able to offer to the Gods sacrifices and oblations, more costly and magnificent than the just man can give, and so may appear to be more favoured by the Gods than the just man. And so, *they* say, Socrates, That the just man has a better life provided for him both by Gods and by men."

The case so stated reminds us of that in the *Gorgias* (§ 68), where, however, it is not the Just and the Unjust man that are compared, but the

unjust man who is punished and he who escapes punishment. The object of these highly-coloured pictures is, as I have said in speaking of the *Gorgias* (§ 165), to show that Plato's convictions, like Socrates's, were not to be shaken by the aspect of death in any form; and to bring forward, with the utmost distinctness, the problem, What is the value of Virtue or Rectitude, separated from all accessories. In the *Gorgias* the answer is given, somewhat loosely, that Vice is a disease of the Soul. In the *Republic* this answer is expanded and put in a systematic form.

But before we come to this answer, we have a further development of the case on the opposite side by Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon.

"When Glaucon had said this," Socrates goes on, "I was thinking of saying something in reply;" but his brother Adeimantus said:

"And you now think, Socrates, that the question has been sufficiently set forth?"

"Why what more is there to be said?" I inquired.

"The main point which should have been put forwards," said he, "has not been touched."

"Ha!" said I, "the old proverb! brother helps brother. If he has omitted anything, do you help him out. But what he has said is enough to put me down, so that I cannot uphold the cause of Justice."

He replied: "You cannot get off so. But hear still more. You must hear what is said by people who talk in a way quite different from that in which he has been talking,—people who praise Justice and blame Injustice; and then you will see still more clearly what Glaucon means."

He then proceeds to show the inconsistency of the way in which men at that time talked of reli-



gious subjects; "saying, in general, that the Gods approve of Justice and punish Injustice; but yet in particular cases making the Gods themselves unjust." The illustrations of this remark introduce many quotations from the poets, especially Homer. He proceeds thus:

"Fathers and instructors of every kind are unceasing in their exhortations to those under their care, that they must be just and virtuous. In doing this, however, they do not praise justice or virtue in itself, but the results of a good repute of justice and virtue;—how that it brings honours, and great alliances in marriage, and other advantages, such as Glaucon was enumerating a little while ago. They go even further: they extend the advantage of possessing such a character, even to its influence on the Gods. They, it is asserted, give bounteous blessings to the virtuous, as the amiable Hesiod and Homer sing. The former says that for the just the Gods make the oaks

'Bear on their summit the acorn, in their trunk the honey  
of wild bees,  
While flocks heavy with fleeces around them browse in the  
meadow;'

and many other good things of the same kind. And the other (Homer) sings to the like purpose: he speaks of (*Odys.* XIX. 133)

'The praise of some great king  
Who o'er a numerous people and renown'd  
Presiding like a Deity maintains  
Justice and truth. The earth under his sway  
The produce yields abundantly: the trees  
Fruit-laden bend: the lusty flocks bring forth:  
The ocean teems with finny swarms beneath.'

And Musæus and his son make the gods give still greater boons to the Just. They make them go to Hades and sit at their ease in a symposium of the blest, with crowns on their heads and goblets

of wine before them; reckoning, it would seem, perpetual wine-bibbing to be the highest reward of virtue. Others, again, make the Gods give rewards of longer duration: they say that the just and pious have, to succeed them, the sons of sons and new generations still. This is the kind of praise which they give to justice. While the impious and unjust they plunge into the mire in Hades, and make them draw water in a sieve: and even while they are alive, they are punished by that evil repute which Glaucon spoke of, in describing just men who are reckoned unjust. They say such things of the unjust; and that is all that they have to say. And this is the way they assign praise and blame.

“But now, Socrates, attend to language of another kind, concerning Justice and Injustice, which you may hear, both from ordinary persons and from the poets. They all with one voice sing the same song;—that virtue and justice are indeed beautiful things, but that they are hard and laborious; that vice and injustice are sweet and easy in practice, and wrong only by opinion and law. They say that generally injustice is more profitable than justice, and they are disposed to respect and to esteem happy the wicked who are rich and powerful, and to despise and slight the just man who is weak and poor, though they allow that he is a better man than the other.

“But most especially strange is the language which many hold about virtue in reference to the Gods. For they say that often the Gods send to virtuous men calamity and evil, and prosperity to the wicked. And there are itinerant priests and soothsayers, who go round to the doors of the rich, and persuade them that *they* have a power granted them from on high, of expiating with sacrifices .

and ceremonies any injustice that may have been committed by them or any of their family before them, and they make such things occasions of festivals and banquets. And if any one have an enemy whom he wishes to injure, they pretend that they can, if he be a good man just as easily as if he be a bad man, bring evil upon him at a small cost; by their incantations and charms compelling the Gods to minister to *their* will.

“And all this they confirm by what the poets say; they make vice an easy thing, as Hesiod,

‘Broad is the way of vice and frequent thronged,  
Easy to hit, and ever close at hand;  
But sweat and hardship stand at virtue’s door.’

and the way is long and steep. And to prove that the favour of the gods may be won, they quote Homer (*Il.* ix. 616):

‘The Gods,  
Although more honourable, and in power  
And virtue thus superior, are themselves  
Yet placable; and if a mortal man  
Offend them by transgression of their laws,  
Libation, incense, sacrifice, and prayer,  
In meekness offer’d, turn their wrath away.’

And they appeal to a multitude of writings of Musæus and Orpheus, and of the children of the Moon, and of the Muses, as they say, from whom they take the precepts of their proceedings: and they obtain the confidence, not only of individuals but of cities; and persuade them that certain ceremonies, accompanied by festivals, may expiate the crimes of the living, and even of the dead. These ceremonies they call the *Mysteries of Purification*: and these they say preserve us from evil in that other world; and if we omit them, leave us to a dreadful destiny.

8 “All this,” said he, “O Socrates, and much

more of the same kind is said about virtue and vice; and the way in which they are looked upon by Gods and men. And now, what are we to suppose will be the impression left by this upon the mind of a young man of good disposition, who can put together what is said? What will he judge as to the course he should take and the life he should lead? He might very reasonably say with Pindar,

Shall I the lofty steep,  
By force, of Justice scale?  
Or, using arts oblique,  
Guarding myself from harm,  
So tread the safest path?

For it follows from what is said, that if I be just, and be not known to be so, I get no good of it, but pain and loss; and if I be unjust and held for just, my life may be blest. Since then, even as the wise (Simonides) says, 'Seeming does more than Truth and gives us Happiness,' *that* must be my course. I must hold before my face the mask of virtue, and be behind it the clever fox which the wise poet Archilochus speaks of.

"But, some one will say, 'It is not easy to be wicked, and always to escape detection.' We reply, Nothing which is great is easy; but if we would be happy, that is the way to take, as the general tenour of what has been said shows. We will protect ourselves against discovery by combining with confederates; we will have masters to teach us how to speak persuasively in political or in judicial assemblies, and so to escape punishment.

"But with the Gods we can neither escape detection nor punishment, it will be said.—If either there are no Gods, or if they care not for human affairs, we need not care to escape their notice. But if there are Gods, and they do watch over the

deeds of men, we know it only from what we have heard from tradition and from the mythological poets. And the same poets tell us that we can avert the wrath of the Gods by prayers and offerings. We must believe both parts of the story or neither. If we are virtuous we escape punishment from the gods, but we lose the gains of injustice. If we take the course of injustice we obtain its gains, and by our devotional acts gain pardon from the Gods.

“But (it will be said) we shall be punished in Hades for the crimes which we commit here, we or our children’s children. But the well-informed man will reply, There are means of expiation to avert this; and such is the doctrine received by great states, and taught by the prophets of the Gods, and by the poets, the sons of the Gods.

9 “What possible ground is there then to prefer justice to injustice, however extreme the latter be? For if we cover injustice with a decent outside, we shall obtain our desires from men and from Gods, in death and in life.

“After what has been said, Socrates, how can any man of any vigour of mind or body, of temper or genius, I will not say have any reverence for Justice, but not laugh at hearing it praised? And even if any one can show that what we have been saying is false, and prove that Justice is the best of things, yet still we ought to have great indulgence for unjust men, and not be indignant against them. For every one must know that, excepting a few persons of a naturally good disposition, and a few who have received good instruction, there is no one who is just willingly; but that it is cowardice, or old age, or some other weakness, which makes him blame injustice, because he is unable to commit it. And it is evident that this is so; for every man, as soon

as he gets the power, does injustice, to such extent as he can."

It must be allowed that the defence of Injustice is strongly and ingeniously urged. To Plato it seemed proper to put the difficulty in all its force, and in all its extent, before proceeding to solve it. In the statement of the inconsistencies and absurdities of the views of the Gods which the Greek poets taught, we shall see nothing which need surprise us, or disturb us; possessing as we do, a better faith and hope. But the main object is, as we have said, to propose it as a problem for the imaginary Socrates, to establish the superiority of Justice or Virtue over the contrary, independent of all consequences; and this Adeimantus once again says in concluding.

"The cause of all this inconsistency," he says, "resides in that which was the origin both of my brother's discourse to you, Socrates, and of mine: that those, my good sir, who have praised virtue and justice, beginning from those who have lauded the ancient heroes, have all, up to the present time, never praised Justice otherwise than by speaking of the repute and honour and advantage which proceed from it. No one has, either in verse or in prose, attempted to shew what each is, as it exists in the mind of man;—that, being there, Injustice, even if it remain unseen by Gods and men, is the greatest of evils, Justice the greatest good. If this were the line taken, this the doctrine inculcated by you our elders upon us from our earliest years, we should have no occasion to keep a guard over each other to prevent wrong-doing; each would be his own best guardian, avoiding wrong-doing as a thing bringing the greatest evil on himself.

"This, Socrates, and more than this, Thrasy-

machus, or some other might say, in praise of Injustice, in blame of Justice; inverting their true character, in an odious manner, as I think. But I give you the whole of it, wishing to hear your reply, and putting the case as completely as I can. Do you then show us, not only that Justice is preferable to Injustice, but show what good and what evil, respectively, they bring to the possessor of them<sup>1</sup>. Show what good the one, what evil the other does, even if it remain concealed from Gods and men."

This is the problem which Socrates has to solve; before doing so, he pays compliments to his opponents, or rather, questioners.

10 "I," he says, "had always admired the intellectual character of Glaucon and Adeimantus, and I was on this occasion especially delighted with the way in which it showed itself, and I said:

"Not without reason, O sons of an honoured father, did Glaucon's admirer address you in the ode which he wrote when you had distinguished yourselves in the battle of Megara:

*'Ariston's sons, offspring divine of one  
Himself illustrious.'*

"This, my friends, appears to me well said; for you really have more than human endowments if, while you do not believe Injustice to be better than Justice, you can speak so forcibly in its defence. And I really think that you do not so believe. I form this opinion from your demeanour on other occasions; for judging from what you have now said, I should have thought otherwise.

"But in proportion as I think thus, I am all the more at a loss what line I shall take. I do not see how I am to maintain the cause of Justice. It

<sup>1</sup> I omit some sentences of repetition.

seems that I can say nothing which will produce any effect. And that it is so, I may see by this, that what I said to Thrasymachus, thinking that thereby I proved Justice to be better than Injustice, fails to satisfy you. And yet on the other hand, I do not know how I can refuse to maintain the cause of Justice. For I am afraid it would be a wicked thing for me, being present when Justice is attacked, to desert her cause, and not stand by her so long as I breathe, and have the power to utter. And so, it is right that I should take up the cause and defend it as best I may.

“On this Glaucon and the others besought me by all means to undertake the cause, and not to give up the subject; but to carry to the end the examination of the question what Justice and Injustice, Right and Wrong, really are; and what is the benefit which each brings.

“So I said, as I really thought, that the inquiry thus asked for is no easy matter, and requires a sharp sight. And as we are,” said I, “unable to see our way into it, let us take a course of this kind: If a person whose eyesight was not very good had to read at a distance something written in small letters: and if he then should find that there are the same letters in another place on a larger scale; he would think it an admirable invention to read the larger inscription first, then to make out the smaller, and to see if it really is the same.”

“Certainly,” said Adeimantus, “it would be so: but what do you see of this kind, Socrates, relative to our inquiry?”

“I will tell you,” said I. “Justice is something which belongs to an individual Man: but it is also something which belongs to a whole State. But a state is greater than a man. It may be then



that in that case, Justice appears on a larger scale, and more easy to decipher. If you please, therefore, let us first examine what Justice is in a state, and then let us consider what it is in an individual man; and thus discern in little what we see an image of in great."

Adeimantus assents to these assertions, and approves the proposed course; and thus we enter upon that descriptive comparison of the constitution of the state and of the individual, which makes the subject of this Dialogue, *the Polity*.

The state or city (*Polis*) is traced from its origin in considerable detail: so considerable indeed, as to countenance the opinion that the political as well as the ethical bearing of the subject was important in the mind of the writer. Socrates proceeds:

"This being so, if in our thoughts we were to trace a State or City from its first origin, we should see also the origin of Justice and Injustice?"—"Perhaps."

"And so by such a speculation, we might hope more easily to find what we seek. Shall we then try this course? It will be no light undertaking. Consider then, whether we shall set about it."

"We have sufficiently considered," said Adeimantus. "Set about it without scruple."

Socrates then begins; his hearers assenting as he goes on.

- 11 "A City has its origin, as I conceive, in this: that each of us is not self-sufficing, but needs the aid of others. An individual joins with himself one man on account of one need, another, of another; and so by the multiplicity of his needs he has to bring together many into one dwelling-place, helpers and companions; and this assemblage he calls *Polis*, a city.

“And he imparts to others what he has, and receives from them what they can give, seeking his advantage therein. So when in thought we follow the origin of a city, the original foundation is our needs.

“Now the first need, and the greatest of all, is the need of food such as life requires.

“The next need is that of a habitation; the third, that of clothing, and the like.

“Now how is the city to provide for these needs? How otherwise than thus? one man must be a husbandman; another a house-builder; another a weaver; and so on. We may add a shoemaker, and the like. And so the city which provides for the merest necessities must consist of four or five men.

“Now shall each of these exercise his special art for the common benefit of all? Thus, shall the husbandman prepare food for four, and spend four times as much time upon it, as he would for himself alone, and let the others share? or do nothing for them, but employ one quarter of his time and labour to provide food for himself, and spend the remaining three-fourths of his time partly in building his own house, partly in making his own coat, partly in making his own shoes?”

It is answered that the former is the better course.

“Yes,” says Socrates. “You may say that different people have different endowments. One man can do one thing better, another, another. A man can work better who works at one art, than one who works at several. Also when a man does not do anything at the right time, time is lost. The work will not wait for the leisure of the workman. The workman must follow his business as a principal business, not as by-work. And

so, work is better done and easier, and more of it, when a man does what he has a gift for, at the proper occasion, as his business, leaving other things to others."

This argument, to show the advantage of the division of labour, may remind us of Adam Smith's discussion on the same subject. Socrates goes on to extend his city. He says:

"But, O Adeimantus, we should want more than four workmen for our needs. The husbandman cannot make his own plough, if it is to be a good one, nor the other agricultural implements. Nor can the builder make *his* own tools, and many tools does he need. And so the weaver and the shoemaker. And so we must have carpenters and smiths and many other such artisans; and so our little city will become a large one. It will not increase it too much if we add cowherds, and shepherds and herdsmen of other kinds; that the husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and the builders cattle to draw their wains, and the weaver and shoemaker may have wool and leather."

"The city which is to contain all these," says the friend, "will not be a small one."

"And yet," Socrates goes on, "it is almost impossible to plant our city in such a position that it shall not have need of foreign imports. And so we must have other persons who must bring to us from other cities what we need. And these persons would go in vain and come back empty, if they did not take something which *those* need who are to supply *our* needs. And so our people must not only manufacture what they need themselves, but also such things, and such an amount of them, as they may take to those who shall give them what they need. And so we want additional

husbandmen and artisans in our city. And then we want other persons who are to take out and bring in the articles of which we speak. And such persons are called *merchants*. And so we must have merchants. And if the importation of these things take place by sea, we shall want several other kinds of persons who are skilled in seafaring employments.

"And now, how are the people in our city to impart to one another what each produces, which transfer was the object for which we founded our city?"

"It is plain," Adeimantus replies; "it must be by buying and selling."

"Then we must have a market-place, an *agora*; and we must have money, the token of exchange of things.

"And then if the husbandman, or any other kind of workman, bring into the market-place what he has produced, and do not come at the same time as those who need to purchase what he has, he will have to sit idle in the market-place."

"By no means," said he; "there are persons, who seeing this inconvenience, take this office upon themselves. In well-regulated cities, it is the weakest in body, those who are less fit for other labour, that do this. They stay in the market, buy some things for money from those that have them to offer, and sell to others for money, things which they want to buy."

"And so this need," said I, "introduces *tradesmen* into our city. For we call them, I think, *tradesmen* who sit in the market having it for their office to buy and sell.

"And then there are workmen of another kind, who are not by their intellectual gifts worthy to be in our community, but whose bodies have

strength which may be employed in labour. They sell the use of their bodily strength, and the price they call *hire*, and so they are called *hired labourers*. And so then hired labourers fill up the measure of our city."—Adeimantus assents.

"And now, Adeimantus, is our city large enough to be complete?"

"Perhaps."

"And where then in this our city reside Justice and Injustice? In which of these parts that we have described are they to be found?"

"I do not see, Socrates; except it be in the mutual intercourse with each other which the members of our city have."

"Perhaps," said I, "you are right in that; and we must consider whether it is so, and not give up our examination. Let us then first consider in what manner the citizens whom we have thus provided, are to live. They must have meat and wine, and clothes and shoes, and houses; they may in summer generally be naked and barefoot; but in winter they must be clothed and shod. They will make themselves cakes of barley-meal and wheaten flour, and serve them on reeds or clean leaves, and at their meal will recline on a litter of ivy or myrtle-leaves; and so will enjoy themselves, they and their children, drinking their wine, wearing chaplets on their heads [as we do on holidays]; singing hymns to the Gods, not producing too many children, for fear of poverty and war."

Here Glaucon interposes; apparently he is amused with the description of the imaginary city, and likes to add new features to it. He says: "You make your people feast on dry bread, without any more savoury viands."

"You say truly," said I. "I had forgot that

they must have more savoury diet; salt, of course, olives, cheese, onions, and other bulbs and pot-herbs, such as people cook in the country. And they shall have a dessert of figs and peas and beans, which they will parch with ashes of branches of myrtle and beech, taking a moderate quantity of wine with them. And thus they will live peaceful and happy, and die as old men, transmitting a life of like kind to their children."

Glaucon is not satisfied with this picture of life. He says: "If, Socrates, you had to describe a city of pigs, you could not have spoken otherwise of their feeding."

"But how are they to feed, O Glaucon?" said I.

"As our custom is," said he. "If they are to be at ease, they must lie on couches, and have tables to eat at, and such viands as we now have, and such desserts."

"Be it so," said I. "I understand. We are not only to consider how a city may be originated, but a luxurious city. Perhaps there is no harm in that. Perhaps by considering that point now, we may find about Justice and Injustice, in what part of a city they reside. A true City seems to me to be such as I described; that is a city in health; if you wish to consider a city in a plethora, there is nothing to prevent you. There are some persons, it appears, who will not be satisfied with our way and our kind of living. They must have couches and tables and other articles of furniture, and seasoning and spices and odours, and waiting women, and delicacies of all kinds. And besides the necessities of life, of which we spoke at first, houses and clothes and shoes, we must have decorations and paintings, and gold, and ivory, and such matters. Is it not so?"

Glaucon assents, and Socrates goes on to enumerate new classes which his city must contain: more it would seem, in order to fill out his picture, than because his argument requires it.

“In that case we must enlarge our city. That healthy little city will no longer suffice; we must have one swollen with a multitude of persons who deal with superfluities, not with necessaries. We must have all those who invent novelties<sup>1</sup>, and those who practise the imitative arts, painters and musicians; and poets, and reciters to grace their works, and actors and dancers, and stage-managers; and, again, makers of all kinds of female ornaments: and attendants of all kinds; footmen, ladies’ maids, hair-dressers, barbers; and again cooks and restaurateurs; classes who were not in our former city; we needed them not: but now we must have them: and we must have all kinds of creatures to eat, must we not?” — “Why not?” says Glaucon assentingly.

“Then we shall want physicians among people who live so, much more than we did before?” — “Much more.”

“And the territory which was large enough before will be too small now?”

“Even so.”

“And so to get sufficient pasture land and arable land we must encroach upon our neighbours, and our neighbours will have to do the same to us, if they too pass the limits of what is necessary and give themselves up to a boundless cupidity.”

“It must needs be, Socrates.”

“Then, Glaucon, we must go to war? or how?”

“Even so,” said he.

<sup>1</sup> *θηπετραί.*

"Well, we will not now say whether war is a good or an evil, but only this, that we have found the origin of War;—war, which brings great ills on states and on individuals, when it happens. And now we have our city larger still; for we must have a large army which may go forth and fight the enemies in defence of the city's possessions or to obtain the objects which we have described."

"What?" says Glaucon, "can the citizens not do that themselves?"

"By no means. You have agreed with the rest of us, when we first constructed our city, that it is impossible for one man to practise well several arts."—"That is true," said he.

"Well then! Do you not think that soldiering is an art?"—"Certainly."

"And are we to take more pains about the shoemaker's art than about the soldier's?"—"By no means."

"But we forbade the shoemaker to try to be a husbandman or a builder or a weaver, that his shoemaking might be well done; and so to each of the others we gave one task for which he was fit, and which he was to attend to exclusively, making it the business of his life, or that he might do it well. And is it not of the highest consequence that the soldier's work be done well? Or is the work so easy that a man, while he works as husbandman or shoemaker, may be a soldier too, though he cannot become a good player at draughts or chess without making it his main business from his earliest years. Or is it likely that a man just taking up a shield or any other implement or weapon of war, without any previous practice, shall be able to use it as a good soldier, while the tools and implements of other arts do not make a



man master of the art the moment *they* are taken up, and are of no use to a person who has not had the requisite apprenticeship and practice."

"Tools would be very valuable things," said he, "if they *did* this."

15 "Well then, in proportion as the office of the soldier or *Guard* of the state is important, it requires more art and more attention."

"I believe so," said he.

"And requires too a disposition and character suited to the office?"

"Certainly."

"It must be our business then, if we can, to select such characters as are suitable to this office of Guards."—"It must be our business."

"Faith," said I, "it is no slight task that we have got; but however we must not be faint-hearted, as long as we *can* go on."

The establishment of a class of soldiers as a separate element of the community is essential to Plato's argument; and Socrates goes on to follow into detail the characteristics of this class. He says,

"The young soldier who is to act as a guard of the state must be like a dog of high blood. He must be sagacious to see his foe, agile to follow him, strong to battle with him. He must have Courage. Now Courage implies the existence of the Irascible Element—Anger. With this element, an animal, horse or dog, flinches at nothing, is fearless, invincible. And so we see that our guards must be strong in body, and have the irascible element in their soul.

"But how then are they to escape being savage to one another and to the citizens? They ought to be gentle to the citizens and fierce to the enemies; if not, they will not wait for other enemies to destroy them, they will destroy themselves. How

shall we have them both gentle and high couraged? How is this to be? It seems difficult to combine these qualities, and yet we cannot dispense with either.

“Still, upon recollecting what we have said, we may see that the combination is possible. Dogs of good breed have it; they are quite gentle to those that they know, and the contrary to strangers. And such must our guards be.

“Further, these guards must be fond of know- 16 ledge. Dogs are so; you may see in them an admirable instinct. They bark at those they do not know, and fawn on those that they do know. And so they hold that form which they know to be a sign of friendship, and that which they do not know to be a sign of enmity. Is not this a proof that they are fond of knowledge, that is, fond of wisdom, and so, in a way, philosophical?

“And so our guard of the state, to be perfect, must be philosophical as well as irascible and swift and strong.”

This proof that these guards of the state must be philosophical, as dogs of good breed are philosophical, (fond of what they know and therefore fond of knowledge,) sounds somewhat grotesque to us. One purpose of the assertion is to introduce a discussion of Greek education, which is so long, and interrupts the main scheme of the discourse so much, that I shall omit it now, and give it afterwards as a Digression. Socrates goes on:

“Such then are our guards to be. But how are they to be brought up and educated? That seems to be a necessary preliminary for us with reference to our main object, the finding about Justice and Injustice—how they come into a city. This we must do, that we may not omit what is to the purpose for the sake of avoiding prolixity.”

“And Glaucon’s brother said: ‘Undoubtedly I think that this inquiry is a preliminary to our question.’

“Then, by Jupiter, my dear Adeimantus, we must not turn away from it, even if it should be rather long. We must describe the education of the men, like persons who are weaving mythological fables and are quite at leisure.”—“Agreed.”

“What then is to be their education? It is difficult to find a better education than that which was found out long ago; Gymnastic for the body, Music for the mind.”

To the examination of these elements of Greek education they then proceed; but I shall pass on to that part of the Dialogue where the image of the state is completed and applied.

This takes us to the middle of the Third Book.

B. III. § 19 “Such then is our scheme of education. And now we must consider who are to be the Governors and who the Governed in our imaginary state.

“In the first place the Elders must rule, the Younger must obey. And of the Elders those who are best for the office,—they are to be the Guardians of the City; and those must be taken who have most of a Guardian character,—wise and strong for this office, and careful for the City. And a man cares most for that which he most loves. And he loves that which he conceives to have the same interest as himself; that of which the well-being makes him do well, and the contrary. Those, then, must be chosen from all other Guardians, whom we shall have seen, during their whole life, ready to do with energy that which they conceive is most for the benefit of the City,

and never to do on any account what is otherwise. And we must follow them through all their ages, to see how they adhere to this maxim, and neither through delusion or through force forget and abandon this rule of doing what is best for the City."

"I do not quite understand," Glaucon says, "what cases of abandoning the rule you mean."

Socrates then explains, according to his usual doctrine, that men never part with what is good willingly; that when men part with truth they do so without meaning to do so; and that therefore it must be by the influence of surprise, or delusion, or force, that they do this. The allurements of pleasure or the chill of fear may produce this illusion.

"We must then, as I said, seek those who 20 best keep hold of the maxim of doing that which is best for the City; we must try them from their early years, putting them in positions in which they might most easily be deceived and forget this maxim; we must select him who is steady in such cases, and reject the others. We must propose toils and pains and struggles in which this steadiness is to be shown. As we expose young colts to noise and tumult that we may see whether they are timorous or bold, so we must expose our young men to terrors and perils, and again to pleasures, that we may try them. They must be tried like gold in the fire, to see whether they keep their fair aspect: we must see whether they show the benefit of their education in music, and exhibit a harmony and a rhythm on all occasions.

"And him who thus tried as boy, and youth, and man, turns out blameless at every stage, is to be made a Ruler and Guardian of the City. Honours are to be given to him during his life, and at his death, an honourable tomb and other marks of respect.

“And the persons thus selected are more truly the Guardians of the City than those soldier-guards of whom we spoke before. They are Guardians of the City from enemies without and from friends within, so that the former cannot, the latter will not, do it harm. Those Guards of whom we spoke before we may rather call the Helpers and Supporters of the rules laid down by the Rulers.”

All this is assented to, sentence by sentence; and then we come to another point, which Socrates proposes with a hesitation quite natural, seeing that it is a recommendation of falsehood.

“And now—how are we to invent those necessary lies which may persuade the Rulers themselves, or at any rate the rest of the City, that they are something great?”

“What do you mean?”

“Nothing new: only the old Phœnician fable [of men springing out of the earth] which has been told of many places, as the poets say and sing; but which has not happened in our time, and perhaps never will happen, and so is hard to persuade people of.”

“You seem to have a great hesitation in bringing it out.”

“When you have heard it,” said I, “you will think I have reason to hesitate.”

“Out with it,” said he, “and fear nothing.”

“Here it is then. And yet I know not with what face, or in what words I could try to persuade the Rulers and the Soldiers first, and then the rest of the City, that all the education which we gave them and which made them what they are, is a mere dream:—that they were really formed in the depths of the earth, they and their arms and their implements:—that when they were fully formed, their mother the earth sent them forth:—

and now they must defend their land as their mother and their nurse against all assailants, and feel for all the other citizens as their brothers from the same womb of earth."

"It was not for nothing that you were ashamed, a little while ago, to utter this story."

"Quite true: but still hear the rest of the fable. 21  
We shall say to them, adopting the language which our story suggests, You are all brethren; and the God who made you put gold into the composition of those who are fit to rule; they are the most precious. He put silver into the composition of the supporters; iron and brass into that of the husbandman and artisans.

"And for the most part, your offspring is like yourselves: yet sometimes from the gold springs a silver offspring, and from the silver a golden one: and the like in the other materials. And the God recommends the Rulers first and chiefly to attend to this:—as Guardians to take more care about the offspring than any other thing; and to see what is the composition of their characters. If their own offspring are alloyed with brass or with silver they are not to allow pity to prevail, but are to remove them into the position which belongs to them, among the artisans or the husbandmen. And if any of the offspring of these classes have by birth a mixture of gold or of silver, they are to place the former among the Guardians, the latter among the Supporters;—it is held that there is an Oracle to the effect that the City will perish when brass or iron is its Guardian. Now can you devise any scheme by which they may be made to believe this story?"

"No," says Glaucon, "not the existing body of men: but their sons may be made to believe it, and the succeeding generations."

"Then may the invention prosper, and make them good patriots, and may the oracle hold good and fame attend it! And now let us arm these sons of the earth, and lead them forth under the conduct of their Rulers."

That is, let us now consider the class of soldiers, and their condition.

"Let them come forward and see in what part of the city they can best encamp, so that they may have most power to control those within the city, if any one will not obey the laws, and to repel the external enemy, if any approaches like a wolf to the sheepfold. And when they have established their camp, let them make the due sacrifices, and then set up their tents.

"And then their tents must be such as to shelter their property in winter and in summer; is it not so?"

"Certainly: you mean their dwellings."

"Yes, but the dwellings of soldiers, not of merchants."

"What difference between the one and the other do you refer to?"

22 "I will try to tell you. It is a most shocking and disgraceful thing when shepherds keep, to defend their sheep, such dogs that the dogs themselves, through hunger or want of discipline, attack the sheep, and are like wolves rather than dogs. And so we must take especial care that our Supporters and Defenders do not take such courses towards the citizens, seeing that they are stronger than those—that instead of kind supporters they be not like savage masters. This must be one great object in our teaching of them."—"They have been taught in this way," said Glaucon.

"I would not be too sure of this," said I.  
 "But I am sure that they ought to be taught,

so as to be kind to one another and to those who are under their guard. But besides this, a wise man would say that they ought to be provided with such dwellings, and placed in such circumstances, as not to interfere with their office of being good guards, and not to impel them to hurt the other citizens. And therefore, for this end, they must be placed in these circumstances:—In the first place no one of them must have any private property, except in cases where it is absolutely necessary. Then they must have no dwellings or store-rooms into which every person who chooses may not enter. They must have such food as is necessary for sober and brave soldiers; and they must have, for their services in defending the City, as much as they need to live on from year to year, and no more. They must eat at a common table, and live like men in a camp. As for gold and silver, they must be told that the divine gold and silver which the gods have put in their minds makes earthly gold and silver useless to them;—that it would be wicked to alloy the possession of that divine gold with the possession of earthly gold: the gold which circulates among men has been the source of many crimes, but theirs is pure gold. They alone of all the citizens are forbidden to handle or to touch gold or silver or to be under the same roof with it, to wear it on their dresses, to drink out of it: and so they will save themselves and save the city. If they want to have land of their own and houses and money, they will turn husbandmen and housekeepers instead of soldiers, and masters and enemies of the City instead of defenders; they will spend their lives hating and hated, plotting and plotted against; fearing the citizens within more than the enemy without; and bringing themselves and the City to



the verge of destruction. So make account," said I; "that we agree that we are to make such arrangements as have been mentioned with regard to the dwelling of the Defenders of the State and the other matters; and let this be our law."

"By all means," said Glaucon.

These arrangements for the soldier-class in Plato's Polity naturally excited much remark. Aristotle criticizes them in *his* Polity. It is indeed easy to show their strange consequences; but we may say that they are necessary for Plato's purpose. As each class in his Polity represents *one* of the springs of action in man, there would arise confusion if the class itself were impelled by *several* springs of action, such as the Love of Property, of House, and of Family.

The objection to this constitution of the state is put forward by Plato himself, in the next Book.

B. IV. "Here Adeimantus taking me up said: 'What  
 § 1 will you say for yourself, Socrates, if any one makes the objection, that you make your soldier-class far from happy, and *that* through their own fault, since the city is really at their disposal; for they enjoy none of the advantages which the city supplies, like the other classes, who possess lands, and build fine houses, and fill them with suitable furniture, and make their own private sacrifices to the gods, and receive their own guests, and have treasures of gold and silver, and everything which is supposed to make men happy: but are simply hired guards, and hold their place in the city merely as a garrison?'

"Yes," said I, "and he may add, that they do not, like other hired troops, get pay as well as

food; so that they cannot travel on their own account, or give anything to their favourites, nor indulge in any of the expences which are supposed to make life pleasant. You omit these and many other obvious grounds of objection."

"Well," said he, "suppose that those too are urged."

"And what shall we answer, you ask?"

"Even so."

"If we go on in the same course which we have been following, we shall find what we must say to this. We shall say, that even if our soldier-class were ever so happy, we did not construct our city with a view to the object of making one class especially happy, but of making the whole city happy in the highest degree: for we thought that in a city so constructed, we should most surely find justice, as in a city most ill-constructed we should most surely find injustice; and thus we thought we could solve the problem, which we have all along been employed about. We have therefore to construct a happy city, not in a fragmentary way, making a small class in the city happy, but the whole body. It is as if we made a statue and painted it, and some one were to object that we do not apply the most beautiful colours to the most beautiful places:—for that the eyes are the most beautiful part, and that we do not paint them purple, or crimson, but black. We should think it was answer enough to say: My ingenious Sir, you are not to suppose that we are to make the eyes beautiful in such a way that they cease to be eyes: and so of the other parts: but look and see whether by making each part of the proper colour, we make the whole beautiful. And so in this case, do not drive us to give to our guards such a kind of happiness as will make them rather anything than guards. We

might, if we chose, make our husbandmen put on long robes and golden ornaments, and work the ground only as a matter of amusement: we might make the potters lie by the fire drinking and feasting, with the potter's wheel by their side, for them to use when they choose; and might make the other classes luxuriate in like manner, by way of making the whole city happy. But do not ask us to do this: for if we comply with such a request, the husbandman will no longer be a husbandman, the potter no longer a potter; and none will have the character of those classes of which a city is constituted. But this incongruity in the other classes is of smaller consequence. If the cobbler is a bad cobbler, or pretends to be one when he is not, but is merely a spoiler of leather, no great harm is done to the city. But if those who pretend to be the guards of the city and its laws are not really so, they utterly ruin the city. They alone can make it prosperous and happy. We in our scheme make the guards really of use to the city; the objector would make them<sup>1</sup> men enjoying a festival, not citizens of a complete city, and would be describing something different from a city. We must consider whether we will make our guards with *this* object, that they shall be as happy as may be, or with the object of making the city happy; and so, have to compel the guards, its defenders, to do and to think what may best fit them for their special work: and so the city being prosperous and well governed, must teach each class to have such happiness as its nature allows it to have."

2 "Well," said he, "you seem to me to speak reasonably."

<sup>1</sup> I omit γεωργούς τῶας καί.

"And," said I, "does another maxim, the fellow of that one, seem to you reasonable?"

"What is it?" said he.

"There are two things which spoil artisans, and make them bad ones: Wealth and Poverty."

"How?"

"If the potter become rich he will not go on working at his trade?"—"No."

"He will become day by day more idle and more negligent, and so be a bad potter?"—"Yes."

"On the other hand, Poverty may prevent his having tools and materials, and teaching his sons or his apprentices to be good potters."—"True."

"And so the guardians of the city must take care of this too; they must avoid both these evils and dangers—Wealth and Poverty:—the former introduces luxury, idleness, and a love of change:—the latter, along with the love of change, brings servility and meanness."

"Undoubtedly: but then, Socrates, consider how our city can carry on war, having no money."

And thus Socrates and his friends go on constructing their ideal city, and working out all its relations, although unnecessary for the main purpose for which it was introduced, the determination of the nature and definition of Justice. Socrates holds that this city would be well able to defend itself: even against more than one hostile city: just as a practised boxer might defeat more than one adversary who was fat and puffy, by retiring before them, and as they followed at unequal speed, thrashing each as he came up with him. "The rich are not the best soldiers, any more than they are the best boxers, and so one city without riches might beat three or four rich cities. More-

over, we might send to another city and tell them that we have no silver and gold: it is against our law to have it: so, if you fight on our side, you will get the spoils of the enemy. Do you think that after such a statement any of them would prefer fighting against hardy and hungry dogs, to fighting on the side of the dogs against fat and tender sheep?" Adeimantus remarks that if in this way one city were to get the riches of its neighbour, it would be dangerous to the poorer city. But Socrates maintains that no city would truly deserve to be called a city, except such a one as he is constructing. "The others all are collections of at least two cities, enemies to one another, the City of the Rich and the City of the Poor: and these have many subdivisions. If you attack the city so composed as one city, you will not succeed; but if you attack it as being several cities, and give to one class what belongs to another—wealth, power, everything—you will have many friends and few enemies; and so long as our city is thus properly governed, it will be truly great;—great even if it have only ten thousand soldiers: for you will not easily find a city larger than this, either among the Greeks or the Barbarians, though there are several which are said to be many times this magnitude."

- 3 Socrates then observes that the consideration just mentioned may serve to determine what ought to be the size of their perfect city. It must be neither too large nor too small, but of such a size that it may be *one* city.

Again, he remarks that the citizens must be put in the offices which are best adapted to the disposition and endowments of each person, so that each may act as one, and not as many; and so the unity of the city may be maintained.

But he observes farther, that all these minor matters will turn out right if the education of the citizens be well ordered. If that be good, it will produce good citizens; and again, good citizens will maintain a good education; and so in a circle, and the race will prosper and go on improving as in the careful breeding of animals.

He then proceeds to urge this in detail. "The guardians of the state must," he says, "pay special attention to this, and take care that no decay or deterioration creeps in here. They must in particular resist all innovation in the great elements of education, Gymnastic and Music. Homer says (speaking of the bard who sang the Adventures of Ulysses to the Suitors, *Odyssee*, I. 443),

'The song  
Wins ever from the hearers most applause  
That has been least in use.'

But care is to be taken that men do not understand this as describing, not a new poem, but a new style of music, and recommending that. We must have no innovations in music: they put everything to peril. The modes of music cannot be changed without stirring the fundamental laws of the state, as Damon says, and I agree with him." To this Adeimantus assents. "Yes," continues Socrates, 4 "the citadel of good polity is Music: that citadel the guardians must safely keep." "And yet," says Adeimantus, "a disregard of established laws may easily creep unobserved into this region." "Yes," says Socrates, "coming in the shape of a mere amusement, with no manifest bad consequences." "Yes," says the other, "the consequences are imperceptibly small at first; and yet the evil, once established, taints men's manners, disturbs their employments, and then goes on to affect their social

relations; and from these, disturbs the laws and the polity of the state, by the license which it generates, so that at last it subverts everything, public and private."

"Even so," said I. "We must then, as I said at first, from the earliest years of our young people, attend to their games and amusements, and take care that these inspire a love of the laws; for without this, they cannot grow up to be good men. But when boys, properly trained, imbibe a love of law by their teaching in Music, they grow better and better, and if anything has gone wrong, it is set right. The smaller matters of propriety which their predecessors had neglected they correct."

I have translated this part of the Dialogue as a curious evidence of the importance which the Athenians ascribed to Music as an element of education, and of the weighty effects which they conceived that it might produce in states. Socrates goes on to enumerate some of the points of propriety which he conceives would be duly attended to by persons in this way well educated: "Such as these; for young people to keep a becoming silence before the old, to give them the place of honour, to rise when they come into the room, to pay visible respect to parents; to have their hair cut in a proper way, and their clothes and their shoes decent, and the whole of their dress and demeanour decorous. There is no use in making laws about such matters. Whether written or oral, they would not be observed.

"Nor will we make laws about contracts of buying and selling, about the wages of labour, about assault and battery, and the process of law, and the constitution of law-courts, and the imposition of taxes and customs, in the market or in

the harbour; all that concerns the market-place, the city or the harbour."

"True," said he. "There is no use in making laws on such subjects for honourable men. They will attend to such things themselves. If they set about regulating such matters by law, they will have to make new laws continually, without ever satisfying themselves: just as persons whose health is damaged by intemperance, try all kinds of medicines to cure their disorders, rather than renounce the intemperate habits which produced and keep up the disorder."

On occasion of this mention of useless laws, 5 Socrates introduces a censure of those cities which forbid the citizens to disturb the constitution of the state, on penalty of death: and which hold as good and wise those men who gratify the desires of the city. He and Adeimantus agree also that those who give their services to such a Public, and allow themselves to believe that they are statesmen because they obtain its applause, are not at all to be admired. When a man does not know how to measure, he may be made to believe that he is six feet high though he is not; but not if he does know the art of measuring. "Do not then," says Socrates, "be angry with men like these who make new laws about contracts and the like, hoping at last to cure all defects in such laws. They are really cutting off the heads of a Hydra. The true legislator does not trouble himself about such laws: in an ill-regulated city they are useless and inoperative; in a well-regulated city they flow naturally from the fundamental arrangements of the state."

Here we have the usual censure of the political state of Athens, and perhaps of some special attempts at legislation, combined with a defence of



his own polity. He then goes on to another point, in order to complete the constitution of his imaginary state. Adeimantus says:

“And now what remains for us to legislate about?”

“For us,” said I, “nothing; but we leave to the Delphic Apollo the highest and greatest point of legislation.”—“What is that?” said he.

“Laws concerning the structure of temples and sacrifices, and forms of worship of Gods and Heroes: the burial of the dead; the propitiation of the Departed. We, only aspiring to found a city, do not presume to regulate such matters, or to impose our opinions on others: we must only have recourse to the recognized authority on such points. The God whose seat is the middle point of the earth, (Delphi) its very navel, is the natural director of such matters for us Greeks.”

And thus the construction and constitution of the Platonic City is completed, and the interlocutors have now to draw from it the conclusions for which it was introduced. The points in the constitution which are essential to the argument are somewhat obscured by the details into which the polity is pursued, as we have seen. The main features to be borne in mind in pursuing the argument are these: that in the Imaginary City there are three main classes:—the Guardians or Governors; the Guards or Soldiers; and the Workmen as Producers of articles of desire. And this being the framework of the State, the question arises, for the sake of solving which the city was imagined, “Where is Justice?” Socrates puts this question in his lively way.

6 “And so, son of Ariston, here is our city founded. And now take a light in your hand, and incite your brother and Polemarchus and the

others to do the same, and look round and search in what part of it resides Justice, in what part Injustice: how the two differ from each other, and which of them he must possess who is to be happy, even if his actions be concealed from Gods and from men."

"No, no," says Glaucon: "it was you that were to make this search. You said that it would be wicked in you not to stand forward in defence of justice, in every way, to the utmost of your power."

"Well," said I, "you remind me truly, and this I must do. But you must help me."

"Yes," said he; "we will do so."

"I hope," said I, "that I shall find what we seek in this way. Our city, if it be rightly founded, must be perfectly good."

"Necessarily," said he.

"It must, then, evidently be *wise, brave, temperate and just.*"

"Plainly."

"If then we find some of these things, the remainder must be what we have not found."

"How so?"

"Just as if in any other case, we had four things, and sought for them in any quarter, if we found what we sought, and knew it, all would be well; but if we found the other three first, and knew them, we should that way too find what we sought; for it must be in that part which remained behind."—"You speak truly," said he.

"We must then, since we have these four things, seek for them in the same way?"—"Evidently."

Here first appears the celebrated Platonic quaternion—the four Cardinal Virtues, as they were afterwards called—Wisdom, Courage, Temperance,

and Justice. The selection of these four virtues—no more, no fewer, and no other—is somewhat arbitrary: yet this analysis of virtue is really the fundamental principle of the Platonic Ethics; and indeed the attempt is made in what follows to justify this analysis of virtue by an analysis of human nature. I give Socrates's discussion, omitting the interlocutions.

“The first thing that we discern in this case is the virtue of Wisdom. Wise the city must be; for it is governed by good counsel, and good counsel is exact knowledge. But there are various kinds of exact knowledge in our city. Which of these entitles us to call the city wise? Is it the knowledge of smiths? No. Of workers in brass? No. Of tillers of the ground? No. Each of these arts would make it a city skilled in iron-works or brass-works or agriculture, but not a wise city. But is there not in our city, constructed as we have supposed, some kind of knowledge which applies not to some part or class of the city, but to the whole city? There is: there is the knowledge which the Guardians, the Rulers of the city, have. On the ground of the existence of this knowledge in the city, we call the city prudent and wise. But are these Guardians and Rulers as numerous as the smiths and the like? By no means, they are the smallest class. And thus the smallest class in our city, the Ruling Class, by its wisdom makes the whole city wise: it alone professes that kind of knowledge which we call Wisdom.

7. “And so we have found one of the four things which we sought;—found what it is and in what part of the city it resides.

“And next as to Courage: what it is; in what part of our city it resides, so that the city may be

called courageous, is not now very difficult to see. What must any one look at, to decide whether he is to call the city brave or cowardly? To what but to that part of it which does its fighting work for it? The other classes do not, by being brave or cowardly, make the City to be such. And so the City is courageous in virtue of a certain portion of it: a portion which holds fast that opinion as to what is danger and what is not, which the legislator inculcated in the course of education which he prescribed. For is not this what we must mean by Courage—a steady retention of the doctrine as to what things are dangerous and what are not, which was imparted by the established education:—a steady retention of this doctrine, undisturbed through pains and pleasures and desires and fears? I will tell you what I compare this disposition to. The Dyers, when they want to dye wool a fast colour that will not wash out, first select the whitest wool, and then prepare it by various processes, that it may take the dye strongly and permanently; and then they dye it. What is so dyed holds the colour for ever, so that it cannot be washed out by water or by soap: but in what is dyed without this selection and preparation, the colours are faint and fleeting. Now such an effect you are to understand that we aim at, when we select our soldiers and educate them for their position: we *dye* them in the laws, that their view of what is dangerous and what is not may be stedfastly fixed, not to be washed out by pleasure and pain, fear and desire, powerful abstersgents though they be: and this fixed feeling I call Courage.

And so, for the present we have said enough of that. There still remain two things which we have to examine—Temperance, and that

for which the whole inquiry was undertaken—Justice. Now how can we discover Justice, that we may have no more to trouble ourselves about Temperance?”

The friend replies, with the general Athenian love of such discussion:

“I neither know, nor do I wish that Justice should come into clear view, till we have examined about Temperance. If you would oblige me, consider that first.”

“Agreed. Well Temperance seems to resemble a kind of harmony and concord of parts, more than the virtues which we have previously considered. Temperance is, they say, a power of controlling desires and pleasures. They talk, in a rather strange way, of a man being master of himself: and there are other indications of its nature [in common language]. But this expression, *master of himself*, appears absurd; for he who is master of himself must be his own slave, and the slave must be the master: for the man is the same man who is spoken of in both cases. But the expression seems to imply that there is in man a better and a worse element: and when that which is better by nature governs the worse, the man is said to be master of himself. This is an expression of praise. But when vicious pleasures or vicious company prevails and overmasters the better but weaker element, they use expressions of blame, and call such a man the slave of himself, an ill-governed man.

“Now look at our City, and you will find a resemblance there. If the better part rule the worse, you may call it *temperate*. You will find desires, and pleasures and pains, numerous and varied, existing in the most numerous and debased classes, including the women and the servants.

While you will find simple and moderate desires, conducted with intelligence and right opinion, in the few best disposed and best taught. And these 9 classes existing in the City, if the desires of the many and worse sort are governed by the desires and the intelligence of the few and better, you may say that the City is master of itself—that it is temperate. And in our City, there is an agreement between the Governors and the Governed as to who shall rule.

“Now this being so, in which class does the temperance reside—in the Governors or in the Governed? In both. And so you see we guessed right when we said that Temperance was like a concord and agreement. It is not like Courage or Wisdom, each of which exists in a particular class, and so makes the City courageous and wise. It is diffused through the whole, and brings into harmony all, the weakest, the strongest, and the intermediate ones; a harmony in intelligence, in strength, in numbers, in wealth, and in all things. And thus Temperance is a Harmony of that which is better and worse by nature, a Unanimity as to which is to rule in general and in all particulars.

“Now we have, we may suppose, explained three of the things we spoke of in our city: and what is the fourth virtue which we must have there? It is, as we have said, Justice. So now, my dear Glaucon, like hunters, we must beat the cover all round, and take care that Justice does not slip out and run away from us. For somewhere there it must be. So try if you can catch a sight of it before I do, and tell me.”

“I wish I could,” said he. “But it will be much for me if you can make me follow you and see it when you point it out.”

"Follow," said I, "praying for success."

"I follow," said he; "only do you lead the way."

"Yes," said I; "but the cover is hard to walk into and to see through. It is very dark and blind work. However let us go on."

"Yes: let us go on," said he.

And I, looking in, said, "See ho! see ho! Glaucon. Here we have the track of our game. I do not think it will escape us."

"You tell me good news," said he.

"But really we were very stupid. Here, my dear friend, the thing has been trundling before our feet all the while; and we, very curiously, did not see it, like persons who seek for a thing while they have it in their hands. Like them we never looked at this; but looked beyond it, and so missed it. We have spoken of it and heard of it, and did not know that we were talking about it."

Glaucon says, very naturally as the reader may think, that Socrates is somewhat long in this preface to his explanation.

"Well," said I, "listen, and tell me if I say anything to the purpose."

- 10 "What we established, as a thing to be universally done, when we founded our City, that, or something like that, is, it seems to me, Justice. We laid it down as a principle, and often said, if you recollect, that each person in the State must do some one thing for which he was especially fitted. Now to do one's own business, and not to meddle with what does not concern us, is Justice: this we have often heard other people say, and have said ourselves. Now this, I think, will turn out to be Justice,—each man doing his own business.

"I will tell you why I think so. Temperance, Courage, and Wisdom being established in our City, what remains to establish appears to be that which gives to each of those Virtues the possibility of being there, and preserves them as long as it is there. Now these other three Virtues being discovered, we agreed that Justice was that which remained to be discovered.

"Now if we had to decide what by its presence most makes the City good, we might doubt whether it is the unanimity of Governors and Governed [which as we have seen, is Temperance;] or the steady holding by the soldiers of a right opinion as to danger [which is Courage;] or Prudence and Conservatism in the Rulers [which is Wisdom;] or whether it is not rather this: that every one, child and woman, slave and freeman, workman, Governor and Governed, each does his own work, and does not meddle with the work of others. And so this virtue of each person doing his own work stands upon a level with Wisdom and Temperance and Courage. And this Virtue is Justice, which is thus a virtue to be ranked with the other three.

"And again, look at the matter this way, and see if we do not come to the same result. In our City you will make it the business of the magistrates to judge contested causes. And in their judgments is there any point which they will more attend to than this:—that each person should not have what belongs to another, and should not be deprived of what is his own?" "Certainly not."—"That being a just judgment." "Yes." "This then again proves that to have and to do what belongs to one's self is reckoned Justice."

"Again. Consider this. If the smith attempts to do the work of the shoemaker, or if they take



each other's tools or pay, or if one man tries to practise both trades, does this appear to you to inflict a great mischief on the City?" "Not very great."

"But if any one who is naturally a workman or tradesman, is so infatuated by wealth or strength or popularity that he tries to enter into the Class of Warriors: or if one of the soldiers, in spite of unfitness, tries to enter the Class of Counsellors and Guardians, and takes to himself their weapons and their rewards: or if one and the same man tries to perform all these employments; then I suppose you will think that this exchange of offices and meddling with several is the greatest possible mischief to the City. The mixing the three different employments is in the highest degree pernicious, and may be called *wrong* in the most emphatic sense; and Wrong, 11 the opposite of right, is Injustice. And so we see what Injustice is. And to confine ourselves to our proper function, be it workman, warrior, or guardian of the state, is Justice, and is what makes the State to be just."

The account of the four Virtues, which is thus reasoned out at length, may be expressed more clearly perhaps by being stated more briefly. The three essential classes in a State are Workmen to supply its wants, Soldiers to defend it, and Magistrates to govern it. If the Magistrates are wise, the State is wise: if the Soldiers are brave, the State is brave: if the Workmen are in due subordination to the magistrates, the State is temperate: if each class keeps to its place and office, the State is just.

The symmetry of this system is not quite perfect. The subordination of those workmen who supply men's bodily needs to the Rulers

who govern the State, may be taken as an exemplification of temperance. But Justice has not exactly its common meaning given it, when it is defined to mean, Each man in his own place. It may be said however, in explanation of this want of symmetry, that the Greek word *Dikaiosyne* is of larger extent than our *Justice*, and means merely *Rightness*, as I have in some places rendered it.

But the main interest of this scheme of four Virtues resides in its application to the individual man, to which Socrates now proceeds.

"Let us not be too confident," said I. "If when we apply this to individual men, the same description is found to suit Justice, we must suppose that it is right: if not, we must try another course. But for the present let us finish the course of inquiry which we begun. We thought that if we first examined what is Justice in some greater example, we should more easily see what it is in an individual man. And we thought that a greater example was the city, and so we constructed a city as good as possible, well knowing that in a city which is good, Justice must reside. Let us then now transfer this to a man: and if we find an agreement there, it is well: but if there is any discrepancy, we must turn back and examine the city again. And so comparing the man and the state, and rubbing them together, as it were, like lighting-matches, we may make Justice shine out, and then we shall see it clearly." "This," says his friend, "seems a hopeful course."

"Now when we talk of things being greater and smaller, they must be alike in having that quality which we speak of as greater or smaller. And so a just man and a just city do not differ in the quality of justice. It is the same quality

in both. Now a city was found to be just because there were in it three classes of disposition, each of which did its own business. It was wise and brave and temperate, in consequence of certain affections and habits of these classes. And so, if we find that man has in his soul the same three kinds of dispositions, we shall call them by the same names in the man, as in the city." "We must," said he. "And so, my good friend, we have stumbled into a tiresome inquiry concerning the soul, whether there are in it these three dispositions or not." "I do not think it will be very tiresome, Socrates: perhaps the proverb is true, that what is excellent is hard." "True," said I. "But I must tell you, Glaucon, that in my opinion, we shall never make this rightly out by the methods of discussion which are now in use. We must have a longer and larger road to lead us to our end. But perhaps it will answer our purpose to follow the same course which we have followed hitherto." "Shall we not then," said he, "content ourselves with that? I shall be satisfied with it for the present." "And," said I, "I shall be satisfied too." "Well then," said he, "do not shrink from the discussion, but set about it."

This preface prepares us for a detailed analysis of the human soul into certain leading elements. The inquiry is ingenious and curious, and has an important place in the history of ethical philosophy.

"But," said I, "we must needs acknowledge that each individual has in him the same dispositions and principles of action which the city has in it: for whence else could the city get them? It would be absurd to suppose that the irascible element in cities does not come from individuals. We see that it does thus arise, as in the nations

of Thrace and Scythia, and generally all that northern region. We see the knowledge-loving element, which we may especially ascribe to our own country. We see the money-loving element, which one may say is found mainly among the Phœnicians and Egyptians. This is plain and clear.

“But *this* is not so clear: whether we do 12 these three things with the *same* part of us, or whether there are *three* parts of us and we do one thing with each; that is, acquire knowledge with one part, feel anger with another part, and with a third desire food and other enjoyments; or whether we do each of these things with the whole of our soul, according to the direction which it takes. This is hard to determine.

“Let us try in this way to discover whether the parts are the same or different. It is plain that the same thing cannot do or suffer contrary things in the same sense with reference to the same object. If therefore we find the parts thus doing contrary things, we shall know that they are not the same, but several. Attend to an example. The same thing cannot at the same time be at rest and be in motion in the same sense. But let us exemplify this more precisely, that no doubt may remain. If any one say that a man may stand still, and yet move his hands and his head, and so is at rest and in motion at the same time, we should reply, I conceive, that this is not rightly expressed, but that a part of him is at rest and a part is in motion. And if our opponent should be still more ingenious, and should allege that a top is at the same time at rest and in motion, when it stands steadily on its point and spins, or any other thing when it revolves upon itself in like manner, we should not allow that

they are at rest and in motion as to the same parts of them. We should say that they have an axis and a circumference; that their axis is at rest,—it does not move in any direction; and their circumference is in motion in a circle: but when the top moves to the right or the left or backwards or forwards at the same time that it spins, then it is not at rest as to any part of it. And so an opponent making these objections will not disturb us, or make us think that the same thing can in the same sense and with regard to the same object, suffer or be or do contrary things. And so let us proceed confidently upon this principle.”

The laborious and careful preparation for the demonstration of Plato's analysis of the soul shows that the analysis was new; and the proofs have a considerable share of ingenuity. He now proceeds to them.

“To assent is the contrary of to dissent; to seek is the contrary of to reject; to attract is the contrary of to repel. Now thirst and hunger and the desires in general, and willing and purposing, are all things to which this rule may be applied. The soul of a man who desires, seeks that which it desires; attracts that which it wishes to have; when it wishes any object to be given to it, beckons to it, as it were, and shows its wish for it. And not to wish for, not to will, not to desire a thing, is an act of a contrary kind, namely, to refuse, to repel, to dissent.

“Now we have desires, and among the most obvious of them, hunger and thirst; the one the desire of meat, the other the desire of drink. And thirst, as thirst, is simply a desire of drink, and nothing more. There may be a desire of warm drink or of cold, of much drink or of little: but this is not thirst simply. If heat is added to thirst

it produces a desire of cold drink, if cold be added, it produces a desire of warm drink; but thirst itself is simply a desire of drink."

This, put interrogatively, is assented to.

"And again, it will not disturb us if any one says that men do not desire drink simply, but desire good drink; not meat only, but good meat. For we always desire what is good; and so the *good* is implied in the desire."

And by further reasoning of the same kind, it<sup>14</sup> is established that he who thirsts simply, desires to drink, and nothing else.

"If then, when the soul is affected by thirst, something holds it back, this must be something different from the principle of thirst which, like a wild beast, urges it on to drink: for, as we have said, the same principle cannot produce two opposite tendencies in the same thing. Thus you cannot say of a bowman that his hand at the same time pushes forwards and pulls back his bow: but that one hand pushes it and one pulls it.

"Now does it ever happen that men who are thirsty abstain from drinking?"

"Yes, many men, and very often."

"Then there must be in their souls a principle which impels them to drink, and a principle which restrains them from drinking, more powerful than the impelling principle?"—"So it appears."

"And this restraining principle, when it operates, comes by reasoning; that which impels and urges them arises from affections and lusts.

"We shall then not be wrong if we say that there are two different principles: the one that by which the man reasons, which we may call the *rational* part of the soul; and the other, by which he hungers and thirsts, and feels other desires; which we may call the *concupitive* part. And

thus we have two parts of the soul distinguished.

“But now as to anger, and the part of the soul with which we are angry,—is it a third part, or is it of the same nature as one of those two?”

“Perhaps,” says the friend, “it is of the same nature as the concupitive.”

This point is now to be examined: and first a story is told to show that desire may be on one side and anger on the other.

“I have heard a story which I believe. Here it is. Leontius the son of Aglaon was one day coming up to town from the Piræus along the northern wall; and perceiving that there were many dead bodies there, in the place of public execution, had a lust to look at them, and at the same time he was vexed at himself and turned his head away. For a time he resisted and kept his cloak over his head, but at last he was mastered by his desire and pulled his eyes open with his fingers, and ran to where the corpses were, and then he said, Ye accursed eyes, satiate yourselves with the pleasant sight!”

“I too,” said he, “have heard the story.”

“But the story,” said I, “shows that sometimes our anger is at war with our desires, as being something different from itself.”

“It does show that,” said he.

- 15 “And,” said I, “do we not on many other occasions, often see that when a man is mastered by his desires, against his reason, he is angry with the part of him which is thus mastered, and reproaches himself: just as if there were two opposite parties [desire and reason], and anger took its part as an ally of reason? But that anger should take part with the desires when reason had decided that the thing was not to be done, I think you

will allow never happened in your own case, nor have you known it in any other person's."—"Truly, no," said he.

"And is it not true," said I, "that when any one thinks himself to be in the wrong, in proportion as he has a more generous nature, so much the less can he feel anger; though he suffers pain, as hunger and cold, at the hands of him whom he thinks to be in the right? His anger, as I may say, will not be roused in such a case."—"True," said he.

"And on the other hand, if any one supposes that he is wronged, does not anger blaze up and become fierce, and take the side of what seems justice, and carry the man through hardships, hunger or cold, or whatever they may be, and conquer at last; and never desist till it obtains its end, or is destroyed; or else is called off by the reason, like a shepherd's dog called off by the shepherd?"

"It is," said he, "just as you say: and it falls in with what we arranged in our City, when we described the guards as dogs, who were to be obedient to the Rulers, the shepherds of the state."

"You apprehend well," said I, "what I mean. But consider a further consequence of what I am saying."—"What?"—"That anger is something very different from what we said a little while ago. We then thought it was of the nature of desire. But now we see that it is something very different; and that in the conflict of the soul it rather takes the side of the reason."—"Even so."

"Is it then different from the reason, or is it a form of the rational principle, so that there are not three but only two parts in the soul, the rational and the concupitive? or rather, as in the City we had three classes, the Producers, the



Guards, and the Councillors, so in the Soul, is the irascible a third element, naturally the ally of the rational element, if it be not spoilt by bad training?"—"It must needs," said he, "be a third element."

"Yes," said I, "if it turn out to be different from the rational, as it has appeared that it is different from the concupitive."

"It is," said he, "not difficult to see that it is different; for instance, one may see in boys that they have abundance of the irascible element from their very birth, but as to reason, some of them seem never to acquire it, and all acquire it late."

"You say well," said I. "And so also in brute animals you may see that it is so. And further, that line of Homer which we quoted before, shows the same thing:

'He smote his breast, rebuked his swelling heart.'

For there Homer makes one part rebuke another: the Reason, comparing the better and the worse, rebukes the irrationally angry mood."

"Enough," said he, "you have made it clear."

16 "And so," said I, "we have at last and with some trouble, settled this point; and shown that the elements which existed in our City exist in the soul of each individual; the same in kind and in number."

That the Reason, the Desires, and Anger are distinct kinds of Elements in the human soul, or, as we may perhaps more simply say, distinct Springs of Action in man, is an important step in ethical and psychological philosophy. In the prolix, laborious and formal manner in which Plato establishes this truth, we may see evidence that

it was, at least as a clear and distinct doctrine solidly proved, new at his time. Indeed the novelty of the doctrine appears from the phraseology which he uses. Reason, Desire and Anger, are to us terms familiar yet definite, which at once imply this doctrine and almost supersede the need of proof. But Plato does not assume these abstract terms as points for which and by which he may reason. He speaks not at first of the Reason, but of *that* (principle) *by which* we learn: not of Anger, but of *that by which* we are angry.

The distinction being once propounded and proved, has been accepted ever since; and was in succeeding times expressed by a technical phraseology. Anger was called the *irascible* part of man; and sometimes Desire was called the *concupiscible* part. But it is better to call it *concupitive*; for *cupio* or *concupisco* is not a deponent verb as *irascor* is; *concupiscible* would by analogy mean desirable\*, not, actuated by desire.

That what I have translated *anger* means anger in the simplest sense of the word, the whole of the argument shows. Nevertheless some modern English translators appear to have had a repugnance to this rendering. I suppose that they were disturbed at having to take Anger as an element of Virtue. Accordingly they have called this element "the spirited element;"—a most loose and vague expression, and a piece of very doubtful English. Such an expression is quite unfit to take its place in Plato's sharp and demonstrative analysis. And that Anger, in its plainest sense, *has* an office on the side of Virtue, they might have learnt was not a strange opinion or a mere fancy of Plato's. In very recent times we have

\* It is so used by S. Jerome.

had the same doctrine forcibly expounded by a celebrated moralist of our own, Butler. But Anger operating on the right side is perhaps better described as Virtuous Indignation.

The Platonic analysis of the human mind being thus established, the construction of the quaternion of Virtues is not difficult.

"It now follows that by the same element and in the same manner as the City was wise, the individual must be wise. In the same manner and by the same element by which the individual is brave, the City must be brave: and so of the rest."—"It must."

"And so, Glaucon, we must say that an individual must be just, in the same way in which the City is just."—"This too must be."

"But we must not forget that the City was just, in virtue of the three classes each doing its own business."

"No, we are not likely to forget that."

"We must remember then that each of us in whom each part does its own work is a just man."—"We must remember that."

"Now the work of the rational part is to govern, it being supposed to be wise, and to exercise a guardianship over the whole soul. And the irascible part must be obedient to this and an ally of this. And this agreement must be brought about by a good education: by gymnastic and music, as we have said, which will bring those parts of the soul into concord, nourishing and strengthening the reason with beautiful discourse and science, softening, soothing, and controlling the irascible part by harmony and rhythm."—"Quite so," said he.

"And these two parts being thus educated and taught to do their duty, are to be placed over

the concupitive part, which really forms the largest part in every soul, and which by its nature never can be satiated. This they will keep watch over, in order that it may not be filled too full by what are called corporeal enjoyments, and so may become too strong, and may not be content to do its own work only; but may aspire to govern those parts with which it has nothing to do, and so may disturb the whole scheme of life."—"Exactly so," said he.

"And these two, [Reason and Anger,] thus working together, the one by counsel, the other by fighting, will best perform their guardianship against external enemies: Anger obeying the Ruler Reason, and giving to Courage the task which Reason directs."—"Even so."

"And we call each individual *brave* from the irascible part of his soul, when it holds fast through pains and pleasures, the standard of dangerous and not dangerous settled by the Reason."—"Right," said he.

"And we call him *wise* from that small part of his soul by which he exercises this command and gives these orders: for that part has the knowledge of what is best for each part, and for the whole."—"Even so."

"But we call him *temperate* or self-controlled by the agreement and harmony which exist between the part which governs and the part which is governed [the desires], when they agree that the Reason is to rule, and do not oppose its authority."

"Yes," said he, "that and nothing else is temperance, either in a city or an individual."

"And he must be just, in the same way, and through the same cause which we have repeatedly alleged" [namely, by each part doing its own work].—"Necessarily."

"And now is there anything which dulls our vision, and prevents us from seeing that justice is the same thing in the individual which it was shown to be in the state? If any doubt remained in our minds, we might remove it by tracing the monstrous consequences of the contrary supposition."

"As how?"

"For instance, with regard both to the City and to the Individual who resembles the City in constitution and in training, can we suppose that he would turn to his own use a deposit of gold and silver? or that he would be guilty of temple-robbery, or theft or fraud, committed either upon any of his companions or upon the state? No, he would be out of the sphere of such acts. He would not deviate from good faith either in the matter of oaths or any other contracts. Adultery, neglect of parents, disregard of the worship of the Gods, would be in his course of action least of any one's."—"How could it be otherwise?"

"And the cause of all this is that each part of him does its own work, be it to govern or to be governed."—"That and nothing else."

"And do you then seek for any other kind of Justice than this power which we have described, which gives rise to such cities and to such men?"

"By Jupiter," said he, "I do not."

17 "And so our dream is come true; and that which we anticipated is realized; namely, that in founding our City we should find there a type and image of Justice."—"Thanks to some divinity we have found it."

"And so it appears that we have a sort of image of Justice when we exhort the shoemaker who is such by his nature, to attend to his shoe-

making and not to meddle with other things, and the smith to attend to his smith's work, and the like. But in the real description of Justice this is to be applied, not to external actions, but to internal springs of action; these are not to be allowed to interfere with each other's work; the three elements are to work harmoniously together like the three notes of a chord, the octave, the key-note, and the fifth. The man is to combine harmoniously all the elements of his being, and then to set about his work, whatever it may be, business private or public. In all these cases he must think and call *that* just which produces and preserves such a habit; he must call wisdom the knowledge which directs such action; he must call *that* unjust which violates this harmony; and that he must call depraved knowledge which directs such a course."

"You say what is quite right, Socrates," said he.

"So be it," said I; "and so if we venture to say that we have found what is a just man, what is a just city, and what is justice, which exists in them, we should probably not be far wrong." This is agreed to.—"And so then we say."—"So we say."

Notwithstanding the somewhat triumphant tone of this conclusion, there is, as I have said, a want of symmetry and completeness in this Platonic derivation of the four cardinal virtues. It is here represented that, as being *just*, a man is withheld from theft, adultery, and the like. But it is plain that such vices arise from the predominance of the desires, and are prevented when the desires are controlled by the Reason; and thus the opposite virtues are results of Temperance. And thus this fourth Virtue, Justice, occupies ground already occupied by [right] of the other three.

Indeed if we apply the Platonic doctrine of the three springs of action, Reason, Anger and Desire, in a more simple manner, we shall be led to a simpler and more coherent ethical system. Wisdom is the Virtue of Reason; Courage or Virtuous Energy exists when Anger is under the guidance and direction of Reason; and the empire of Reason over the Desires may be called Temperance in a large sense. But of the Desires, some are Bodily Appetites, and Temperance is rather spoken of as the due control of these: others of the Desires refer to more abstract objects, as for example, Property; and the regulation of such Desires by Reason is more commonly called Justice. And thus we should have an account of Justice more nearly parallel to the account of the other Virtues than that which Plato gives us; which is indeed somewhat vague and confused.

It is, however, as I have said, propounded somewhat triumphantly, and Socrates goes on to conclude his lecture :

“ Let this be so,” said I: “ and now we must consider what Injustice is. It is plainly a dissonance of the three elements which we have mentioned; an interference of one part with another; a jumbling together and crossing of purposes among these parts; an insurrection of some part which ought to be subordinate against the part which by its nature should rule. This confusion and perversion it is which constitutes Injustice and Intemperance, and Cowardice, and perverse-mindedness, and in short vice of every kind.

18 “ And so as we see what is Justice and what is Injustice, we see what it is to do Justice and to commit Injustice; and the difference of the two is manifest.”

“ What is it?” said he.

“The same,” said I, “in the soul, as the difference of health and disease in the body. As health consists in having those parts of the Body superior and those subordinate which nature intended to be so; and disease in having the operation of the parts contrary to nature; so Justice causes the parts of the Soul to govern which are by nature superior, and Injustice makes some part of the Soul rule and govern contrary to nature. And so Virtue is a Health of the mind, a Comeliness and Good Habit of the Soul, and Vice is a Disease and Deformity and Weakness of the same.

“Moreover, good actions lead to the possession of Virtue; bad actions to the possession of Vice.

“And what remains for us now is, to consider whether it is advantageous to do good actions, to practise what is right, and to be just, whether we are or are not known to be such; or to do wrong and to be unjust, though we may not incur punishment or chastisement.”

“But,” said he, “O Socrates, this inquiry now seems to me absurd. For if when the health of the body is ruined, life is not tolerable, even in the midst of all the pleasures of sense and wealth and power, can it be that when that principle by which we live [the Soul] is perverted and ruined, it is worth our while to live, even if we might do anything that we pleased—anything but that by which we might get rid of our vice and depravity, and acquire justice and virtue; their nature being such as we have described?”

“Absurd enough,” said I. “But since we have attained a point of view whence we see clearly that this is so, we must not flag in our speculations.”

“Certainly not by any means must we flag,” said he.

“Follow me, then,” said I, “that you may see



what the forms of vice are; for it is worth your while to look at them."

"I follow," said he; "go on with your explanation."

"Well," said I, "from the point of view to which we have now mounted, I seem to see as from a watch-tower, that the form of Virtue is one, and the forms of Vice are innumerable; but that there are four of them which are worth especial notice."

"How mean you?" said he.

"As many kinds of polity as there are in states, so many constitutions of the soul are there likely to be."

"How many is that?" said he.

"Five kinds of Polity, five kinds of Soul."

"Name them."

"I say then that the kind of Polity which we have described [as representing Virtue] is one; but it has two names: when the Ruler is one it is called Monarchy; when several, Aristocracy. This I call one kind. For neither the one nor the many would change the fundamental laws of the state; being found and educated as we have described."

"Certainly not," said he.

Here the fourth Book ends, though the Dialogue obviously requires a continuation of the discussion;—an exposition of the various forms of polity different from monarchy and aristocracy, and of the vices analogous to these imperfect kinds of polity.

But here come in an enormous series of digressions, occupying the fifth, sixth and seventh Books. These digressions treat of the condition of women in the Ideal Polity, the state of philosophy, and other large subjects. But in the Eighth Book

the continuation of the Fourth Book really appears, and to that I shall proceed; making it, however, a separate Part of the Polity.

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### REMARKS ON THE IDEAL POLITY.

IN some of the Dialogues of the Antisophist class we have views which may be regarded as anticipations of the system presented in the *Republic*. Thus in the *Gorgias* we have the declaration (§ 133) that virtue in the soul depends upon its having a right constitution; though it is not there stated what the elements of the soul are, among which the constitution is to be established. And in the *Phædrus* (§ 54) the soul is represented as a charioteer who has to guide a pair of horses; one good, and one bad. These two horses seem to be Reason and Desire, so that we have not yet here the separation of Desire and Anger as different springs of action, which is one main point in the Polity. Plutarch indeed makes the charioteer to be Reason, and the two steeds to be Desire and Anger; which makes the system of the *Phædrus* to agree very closely with that of the Polity. But it appears more likely that the psychological analysis of the springs of action into Reason, Desire, and Anger, was a step made by Plato after the incomplete speculations of the *Gorgias*, the *Phædrus*, and the *Philebus*; and was the discovery which set him upon constructing the system of his Polity. It may seem to be using too strong an expression to call this step a *discovery*; and yet we cannot doubt that Plato so regarded it, when we look at the very elaborate manner in which he proves the distinction of Desire and Anger from Reason and from one another. (B. IV. § 14, &c.) Indeed to mark the place and office of Anger in the constitution of man has been regarded as a valuable step in psychology in more modern times, in the case of our Bishop Butler. And even now it would seem that Plato's discovery, as he at least regarded it, is not generally well understood. He held

Anger to be a necessary element of human virtue; as a component of Courage, Zeal, Virtuous Indignation, and the like. Some of his modern English translators have been so startled by this doctrine that they refuse to translate the word Anger, and try to avoid the shock by calling it "the Spirited Element," and the like: but it is very plain, both from Plato's language and his illustrations, that he meant plain downright Anger. And that this feeling may be an element of virtuous sentiments, St Paul held no less than Plato; as we see, among other places, by what he says to the Corinthians (2 Cor. vii. 11), with obvious approval, "This...what carefulness it wrought in you; yea, what clearing of yourselves; yea, what indignation; yea, what fear; yea, what vehement desire; yea, what revenge!" And there can be no doubt that Anger is really a distinct and important part in the constitution of man, and that virtue consists in the due direction and control of it as an important part of morality.

And the main ethical result of the *Republic* may be expressed by saying, that the leading springs of Human Action are Reason, Anger and Desire:—that a virtuous character consists in the due harmony of these; Reason directing Anger, and both controlling Desire; and that Happiness arises from this harmony.

This may appear a very inadequate result of so large an apparatus of hypothesis and argumentation. Yet the distinct separation of those three elements of the human soul was really a great step in ethical philosophy, and has governed the treatment of the subject ever since. The promised proof of the doctrine which is rather positively and ostentatiously asserted, here and elsewhere, that virtue is happiness, even under external circumstances of the most adverse kind, might, I think, have been considered by some of Socrates's hearers as incomplete, but it is supposed to be acquiesced in as decisive.

The Polity being, as I have said, a system resulting from an advance in Plato's views beyond the other Dialogues which I have mentioned, must be supposed to have been written at a later period than they were: that is probably some years after Plato had returned from his travels and established himself in the Academia, which we conceive to have happened about 388 B. C.

It is stated by some authors that the Polity was published in separate parts at successive intervals. Aulus Gellius says (xiv. 3) that Xenophon read two Books of the *Republic*, which came out first, and thereupon wrote his *Cyropædia*, in opposition to Plato's scheme. We can hardly conceive any part to have been published separately which did not go as far as the end of the fourth Book; for, short of that, there is no system expounded nor any conclusion drawn. At that point the system is in a certain sense completed; and accordingly I have terminated the Second Part at that point.

That other parts of the Polity, as it now stands, were published by Plato, that is, read or in some way delivered to his disciples, separately, and that this was done at a subsequent period, is a supposition which the structure of the work strongly supports. As I shall have to notice, in the later parts of the work, the complex element, Desire, is analysed into several separate Desires; and the phraseology is more definite and compact than it is in the earlier Books. And as to the separation of our Part III. from Part II., we may remark, that though the eighth Book is and professes to be an immediate sequel to the fourth, there intervenes a vast series of digressions, which if delivered at first along with the parts of the system, must have overwhelmed and obscured all perception of system, and overtaken the patience of the most devoted disciples. Considered as disquisitions on special points, followed out at leisure in the Platonic school, when the Polity had become an established topic, they are intelligible and interesting.

Difficulties have been raised as to the date of the publication of the Polity, by commentators who have supposed that the functions of women in the Platonic Polity are ridiculed in the *Ecclesiazusæ* or *Female Parliament* of Aristophanes, which was brought upon the stage B. C. 392; and that therefore the Polity must have been published before that date. But in truth there is no ground for supposing that the Comedy had any special reference to the Platonic Polity. Such an extravaganza as the *Female Parliament* has often suggested itself to the dealer in fiction; and the institutions of Sparta exhibited in a real form some of the traits of the *Female State*. And the manner in which Plato anticipates and protests against the ridicule which proposals like his might excite

(*Rep. B. v. § 3*), rather suggests the belief that such a plan had already been made the subject of ridicule in some public manner, and thus that the Female part of the Platonic Polity was published after the Female Parliament.

As to the *dramatic* date of the Polity—the period when the Dialogue is supposed to be held,—the date which suits best with the notes of time in the Dialogue itself appears to be about B. C. 410; when Socrates was 58 years old; Plato 20, and his two brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, probably a few years older; when Lysias (afterwards the Orator), who was the son of Cephalus, and is present at the Dialogue (see § 2), had just returned from Thuriæ, to which he went at an early age; when Perdiccas (see § 9) had long been known as king of Macedon, and Niceratus, the son of Nikias, who was also present (§ 1), and who was a boy at the time of the *Laches*, was now a man. Some doubt has been thrown upon this date because the author of the *Lives of Ten Rhetors*, sometimes called Plutarch, says that Cephalus died before the departure of his son Lysias; but this is very insecure authority, and moreover could not be followed without throwing the whole of Plato's dramatic representation into confusion.

# THE REPUBLIC.

## PART III.—OF IMPERFECT POLITIES AND OF VICES.

(*Republic*, B. VIII. and IX. § 1—17.)

HAVING at the end of the Fourth Book established the constitution of the Perfect Polity and the character of the Virtuous Man, Socrates announces that the next subject of discussion is to be the deviations from this polity and from this character. This subject is taken up in the beginning of the Eighth Book; the intermediate Books, in the form in which the work has come down to us, being occupied with digressions. I shall proceed to give an account of this continuation of the *Republic*; dealing, however, rather with the matter than with the detail of the Dialogue. Glaucon says, referring to the end of the Fourth Book:

“You had finished describing the constitution 1  
of your city, and said that such a city you called  
*good*, and also a man whose constitution was like  
that of the city; and you added, that if this was  
good, all the rest were wrong. You proceeded to say,  
if I recollect, that there were four other forms of  
polity which it was worth our while to consider;  
to examine their defects and to estimate the indi-  
vidual men who resemble them:—this we were to

do, that we might see who is the best man and who is the worst man, and so might decide whether the best man is the happiest and the worst the most miserable, or how otherwise. And when I was asking you what were these four kinds of polity, Polemarchus and Adeimantus interposed, and you followed their lead, and so are come to the present stage of the discussion."

"You remember the course of the conversation quite rightly."

"Now then do, as wrestlers do. Give me the same hold of you again. Supposing me to ask the same question, give me the answer which you were then going to give."

"Well," said I, "I will if I can."

"I want to know what are the four polities of which you spoke."

"It is easy to name them," said I. "They have names which are well known. First, there is that which is admired by many, the Cretan and Laconian, [Timocracy]. Secondly, there is the one which is next in general estimation, and which is called Oligarchy; a polity full of evils. Next there is a different polity, Democracy; and last and different again, is Tyranny, the fourth, the climax of political disease. These are all; for can you mention any really distinct kind of polity that is different from these? Monarchies by descent, and constitutions in which offices are sold, may still be ranked with these; for such there are both among the barbarians and Greeks."

"Many and strange constitutions!" said he.

2 "And you know that there must be so many kinds of character of men, as there are of polities. [The state must derive its character from the individual;] or do you think that states have their origin from oaks or rocks? [though men have not,

as Homer makes Achilles say:] do you not think that they are determined by the manners of their citizens; which in whatever direction they go, draw the institutions of the state after them?"

This is assented to: and so, as Socrates says, there being five kinds of Polity, there must be five kinds of individual character.

These they now proceed to examine.

"The individual who resembles an Aristocracy, we have already passed in review. We say that he is the virtuous and just man.

"And now we must pass in review the worse characters:—the ambitious, who is on the model of the Lacedæmonian state; the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannic man. This we must do that we may put in antithesis the most just and the most unjust man; and see how pure justice is relatively to pure injustice in respect of happiness and misery: and so may take the advice of Thrasymachus, and make injustice our line of action; or else justice, in favour of which the arguments now seem to prevail."

Socrates then proceeds to explain, at some length, the several kinds of evil polity, and the analogous vicious characters; introducing various fanciful hypothetical histories by which they may be connected. The symmetry of this Platonic system would perhaps be more evident, if it were stated more briefly, with less variety of phrase and fewer attendant circumstances. The statement would then amount to this:—that the bad polity may result from the predominance of the military class, or of the wealthy class, or of the lower classes generally, or of some one master:—and that the characters corresponding to these evil polities are the ambitious man, who is actuated by the desire of superiority; the avaricious man, who is pos-



sessed by the love of wealth ; the ungoverned and unstable man, who is ruled by the whole mob of passions ; and the darker criminal who is impelled by some master passion which tramples down all control. The first Polity Plato calls a Timocracy ; for which name he gives reasons ; although in this use of the word he differs from Aristotle, as we shall see. The second Polity he calls an Oligarchy ; meaning, it would seem, an Oligarchy of Wealth ; for the former Polity is by the hypothesis an Oligarchy no less. The third Polity is a Democracy, and the fourth a Tyranny. I will give a few traits of the several parts of this exposition.

What Plato's Timocracy is, is plain from the course of the Dialogue. "Having considered the best form of government, Aristocracy, we must now go through the less good forms ; and first the ambitious and contentious, the Laconian ; the Timocratic, as I may call it, for I know no other name for it."

He then proceeds to give a hypothetical explanation of the transition from Aristocracy to Timocracy. "All revolution from one form of government to another must arise from some dissension in the governing part. And now, how may such a revolution arise in the state which we have imagined ? May a dissension arise between the Rulers and the Warriors ? Shall we invoke the Muses to reveal to us the origin of this dissension, as Homer invokes them to sing the dissensions of Achilles and Agamemnon, and shall we make them speak in a lofty and poetical style, as if they were telling poetical tales to children, and yet in earnest ?"

Having thus prepared the hearer to expect something of poetical fiction and poetical expression in his account, he proceeds to declare, as from the Muses, that states, like the generations of

plants and animals, are subject to certain cycles of growth and decay. These cycles are governed by a certain geometrical number, of which the origin and construction are described in a very obscure and mystical manner, which has given rise to many interpretations by scholars and mathematicians. This *Numerus Platonicus* still continues to be a *crux* of the commentators. It is however unessential to the general argument, and I shall pass it by.

“The result of this discord in the elements of the State is then described as making the Rulers less apt to discern the ages or races of gold and of silver, of brass and of iron, of which Hesiod speaks, and which exist in our city. (See Book III. § 20.) And so the iron is mixed with the silver and the brass with the gold, and in these is a defect in homogeneity, which ever breeds war and discord. And this is the origin of that dissension of which we spoke.” This Socrates gives as the account delivered by the Muses. “And,” says his friend, “we must say that they have answered well.”

“How could they do otherwise, Muses as they are?”

He goes on in the same playful vein to trace <sup>3</sup> further the consequences of this schism in the State. The different classes, the races of brass and of iron (that is the artisans and husbandmen), aspire to enrich themselves and to acquire lands, houses, gold and silver; while the races of gold and silver (the Rulers and Soldiers) hold to the old constitution.

And the result of this dissension is that they come to an agreement that the Soldiers shall form a military aristocracy possessing the land, while the husbandmen and artisans occupy it as their

dependents, like *Periokoi*; (the Provincials of Laconia and of Crete).

This is a Polity, he remarks, intermediate between Aristocracy and Oligarchy, meaning by Aristocracy the best kind of government. It agrees with this in its respect for the magistrates, the aversion of the soldiers to the pursuits of agriculture and trade, and the habit of dining at a common table, and of cultivating gymnastic and military exercises. On the other hand, the predominance of military rule will exclude the wise men who are the natural rulers. And these military rulers will really nourish in secret a love of wealth, and will lavish it upon their private pleasures, driven to this course by the want of the culture which the true Muse gives, namely philosophy and music, which they have deserted for gymnastic. "And so," as Glaucon observes, "this kind of state is mingled of good and ill." "But its most prominent character is," Socrates rejoins, "that it is contentious and ambitious."

"And now, who is the man who corresponds to this kind of state? What is his character?"

4 "I think," says Adeimantus, jesting at his brother, "he must be something very like this our Glaucon, at least so far as ambition is concerned."

We may recollect, as illustrative of Glaucon's ambitious character, what Xenophon tells us in the *Memorabilia* (III. 6), that when he was not yet twenty years old he attempted to ascend the *bema* of the political orators, and was with difficulty dragged down and laughed down by his friends. Socrates replies:

"In that trait perhaps there may be a likeness: but in other things not so. He must be more self-willed and less fond of literature; though he too may have a love of literature, and may be

fond of reading or hearing, but by no means of speaking in public. To his slaves he will be fierce, not treating them with contempt, like a man well brought up; to freemen gentle, submissive to rulers; eager for superior place and honour, but not seeking them by eloquence, but by warlike deeds and arts; fond of bodily exercise and of the chase."

"That," says his friend, "is really the character of the man who corresponds to such a polity."

Socrates adds another trait:

"As a young man, he despises wealth; but as he grows older, the love of riches which is in his nature, grows stronger; the more so, as his nature is not pure, and wants the best guardian."

"What is that?" Adeimantus asks.

"Philosophy joined with Music. That alone once implanted in the soul, keeps it virtuous through life. And *that* is the timocratic young man."

We then have a hypothetical history of the way in which such a character is generated.

"His character is formed in some such way as this. He is, it may be, the son of a father who is a good man, but living in a state not well governed, shuns public office and honours and all *that* bustle, and tries to be obscure, so as not to be troubled with such things. And this being so, the youth hears his mother lamenting that her husband is nobody among the men, and that thereby she is nobody among the women....He hears her declare she has lost all patience with him; that he is indolent and a man of no character, and such other things as women in like case use to say. And in such families, the servants, too, often say things of the same kind to the son of the house, to ingratiate themselves with him. And if the youth runs in

debt, and the father does not help him out, or fails him in any other way, they exhort him to set all such matters right when he is a man, and so to be a better man than his father. And he learns the like lessons out of doors. He sees those who mind their own business despised as fools, and those who meddle with other people's business rewarded with praise and honour. And so the youth, impelled by these various influences,—the rational principle which he has from his father being still strong in him, while others excite the irascible and concupitive principles, as he is not bad by nature but is misled by these evil communications, takes a middle course;—he gives the ascendancy to the irascible and contentious principles, and so becomes an aspiring and ambitious man."

This fanciful and detailed account of the domestic circumstances by which an ambitious character is formed, is so particular that it might almost be deemed a portrait of some actual person. It is however accepted as merely hypothetical. And Socrates says that having thus disposed of the second Polity and the second man, they must proceed to another: quoting *Æschylus*, who, in the *Seven against Thebes*, speaks of the seven chiefs as

"Each man against the City separate stands."

Or rather, he says, as before, we must take the City first.

- 5 "We must now, therefore, consider the form of government which is called Oligarchy: that is, when people have a place in the state according to their income; so that the rich are the rulers, and the poor have no political power.

"How a timocracy passes into such an oligarchy as this, even a blind man," Socrates says, "may see. The love of wealth grows with possession. Men,

in spite of laws, expend more and more upon themselves and their wives. This becomes a matter of emulation among them. They value wealth more and more, virtue less and less. And so from being ambitious they become avaricious; worship wealth rather than honour; put the rich man in high places and despise the poorer man. And then they make offices of power depend on the amount of a man's riches, and exclude from them every one who has not a certain amount of wealth.

“Such is the origin of oligarchy. Its evils are, in the first place, that the Rulers are not chosen for their fitness, and therefore are not likely to be fit for their office. In the next place, that the City is, in fact, two cities, one of rich men and one of poor men. They inhabit the same place, but are always framing designs the one against the other. Then in the third place, the City has little strength for war. If they arm the many, they will have to fear them more than they fear the enemy: if they do not, they will have an army truly oligarchical, for it will be the few.

“But the greatest of all the evils belonging to such a state is that a man may get rid of all that he has, another may acquire it, and so the former man may go on living in the City without being any part of it—neither tradesman nor artificer, horsesoldier nor footsoldier; but a pauper—an impotent person. This vice is universal and irremediable in oligarchies. And the man who has thus spent his possessions has done no good to the state: whatever his position might be, he was really a prodigal and nothing more. He was like a drone in a hive of bees, a mere excrescence of the state.

“But the winged drones in a swarm of bees are all constituted by providence without stings; of our biped drones, some have not stings, some

have very formidable ones. Those without stings continue paupers to the end of their days: of those that have stings come all the race of malefactors. When you see a city full of poor classes, you may be sure that there are among them thieves and pickpockets and burglars, and all such evil practitioners. And so in oligarchical states there are many such dangerous people whom the magistrates only keep down by force.

- 7 "Such is the oligarchical city, and these and more than these are the evils which exist in it. And now let us see who is the man whom such a state represents; how he is formed, and what is his character.

"The son [of a man in a timarchical state] is at first disposed to follow in his father's footsteps: but sees the state to be a rock on which his father suffers shipwreck and loses all;—perhaps in consequence of having had to command an army, and then being dragged to a trial by informers, and punished with death, or exile, or infamy, and the loss of all his havings. The young man, seeing all this, finding himself destitute, and fearing what may happen to himself, drives ambition and an aspiring temper away from his soul's throne; and humbled by poverty turns to money-making, and by toiling and sparing gets together a mass of riches. Do you not suppose that then he will place upon the throne of which we have spoken, the Love of Money; that he will make *that* the Great King of his soul, put upon it a tiara, gird it with the robe and sword of an eastern monarch? Neither Reason nor virtuous Zeal can hold their place in opposition to this predominant Greed. He only reasons how less may be made more, he is only zealous in his admiration of riches and rich men; he is only ambitious of wealth or something which may lead to wealth."

“Certainly,” says Adeimantus, “there can be no other way so swift and sure of changing an ambitious young man into an avaricious one.”

“And now,” says Socrates, “what is the character of the man thus formed? He is like the oligarchical state. He thinks wealth the greatest thing in the world. He is penurious and laborious, and grants to nature no more than the necessary desires require, cutting down all other expenses, subjugating his other desires as unprofitable. He is a sordid man, who makes money out of everything, and hoards it when made: a quality which the many much admire.”

He then goes on to trace in the avaricious man what is analogous to the division of the oligarchical state into rich and poor, and to the evil propensities of the poor.

“This avaricious man has not been well educated. Hence he has those desires which in the state we compared to drones, some of them beggars, some of them criminals, kept in subjection only by the dominant power. And how will the criminal part of his Desires appear? It will come out when he has the guardianship of an orphan, or some other opportunity of doing wrong with impunity. In other cases where he has to act in concert with other men, he will look to his reputation for being an honest man, and will control the evil desires that are in him; not because he thinks it really good to do so, nor in obedience to reason, but through necessity and fear of endangering his possessions. It is not that there are no factions in the breast of such a man. He is two men, not one; but for the most part the better desires control the worse. He will be more decent than other persons; but true unity of soul and love of virtue are far from him. He is not well fitted for



the competition of public life. He is too sparing of his money; for he is afraid to arouse the host of Desires that might be auxiliaries, but might also be insurgents, and that would lead to expense; and so using only a part of his revenues, he is almost always beaten, but always grows rich. And so the covetous man is a parallel to the oligarchical city."

We come next to the consideration of Democracy, its occasion, its character, and that of the man who is analogous to it. And here, as before, the hypothetical history is so special and the traits of character are so grotesque, as to suggest the suspicion that some particular state and particular man are spoken of. Socrates discourses to this effect, obtaining, as usual, assent at each step.

"The change from oligarchy to democracy takes place in some such way as this. It arises from the love of wealth, regarded at first, as the greatest good. The Rulers, made such by their wealth only, will not restrain by laws the profligacy of the young. They like them to spend all they have, that they themselves may purchase their estates, and have them dependent on them by usury, and so may become more rich and more powerful still. The worship of wealth is inconsistent with temperate and virtuous habits; and the facilities of profuse and profligate indulgence in oligarchical states often reduce men of ability to a state of destitution; and so you have in such a state a class—drones with formidable stings such as we spoke of—composed of persons in debt, or in infamy, or in both, who are waiting for their opportunity to put down those who have deprived them of their havings, and are eager for a revolution. And all this while the greedy oligarchs are blind to this state of things, and are employed in

extracting fresh gains from their remaining victims by extravagant usury: and thus will not apply the only remedy to this evil; which is, either to prohibit men from selling their estates, or to make the lenders lend at their own risk. And so the governed become profligate and effeminate, and the rulers are engrossed in the care of their money.

“The classes being thus disposed towards one another, when the governors and the governed find any occasion to compare their strength—when they travel together, or meet together in the public spectacles, or in the army, in a voyage or in a campaign, or in any occasion of danger—the rich soon see that they have no ground to despise the poor. It will often happen that men are ranged side by side, a poor man strong and sunburnt, and a rich man bred in the shade, laden with much superfluous flesh, asthmatic and helpless; and then do you not think that the poor man will say to himself, ‘They owe their riches to our cowardice?’ and such men will say among themselves, ‘Our great men are worth very little.’ And, as when a body is in bad condition it only needs the smallest external accident to bring out disease, and sometimes disease shows itself without any external cause; so a state which is in this condition falls into factions on the smallest pretext; for instance, if the oligarchy seek the help of another oligarchical city, or if the people have recourse to a democratical city, or sometimes the factions break out with no external influence.

“And then, when the poor get the upper hand, 10 they put to death or banish their adversaries, and distribute public offices equally among all who remain, generally by lot; and so there is a Democracy.”

“Yes,” says the other, “that is the way a

Democracy comes in ; whether the parties come to actual conflict, or the rich retire at the prospect of the danger."

"And now what is the character of the City so constituted? for the democratic man, too, must have a like character. In the first place the City is entirely free; every body in it does and says what he likes. Every one takes the course of life which he likes best. And as there are in the City men of all characters, this produces a great variety. There is a beauty in this polity arising from this variety. It is like a garment of many colours diversified with flowers of every kind. And women and children, who like a collection of gay colours, may naturally think this the most beautiful polity.

"And such a City is a place where we may conveniently seek a polity for ourselves: for every kind of polity is to be found there. It is a sort of bazaar, where you may see patterns of all kinds of governments; and people who, like us, want to found a new city, may find the plan of it there.

"And is there not something marvellously convenient to be in a place where you are not obliged to do anything? You need not be a Governor, if you do not wish it, however fit you may be: you need not be governed; you need not be at war when the others are at war, nor at peace except you like peace. If any law prevents you taking an office, or acting as a judge, you may nevertheless take the office and assume the judge.

"And is there not a peculiar indulgence shown to men under condemnation? Have you not seen in such a city, men who had been sentenced to death or to exile, nevertheless staying in the city and going about among other people; nobody noticing such a man or caring about the law, he

walks among them like a hero? All this magnanimous indulgence, this disregard of small scruples, how completely it tramples under foot the maxims of government which we were simple enough to lay down, about the need of a good education. All education is here disregarded; and the man is honoured if only he calls himself a friend of the people.

“And these, and the like of these, are the characters of democracy. It is, as we see, a pleasant kind of government, or of no government, beautifully chequered, establishing an equality among the equal and the unequal alike.”

We see that Athens is in the thoughts of the writer, during this satirical and ironical description.

“Yes,” says his friend, “you utter well-known truths.”

“And now look,” said I, “at the individual 11 who is like this. Or rather let us first consider, as in the case of the state, how the character originates.”

But we may conveniently abridge this account. It amounts in effect to this; that the son of an oligarchical father, educated ill, and parsimoniously, is 12 liable to an insurrection of the desires which tend to luxurious pleasures; and so is led to reject the authority of reason, and to hold that all the desires alike are to be obeyed. And so he lives for the present day without care or control, indulging the desire of the moment: sometimes revelling and swilling wine; sometimes fasting and drinking water; then, devoted to gymnastics; sometimes to bodily ease; sometimes sedulous about philosophy, and often about politics. Sometimes he is emulous of men of war; sometimes of men of business. There is no order nor rule in his life; yet he calls it sweet and free and happy.

“And the man whom we describe, like the city which I described, is full of all kinds of fancies, pretty and variegated.”

“Yes,” says the friend, “you have described the life of a democratic man: a man free from control.”

13 “And now we have to describe the finest polity of all, and the finest man; Tyranny and the Tyrant.”

“And how does Tyranny arise from Democracy?”—“Much in the same way in which Democracy arises from Oligarchy: as in *that* case, from the exaggerated love of the supposed greatest good, money, so in this, from the exaggerated love of that which is conceived as the greatest good, liberty. In a democratic city, you hear everybody say that liberty is the most precious thing in the world, and that he who is born a freeman cannot live in any other condition.”

“Yes,” said he, “we often hear that said. And how does this temper give rise to tyranny?”

“Thus,” said I: “<sup>1</sup> When a democracy is intoxicated with liberty, the Rulers, if they are not very indulgent, and do not give abundant freedom to the people, are subjected to punishment on charges of treasonable and oligarchical practices. Those who are obedient to the magistrates are insulted as servile and contemptible. The Rulers who resemble the subjects, the subjects who resemble the Rulers, are praised and honoured in private and in public. Everything is guided by this notion of freedom. It makes its way into private life in the shape of family anarchy, which extends even to the cattle. The father assumes the habits of the son, and stands in fear of his son. The son, on his part, has no reverence for his

<sup>1</sup> This is translated by Cicero in his *Republic*, I. 43.

father, for he is a freeman. The teacher fears and pays court to his pupils; the pupils disregard the teacher and tutor. In all respects the young men are on terms of equality with the old; dispute with them in words, oppose them in deeds. The old sit in the company of the young, and enjoy with them the pleasures of luxury and good fellowship, that they may not appear harsh and despotic. And what is the last step in such a case? Slaves, male and female, are no less free than those who have bought them; and as for the freedom and equality of women towards men, and of men towards women, I had almost forgotten to speak of it."

Socrates is disposed to add even more grotesque traits of freedom, but he hesitates:

"May one," he says, "according to Æschylus's phrase, utter what comes to the lips? Well then," he says, "this freedom extends even to brutes. For verily the dogs, according to the proverb, are like their masters<sup>1</sup>; and the horses and asses walk along the roads in a most free and independent manner, running against any one they meet if he do not get out of the way."

"Why," said he, "you remind me of what I had dreamt. I never go into the country without meeting with such adventures."

"But the end of all this is," said I, "that the citizens become sensitive and touchy, and will not bear any laws, either written or unwritten, that they may be sure they are not under a master."

We may imagine that Plato had, by retirement in his grove of Academus, become so fastidious, that he saw, in the tumult of the great roads near Athens, disgusting characteristics of the coarse de-

<sup>1</sup> In the original *mistresses*.

14 mocracy. Socrates goes on with his history of the rise of tyranny.

“And this,” said I, “is the fair and juvenile source from which tyranny springs, as seems to me.”

“Juvenile, certainly,” said he; “but what follows?”

Socrates then proceeds to describe the growth of the ascendancy of a tyrant in a democratic state, having plainly the history of Pisistratus in his mind. “Every excess,” he says, “brings in its opposite; and so the excess of liberty brings in slavery. In popular governments alone does tyranny spring up, and the most unbounded liberty is succeeded by the most complete and intolerable despotism.

15 “The agent of this change is the multitude, who manage all the public affairs, swarm round the bema of the public speaker, and by their humming and murmuring prevent all speaking on the opposite side. These are ready to attack the rich, and to seize their property. The rich defend themselves, and are therefore accused of a tendency to oligarchy. Then there come accusations and trials and judicial struggles. And then the People always select some one man as their Protector<sup>1</sup>, and put all the power they can into his hands. When a Tyrant comes into bloom, it is always from a Protectorial root.

“And how does the Protector become a Tyrant? It is when that happens to him which they speak of as happening in the Temple of Lycean Jove in Arcadia: that he who takes human entrails mixed with the other entrails of the sacrifice becomes a wolf. So the Leader of the People when, supported by them, he does not stop short of the destruction of his countrymen; on false accusations

<sup>1</sup> προστατης.

brings them before tribunals and seeks their destruction; dips his unhallowed lips and tongue in the blood of his brother-citizens; drives men into exile and to death, and abolishes debts and divides estates among the multitude,—he brings himself into a condition in which he must either perish by the hands of his enemies, or become a wolf, that is, reign as a tyrant.

“And if he be expelled by the rich and afterwards return in triumph, he is still more a tyrant than he was before. Then the rich conspire against him. And then he introduces that famous tyrant’s request, which all who have arrived at this point make, that the People will give him a guard, that he, the Defender of the People, may be safe from danger. And so they give it him, having fears about his safety, but no fears about their own. And now every man of property sees this, and knowing that his property is sure to make him regarded as an enemy of the People, takes a course like that recommended by the oracle to Croesus<sup>1</sup>:

‘To rocky Hermus flee,  
Nor stay, nor shame thee to be styled a coward.’”

“Yes,” said he, “he would not have the opportunity of ‘shaming him’ twice.”

“No,” said I; “he who stays behind is put to death. And it is plain that this Protector of whom we speak does not fall asleep in his greatness: he strikes down his enemies, mounts the chariot of the State, and from the Protector becomes the Tyrant complete.”

“And now,” Socrates says ironically, “let us take a survey of the happiness of the condition of the man, and of the city in which such a man is brought into being.

<sup>1</sup> See the story, Herodotus, i. 55.



“In his first days he smiles upon all, embraces all that he meets. He protests he is no tyrant. He is prodigal of promises in public, and in private he frees debtors from their debts; he distributes land to the people and to his favourites, and affects kindness and affability to all. But when he has got rid of his external enemies, some by agreement and some by victory, and is at ease with regard to them, he is always stirring in some war, that the People may need a leader. And also that the people by their contributions to the expenses of the war may be the poorer; and may be compelled to attend day by day to their necessary wants, instead of plotting against him. And if there be any who nourish thoughts of freedom, he will get rid of them by sending them against the enemy. On all these accounts he must always be at war.

“And so, it will be necessary for him to remove every man of any importance; every man who has courage or elevation of character or wealth. This is his happiness; that he must needs, whether he will or no, be the enemy of all such, and practise against them till he has purged the city of them.”

“A proper purge indeed,” said Adeimantus.

17 “Yes,” said I, “different from that practised by physicians. They purge out all the bad elements: he must purge out the good. And so he must either perish, or live with the most despicable part of the populace, and hated even by them.”

He then goes on to say that the tyrant will be able to surround himself with guards from the dangerous classes—the drones with stings—of all countries, and from slaves whom he may buy and enfranchise. And then his satellites admire him, while all honest men hate and fly him?

“At last when the People get tired of him they

will refuse to supply his expenses, and will say that a grown-up son of the state should not be a burthen to his father: that rather he should take upon himself the maintenance of his father:—that they did not adopt him as their Protector with the expectation of having to support him, and these slaves and reprobates, and thus to be the slave of his slaves; but in order to throw off the yoke of the rich and of the gentlemen<sup>1</sup>, as they are called; and so they beg him and his companions to march off and go out of the City.”

“And then,” said Adeimantus, “the People will know what kind of wild beast it has nourished and pampered, and that it is the weaker part trying to drive out the stronger.”

“How do you say?” I asked. “Will the Tyrant disobey his parent, and beat him if he resist?”

“Yes,” said he; “and will take his arms from him.”

“Then the tyrant is an ungrateful son, a parricide; and so we see that what men say of a tyranny is true; that the People running away from the smoke of servitude, run into the fire of despotism; and exchange an excessive liberty for a hard and bitter slavery.”

“Even so,” said he.

“And now we may venture to say that we have duly surveyed the way in which a tyranny arises out of a democracy, and what kind of thing it is.”

“We have done that sufficiently,” said he.

“There remains to be considered,” said I, “the tyrannic *man*: how he is produced out of the democratic man; and what life he lives, wretched or happy.”

<sup>1</sup> καλοὶ κἀγαθοί.

B. IX. Socrates having thus propounded the remain-  
 § 1 ing part of his subject, proceeds to supply, as he says, some deficiency in the account which he had given of the Desires. The amount of this account is, that the Desires are capable of monstrous development when the control of reason is quite removed, as may be seen in the atrocities of which men feel themselves capable in their dreams. In this way some one of the Desires may become an over-  
 2 mastering passion; and the democratic youth, who was supposed to be given up to the sway of all the Desires, may become the subject of one tyrannical Desire: and thus may become analogous to the city ruled by a Tyrant.

This is the essential part of Socrates's exposition; and it is, I think, obscured and confused by various details and images which are combined with it; especially the images drawn from a swarm of bees. The youth is counselled to moderation by his father and his friends: "but those clever magicians and tyrant-makers who urge him the opposite way, when they find they cannot get complete hold of him in any other manner, produce in his bosom some Master Desire, which takes the lead among the self-indulging Desires. This Desire is like a great drone in a hive; and the other Desires buzz about it, pamper it, and give it a sting. And so this Master of the soul becomes wild with excitement; and kills all the good and modest Desires and casts them out. The excitement is like the excitement of love or of intoxication or of melancholy.

3 "Well, in this way such a character is produced. And now, how does he live?"

"I must answer," said he, "as people do in games: That *you* must tell *me*."

"Well," I said, "the man who is so possessed

will give himself up to feasts and revels and courtizans. Day and night his desires will become more and more craving. His wealth will be exhausted. He will borrow and spend all that he has. His desires will become more importunate; will drive him onwards like a madman, in search of plunder, which he must have, or must writhe under his privation. And when he has squandered all that is his own, he falls back upon his father and mother, and tries to take what they have. If they yield it not, he uses force or fraud. If the old people resist, would he refrain from deeds of violence?"

"In truth," said he, "I should not feel very easy for the lot of his parents."

"What, Adeimantus! for God's sake, would he, for the sake of a mistress taken up yesterday, beat or imprison his mother who has loved him so long and so dearly, or his father the oldest and closest of his friends?"

"Faith, he would!" said he.

"A happy thing, it seems, it is to have a son who is the tyrannic man!"

"Not very," said he.

"Well! But when he has consumed what he can get from father and mother, and still his Desires cry out for more, he will have to turn burglar, highway-robber, temple-pillager. He will be, awake and in reality, such as we spoke of a man being in his most wicked dreams. No crime, no atrocity will stop him. His Tyrant-desire will treat him as the Tyrant treats the state:—will carry him on to every wickedness by which the host of Desires may be gratified and fed."

There is then another consideration introduced, which again seems to me to confuse the image of the tyrannic man. A number of such men are

supposed. If there be but few, they go away and enter the service of some foreign Tyrant; or those who remain at home become thieves, robbers, kidnappers and the like: or if they have the gift of speaking, they become public informers and hired accusers or defenders. Small evils these compared with the greater evils that may be. Compared with the misery of political tyranny, they do not come near the mark. But when there are many such men, they, using the madness of the people, engender the Tyrant, setting up him who has the most of the Tyrant in his soul."

"Rightly," said he; "for he is most supremely tyrannic."

"And then if the opponents yield, so it is: but if the city resist, as he did violence to his father and his mother, so will he to his fatherland and his mother-country use force by the means of his satellites. And this is the course of such a man."

4 It is then explained that such men are faithless, unrighteous, incapable of true liberty or friendship. And thus the complete villain is he, who being in his character the tyrannic man, is in his position the monarch. And the longer his tyranny lasts, the more is this true.

"It must be so," said Glaucon, taking up the discourse.

"And now," said I, "is he who is thus the greatest villain also the most miserable man? And is he more miserable in proportion as his tyranny lasts longer? The common people do not all think so."

"But still," said he, "it must be so."

"Yes: must not the tyrannic man be to the tyrannic or tyrannized city as the democratic man to the democratic city, and as the rest, each to each? And so, as the citizen to the city, in happi-

ness as well as in virtue, so is the man to the man. And so as the aristocratic city is the best, the tyrannic city is the worst; and as the former is the most happy, the latter is the most miserable. Is it not so?

“Let us not be dazzled by looking at the Tyrant alone, and at a few who are near him. Let us enter within the city, and look into every part of it, that we may form a just opinion.”

“What you propose is right. And it is evident to all the world that no state is more miserable than that which is subject to a tyrant, none more happy than that which is rightly governed.”

“And we must judge in the same way of men. We must enter into their interior. We must not, like children, be imposed upon by the external show of the tyrannic man. We must look into his heart. And as in the case of a political tyrant we should wish to have the testimony of some one who has lived with him, and seen him stripped of the pompous vestments and accompaniments of the stage: for such a man could tell us if the tyrant was happy or miserable; so let us imagine we come close to the tyrannic man, and judge of his condition.”

“And we may judge of the man’s condition by 5 similarity from that of the city. Look at the conditions of both. The city is not free, but enslaved; not enslaved the less because the tyrant is free. And the tyrannic man is in the same condition. His soul is full of slavery. The most respectable parts of it are under a yoke. The small part which is master of the rest is that part which is most mean and most mad. The tyrannized soul cannot do what it would. It is forcibly driven on by an inward sting. It is filled with shame and remorse. The tyrannized city too, like the tyran-

nized soul, is poor and starved. The city is full of fear. There you find, far more than any where else, weeping and wailing; and will you find more misery in any one than in the man who is mad with desires and appetites, the tyrannic man? The city is the most miserable of cities: and what do you say of the tyrannic man?"

"That he is," said Glaucon, "the most miserable of men."

"No," said I, "you are not yet quite right. There may be a still more unhappy man."

"Who?"

"He who being a tyrannic man by nature, does not live the life of a private man, but is so unhappy as by some occasion to become really a tyrant."

"Even so: from what has been said I conjecture that to be true."

"But in a case so important, we should not be content with conjecture, but proceed rigorously, as I shall do."

He then proceeds to another comparison. "The tyrant may be compared with a rich man in a city, who has many slaves. A private man in such a case is tranquil, because he knows that the whole city is ready to help him against his slaves in case of need. But if some God were to take a man who has fifty or more slaves, away from the city, and put him with his wife and children in a desert place with his servants, in what a terror do you not suppose he would be, lest he and his wife and children should be destroyed by his servants? He would be obliged to coax some of his slaves and promise them great things, and to give them their freedom gratuitously; in short, he would have to cringe to them. And if the same God should place all round him neighbours who maintain that

no man ought to lord it over another, and who were prepared to inflict signal vengeance on any one who did so, he would be still worse off. And so he is, as it were, in a prison, overwhelmed with fears and desires. He cannot get loose to see any object of curiosity, and envies his subjects who can travel at their pleasure. And so, you see, he has all these special causes of being miserable, in addition to his being merely a bad man, which you thought made him the most miserable of men."

The persevering and overwhelming way in which Plato insists on the misery of the successful tyrant, was perhaps pursued in consequence of such characters, for instance Archelaus of Macedon, being the stock examples of the 'Might makes Right' school; as we have seen in the *Gorgias*. The special misery here insisted upon is that of a tyrant surrounded by free states, like most of the Greek states.

Socrates finally sums up.

"And so in reality, whatever may be the seeming, the true tyrant is a true slave;—a slave condemned to the severest and basest of slavery, the flatterer of the meanest of men. He is so far from being able to gratify his desires, that he is in reality poor and destitute of almost everything, in the eyes of one who can look to the bottom of his soul. He is full of terrors, struggles, and writhings, throughout his life, if he be like the tyrannized city; and like it he is. And as we have already said, sovereign power makes him necessarily still more envious, perfidious, unjust, impious, the receptacle and fostering place of all wickedness; wretched in himself, and the cause of wretchedness in all who are near him."

The description of the tyrant, "stript of his



tragic pomp" and found to be at bottom vile and miserable, is the origin of the "purple tyrants," who "fear" and "groan" in the poets of ancient Rome and of modern Europe. Tacitus is obviously referring to this passage, when (*Annals*, VI. 6) on the occasion of Tiberius's celebrated letter to the Senate, he says: "Not without reason does the great philosopher declare, that if the souls of tyrants could be thrown open to view, they would be found marked with gashes and bruises caused by their own cruelty, lust, and iniquity, as the body is marked with the stripes of a scourge."

The Dialogue now approaches to its proper conclusion. In the fourth Book we had the picture of an ideal polity and a corresponding human character. In these eighth and ninth Books we have the exhibition of other forms of polity, and other characters. The polities were introduced at the first in order to help the hearers to decide which of the characters was the proper form of human life, and whether the just or the unjust man was, by the constitution of his own soul, the happy man. The conclusion had already, at the end of the fourth Book, been in favour of justice. It is now expressed, not more distinctly perhaps, but at any rate more formally and ceremoniously than it was before. Socrates now speaks as if he had been placing before his companion a series of public spectacles; of tragedies, for instance, or of choric exhibitions, to receive the judgment of the audience, which was best, as was the practice in the spectacles at Athens. He puts this to Glaucon thus:

"Now do you, acting the part of one who is to judge a theatrical competition, determine who in your judgment is first in happiness, who next; and what is the order of the whole five which I have

presented to you ;—the Royal man, the Timocratic, the Oligarchic, the Democratic, the Tyrannic.”

Glaucon enters into the image at once, and responds to the invitation. “I decide,” says he, “at once: I place the choruses in the order in which they have come into the theatre. That is the order which they occupy as to virtue, and as to happiness or misery.”

“Well then,” Socrates says, still preserving the allusion to the theatrical practice, “shall I engage a herald to proclaim this judgment, or shall I myself discharge the office?” And he then proceeds to do so in formal terms: “Glaucon the son of Aristo gives his judgment, that the best and most just man is the most happy—the royal man, who governs himself. And the worst and most unjust is the most miserable—the man who has a tyranny in his soul and is himself the tyrant of the state.

“And,” he asks, “may I add that this is so, even if, being such, they are unseen by men and gods?”

“Add that too,” says Glaucon.

And so the Dialogue, according to its original scheme is, as I conceive, brought to a close. The Dialogue, in this form, might be called the First Edition of the Polity. The remainder of the Ninth and the Tenth Book are continuations, with certain indications of being added at a later time, as I shall endeavour to show in translating them. The digressions which I have omitted, and which I shall add hereafter, may also have been written later than the main body of the Dialogue as I have now given it: and at any rate, they leave its scheme clearer by their removal.

## REMARKS ON THE IMPERFECT POLITIES.

THE descriptions of the characteristics of the different imperfect Polities, and the hypothetical histories of the Transitions from one form of polity to another, are very curious; but, as I have said, they have rather the aspect of being suggested by actual cases familiar to the writer, than of being fairly deduced by systematic reasoning.

The difference between Plato's classification of Polities and that of Aristotle is very remarkable. Aristotle says (*Eth. Nic. VIII. 10*), that there are three normal or regular kinds of polity:—Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Timocracy; and three abnormal or irregular kinds, perversions of these; namely, Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy. But the Timocracy of Aristotle is altogether different from the Timocracy of Plato. The former is a constitution in which all persons of a certain income (*timema*) have a share in the government;—a constitution founded on a property qualification, like the parliamentary suffrage of the English constitution. The Platonic Timocracy is, as we have seen, that in which military honour (*timē*) confers power;—the ascendancy of the military class. The Aristotelian polities differ, according to the author, in this way; that the true King aims at the good of the people; the Tyrant at his own advantage only. And in like manner the Aristocracy becomes an Oligarchy, when the governors assign the honours and emoluments of the State to themselves exclusively. And a Timocracy, a government by the men of some property, easily degenerates into a Democracy, a government by mere numbers; for a Timocracy is already a government by numbers, only with a condition.

This second part of the Polity, (as we have divided it,) which treats of Imperfect Polities, is closely connected with the first, the Ideal Polity; and might be supposed to have been published at the same time: but against this supposition we have, (1) The enormous intermediate Digressions, occupying Books V, VI, and VII; (2) The ancient story that a part of the Polity was published before the rest: the natural division into two parts

in that which we have given: (3) The Third Part of the Polity, which I have termed the Ethical Sequel to the Polity, is recognized by Plato as a third part co-ordinate with the other two (B. IX. § 9); and as the Third Part appears to have been written later than the others, (for reasons which I have given,) we may also suppose that the Second Part was written after the First.

The reader must give to these arguments such weight as he thinks they deserve. At any rate there seems to be much to lead to the belief that the different parts of the *Republic*, including the Digressions, were published in the school of Plato at different times, as the subject was further and further prosecuted.

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Plato's picture of the freedom which the complete Democracy allows each man, so that he may live in what way he pleases (VIII. 12), represented a feature in the habits of Athens upon which the Athenians looked with great complacency. It is one of the topics of Pericles's praise of the City, in his Funeral Oration (Thucyd. II. 37):—

“Thus liberally are our public affairs administered: thus liberally too do we conduct ourselves as to mutual suspicions in our private and every-day intercourse: not bearing animosity towards our neighbour for following his own humour, nor darkening our countenance with the scowl of censure, which pains though it cannot punish.”

Here, as the Scholiast observes, we have an allusion to the moroseness and severity of Sparta, where there was required a uniformity of manners and way of life; and where every one who deviated from this standard into any occasional gaiety was visited with censure and punishment.

# THE REPUBLIC.

## PART IV.—SEQUEL TO THE ETHICS OF THE POLITY.

(*Republic*, B. IX. § 7, &c.)

THE portion of the *Republic* which I have given as the original form of the Platonic Polity, contains, I think, evidence in itself of its completeness and unity. In that form all the parts cohere consistently, and all tend to the conclusion, which in its expressions professes itself to be a conclusion. The Ninth Book, however, goes on with a further prosecution of the ethical thesis, that Wisdom is the supreme good for man. This part appears to me to have been written at a subsequent time, on this account;—that the phraseology is here more pointed, compact and systematic than in the preceding part; as if the language of the Platonic ethics had now assumed a more fixed familiar character. The three parts of the soul are now enumerated and referred to as something which is settled and generally recognized. Names are proposed for them which may save periphrases. The first, *Desire*, or rather the Desires, (for as Socrates remarks, they are many and various,) is so called after a leading one of the number, the Love of

Money, the Love of Gain<sup>1</sup>,—for money, besides being a main object of Desire on its own account, is desired as the instrument and representative of other desires. The second, the Pugnacious or *Iras-cible* Element, is to be called the Love of Victory—the Love of Power<sup>2</sup>; the third, the *Reasonable* Part of man, is to be denominated the Love of Knowledge—the Love of Wisdom<sup>3</sup>. And there are three kinds of man corresponding to these elements of man;—the ambitious, the avaricious, the philosophic<sup>4</sup>.

The proposed object of this part of the Book is to give a second proof of the proposition, that the just man is the most happy. Socrates says, proceeding after the conclusion of the last Part:

“That is one proof; now here, if you wish for it, is the second.”

And then he expounds the ethical phraseology, which I have just spoken of. And the proof which he offers is of this nature. Each of the three kinds of man,—the philosophic, the ambitious, the avaricious—has his own aim, which he supposes to be the supreme and only true source of pleasure. The last cares for gain only; the second for victory, the first for wisdom; and each cares nothing for the pleasures so highly valued by the others.

So far they are on an equality: but which of 8 the three is most likely to be right in his estimate of true pleasure? Surely the lover of knowledge—the philosophic man. For, in the first place, he knows something of the pleasures of gain and of victory from the experience of his youth; while the lover of gain or of power knows nothing of the pleasures of wisdom. And again, the question being what is a right judgment in such a case,

<sup>1</sup> φιλοχρήματων και φιλοκερδές.

<sup>2</sup> φιλόνηικον και φιλότιμον.

<sup>3</sup> φιλομαθές και φιλόσοφον.

<sup>4</sup> φιλοκερδές, φιλόνηικον, φιλόσοφον.

must be decided by knowledge, thought, reason. Now knowledge, thought, reason, especially belong to the philosophic man. The very *organ* by which the judgment is to be formed belongs to him, and not to either of the other two. His judgment therefore must be the right one.

This is assented to: though it proves rather Wisdom to be the supreme good than Rectitude the supreme happiness, which was the proposition in question. And then another proof is offered of the same proposition, in this manner.

9 “And now after these two arguments there is a third which gives us the threefold victory, grateful to Olympian Jove. It is this.

“All pleasures except those of the reasonable man are mere shadows of pleasure. Pleasure and pain are opposites: and relief from pain is often taken for pleasure. The cessation of pain is pleasure, and the cessation of pleasure is pain. There are some cases in which this is not so. Thus the pleasure of sweet odours does not arise from any preceding pain: but in general the bodily pleasures are mere cessations of pain, and the expectation and hope of such pleasures is only a presentiment of this relief, and is in like manner a mere comparative feeling.

10 “We may illustrate the matter in this way. In a space you may have a top, a middle and a bottom. If any one is carried from the bottom to the middle he conceives that he is carried up; and when from the place at which he has arrived he looks to the place from which he came, he thinks he is at the top, though he has not really seen the top: and this is because he does not truly know what is top and middle and bottom. Now in ignorance of this kind are men with respect to pains and pleasures. When they move to the region of pain

they feel pain, but when they move from pain to indifference, they think it pleasure: like those who seeing grey by the side of black, think it white because they do not know what white is.

“Now hunger and thirst and other bodily pleasures are certain vacuities of the body. And ignorance and unreason are certain vacuities of the mind. He who satisfies his hunger and he who informs his mind are both filling vacuities. But that must be more truly a filling, which fills the vacuity with that which really exists. Now meat and drink and victuals of all kind are not such really existing things as truth and knowledge and virtue. That which proceeds from an eternal, ever-consistent source, which is itself eternal and consistent, and is manifested in such a form, must more truly exist than that which proceeds from a source ever varying and perishable, and which is itself such, and is manifested in such. And knowledge and truth are the concomitants of this real and immutable kind of being. And thus the nutriment for the body has less of truth and of real being than the nutriment for the soul.

“And again: the soul more really exists than the body. And that which more really exists, being filled with things which more really exist, the filling is more real than when that which less really exists is filled with things which less really exist. If then pleasure consists in being filled with that which is congruous by nature, that which is really filled with real existence, has very much more a real and true pleasure in comparison with that which, less participating in reality, is less truly and really filled, and so has only an insecure and less true pleasure.

“They then who have no share in wisdom and virtue; who spend their time in sensual enjoy-



ments; go to the bottom point, and then come up to the middle point, and spend their lives in this oscillation: they never rise higher, nor look to the top; they never tasted solid and pure pleasure. They live like the beasts of the field, always looking down on their pasture; and sometimes goring and kicking each other in quarrels about their food: for they are insatiable, as never being filled with realities."

"You speak," said he, "like an oracle about the life of these people."

"They pursue pleasures mixed with pains, mere shadows of true pleasure, set off only by the neighbourhood of one another, so as to make them seem lively and strong, and thus to drive men into mad conflicts about them; as the phantom of Helen (according to Stesichorus) was what the people fought for at Troy, in their ignorance that it was not the true Helen."

The story told by Stesichorus about Helen was that when carried from her home by Paris she really stopped in Egypt; and that it was only a phantom of her which was the subject of contention at Troy. We have had Stesichorus's poem on Helen already referred to in the *Phædrus*, § 44.

This proof that the pleasures of wisdom and virtue are the only true pleasures, drawn from the principle that truth more really exists than external objects, and the soul than the body, will, I fear, seem to the English reader rather ingenious than convincing. I have done what I could to give the meaning of the argument. It is further pursued with reference to another class of pleasures, those of the irascible or pugnacious element.

"Is not the like necessarily true of the irascible element? When a man urged to rivalry by ambition, or to violence by quarrelsomeness, or to

anger by impatience, seeks the gratification of his passion, seeks a feast of honour or victory or rage without reflection or reason? And so our ambitious and avaricious desires, if they allow themselves to be guided by reason and knowledge in the pursuit of their respective pleasures, will attain the truest of the pleasures which belong to them. And thus when the soul moves onwards in the path of wisdom and virtue, no digression existing in it, not only is good order preserved, but the truest and purest pleasures are obtained."

After this there follows a curious numerical comparison of the happiness of the good and the bad man, or, in the language of the Platonic system, of the royal and the tyrannic man. "Do you know," said I, "by how much more miserably the tyrant lives than the true king?"

"I shall know if you tell me," said he.

It is then explained thus. "The tyrannic man is the third from the oligarchic man; for there is the democratic man between them. The oligarchic man is the third from the royal or aristocratic man; for there is the timocratic man between them. And so the tyrannic man is removed from true pleasure by a distance of three times three." Then a reason, very obscure, as seems to me, is given why the cube or third power of this number is to be taken as the true measure; and thus it is proved that the royal man is distant from the tyrant seven-hundred-and-twenty-nine fold<sup>1</sup>. And if the just surpasses the unjust in happiness so vastly, still more does he surpass him in grace and beauty of life.

We have then another image presented for the purpose of illustrating the ethical doctrines which have been propounded; and in this we have evi-

<sup>1</sup> 729 being the cube of 9.

dence that the Platonic analysis of the soul into Reason, Anger, and Desire, was now familiar, and also the divisions of Desire into several Desires, which has already been noticed in this argument. Here Desire is represented as a many-headed monster. "We must," says Socrates, "make an image of the Soul. And in the first place an image like Chimæra, or Scylla, or Cerberus, many different shapes grown together. Mould in your thoughts a many-headed monster, with heads of tame beasts and wild beasts all clustered together."

"Well," says Glaucon, "this is wonderful image-making, but thought is more plastic than wax: so it is done."

"Mould also a figure of a lion, and a figure of a man, and make the man the smaller of the two. And now put all these three into the single figure of a man, as into a case: and so this man has his springs of action within.

"If any one says that it is profitable to this man to do injustice, he says neither more nor less than that it is profitable to him to pamper the many-headed beast within him, and to feed the lion, so as to make those two strong and fierce, while he starves the internal man, and leaves him to be dragged this way and that by the brutes. He who says justice is profitable, says that it is best to encourage and strengthen the internal man, to make him the master of the many-headed brute, guiding the tame heads and crushing the wild ones, and getting the lion to help him, and so keeping all in good order. And so he who praises injustice talks altogether falsely, ignorantly and irrationally.

"And so we may use this image to persuade him and set him right; for he does not mean to do wrong. My dear Sir, we shall say, do you not see

that what is fair and good in human actions arises from keeping the wild beast in subjection to the man—rather, to God; and that vile and foul actions arise from putting the tame parts under the wild parts? If a man could get money by making his son or his daughter a slave of bad and cruel men, he would not take it, however great the sum. If, then, he make the best and most divine part of himself a slave to the vilest and most brutish, and be not withheld by any compunction from doing this, is he not a wretched creature? Does he not get his gain at a far heavier cost than Eriphyle?" (who betrayed her husband to certain death for a collar of gold<sup>1</sup>.)

We have, then, views of various vices, such as the image suggests.

"And so we see that all incontinence is wrong, for it is giving way to that horrid, many-headed brute. All arrogance and irritability is wrong, for it is giving way to the lion. All luxuriousness and effeminacy is wrong, for in it the lion has lost all vigour and spirit. All flattery and meanness is wrong, for in it the lion is subjugated to the many-headed brute; the lion is spoilt by the love of money, and becomes a monkey. And to give one's self up to handicraft and trade incurs reproach because it implies that the best part of the man, his reason, is too weak to rule over the brute part, and is reduced to serve and minister to it.

"If then we desire that men should have a master similar to the master who rules the good man, we must say that they are to be ruled by the man who is good, and has within him a divine ruling

<sup>1</sup> Eriphyle was the wife of Amphiaraus the seer. He had foreseen that if he went to the siege of Troy he would perish there, and had hidden himself to avoid his fate. His wife revealed his hiding-place for the bribe mentioned.

principle: and that for men to be so ruled is not their loss; as Thrasy-machus says, to be ruled always is. It is always most profitable for men to be ruled by a power divine and wise; if possible, by such a power dwelling within; but if not, at least by such a power governing them from without; that all of us may be to the extent of our power, like to and friends with that governing power.

“And the mode of educating children shows that this view is generally accepted. We do not give them full liberty, till we have established a kind of polity in their souls; developing what is best in them by what is best in us, and establishing it as a guardian and master of their soul; and then we leave them free.

“How then can we pretend, Glaucon, that it is advantageous to a man to be guilty of any vice? or if he is guilty, to escape punishment? He who escapes punishment grows worse and worse. In him who is chastised the wild-beast part is tamed, the reasonable part is set free, and the soul, elevated to its best state, acquires the healthy habits, of temperance, and justice and wisdom; and so is more improved than the body is by health and beauty and strength, in proportion as the soul is superior to the body.

“This is the object which the reasonable man will have in view, in every stage of his life. He will seek such knowledge only as tends to this. In the government of his body, he will not seek brutish and irrational pleasures; he will not even aim at health and strength and beauty, except so far as those are to be enjoyed under self-control. He will try to keep the parts of his body in harmony for the sake of concord in his soul. He will seek the same harmony in his possession and use

of wealth. He will not try to gather those heaps of treasure which call out the admiration of the many. Looking at the polity within him, he will take care not to damage it either by too many or too few external goods; and by this measure he will acquire and spend. And so with regard to honours: he will accept and relish such as he thinks may make him a better man. Those which may disturb the balance of his soul he will shun, be they public or private."

"If that be his rule," said Glaucon, "he will not meddle with politics."

"Oh by my troth," said I, "he will enter deeply into the politics of his own polity: but hardly into the politics of his country, unless some wonderful change takes place."

"I understand. He will be a politician in that City which we have been describing which exists nowhere on earth."

"Well, but perhaps there is a pattern of it in heaven, for those who look for it, and will regulate their own constitution by it. But it makes no difference whether this Polity exists now or ever shall exist. The wise man will deal with it and no other."

"Very likely," said he.

# THE REPUBLIC.

## PART V.—OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

(*Republic*, B. x. § 9, &c.)

THE first portion of the tenth Book is occupied with a justification of the exclusion of poets from the Platonic State; a subject already partly discussed in a former Book. I shall give this portion afterwards, as a Digression. The Dialogue then goes on to the subject indicated in the above title. After speaking of the dangers of the love of poetry, and the necessity, on moral grounds, of resisting this inclination, so seductive in consequence of the youthful recollections which it involves, Socrates goes on:

- 9 “For it is a serious stake for which we have to engage; a very serious one indeed, my dear Glaucon, and of a very different order from what men generally imagine, when the question is, whether one shall be a good man or a bad man; a stake so heavy, that we must not, from a love of reputation, or riches, or power, or even poetry, neglect justice and virtue.”

“I agree with you,” said he, “on the grounds which have been stated; and so, I think, will everybody else.”

“And yet,” said I, “we have not hitherto

spoken of the greatest prizes which are provided for virtue."

"If there be any other, greater than those which you have mentioned, they must be of inconceivable magnitude."

"But what," said I, "can be really great which lasts only a short time? And how short is the interval from boyhood to old age compared with the whole extent of time!"

"O, it is nothing," said he.

"Well then: do you think that an immortal being should employ its care on so short a time instead of looking to the whole?"

"Certainly not," said he; "but why do you ask such a question?"

"Do you not know," said I, "that our soul is immortal and never dies?"

And he looking me in the face with an air of surprise said, "By Jove, I do not. Are you prepared to prove that it is?"

"Yes, if I am not mistaken; and I think that you may prove it too; for it is not hard."

"It is too hard for me; but I would gladly hear you do what you say is so easy."

"You shall hear," said I.

"Say on," said he.

The proof then proceeds: and in translating it, I shall, in general, as I usually do in such cases, suppress the responses.

"There are such things as Good and Bad. What do we mean by them? That which destroys and spoils a thing is Bad: that which preserves and improves it is Good. And each thing has what is bad and good *for it*. The ophthalmia is bad for the eyes; every disease is bad for some part of the body: the mildew is bad for corn; the rot is bad for wood; rust is bad for brass and iron;



and, as I have said, everything has some special thing which is bad for it. And when this bad thing is in each case present, it spoils that on which it fastens, and in the end dissolves and destroys it. And thus each thing is destroyed by its own appropriate evil and internal disease; and if *this* does not destroy it, nothing else can. For the Good cannot destroy it; neither can the Indifferent, which is neither good nor bad.

“If then we find something which has belonging to it a disease which spoils and corrupts it, but which has not the power to destroy it, by dissolving it, we shall know that *that* which is so constituted cannot perish and come to an end.

“Now for the soul there are things which make it bad and spoil it: such are the vices of which we have been speaking, injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. But does any of these dissolve and destroy the soul? And let us take care not to make the mistake of supposing that when the unjust man is condemned to death for his wrong-doing, he is destroyed by his injustice as being a disease of the soul. Consider the matter rather in this way. The disease which is the natural vice of the body decomposes and dissolves it—so that at last it is no longer a body; and all the other things are, by the presence of their appropriate disorder, dissolved, so that they cease to be. Now apply this to the soul. When its diseases, injustice and the rest, are present, do they make the soul pine away continually so that they bring on death, and separate the soul from the body? By no means. And it is absurd to suppose that the disease of another thing can destroy it when its own does not. And now consider that even with regard to the body, we do not suppose that it can be destroyed directly by any

badness of the aliments which is proper to them; whether it be rottenness, mouldiness, or any other; but if their badness generate in the body its proper disorder, we say that the body is destroyed by its own disease, on occasion of them. We do not say that the body, which is one thing, is destroyed by the badness of the food, which is another thing, except in so far as the food generates in the body its native and appropriate disease.

“And by the same reasoning, unless the disease 10 of the body engenders disease in the soul, we cannot suppose that the soul will be destroyed by the disease of that other thing.

“Let us then hold firmly this doctrine, that neither a fever, nor any other disorder, nor wounds, not even if the body were to be cut in pieces, can destroy the soul; let us hold this, until some one can show that these sufferings of the body make the soul unjust or unrighteous. We cannot allow any one to say that either the soul or anything else is destroyed by what happens to another substance, without the intervention of its proper disorder.”

“But no one can show,” Glaucon answers, “that the souls of those who die become more unjust by death.”

“If any one,” said I, “in order to escape from assenting to the immortality of the soul, should assert that death does make men more wicked and unjust; we should infer that injustice is a mortal disease, and that those who take the disease die of it, some sooner and some later. Whereas the fact is, that they who die through their own injustice, die by punishments inflicted by others.”

“By Jove,” said he, “injustice would not be such a formidable thing to other people, if it were death to him that had it; for there would be an end of the bad man. But I am afraid the contrary

is the case; and that it kills other people very often; while he that has it is very much alive and very lively to boot. There are no symptoms of its being a mortal disease."

"You say well," I replied. "And if the proper disorder and internal evil of the soul cannot destroy it, the disorder of another thing, which has another office, cannot possibly do so."—"Not possibly," said he.

"But if a thing cannot be destroyed, either by an evil of its own, or by an evil belonging to something else, it cannot ever cease to be: and if it always subsists, it must be immortal."

And thus we have one of Plato's proofs of the immortality of the soul. He goes on to illustrate it somewhat further. He observes that the soul being immortal, the number of souls must always be the same. None can be destroyed; none can come into being.

And further, the soul must be a simple substance. It cannot be composed of several heterogeneous elements. The composition must be perfect, as we have seen that that of the soul is.

"And so the soul is immortal, as both this reasoning and others show:—"

Referring probably to the reasonings in the *Phædo*, and in the *Phædrus*. But he proceeds to give a caution to his hearers.

"In regarding the soul as immortal, we must contemplate it as it is in truth, not in the degraded state into which it is brought by its union with the body, as we now see it. We must look at it with the eye of reason, as it really is, purified from stain. Then it will be found more beautiful than we have yet seen it, and will more clearly discern the difference of right and wrong. We now speak of it as it now appears. But it presents itself to

us like the figure of the Marine God Glaucus; whose original human shape having been long tossed about in the waves, has bits broken off it, and is battered and disfigured, and moreover has got things growing to it; shells and sea-weed and bits of rock, so that it is like anything rather than its original form. So we see the soul disfigured by a thousand accidents. But what must we look at to see its real nature? At its love of Truth? We must see what views it aspires to, what trains of discourse it delights in, as showing its connexion with the divine, the immortal, the eternal. We must consider what it would be if it entirely followed these impulses, and were by such a movement raised out of the sea-waves in which it is now immersed, and were cleansed from the stones and shells which, from its connexion with the earth, cling to it and make it earthy and stony, the results of the nutriment which is taken in and which some persons think so delightful. By considering this, one would see its true nature, whether it is simple or compound, what it is and to what it tends. The passions and parts of the soul as it appears in this its human life, we have, I trust, sufficiently explained." 11

Socrates then goes on to discuss the general subject, the advantages of virtue, in another way. In the early part of the Dialogue it had been taken as a supposition by Adeimantus, that the just man was oppressed by external calamity and calumny; and Socrates had accepted the challenge to show that even then he was the happiest of men. But this supposition is not true, and is now retracted.

"We have," said I, "reduced the question to its simplest form in other ways, and also in this; that we excluded the rewards and the reputation

of justice, which you said that Hesiod and Homer introduced arbitrarily; and we found that justice in the abstract was the best thing for the soul; and that what is right is to be done, whether or not we have the ring of Gyges, and even if we had the helmet of Hades<sup>1</sup>. But now I think we may be allowed to restore to justice and to virtue their rewards, which they really receive both from men and Gods, both during life and after death."— This is assented to.

"Well then, you must give me back what you borrowed of me in our discussion. I granted to you that the unjust man might appear just, and the just might appear unjust. For you thought, that though this might not be so in fact, it must be supposed for the sake of the reasoning, that what he did was unknown to Gods and men; in order that justice in the abstract might be compared with injustice. Or do you not recollect?"

"It would be very wrong in me," said he, "not to recollect."

"Well, then; now that we have settled that point, I summon you in behalf of Justice to acknowledge in what estimation she is held both by Gods and men, that she may obtain the prizes of this reputation, and may give them to her adherents; it having been shown that she gives the benefits of being just to those who really have a claim to them."

"That is reasonable," said he.

"Well then; you must first give me back this point; that the Gods, at any rate, are not deceived as to whether each man is just or unjust."

<sup>1</sup> The helmet of Hades had the power of rendering the wearer invisible. So *Iliad*, v.:

"Pallas to elude his sight,  
The helmet fixed of Hades on her head."

"That we will give you back," said he.

"And, both being known to the Gods, the one is loved, the other is hated by them."—"As we said at first, this is agreed to."

"And will you not grant that he who is loved by the Gods, will, so far as their gifts go, receive nothing but good; except such necessary evil as some former sin may bring upon him."—"Agreed."

"We must then believe of the just man, that whether he be assailed by poverty or by sickness, or any other seeming evil, it will all in the end turn out for good, either during his life or after his death. For he cannot be deserted by the Gods who has earnestly striven to be a just man; and who by the cultivation of virtue has endeavoured to become like God, so far as a man can."

"It is to be supposed," said he, "that he will not be overlooked by him to whom he is like. And the lot of the unjust man will be the contrary."

"And thus the prize of superiority falls to the just man, so far as the Gods are concerned."

This argument more resembles the one which Addison's Cato rests upon than any of those in the *Phædo*.

Here will I hold. If there's a God above us,  
(And that there is, all Nature cries aloud  
Through all her works,) he must delight in Virtue,  
And that which he delights in must be happy.  
But when? or where? this world was made for Cæsar.

Socrates then goes on to the rewards of right action which proceed from men.

"And then as to what comes from man. Is not the state of the case really this, if we are to say the truth: Are not knaves and rascals like those foot-racers who are successful in running out, but not so successful in running in again? They

go off very fast at first, but they get laughed at in the end, running with their ears down upon their shoulders, and sent away lacking the prize. They who are really good runners hold on well to the end, and get the prize, the honour and the stake. And is it not so commonly with regard to honest men? At the end of every course of action, of every dealing with others, and at the end of life, they maintain their good repute, and receive the rewards which men can give."—"Granted."

"Allow me then, now, to say of honest men what you said about knaves. I say then that honest men, when they come to ripe age, arrive in their own community at all the dignities to which they aspire. That they have their choice, as to marriage parties, for themselves and their children; and, in short, all that you said as to the advantages which knaves have, I now say that honest men have. And of the knaves, I say further, that most of them, even if they are not found out while they are young, are detected before they reach the end of their career, and are laughed at; and when they grow old they are wretched, exposed to insults from fellow-citizens and strangers, liable to be beaten, and, to use again expressions which you rightly thought were too strong, likely to be racked and branded. You may suppose that I now say all that you then said: will you allow me to do so?"

"Certainly," said he; "for it is quite fair."

And thus the proposed aim of the Dialogue is completely reached, and the case so strongly stated by Glaucon and Adeimantus is fully answered by Socrates.

But still here, as in the *Phædon* and in the *Gorgias*, he thinks it well to support his reasoning by the traditions which were current concern-

ing the destiny of men in a world after this; adorning these traditions with imagery borrowed from his own speculations concerning various parts of the universe. He proceeds :

“And these are the rewards, the prizes, the gifts which the virtuous man receives from gods and from men, in addition to those which virtue itself bestows. And yet these are nothing either 12 as to number or magnitude in comparison with those which await him after death. These too you must hear, that the just and the unjust man may each receive from our discussion that which turns out to be due to them.”

“Tell me of them,” said he; “there are few things I would hear so willingly.”

“Yes: and it is not a mythe, like the wondrous tales of Alkinous, that I am going to relate, but the relation of a brave man, namely Er the Armenian, who was supposed to have been killed in battle and revived after a twelve days’ trance.”

There is a quibble between *Alkinou* and *alkimou*, *brave*, which I cannot render. *The tale of Alkinous* was a proverbial expression for marvellous stories, borrowed perhaps from the circumstance that Odysseus in the *Odyssee*, tells to Alkinous and his attendants his marvellous stories about the Lotophagi, the Læstrigones, and the like.

The testimony of Er was to the effect that he had been admitted to witness the distribution of rewards and punishments to the souls of the Departed, and had been allowed to return to earth to tell the story. The general scheme of retribution is of the same kind as that which Socrates presents to his hearers at the end of the *Phædo* and at the end of the *Gorgias*, but with considerable differences in the circumstances and scenery. In this case the judgment is held in a



wonderful place where there are two openings in the earth below and two openings in the heaven above. Those who are declared by the judges to be good men are sent up through one of these openings in the sky; the bad are sent down by one of the openings in the earth. But with this scheme of retribution is joined a sort of transmigration of souls. The souls of the wicked return through the other aperture in the earth, and the souls of the just through the other aperture in the sky; those, after a period of suffering, proportioned to their crimes; these, after a like period of reward. And this period is ten times the full time of human life, namely a thousand years. But all were not allowed to run this round. The narrator had heard a soul ask about the great Ardiæus, who had been tyrant of a city of Pamphylia a thousand  
13 years before; and it appeared that in consequence of the enormity of his crimes he was not allowed to reascend from the nether abyss, but was detained there by fiery forms with hideous howlings.

The souls which had returned after their long circuit above or below were assembled in the judgment place; which place seems to be intended for the centre of the universe, and is described with curious but perplexing reference to the system of the structure of the universe which Plato had adopted. The souls after four days' travel arrive at a place where they can see above them a straight beam of light like a column reaching through the whole of the earth and the heaven, brighter than the rainbow; and to the middle of this column of light the ends of the frame-work of the heavens are joined; for this column of light is the bond of the structure of the heavens, surrounding it and holding it together, like the girders of our ships.

Most interpreters of Plato regard this column

of light as the milky way, an interpretation which throws everything into confusion. I conceive, with Dr Donaldson<sup>1</sup>, that the column of light is the axis of the world: the frame-work of the heaven consists of planks, as we may call them, which go from pole to pole, like the planks of a boat, and are held together by the axis; as it appears that the planks of a boat were by a rope girding the two sides together.

This indication of the centre of the universe is further elaborated by connecting it with the motions of the planets, though in an obscure manner. The Greek mathematicians of Plato's time had discovered that the apparent motions of the planets might be explained in a general way by supposing a set of concentric circles, the inner ones turning within the outer ones, each within each, like a nest of concentric circular boxes. Each of these circles was supposed to carry with it in its revolution one of the planets; and thus the different velocities with which the planets move in the heavens were accounted for. And that place which was the centre of the universe for the purposes of divine justice, might be supposed, as it is here supposed, to be the place where the structure of the universe is most clearly manifest. The motion of these circles thus producing the celestial motion, is the revolution of the spindle of Necessity; Necessity being supposed to spin perpetually the necessary order of things; and the spindle which spinners use, a wheel turning on an axis, being the most familiar image which could be taken of concentric circular disks turning round an axle<sup>2</sup>. The way in which the system is framed is, that eight such

<sup>1</sup> *Camb. Phil. Trans.* Vol. x. i.

<sup>2</sup> As Dr Donaldson has remarked, some English translators have confounded the *spindle* with the *distaff*.

disks or rings are fitted together; their respective velocities, their colours, are described; though these circumstances have of course no bearing upon the ethical purpose of the mythe.

Moreover with each of the rings moves round a Siren, each Siren uttering a single note, and the eight notes together produce a harmony. This "music of the spheres" was a notion very familiar to the ancients; and arose probably from this: the Pythagorean school had discovered that musical relations depended upon numerical ratios: the Platonic school held that similar relations governed the motions of the heavenly bodies; and hence the heavenly motions were supposed to be accompanied by a music, though too sublime to be heard by ordinary human ears.

Around the place where Necessity sits, with her spindle on her knees, her three daughters, the Fates, sit on three thrones, white-robed and crowned, Lachesis and Klotho and Atropos; who, accompanied by the harmony of the Sirens, sing, Lachesis past events, Klotho, present, and Atropos, future. Klotho with her right hand touches from time to time and turns the outer circumference of the spindle, while Atropos with her left hand turns the inner rings; and Lachesis with each hand touches each.

This implies that the outer circles move from left to right (the diurnal motion of the heavens); the inner circles from right to left with several separate motions (the proper motions of the planets).

The ethical purpose of the mythe is then re-  
14 sumed, and followed out, as I have said, by a doctrine of transmigration of souls. A proclamation is made to the souls which have performed their cycle, that a second life is before them. A

hierophant ranges them in order before Lachesis and takes from her lap the lots which are to determine their future career, with this proclamation from a lofty pulpit.

“The proclamation of Lachesis, the virgin, daughter of Necessity. ‘Transitory Souls! you are about to begin a new period of mortal life: and you shall not be chosen for by your attendant genius, you yourselves shall choose him. He who takes the first lot shall take the first life, and by his choice he shall abide. Virtue has no master. He who honours her shall have her more; he who dishonours her, shall have her less. The chooser is responsible. God is free from blame.’

“And with these words the lots were thrown among the crowd, and each obtained his number; and then the hierophant strewed on the ground the various kinds of lives, and each chose one in his order.

“There were in this collection lives of all kinds—sovereign power, beauty, strength, valour; nobility; wealth and poverty; health and sickness; and intermediate conditions. And, O my dear Glaucon, here is a great trial for man; and we see how important it is that each man should disregard other studies, and study this point; how we may learn to be strong and wise in this task—how we may know a good life from a bad one; and always choose the best that is in our reach: taking into account all that we have been saying as to the value of life. We must know what beauty with poverty or with wealth, what high birth or low birth, what public life or private life, what strength and weakness, what bright talents or poor talents, what gifts natural or acquired, can do for us: so that we may, taking all these things into account, choose between a good and a bad life: meaning by

good that which will make the soul more virtuous, by bad, that which will make it more vicious; and disregarding all besides. For we have seen that this is the best course which we can take either for this life or for the next. And we ought to hold to this opinion to the death, firm as if fastened by bands of adamant; and not give it up even in Hades for any temptation of place or power or wealth: so that we may not choose a splendid but guilty condition; but rather a condition of mediocrity, avoiding extremes in this life, and in every life which may succeed it: for so is man most happy."

The narrative is then resumed of the proceedings which take place in the "Choice of Lives," by the souls. "The first who had to choose chose a tyranny, that is, the sovereign power in his state, and soon discovered his mistake, and regretted and lamented it in vain. And yet this soul came by the heavenly opening, but had probably done good rather by force of habit than by true philosophy. And indeed there were many of those who came from heaven who made the like mistakes, as not being disciplined by suffering. While most of those who came from the earth, as having suffered and seen others suffer, did not choose in haste. And thus those who give themselves to philosophy in their earthly life, may not only have a happy life here, but also would probably have a happy and easy passage by the heavenly gate, instead of that rough subterranean passage.

"But the Choice of Lives was wonderful to see; lamentable and laughable, as the Armenian said; each soul choosing under the influence of its former life. The soul which had belonged to Orpheus chose a swan, through hatred of the female sex; Thamyris chose a nightingale; a swan chose a hu-

man life, and other musical animals did the same. One soul, when its turn came, chose the life of a lion: this was Ajax Telamonius, wrathful on account of the assignment of the arms of Achilles to Ulysses. Agamemnon's soul, hating the griefs of human life, chose an eagle's life. The soul of Atalanta, ambitious of the athlete's honours, chose such a life. The soul of Epeius, the son of Panopeus, (the artist of the Trojan horse,) became a workwoman. The soul of the buffoon, Thersites, entered into an ape. By chance the soul of Odysseus had the last choice, and after long search, he, cured by his long toils of all ambition, took the quiet life of a common man, which he had found lying in an obscure corner, and which all the other souls had passed over. And when he had considered this life deliberately, he said that if he had had the first choice, he would not have done otherwise.

“Lachesis then assigned to each his guardian genius; Klotho fixed the destiny by a turn of the spindle, and Atropos tied it in a knot, and the Soul and the Genius passed before the throne of Necessity, and then there was no returning.

“As soon as all have passed, they move into the plain of Lethe (Forgetfulness), and drink of the river Ameles (Carelessness), whose waters no vessel can contain; and as they drink each soul loses all memory of the past.

“After this, they fell asleep. And towards the middle of the night, there was a clap of thunder, and an earthquake: and all the persons were scattered in all directions, like shooting-stars, so as to be carried to the place where each was to have its earthly birth. He himself, Er said, was prevented from drinking the waters, and yet he knew not how he returned to the body; but in the morning,

opening his eyes suddenly, he found himself lying upon the funeral pile.

“This mythe, O Glaucon, has been preserved from oblivion; and it may preserve us, if we believe it, from our loss. We shall then pass the river in the plain of Lethe happily, and keep our minds pure from stain.

“And, my friends, if you will believe me, we, acting on the conviction that the Soul is immortal, and that it is by its nature capable of the greatest happiness and the greatest misery, shall always keep our thoughts fixed on that upward way; we shall pursue virtue and wisdom with all the powers of our minds, that we may be at peace with ourselves and with the Gods; and that both while we remain here, and when we go to receive our reward elsewhere, we may be received as victorious combatants, and may be triumphant both here and in that progress of a thousand years of which we have spoken.”

The cosmical part of this mythe is certainly from Pythagorean and Platonic sources; but the doctrine of the metempsychosis is probably of oriental origin; and, as Dr Donaldson remarks, the tale itself was borrowed from an oriental tradition. He conceives Er, the Pamphilian, to be Zoroaster. He quotes Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* v. p. 710), who says: “Plato has mentioned, in the tenth Book of his *Republic*, a certain Er, the son of Armenius, by race a Pamphylian, who is Zoroaster. At all events Zoroaster himself says: ‘Thus wrote Zoroaster, the son of Armenius, by race a Pamphylian; having fallen in battle and gone to Hades, I learned these things from the gods.’” And this passage is repeated by Eusebius (*Præf. Evangel.* XIII. 13). And Dr Donaldson gives good reasons for believing this tradition to be true.

Dr Donaldson conceives that the threads which Lachesis spins with her ever-whirling spindle, are threads derived from the ethereal fire of which the world's axis is composed ; and that the purpose of this part of the Apologue is to show how, as the result of Lachesis's spinning, the souls after a certain period, return to bodily life, the soul of man being a particle of the fire which holds together the world.



# THE REPUBLIC.

## DIGRESSION I.

### ON EDUCATION IN THE IDEAL POLITY.

(*Republic*, B. II. 16, &c.)

WE have seen that in determining the character of the Soldiers or Guards of Plato's ideal state, the importance of their education was declared. This subject is followed out at some length in the original Dialogue; but in order to bring more clearly into view the connexion of the parts of Plato's scheme, I there omitted the portion which refers to this subject. I shall now insert the purport of it, which may be regarded as a discourse on the subject of Greek education. I shall here, as in other parts of the Dialogue, and even more constantly, omit the responses made by the other interlocutors; and, in general, give Socrates's declarations as a continued discourse. The interruptions take from the clearness of the exposition more than they add to the vivacity.

16 "What then," asks Socrates, "is the education to be? Perhaps," he goes on, "we could hardly find a better than that which the experience of the past has already discovered; which

consists in Gymnastic for the body and Music for the mind. And we shall begin our course of education with Music rather than with Gymnastic."

Music includes poetry, as well as what we call Music; and thus using the term, he proceeds:

"Under the term *Music* we include narratives. Of narratives there are two kinds, the true and the false. Now we begin with children by telling them fables; and these, to speak generally, are false, though they contain some truths. And we employ such fables in the instruction of children at a very early period.

"But in every work the beginning is the most important part, especially in dealing with anything young and tender; for that is the time when any impression which we may desire to communicate is most readily stamped and taken. Shall we then permit our children without scruple to hear any fables composed by any authors indifferently, and so, to receive into their minds opinions generally the reverse of those which, when they are grown to manhood, we shall think that they ought to entertain? Certainly not. Then our first duty will be to exercise (in our State) a superintendence over the authors of fables, selecting their good productions and rejecting their bad. And the selected fables we shall advise our nurses and mothers to repeat to their children, that they may thus mould their minds with the fables even more than they shape their bodies with the hand.

"But we shall have to repudiate a large part of those fables which are now in vogue; and especially of what I call the greater fables, the stories which Hesiod and Homer and the other poets tell us. They told, and tell, their stories to men. But in these stories there is a fault

which deserves the gravest condemnation ; namely, when an author gives a bad representation of the characters of gods and heroes. We must condemn such a poet as we should condemn a painter whose picture should bear no resemblance to the objects which he tries to imitate.

“For instance, the poet Hesiod related an ugly story when he told how Uranus acted<sup>1</sup>, and how Kronos had his revenge upon him. And even if the deeds of Kronos and his son’s treatment of him were authentic facts, it would not have been right to tell them without reserve to young and thoughtless persons. They are offensive stories, and must not be repeated in our city. No ! we must not tell a youthful listener that he will be doing nothing extraordinary if he commit the foulest crimes ; nor if he chastise the crimes of a father in the most unscrupulous manner ; but will simply be doing what the first and greatest of the gods have done before him.

“Nor yet is it proper to say in any case—what is indeed untrue—that gods wage war against gods, and intrigue and fight among themselves. We are not to teach this, if the future guards of our state are to deem it a most disgraceful thing to quarrel among themselves. Far less ought we to select as subjects for fiction and embroidery<sup>2</sup> the battles of the giants, and numerous other feuds of all kinds, in which gods and heroes fight against their own kith and kin. If there be any possibility of persuading them that to quarrel with one’s fellow is a sin of which no member of a state was ever guilty, such rather ought to be the language held to our children from the first, by men and

<sup>1</sup> Hesiod, *Theogony*, 154. 450.

<sup>2</sup> Embroidered representations of such parts of mythology were exhibited at certain festivals at Athens.

women, and such is the strain in which our poets must be compelled to write. Stories like the chaining of Hera (Juno) by her son Hephæstus (Vulcan), and the flinging of Hephæstus out of heaven for trying to take his mother's part when his father was beating her, and all other battles of the gods which are to be found in Homer, must be refused admittance into our state, whether they be allegorical or not. For a child cannot discriminate between what is allegory and what is not; and whatever at that age is adopted as matter of belief, has a tendency to become fixed and indelible; and therefore we ought to esteem it of the greatest importance that the fictions which children first hear should be adapted as far as may be to the promotion of virtue.

“If any one proceed to ask us what should be 18 these fictions and what these fables that convey them, we should reply, that on the present occasion we are not Poets but Founders of a State. And Founders ought certainly to know the moulds in which the Poets are to cast their fictions, and the rules from which they must not deviate; but they are not bound to compose tales themselves.

“Now what should these moulds be in the case of Theology? They may be described as follows. It is right always to represent God as he really is, whether the poet describe him in an epic or a lyric or a dramatic poem. Now God is, beyond all else, good in reality, and therefore so to be represented. But nothing that is good is hurtful. That which is good hurts not; does no evil; is the cause of no evil. That which is good is beneficial; is the cause of good. And therefore that which is good is not the cause of *all* which is and happens, but only of that which is as it should be. God, inasmuch as he is good, cannot be the cause

of all things, as the common doctrine represents him to be. On the contrary, he is the author of only a small part of human affairs; of the larger part he is not the author; for our evil things far outnumber our good things. The good things we must ascribe to no other than God: while we must seek elsewhere, and not in him, the causes of evil things."

The difficulties which arise in the philosophical mind with regard to the origin of evil, and the assumptions which are made in order to remove or lessen them, must always be regarded with indulgence at least. We cannot but look with interest at Plato's jealousy lest the goodness of God should be impugned, and his condemnation of the poets on that account. He proceeds to exemplify his criticisms.

"We must then express our disapprobation if Homer, or any other poet, is guilty of such a foolish blunder about the gods, as to tell us that (*Il.* XXIV. 660)

'Fast by the threshold of Jove's courts are placed  
Two casks, one stored with evil, one with good:'

and that he for whom the Thunderer mingles both,

'He leads a life chequer'd with good and ill.'

But as for the man to whom he gives the bitter cup unmixt,

'He walks  
The blessed earth unblest, go where he may.'

19 "And if any one assert that the violation of oaths and treaties by the act of Pandarus was brought about by Athenê and Zeus (*Il.* II. 60) we shall refuse our approbation. Nor can we allow it to be said that the strife and trial of strength

between the Gods (*Il.* xx.) was instigated by Themis and Zeus. Nor again must we let our young people know that, in the words of Æschylus, [in a lost Tragedy,]

‘When to destruction God will plague a house,  
He plants among the members guilt and sin.’

“But if a poet writes about the sufferings of Niobe, as Æschylus does in the play from which I have taken those lines; or the calamities of the house of Pelops, or the disasters of Troy, or any similar occurrences; either we must not allow him to call them the work of a God, or if they are to be so called, he must find out a theory to account for them, such as we are now searching; and must say that what the God did was right and good, and that the sufferers were chastened for their profit. But we cannot allow the poet to say that a God was the author of a punishment which made the subjects of it miserable. Now if he say that because the wicked are miserable these men needed correction, and the infliction of it by the God was a benefit to them, we shall make no objection: but as to asserting that God, who is good, becomes the author of evil to any, we must do battle uncompromisingly for the principle that fictions containing such a doctrine as this, whether in verse or in prose, shall neither be recited nor heard in our City, by any member of it, young or old, if it is to be a well-regulated city. Such language cannot be used without irreverence; it is both injurious to us, and contradictory in itself.

“And thus one of our theological rules or moulds, in accordance to which all must speak and write, will be to this effect—that God is not the author of all things, but only of such as are good.”

This is very much like laying down fundamental Articles of theological belief for the Ideal City. He proceeds to another article of the same kind. He inquires :

“ Is God a wizard, so that he may appear for special purposes in different forms, at different times ; sometimes actually assuming such forms and altering his own person into a variety of shapes, and sometimes deceiving us, and making us believe that such a transformation has taken place ? or are we to suppose that he is of a simple essence, and that it is the most unlikely thing that he should ever go out of his own proper form ? In order to answer, we must consider this : If anything passes out of its proper form, the change must be produced either by itself or by some other thing. Now changes and motions communicated by anything else affect least the things that are best. For instance, the animal body is changed by meat and drink and exercise, and plants by sunshine and wind, and similar influences ; but the change is slightest in the plant or the body which is healthiest and strongest. And so of the mind, that is the bravest and wisest that is least disturbed by any influences from without. The same principle applies even to manufactured things, such as furniture, houses and clothes : those that are well-made and in good condition, are least altered by time and other influences. So that everything which is good, either by nature or by art or by both, is least liable to be changed by another thing.

20 “ Now God and the things of God are in every way most excellent. Therefore God will be most unlikely to assume many shapes through external influences.

“ But will he change and alter himself ? Clearly he must, if he alters at all. Let us then consider.

Does he, by changing himself, attain to something better and fairer, or to something worse and less beautiful than himself? Necessarily something worse, if he alters at all; for we shall not, I presume, affirm that there is any imperfection in the beauty or goodness of God. And this being the case, can we think that any God or man would voluntarily make himself, in any respect, worse than he is? This is impossible. Therefore it is also impossible for a God to be willing to change himself; and therefore it follows that even God, inasmuch as he is perfect to the utmost in beauty and goodness, abides ever simply and without variation in his own form."

This being established is applied in condemnation of passages of the poets.

"Then let no poet tell us that (*Odys.* xvii. 582)

'In similitude of strangers oft  
The Gods, who can with ease all shapes assume,  
Repair to populous cities.'

And let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, or introduce, in tragedies or any other poems, Hera transformed in the guise of a princess, collecting [in a lost play of *Æschylus*,]

'Alms for the life-giving children of Inachus, river of Argos:'

Not to mention many other falsehoods which we must interdict.

"And once more: let not our mothers be persuaded by these poets into scaring their children by injudicious stories; telling them how certain Gods go about by night in the likeness of strangers from every land; that they may not by the same act defame the gods, and foster timidity in their children.

"But let us consider the other supposition.



Perhaps though the gods have no tendency to change in themselves, they induce us, by deception and magic, to believe that they appear in various forms. Let us see whether this is likely. Would a God consent to lie, either in word, or by an act, such as that of putting a phantom before our eyes? To lie with the highest part of himself [the soul], and concerning the highest subjects [good and evil], is what no one consents to do. Every one fears, above all things, to harbour a lie of that kind. To lie or to be the victim of a lie, in the mind and concerning absolute realities [right and wrong], is the last thing that any one would consent to do. All men hold in especial abhorrence such a kind of untruth.

“Now this is what might more correctly be called a real lie, namely, a false persuasion residing in the mind of the deluded person.

“The spoken lie is a kind of embodiment and imitation of the anterior mental error, not an original falsity. And thus a real lie is hated not only by the gods but by men.

21 “Once more: when and to whom is the verbal falsehood useful, and therefore tolerable? Is it not when we are dealing with an enemy? Or when those that are called our friends attempt to do something mischievous in a fit of lunacy or madness of any kind; then a lie may be useful, like a medicine, to move them from their purpose. And so in the legendary tales of which we were just now telling, it is our ignorance of the true history of ancient times which renders falsehood useful to us, as the utmost attainable copy of the truth.

“Now on which of those two grounds is lying useful to God? Will he lie for the sake of getting as near the truth as he can, because he knows not

the things of old? The supposition is absurd. And thus there is no place in God for the falsehood which the poets' legends involve.

"Will he then lie through fear of his enemies? or because his friends are foolish or mad? No. No fool or madman is a friend of the gods. And thus there is no inducement for a god to lie: and the nature of gods and godlike beings is in every aspect incapable of falsehood.

"God then is a being of perfect simplicity and truth, both in deed and in word; and neither changes in himself, nor imposes upon others, either by apparitions, or by words, or by sending signs, whether in dreams or in waking moments.

"And thus we have a second principle, in accordance with which all speaking and writing about the gods must be moulded: namely this:— that the gods neither metamorphose themselves like wizards, nor mislead us by falsehoods expressed either in word or act.

"And thus while we commend much in Homer, we shall refuse to commend the story of the dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon (*Il.* II.) as well as that passage in *Æschylus*, [in a lost Drama,] where Thetis says that Apollo, singing at her marriage<sup>1</sup>

'Dwelt on my happy motherhood,  
The life from sickness free, and lengthen'd years.  
Then all-inclusively he blest my lot,  
Favour'd of heav'n, in strains that cheer'd my soul,  
And I too fondly deem'd those lips divine,  
Sacred to truth, fraught with prophetic skill;  
But he himself who sang, the marriage-guest  
Himself who spake all this, 'twas even he  
That slew my son.'

<sup>1</sup> I borrow this translation from Messrs. Davies and Vaughan's translation of the *Republic*: to which I owe also other obligations. I hope they will excuse this appropriation, considering how different the plan of my translation is from theirs, so that we are not rivals.

“When a poet holds such language concerning the Gods, we shall be angry with him and refuse him a chorus; (that is, the means of bringing his play upon the stage.) Neither shall we allow our teachers to use his writings for the instruction of the young, if we would have our Guards grow up to be as godlike and god-fearing, as far as it is possible for men to be.”

This is assented to by the listeners, and so the Second Book ends.

B. III. In the Third Book the subject of the Ideal

§ 1. Education is still pursued.

“Concerning the Gods then,” Socrates continues; “such is the language to be held, and such the language to be forbidden, in the hearing of all, from childhood upwards, who are thereafter to honour the gods and their parents and to value mutual friendship.

“But further: if we intend our citizens to be brave, we must add to this such lessons as are likely to preserve them most effectually from being afraid of death. For, can a man ever become brave who is haunted by the fear of death? And can we imagine that a believer in Hades and its terrors will be free from all fear of death, and in the day of battle will prefer it to defeat and slavery? We cannot.

“Then it appears that we must assume a control over those who undertake to set forth these fables, as well as the others. We must request them not to give such repulsive representations of the other world, but rather to speak well of it; because such language is neither true nor beneficial to men who are intended to be warlike.”

This being assented to, he proceeds to apply it to various passages of the poets. “We shall

expunge," he says, "the following passage, and all that are like it (*Odyss.* XI. 489, (594)<sup>1</sup>):

‘I had rather live  
The servile hind for hire, and eat the bread  
Of some man scantily himself sustain’d,  
Than sovereign empire hold o’er all the shades.’

And this, (*Il.* XX. 64, (82)):

‘Should wide disclose  
To mortal and immortal eyes his realm,  
Terrible, squalid, to the gods themselves:  
A dreaded spectacle.’

And (*Il.* XXIII. 100, (127)), [Achilles says],

‘Ah, then, ye gods! there doubtless are below  
The soul and semblance both, but empty forms.’

And (*Odyss.* X. 495, (602)), [of Tiresias],

‘To him alone of all the dead Hades’ Queen  
Gives still to prophecy, while others flit  
Mere forms, the shadows of what once they were.’

And (*Il.* XVI. 856, (1046)), [of Patroclus],

‘So saying, the shades of death him wrapt around,  
Down into Hades from his limbs dismiss,  
His spirit fled sorrowful, of youth’s prime  
And vigorous manhood suddenly bereft.’

And (*Il.* XXIII. 100, (124)), [the shade of Patroclus],

‘Shrill-clamouring and light  
As smoke the spirit past into the earth.’

And (*Odyss.* XXIV. 6, (5)), [of the shades in Hades],

‘He drove them gibbering down into the shades,  
As when the bats within some hallowed cave  
Flit squeaking all around, for if but one  
Fall from the rock the rest all follow him.’

<sup>1</sup> The second number is the number of the line in Cowper’s translation.

“These verses, and all that are like them, we shall entreat Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we erase; not because they are unpoetical, or otherwise than agreeable to the ear of most men; but because, in proportion as they are more poetical, so much the less ought they to be recited in the hearing of boys and men whom we require to be freemen, fearing slavery more than death.

2 “Further: we must likewise cast away all those terrible and alarming names which are introduced in connection with such subjects, the Cocy-tuses and Styxes, and Manes, and Infernals, and all such words, the mention of which makes men shudder with fear. For some other purpose perhaps they may be useful: but we are afraid for our Guards, lest these terrors should render them spiritless and effeminate. So we must discard these expressions, and speak and write after an opposite model.

“Again: we must also strike out the weepings and wailings of renowned heroes. What we maintain is, that a good man will not look upon death as a dreadful thing for another good man, whose friend he is, to undergo. Therefore he will not lament over such a person as if some dreadful disaster had befallen him.

“Moreover, we say this also, that such a man contains within himself, in the highest degree, whatever is necessary for a happy life; and is distinguished from the rest of the world by his peculiar resources. It is therefore less dreadful to him than to any one to lose a son or a brother, or worldly wealth, or anything else of that kind. He is less likely than any one to complain; and will rather bear it with all meekness, whenever any such calamity has overtaken him.

“We shall therefore do well to strike out the

lamentations put into the mouths of famous men, and make them over to women, and to women of feeble character, and to the baser sort of men, in order that those whom we profess to be training up to be the Guards of their country may scorn to act like such persons.

“Thus, we shall request Homer and the other poets not to represent Achilles, the son of a Goddess, as (*Il.* xxiv. 10) ‘tossing now on his side, and now on his back, and now once more on his face; and then as rising and pacing in fury the shore of the waste untameable ocean:’ nor yet as (*Il.* xviii. 23) ‘taking in both hands black burnt-out ashes and pouring them over his head;’ nor as indulging in all that weeping and wailing which Homer has attributed to him: nor to describe Priam, whose near ancestor was a god, as making supplication, and (*Il.* xxii. 414, (477)),

‘To all he kneel’d  
In turn, and roll’d himself in dust, and each  
By name solicited to give him way.’

And still more earnestly shall we beg them, whatever they do, not to represent the Gods as complaining and saying (*Il.* xviii. 54, (68)), [Thetis’s words],

‘Ah me, forlorn! ah me, parent in vain  
Of an illustrious birth.’

Or, if they will not so far respect the Gods, at least we shall entreat them not to presume to draw so unlike a picture of the highest of the Gods, as to make him say, (*Il.* xxii. 168, (195)):

‘Ah! I behold a warrior dear to me  
Around the walls of Ilium driv’n, and grieve  
For Hector.’

And (*Il.* xvi. 433, (526)):

'Alas, he falls! my most belov'd of men,  
Sarpedon, vanquish't by Patroclus, falls.'

3 For, if our young men were to listen sincerely to such accounts, instead of laughing at them as unworthy descriptions, it would be very unlikely that any one of them should look upon himself, that is but a man, as above such behaviour, and should rebuke himself, if he were ever betrayed into it, either in word or act; (as he should do;) nay, rather, unchecked by shame or fortitude, he will, on the slightest occasion, give himself up to groans and tears; which he ought not to do, as our reasonings have shown.

"Again, our Guards ought not to be given to laughter: for violent laughter produces a violent agitation of the soul. If therefore a poet represent even important men as overcome by laughter, our approval must be withheld; much more if Gods are so described. We shall not allow Homer to speak of the Gods thus (*Il.* i. 599, (739)):

'Heav'n rang with laughter inextinguishable,  
Peal after peal, such pleasure all conceived:  
At sight of Vulcan in his new employ.'

"But, again: a high value must be set also upon truth. For if we were right in what we said just now, and falsehood is really useless to the gods, and only useful to man in the way of a medicine, it is plain that such an agent must be kept in the hands of physicians; and that unprofessional men must not meddle with it.

1/ } "To the Rulers of the State then, if to any, it belongs of right to use falsehood, to deceive either enemies or their own citizens for the good of the State; and no one else may meddle with this privilege. For a private person to tell a lie to our magistrates we shall maintain to be as great a mis-

take as for a patient to deceive his physician, or a pupil his training-master, concerning the state of his own body, or for a sailor to tell an untruth to the pilot concerning the ship and the crew. If, then, the authorities find any one else in the city guilty of lying (*Odyss.* XVII. 353),

‘Any of those that are craftsmen,  
Prophet and seer, or healer of hurts, or worker in timber;’

they will punish him for introducing a practice as pernicious and subversive in a State as in a ship.

“Once more: our young men must be sober, temperate, modest. Now sobriety, as generally understood, implies the following principal elements: obedience to governors, and temperance in bodily pleasures.

“We shall approve then of such language as Homer puts in the mouth of Diomedes (*Il.* IV. 412):

‘Friend, sit down in silence, and give good heed to my sayings.’

And of the lines that follow:

‘Wrath breathing, marcht the Achaians,  
Silently dreading their captains.’

And everything of the same kind.

But we cannot approve such language as this (*Il.* I. 225, (275)):

‘O, charged with wine, in steadfastness of face,  
Dog unabasht, and yet at heart a deer;’

and of what follows, and all the other insolent expressions, which in prose or in poetry are put in the mouths of inferiors towards those in authority. For these do not tend to promote modesty in youth.

“So when the wisest of men is represented as 4



saying that what appears to him the finest sight in the world is (*Odys.* IX. 8, (9)) [Odysseus, of the Phæacians],

‘The steaming tables spread  
With plenteous viands, while the cups with wine  
From brimming beakers fill’d, pass brisk around.’

Do you think that being told this will aid a young man in acquiring self-control? Or this (*Odys.* XII. 342, (489)):

‘But death by famine is a fate of all  
Most to be fear’d’!

“Or what do you think of representing Zeus as forgetting, in the eagerness of his desire, all that he had been meditating, and so smitten at the sight of Hera, that he would not even defer the gratification of his passion till they should enter into their chamber? And what say you to the story how Ares and Aphroditê were bound in fetters by Hephæstus in consequence of a similar proceeding? Surely such stories are very improper to be told.

“But acts of fortitude under all trials in deed and word ascribed to renowned men are things that we willingly contemplate and listen to; as when Odysseus (*Odys.* VIII. 26)

‘Smote firm his breast, repressed his swelling heart:  
Bear this, my heart, thou hast borne worse than this.’

“Further, we must not permit our men to be receivers of bribes or lovers of money. Therefore we must not sing to them that (as Hesiod says),

‘Gods are persuaded by gifts, by gifts dread kings are persuaded.’

“Nor must we praise Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, or allow that he spoke wisely when he

advised him (*Il.* xxii. 15) to aid the Achæans if he received presents from them, but without presents, not to dismiss his anger. And we shall not believe that Achilles himself was so avaricious as to take gifts from Agamemnon; and at another time to give up a dead body, only on condition of receiving a price for it.

“It is only my regard to Homer that makes me stop short of asserting that it is a positive sin to say these things of Achilles. Nor, again, can I believe that he said to Apollo (*Il.* xxii. 15, (17)),

‘Of all the Powers above,  
To me most adverse, Archer of the skies,  
Thou hast beguiled me, leading unawares—  
Ah! had I power, I would requite thee well.’

Nor that he was so rebellious to the voice of the river Xanthus, who was a god, as to be ready to fight with him (*Il.* xxi. 130). Nor that he said of the other river, Spercheius, to whom his hair had been consecrated, that he would nevertheless give it to Patroclus at his funeral (*Il.* xxiii. 151, (190)):

‘The hero these (ringlets)  
Patroclus takes down with him to the shades;’

and that he fulfilled his purpose.

“And, again, all the stories (*Il.* xxii. 394 and xxiii. 175) of his dragging Hector round the tomb of Patroclus, and of his immolation of the captives on the funeral pile, we shall unhesitatingly declare untrue. We shall not allow our young men to be persuaded that Achilles, the son of a goddess and of Peleus, who was a most discreet prince; third in descent from Zeus, and pupil of Cheiron, that wisest of teachers, had yet so ill regulated a soul as to unite two opposite vices, mean covetousness and arrogant contempt of gods and men.

5 “Nor, once more, will we believe, or allow it to be said, that Theseus the son of Poseidon, and Peirithous the son of Zeus, went forth to commit such a shocking rape as is ascribed to them; nor that any other god-sprung hero could have dared to commit such impieties as are falsely told of them. We must oblige our poets to admit, either that the deeds in question were not their deeds, or else that they were not the children of the gods. They must beware of combining the two assertions, and of attempting to make our young men believe that Gods are parents of evil, and that heroes are no better than common men.

“These doctrines are at once irreverent and untrue; for we have proved, I believe, that evils cannot originate with the gods. And besides, such language is pernicious to the hearers; for every one will be indulgent to vice in himself, if he is convinced that such were and still are the practice of those who are

‘Kinsfolk of gods, not far from Zeus himself,  
Whose is the altar of ancestral Zeus  
Upon the hill of Ida, in the sky,  
And still within their veins flows blood divine.’

[From the *Niobe* of *Æschylus*.]

On these accounts we must suppress such fables lest they engender in our young men an aptitude for wickedness.

“We have now stated what rules must be observed in speaking of the gods, and demi-gods, and heroes, and the souls of the departed. We shall next consider how men are to be spoken of. Now both poets and prose-writers speak of men as if many are happy though unjust, and many just, yet miserable; and that injustice is profitable if it be not found out, and that justice is a gain to your neighbour but a loss to yourself. We should

be disposed to forbid the use of such language, and lay our commands on all writers to express the very opposite sentiments in their songs and their legends. But if you allow us to reject such expressions as false, you allow the very proposition to which the whole of our discussion tends. So to avoid begging the question, we must defer our rules on this subject till we have discovered the real nature of justice, and prove that it is essentially profitable to its possessor, whether he have the name of being just or not.

“And here ends our discussion of the subject-6 matter of narratives: our next task is to consider what must be their form. This done, we shall have considered both what ought to be said, and the mode of saying it.

“To understand this let us consider that all the compositions of poets and mythologers may be described as narratives of past, present, or future events. And the author attains his object either by narrative simple, or by narrative imitative, or by a mixture of both.

“I will take an instance. In the beginning of the *Iliad*, the poet tells us that Chryses besought Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that Agamemnon was angry with him: whereupon Chryses, finding his suit denied, prayed to his god to avenge him on the Achæans. Down to the lines (*Il.* i. 15, (19)),

‘His application was at large to all  
The host of Greece, but most of all to two,  
The sons of Atreus, highest in command,’

the poet speaks in his own person, and does not attempt to divert our thoughts into supposing that the speaker is any other than himself. But in what follows,

[‘Ye gallant chiefs, and ye their gallant host, &c.’]

he speaks in the person of Chryses, and endeavours, so far as he can, to make us believe that it is not Homer who is speaking, but the aged priest. And in this mixed style he has constructed all the rest of the narrative of the Trojan War, as well as the events that took place in Ithaca, and the rest of the *Odyssee*.

“It is equally narrative, whether the poet is reciting the occasional speeches or describing the intermediate events. But when he delivers a speech in the character of another man, he aims at the closest resemblance in style to the person introduced as the speaker. Now to assume a resemblance to another is imitation. And thus it appears that in such a case Homer and other poets carry on the narrative through the medium of imitation [and we may call it narration imitative].

“To explain this further: if Homer, after saying that Chryses came, bringing his daughter's ransom, in the character of a suppliant to the Achæans, and above all to the kings—had continued to speak, not as if he had become Chryses, but as if he were Homer still, that would have been, not imitation, but simple narration. The story would have run in something like the following manner (I shall tell it in prose, for I am no poet):

“The priest came and prayed that the gods might grant to the Greeks the capture of Troy, and a safe return, if only they would release unto him his daughter, accepting the ransom and reverencing his god. And when he had thus spoken, all the rest were moved with awe, and were willing to consent; but Agamemnon was wroth, and charged him to depart, and come again no more, lest the wand and the wreaths of the god should avail him nought. And ere his daughter should be set free, he said she should grow old with him

in Argos; so he bade him begone, and avoid provoking him, if he wished to reach home unhurt. And the old man, when he heard it, was afraid, and went away in silence; but when he was clear of the camp, he prayed much to Apollo, calling upon the god by his titles, and putting him in remembrance, and asking to be repaid, if ever he had presented an acceptable offering to him in the building of temples or the sacrifice of oblations; in consideration of which things he prayed that the god would avenge his tears upon the Achæans by shooting his arrows at them.

“In this we have a simple narration without imitation. The opposite result ensues when you strike out the poet’s own words that stand between the speeches, leaving only the alternate dialogue. You have then narration imitative, as in Tragedies.”

This elaborate distinction of narrative and dialogue, or, as we sometimes say, indirect and direct speeches, appears to show that criticism on such subjects was a novelty. Socrates goes on:

“Thus one branch of poetry and mythology consists wholly of imitation; that is, Tragedy and Comedy: another branch employs the simple recital of the poet in his own person, and is chiefly to be found in Dithyrambic poetry; while a third employs both recital and imitation, as is seen in Epic poems and the like.

“And this being settled, then arises the question, Shall we allow our poets, in telling their story, to employ imitation exclusively or partially, (and if so with what limits,) or not at all? that is, whether we shall admit Tragedy and Comedy into our city or not.

“And to decide this question, let us ask, Ought our Guards to be apt imitators or not? Does it not

follow from what we said at first, that an individual may pursue with success one calling, but not many; or, if he attempt many, by meddling with all he will fail in all, so as to make no proficiency in any? Now the same principle applies to imitation. The same person cannot imitate many things as well as he can imitate one, and therefore it is very improbable that one who has an important calling of his own will at the same time know how to imitate a variety of things, and do it well. Even two branches of imitation closely allied are more, I believe, than one person can succeed in, for example writing comedy and writing tragedy, nor can a man be a Rhapsode (recitor of epic poetry<sup>1</sup>) and an Actor. Nay, the same actor cannot even play both Tragedy and Comedy. And human nature appears to be split up into yet more minute subdivisions than these; so that a man is unable to imitate many things well, or to do the things well of which the imitations are likenesses.

8 “Since then our Guards are to be released from every other business, that they may become very skilful in erecting and upholding their country’s freedom, and may follow no occupation but such as tends to this result, it will not be desirable for them either to practise or to imitate anything else. If they do imitate, let them imitate from childhood what is proper to their profession,—the qualities of brave, sober, religious, honourable men, and the like; but meanness and every kind of baseness, let them neither practise in reality, nor in imitation, lest they be infected with the reality. For imitations, whether of bodily gesture, tones of voice, or modes of thought, persevered in from an early age, are apt to become habits and a second nature.

<sup>1</sup> See the *Ion*.

“Therefore we shall not permit those whom we wish to become good men to imitate a woman, young or old, reviling a man, or vaunting against the gods her own felicity: or taken up with misfortunes, and griefs and complaints. Much more shall we forbid them to imitate a woman who is sick, or in love, or in labour.

“Nor must they be permitted to imitate slaves, male or female, and their servile occupations.

“Nor bad men, as cowards; nor men caricaturing or abusing one another; nor uttering ribaldry, whether drunk or sober; nor committing any of the offences of which bad men are wont to be guilty. It is right that they should know mad and wicked people; but they ought not to act like them nor give imitations of them.

“Nor may they imitate smiths, or any other craftsmen working at their trade, or rowers pulling at the oars in a galley, or the like; for they are not to be permitted to attend to any of these occupations.

“Nor shall they give imitations of horses neighing, or bulls bellowing, or of roaring rivers and sounding seas, and claps of thunder.”

This elaborate proof that the citizens of the ideal polity cannot be actors is carried into such detail, that we must suppose it to refer to performances which had really taken place on the Athenian stage. He goes on to say, that a good man, in speaking of bad men and bad deeds, will pass rapidly over them. But, he continues,

“The man who is not of this character, the more contemptible he is, the more he will be inclined to omit nothing in his narration, and to think nothing too low for him; so that he will attempt, seriously and in the presence of many hearers, to imitate everything without exception;



even the phenomena mentioned just now, claps of thunder and the noise of wind and of hail, and of wheels and pulleys, and the sounds of trumpets and pipes and flutes and of all sorts of instruments; nay, even the barking of dogs, the bleating of sheep, and the notes of birds; and his performance will consist wholly of imitation by voice and gesture, and there will be but a small portion of narration."

We might almost suppose that Plato's indignation had been roused by some splendid pantomime full of imitative tricks and sounds, and destitute of dramatic merit. Socrates goes on to say, that the former kind, the Homeric mixture of narration and speeches, requires few changes of melody and rhythm: while the other requires all the kinds of melodies and rhythms. The pure and simple narrative of the good man is the best type; but the poets mingle and compound the two.

"There is an attraction about the composite type; while by far the most attractive of all, to children and servants, and the vulgar, is the splendid and varied kind. But this is not in harmony with the genius of our commonwealth; because with us there is no twofold and manifold man, since every one has one single occupation. A shoemaker is a shoemaker, and not a pilot to boot; the husbandman is a husbandman, and not a jurymen in addition; and so on."

"If, then, a man should arrive in our city, so clever as to be able to assume any character and imitate any object, and should propose to make a public display of his talents and his productions, we should pay him all reverence as a sacred, admirable and charming personage; but we shall tell him that in our State there is no one like him;

that our law excludes such characters, and we shall send him away to another city, after pouring perfumed oil upon his head, and crowning him with garlands. But for ourselves, we shall employ, for the sake of our real good, that more austere and less fascinating poet and mythologer, who will imitate for us the style of the virtuous man, and will cast his narratives in those moulds which we prescribed at the outset when we engaged in the training of our soldiers."

"And now we have done with that branch of Music which relates to poems and mythologies: we have explained what is to be said and how it is to be said.

"Our next subject is song and melody. We 10 must see what rules we must prescribe for these, so as to be in conformity with our principles.

"It is obvious that a song consists of three parts, the words, the melody, and the rhythm. As to the words of a song, they must conform to the rules already laid down for poetry in general; and the melody and the rhythm ought to follow the words.

"But we said that in the case of words we must banish plaintive and wailing compositions. Now what are the plaintive melodies? The musicians say, the mixed Lydian and the Hyperlydian, and such like. These then must be discarded; they are unfit even for virtuous women, much more for men.

"Again, drunkenness, effeminacy and indolence, are things unfit for our Guards. Now which of the melodies are effeminate and convivial? The Ionian and the Lydian, which are called 'lax modes.' These, therefore, we shall not employ in the training of soldiers.

"We have only the Dorian and Phrygian left.

I do not know the modes of melodies myself; but we must have that kind of melody which will represent the tones and accents of a brave man engaged in a feat of arms, or in any strong exertion; a man who, if he fails of success, or encounters wounds or death, or any other calamity, in all such events meets the blows of fortune with unflinching endurance.

“We must also have another melody expressive of the feelings of one engaged in an occupation peaceful and unconstrained:—invoking the Gods, advising, persuading, or counselling his equals, or agreeing to the prayers, instructions, or counsels of another; free from arrogance, sage, moderate, and content with his lot. We must have these two kinds of melody; the one spirited, the other tranquil, to imitate the tones of a man temperate and courageous in adversity and in prosperity.”

The distinction of the Greek musical “modes,” Dorian, Lydian, &c., may be conceived to be something like the distinction of the major and minor scales in modern music. Though the variety was carried to a much greater extent, yet, like these latter, they differed as more or less plaintive, more or less spirited. That such differences are capable of producing a wonderful effect upon the spirits and feelings of men, especially of men acquainted only with simple melodies, is well known. The persuasion, here implied by Plato, that music rightly chosen might sustain courage and inspire fortitude, is adopted by Milton, in his striking description of the host of rebel angels (*Par. Lost*, I. 550):

“Anon they move  
In perfect phalanx to the Dorian mood  
Of flutes and soft recorders; such as raised  
... To highth of noblest temper heroes old

Arming to battel; and instead of rage,  
 Deliberate valour breathed, firm, and unmoved  
 With dread of death to flight or foul retreat;  
 Nor wanting power to mitigate and 'suage  
 With solemn touches, troubled thoughts, and chase  
 Anguish, and doubt, and fear, and sorrow, and pain,  
 From mortal or immortal minds."

Socrates then goes on to speak of musical instruments.

"It appears from what has been said that we shall not require for our accompaniments instruments of many strings, or fitted for all harmonies. We shall not need harps or dulcimers. And the flute is equivalent to an instrument of several strings, and stringed instruments are merely imitations of the flageolet. And therefore the flute and flageolet are to be excluded. There remain the lyre and guitar; while in the country the herdsman will have some sort of pipe. And we are guilty of no innovation in preferring Apollo and Apollo's instrument (the lyre) to Marsyas and his instrument (the flute). And so we have purged our city from musical luxuries.

"Let us finish our purgation. After Melody comes Rhythm. Our rule must be that we must not aim at a variety of rhythms, or use all rhythms indiscriminately; but we must observe what are the natural rhythms of a well-regulated and manly life. And when we have discovered these, we must compel the foot and the music to suit themselves to the sense of such a life, and not the sense to suit itself to the foot and the music."

"What these rhythms must be, the musician must tell us. He says there are three principal kinds of movement: but which kinds of rhythm express which kinds of life, I cannot say. Damon, the musician, uses many technical terms on this subject: he speaks of the *Euoplan* or March, and

the *dactylic* or heroic measure: he speaks of *up* and *down*, of *long* and *short*; he calls one foot an *iambus*, one a *trochee*. We must ask *him* what movements mark meanness, what, insolence, what, vice, what, madness, and what are left as expressive of better qualities.

“But we at least can settle that grace coexists with beauty of rhythm, and ungracefulness with faulty rhythm. And good and bad rhythm naturally flow from good and bad style; and so do good and bad melody: that is, if rhythm and melody suit themselves to the words, as they ought to do.

“And so good style and good melody and rhythm and grace all depend upon *good nature*. I do not mean good nature in the sense in which we use it as a gentler term for silliness, but a real goodness of moral character. And this is the character to which our young men must aspire in order to perform their proper work.”

“Also the same rules apply to the fine arts: to painting, weaving, embroidery, architecture, furniture-making. Examples may be seen too in living bodies and in plants; all these may be graceful or ungraceful. And the want of grace, rhythm and melody, are closely allied to bad style and bad character: and the opposite qualities are allied to a character well-constituted and well-regulated.

- 12 “Therefore we ought not to confine ourselves to superintending our poets and compelling them to impress on their productions the image of a good character: we ought to extend our superintendence to the professors of every other craft as well; and ought to forbid them to give us, in the representation of living things, or in architecture, or in any other work, anything contrary to good

manners, to modesty, to liberal thoughts. All who cannot do this are to be interdicted working in our city, that our Guards may not be reared among degraded images, as a sort of pasture from which they take something day by day, till their souls become thoroughly vitiated. We ought, on the contrary, to seek out artists of another stamp, who by the force of genius can trace the form of the fair and the graceful; that our young men, dwelling, as it were, in a healthful region, may drink in good from every quarter; the emanations from noble works striking upon their eye or their ear; and like a gale wafting health from salubrious lands, and winning them imperceptibly from their earliest childhood into resemblance and love and harmony with the true beauty of reason.

“On these accounts it is that we attach such supreme importance to a musical education; because rhythm and harmony sink most deeply into the recesses of the soul, and take most powerful hold of it; bringing grace in their train, so that he who is well-nurtured is graceful, and he who is not, is not. And on this account too: that he who is well nurtured in music will have the keenest eye for defects, whether in the failures of art or in the misgrowths of nature. He, feeling a repugnance for these, will select and commend beautiful objects and gladly receive them into his soul, and feed upon them, and grow to be noble and good. He will blame and hate all repulsive objects, even in his childhood, and before he is able to be reasoned with. And when reason comes, *he* will welcome her most cordially who can recognize her by the instinct of relationship, because he has been thus nurtured. Such are the reasons for an education in Music.

“But we go further. In learning to read, we

are not fully taught till we can be sure of recognizing the small number of letters which there are in all their combinations, never overlooking any one. And we shall not know the images of letters, reflected in still water or in a mirror, till we know the letters themselves: for the knowledge of the reflections belongs to the same art and study as that of the originals. And how then, in the name of heaven, can we become truly *musical*, or make our Guards, whom we instruct, truly musical, until we know the essential forms of the virtues—Temperance, Courage, Liberality, Magnanimity and the like, wherever they are to be found: not overlooking any image of them in things small or great, but supposing that a knowledge of these belongs to the same art and study as that of the originals?

“Surely then to him who has an eye to see, there can be no fairer spectacle than that of a man who combines the possession of moral beauty in his soul with outward beauty of form: the external beauty corresponding and harmonizing with the internal, because the same great Type or pattern enters into both. Nothing can be so fair. And what is most fair is most loveable. And thus the truly *musical* person will love those who combine most perfectly moral and physical beauty; and will not love any one in whom there is a dissonance: at any rate, not if there be any defect in the soul. If it be only a bodily blemish he may bear it, and even regard it with complacency.”

Perhaps there is an allusion here to Socrates's ugliness. He goes on to a point difficult to speak of, but one on which it is fit that justice be rendered to Socrates and Plato. After thus speaking of love for a beautiful and virtuous object, he says:

“It is the nature of legitimate love to desire an orderly and beautiful object in a sober and harmonious manner, and therefore nothing akin to madness or licentiousness must approach legitimate love. But the sensual pleasure which is sometimes sought in love is closely allied both to licentiousness and to madness. Therefore this pleasure must not approach such love as we speak of: nor must a lover and his beloved whose affections are rightly given and returned have anything to do with it.

“This then must be the rule in our city. Though a lover may be attached to a favourite, and frequent his society, and embrace him as a son; yet he shall so regulate his intercourse as never to give occasion to suspicion that he extends his familiarity beyond this. He who does so shall be considered as a person of no education, and no delicacy.

“And so our discourse concerning *Music* has terminated where it ought to terminate. For the end of Music is the love of the Beautiful.”

We then go on to another subject. Socrates 13 says:

“Gymnastic will hold the next place to Music in the education of our young men.

“A careful training in Gymnastic, as well as in Music, ought to begin with their childhood and go on through their life. But this is my view of the case:—not that a good body will necessarily make the soul good; but that a good soul will by its proper virtue render the body as perfect as it can be. We must therefore first administer the requisite treatment to the mind, and then charge it with the direction of the body, laying down only the general principles of our scheme.



“We have already said that the persons in question must avoid intoxication. A guard must not get drunk. It would be absurd that a guard should require a guardian.

“Then about eating. Our men are athletes preparing for a great combat. Will then the habit of body which is cultivated by the trained fighters in the palæstra be suitable to them? Not quite. It is a drowsy regimen and produces an insecure state of health. Men in regular training sleep their life away; and if they deviate at all from their prescribed diet are attacked by serious maladies.

“Therefore a better-conceived regimen is required for our athletes of war, who must be wakeful like watch-dogs, and be very quick of eye and ear: and who are so exposed when on service to variations of food and water, that it will not do for them to be of precarious health.

“And so we must have a Gymnastic which is sister to the Music which we described as fit for us: a simple, moderate system.

“On these points we may take a lesson from Homer. In the repasts of his heroes when they are in the field, he never sets fish before them, although they are upon the shore of the Hellespont; nor yet boiled meat, but only roast, which soldiers could of course procure most readily: for anywhere there is less difficulty in using mere fire than in carrying about pots and pans.

“Neither has Homer said anything about sauces. But indeed it is known to all trainers, as well as to Homer, that a man who desires to be in good condition must abstain from such dainties.

“We do not therefore approve of a Syracusan table and a Sicilian variety of dishes; nor of a

taste for the damsels of Corinth; nor of those celebrated delicacies of Athenian confectionary.

"In fact this whole system of feeding may be compared to that complex and meretricious system of Music which we have rejected. And as in music, variety begat dissoluteness in the soul, so here it begets disease in the body: and simplicity in gymnastic is productive of good health, as in music it was productive of rightmindedness.

"But where bodily disease and mortal cupidity abound in a city, there law-courts and surgeries are opened in abundance. And Law and Physic begin to hold their heads high, when numbers even of well-born persons devote themselves with eagerness to these professions.

"Where can you find a more cogent proof that 14 a low and vicious education prevails in a state, than in the fact that every body runs to physicians and lawyers: not merely base-born mechanics, but even gentlemen of birth and breeding. Does it not seem a scandalous thing, and a proof of bad education, to be obliged to import justice from others, in consequence of the scanty supply at home; thus making them our lords and judges?"

We are here reminded of St Paul's remonstrance with the members not of an *imaginary* but of a real polity (1 Cor. vi. 1): "Dare any of you go to law before the unjust? I speak to your shame. Brother goeth to law with brother." The Dialogue goes on:

"It is still more scandalous when a man not only consumes the greater part of his life in courts of law, but is proud of being skilled in their practices; boasts of being an adept in getting the better of others; of being master of tricks and turns, manœuvre and evasion, so as always to wriggle out of the grasp of the law and escape

from defeat: and that for such a trifle as money."

And now Physic is to be condemned, as well as Law. Plato has no feeling for permanent valetudinarians.

"Do you not hold it disgraceful to require medical aid, unless it be for a wound, or an attack of some epidemic;—to require it, I mean, in consequence of want of exercise and through high living, such as we have spoken of?—to get ourselves stuffed with humours and wind, like quagmires, so as to compel the clever sons of Esculapius to call our diseases by such names as *flatulence* and *catarrh*.

"Such are newfangled names; not known in Esculapius's time. So I infer, because at Troy when Eurypylus was wounded, his sons (the physicians Machaon and Podalirius<sup>1</sup>) did not blame the woman who gave him a draught of Pramnian wine, with a plentiful sprinkling of barley-meal, and cheese grated over it, which would now be thought an inflammatory potion. Nor did they rebuke Patroclus who dressed the wound.

"We must consider that formerly, till the time of Herodicus, the sons of Esculapius did not follow our present medical practice, which is, to nurse diseases as rich men's sons are nursed by their attendants. Herodicus was a training-master: he fell into bad health, and made such a compound of physic and gymnastic as served to be a torment to him and to many since him: namely, he made his death a lingering one. He had a mortal disease, which he followed step by step with medicines; he could not cure himself though he attended to nothing else. He was distressed if ever he deviated from his regimen: and so in virtue of

<sup>1</sup> *Iliad*, II. 729, and XI. 623 and 829.

his professional skill he secured a miserable old age.

“Now it was not because Esculapius did not know or had not tried this kind of medical treatment that he did not transmit it to his followers. But he was aware that in well-regulated communities every man has his work assigned him in the state, which he must do. No one has leisure to spend his life as an invalid in the doctor’s hands. We see this among the labouring population: we cannot see it in the case of the rich and idle. When a carpenter is ill he expects to receive a draught from his doctor that will expel the disease by vomiting or purging, or get rid of it by cauterly or the knife. If a doctor were to prescribe to him a long course of diet, and to order him to bandage up his head and the like, he would tell such a doctor that he had no time to be ill: that it was not worth his while to live in this way, attending to nothing but his malady and neglecting his proper occupation. He would wish the doctor a good morning, and enter upon his usual course of life; and either regain his health and go on doing his business: or if his constitution could not bear the shock, he would die and have done with his troubles. 15

“Now for a man in that station of life, this is thought the proper use to make of medical assistance. And why? Is it because he had a work to do, which if he failed to do it was not worth his while to live, while we suppose that the rich man has no appointed work of this kind?

“But let us listen to Phocylides, when he says that as soon as a man has got whereon to live he ought to practise virtue. We might reply, Yes, and before that time too. But let us have no quarrel with him on this point: but let us inform ourselves

whether the rich have to practise virtue, so that, if they do not, life is worthless to them : whether this *nosotrophy*, this accepted condition of permanent disease, though it be an impediment in carpentering, is no impediment to the rule of Phocylides.

“Now, in truth, there is no greater impediment to that rule than an excessive care of the body, going beyond gymnastic. It is harassing to a man, whether he be engaged in domestic business or serving in the field, or sitting as a magistrate at home. And the worst of it is, that it is a grievous hindrance to all study, and reflection and meditation : for the valetudinarian is ever apprehensive of some headache or dizziness, which he accuses philosophy of producing. And therefore so far as virtue is practised and proved by intellectual study, this state is a mere obstacle to it. It makes a man always fancy himself ill ; never lets him rest from anxiety about his health.

“And so we maintain that Esculapius, knowing this, transmitted to his followers the healing art, for the benefit of those whose constitutions were naturally sound, and had not been impaired by their habits of life ; but were suffering from some specific complaint. This being so he used to expel their diseases by drugs and the use of the knife, without interrupting their customary avocations, that he might not damage the interests of the state. But when the constitution was thoroughly diseased to the core, he would not attempt to protract a miserable existence by a studied regimen, and injections and ejections ; he would not suffer them to beget children in all probability as diseased as themselves. He thought medical treatment ill-bestowed upon one who could not live in his regular round of duties ; and so, was of no use either to himself or the state.

“Thus Esculapius was a profound politician; and because he was so, his sons, as you may have observed, proved themselves brave men in the battle before Troy; and also employed the healing art in the manner I have described. When Menelaus had been wounded by the spear of Pandarus (*Il.* IV. 208):

‘Sucking the blood from the gash they laid mild simples upon it.’

But what he was to eat and drink after this, they no more prescribed than in the case of Eurypylus, knowing that the simples were sufficient to cure men who were healthy and regular in their mode of life, even if they happened to drink the next moment a compound of meal, wine, and cheese. As for those who had bad constitutions or were intemperate, they thought the existence of such a man no gain, either to himself or to others. They thought that their art was not meant for persons of that sort, and that it was wrong to attempt their cure, even if they were richer than Midas.

“And yet the tragedians and Pindar dissent 16 from us. While they assert that Esculapius was the son of Apollo, they declare that he was induced by a bribe of gold to raise to life a rich man who was dead, which was the cause of his being smitten with a thunderbolt. But we, with our principles, cannot believe both these statements of theirs. We shall maintain that if he was the son of a god, he was not covetous; if he was covetous, he was not the son of a god.

“But the question remains: shall we have physicians in our city, and also lawyers? (namely judges). Now a physician requires an experience both of health and of disease, and it may be, of disease in himself. A lawyer governs mind by

mind. His mind, therefore, must not be reared among vicious minds, and run the whole round of crime in its own experience, as is allowable in the case of bodily disorders. On the contrary, it ought from early youth to have been free from all experience and taint of evil habits. It must be qualified by its own excellence to administer sound justice. Good people when young, are simple and easy victims to the impositions of bad men, because they have not in their own consciousness examples of passions like those of the wicked. Therefore to make a good judge, a man must not be young but old. This acquaintance with what injustice is, must be acquired late in life; not by observing it as an inmate of a man's own soul, but by long practice in discerning its baneful nature as it exists in the souls of others: in other words, he must be guided by *knowledge*, not by his own experience.

"Such is a good judge. But your smart and suspicious lawyer, who has been guilty himself of many crimes, and fancies himself knowing and clever, so long as he has to deal with men like himself, betrays astonishing wariness,—thanks to those inward examples which he has ever in sight. When however he comes into communication with men of years and virtue he shows himself to be no better than a fool, with his mistimed suspicions, and his ignorance of a healthy character, which are the consequences of his not possessing within himself any example of such a thing. But as he falls in oftener with wicked than with good men, he seems both to himself and to others to be rather clever than foolish."

We may suppose that here, as in other parts of the Dialogue, Plato is describing a state of things which he saw at Athens. He goes on:

“It is then in a man of this stamp that we must look for the good and wise judge, not in one of the former class. For vice can never know both itself and virtue; but virtue in a well instructed nature will, in time, acquire a knowledge both of itself and of vice. The virtuous man, therefore, and not the vicious man, will make the wise Judge.

“And thus we establish in our city the two professions of Medicine and of Law; each such as we have described. They are to bestow their services on those only of the citizens whose bodily and mental constitutions are sound and good; leaving those that are otherwise as to the state of their body, to die; and actually putting to death those who are naturally corrupt and incurable in soul.”

This is a somewhat severe view of the analogy between the business of the Judge and the Physician.

“And thus those who establish a system of Education, and Music, and Gymnastic, do not, as is commonly said, intend to apply the one to the improvement of the soul, the other to that of the body. On the contrary, they introduce both mainly for the sake of the soul.

“For consider the characteristics which distinguish those who have been practised in Gymnastic all their lives without any acquaintance with Music; and again of those who have attended to Music and not to Gymnastic.

“Those who have devoted themselves to Gymnastic become too rough and hard, those who have devoted themselves to Music become too soft and mild.

“But these are exaggerations of good elements. Roughness and hardness are the natural produce



of the pugnacious element, which if rightly nurtured produces courage. Mildness is a property of the philosophic temperament, which rightly nurtured renders the character gentle and orderly.

“And we have said that our Guards ought to combine both these attributes, naturally harmonized. Where this harmony exists, the soul is both sober and brave: where it is wanting, the soul is coarse and cowardly.

18 “Accordingly, when a man surrenders himself to Music, and gives up his soul to be flooded through the funnel of his ears with those sweet and soft and plaintive melodies which we have spoken of, and spends his whole life in warbling and delighting himself with song, such a man at the outset softens whatever portion of the pugnacious element he possesses, as iron is softened, and makes it ductile and useful, instead of rigid and useless. But if he do not stop in time, but goes on with this softening process, his courage melts away, all the strength of his soul is destroyed, and he is a feeble warrior. This is the case if he has no courage in his disposition. If this be not so, his courage becomes irritability. The smallest thing angers him, he becomes choleric, vehement and ill-humoured.

“If the same man be given up entirely to Gymnastic and to Eating, and neglect Music and Philosophy, the excellent condition of his body at first inspires him with courage and confidence, and he becomes braver than before. But what is the consequence of thus engaging in an occupation to the exclusion of the Muse’s influence? Even supposing him to have possessed at first some taste for learning, yet if that taste is never found with knowledge or inquiry, and takes no part in rational discourse or any intellectual pursuits, does it not become weak, and deaf, and

blind, from the want of stimulus and nourishment, and purgation of the faculties? It does. Consequently such a man hates reasoning and literature. He abandons the use of rational persuasion, and like a wild beast, would decide everything by force and violence. He lives in ignorance and coarseness, a stranger to harmony and grace.

“And thus Gymnastic and Music are two providential gifts, bestowed to correct two exclusive temperaments, the irascible and the philosophic. Not properly for soul and body respectively but for the soul: and for the two virtues of Wisdom and Courage, to put them in harmony, the one with the other, by tension or relaxation of their springs. He who can thus employ Gymnastic and Harmony is better than the best musical instrument tuner. And some such tuner we must have in our state.”

The different effects of Literature and Gymnastic upon the character, as elements of education, are presented to us in the Dialogue of *The Rivals*, (Vol. I.); which, as I have remarked, might be entitled *Philosophy and Gymnastic*.

The delineation of the Education of the Ideal State ends here. Socrates does, indeed, in a single sentence, mention dancing, hunting and field exercises, the sports of the gymnasium and the race-course; but merely to say that they require no special discussion: and the Dialogue then proceeds to the further construction of the Ideal State, which has already been given.

## REMARKS ON PLATO'S IDEAL EDUCATION.

IN the objections which Plato makes to the works of the Greek poets as parts of Education, grounded on their unworthy representations of the divine nature, we have an interesting proof how far superior his natural religion was to the prevalent mythology. The question of the exclusion of poets from the Ideal State is the subject of another Digression in the Tenth Book, which I shall give hereafter. The matter is there argued on another ground, namely the doctrine already put forth in the *Ion*, that the imitative poet is only at the third stage from Truth; which doctrine is however there more closely connected with the Platonic System of Ideas.

The efficiency ascribed to Music in its ordinary sense, as an element of education seems to us strange. We cannot understand what the musical 'Modes' could be, so that the use of one or other of them in a boy's training should materially affect his character. As I have already said, I conceive that these Modes must have differed somewhat in the same manner as our Major and Minor scales or modes differ: the one being more cheerful and spirited, the other more tender and plaintive. We may imagine such differences to be more than two: indeed they are so with us; for the minor scale is made to assume several forms; and in the major scale we have often a cadence on the *third* above the key-note, which makes it a different strain. It seems almost certain that the Grecian modes must have differed mainly in the cadence of the strain and in the half notes which occurred in the gamut. And that strains with such differences, undisturbed by harmonies, and long and often dwelt on, can produce deep effects on the souls of susceptible persons, we can have no doubt.

Dr Burney, in his *History of Music*, makes the difference of the Greek modes to be a difference of key in our ordinary sense of a difference of keys, as when we speak of the key of C major or of D major, or the like. These keys have no doubt a difference of character, so that one is much more bright and lively, another more grave and solemn. These keys are, with us,

distinguished by the number of sharps and flats which are added to the natural gamut in order to form the scale of the key. But the differences of character of keys so related to each other depend on their being referred to a fixed gamut, such as that of a keyed instrument, and are governed by the *temperament* according to which the instrument is *tuned*. Now the Greek scale was not a scale thus tempered, but a pure untempered scale, as we know from their mathematical writers on music. Moreover, though the differences of the different keys as to cheerfulness or plaintiveness, and the like, are considerable, they are much smaller differences than the differences in this respect of our major and minor modes; they are differently estimated by different persons; and they also depend for their degree upon the scheme of temperament adopted. I conceive therefore that the difference of the Dorian and Lydian modes, and the like, was more of the nature of our difference of major and minor scales or modes, than of our difference of keys.

We have another example of a peculiarity of musical scale which produces a peculiarity of expression, in what is called *Scotch* music. In this the *third* and the *seventh* of the key being omitted, a noticeable character is given to the airs; though it would probably be deemed too fanciful a speculation to ascribe to this any of the peculiarities of the Scotch character.

What is said of Gymnastic, as tending to make men rude and coarse when not duly balanced by Music and Philosophy, puts us in mind, as I have already said, of the two rival students in the Dialogue of *The Rivals* in our first volume. The remarks on Cookery and Medicine are a curious example of the tendency to introduce on every occasion of speculation a reference to Homer.

# THE REPUBLIC.

## DIGRESSION II.

### THE CONDITION OF WOMEN IN THE IDEAL POLITY.

(*Republic*, B. v. § 1.

**A**FTER the end of the Fourth Book, when the Ideal State has been constructed, there ensues a large quantity of digressive discussion occupying the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Book. Dividing this discussion into separate Parts, we may take, as the first Part, that which refers to the subject above stated, The Condition of Women in the Ideal State. That this and the subsequent discussions are digressive is plainly indicated in the Dialogue itself. Socrates in the beginning of the Fifth Book proposes to discuss the deviation from the Ideal Polity, which subject he really does pursue in the Eighth Book; and he is diverted from doing what he proposes at first by the urgency of his friends, who propound to him the new subject above named. I will give the Dialogue in which their request is conveyed, and then go on to a more direct and uninterrupted account of Socrates's strange and indeed monstrous propositions. Socrates says,

“Such then is the state, and such the man

that I call good and right. All others which deviate from this I consequently call bad, the states in their administrations, the men in their dispositions: and there are four kinds of this badness."—"What are those?" said Adeimantus.

"I was going to speak of them in order, as I conceived them, and of the transition from one to another, but Polemarchus—for he sat a little beyond Adeimantus,—stretching out his hand and taking hold of him by the top of his vest near the shoulder, drew him towards him, and leaning towards him whispered something to him. We only heard these words. 'Shall we let him off? or how?'—'By no means,' said Adeimantus aloud. And I said, 'What or who is it that you will not let off?'—'You,' said he.—'As how?' said I."

"We think," said he, "that you are lazy; and that you are going to cheat us out of a part of your discourse, not the least interesting, that you may not have the trouble of going regularly through it. You are trying to slip away from us by saying, in a slight way, that every one could see that the rule 'Among friends everything is common property' would apply to the women and the children."

"Well, and was I not right, Adeimantus?"

"Yes, but this word 'right,' like the rest, requires explanation. In what way is this community to take place? for there may be many ways. Do not then omit to tell us which it is that you mean. For we have been long waiting in the hope that you would at least recollect to say something about the procreation of children, and of the way of bringing them up, and in short, of all that belong to this community of women and children. We are persuaded that according

as it is well or ill established, it is of great consequence, or rather, that it is all-important to the society. Now that we are passing onwards to the consideration of another form of government, without having sufficiently unfolded this point, we have resolved, as you hear, not to allow you to go further till you have explained this matter as you have the rest."

"And I," said Glaucon, "vote with them."

"Yes, Socrates," says Thrasymachus, "we are unanimously of this opinion."

2 "What have you done, I replied, in thus putting me under duress, and opening, almost, the whole subject of our Polity afresh! I was congratulating myself on having got past that place, and glad if you would be satisfied with what I have said. In reviving this subject you do not know what a swarm of questions you have stirred up. I saw well how it was: and I then let the subject alone for fear of creating an endless stir."

"What!" said Thrasymachus: "do you think that we are come here a gold-hunting? Do you think that we care for gold, or anything else, so much as for philosophical discussions?"

"No," I said; "but discussions of a moderate measure."

"The due measure of such discussions, O Socrates," said Glaucon, "is the whole of life, for sensible men. But as to the length of time occupied, leave us to take care of ourselves. Only do you not get tired of answering our questions. And tell us in what way the Guards of our city are to have in common the women and children; and how the children are to be brought up in the interval between birth and education properly so called—the period when children require most care. Tell us how these things are to be managed."

“That is not easy to do, my friend. What I have to say will be received with more distrust even than what I have said already. People will not believe that the thing is possible; and when it has been shown to be quite possible they will not believe that it is worth much. So I hesitate to meddle with the subject. It will seem, my dear friend, like a visionary wish.”

“Do not be afraid,” said he: “you speak to hearers who are neither obstinate nor unfriendly to you.”

“My excellent friend,” said I, “do you say that with a view of encouraging me?”

“I do,” said he.

“But what you say produces the opposite effect. If I were confident of my own knowledge of the subject, your encouragement would have been well and good; for to speak on weighty and interesting topics among intelligent friends, is a thing that may be done with freedom and confidence if we think that we have truths to tell; but to speak, as I do, doubting and still seeking, is dangerous; and makes one fear,—not to be laughed at—that would be a childish fear—but to go aside from the truth, and along with you to mislead your friends into error where error is fatal. And so, O Glaucon, I must entreat Adrastea [the avenging goddess of unintentional homicide] to look indulgently on what I am going to say. For I fear that it is a less crime to kill a person involuntarily, than to cheat him about what is honest and good and just and lawful.”

“At this Glaucon laughed, and said, ‘Well, Socrates, if your discourse does us any mischief, we will refuse to prosecute you, as people sometimes do in the case of homicide. We will not accuse you as a cheat. So speak, and fear nothing.’”



"Well," said I, "in the case of homicide, a man is safe who is not prosecuted; and so it must be, by analogy, in this case."

"Therefore," said he, "say on."

"I must then resume a subject which perhaps I might better have followed out in its proper place. But it will not be unsuitable, after having determined in all points the part which men have to play, to examine the women's part; especially since you challenge me to do it."

After this prologue, the subject is followed out steadily.

3 "Men born and brought up as we have described cannot do anything better, in respect to the possession of women and children, than follow the line which we have already traced out for them. But we have represented the men as the Guards or Guardians of a flock. Let us follow out this notion, and see how it will do.

"In the care of a flock, do we hold that the female dogs should, as well as the males, guard the sheep, hunt with the male dogs, and share their employments in general? or do we hold that they should stay at home, laying it down as a rule that the office of having litters of puppies, and of bringing them up, makes it impossible for them to do anything else, and that the male dogs must have the whole care of the flock? No. We require that the male and female should share in everything; only we treat the females as the weaker, and the males as the stronger.

"But it is not possible to use animals for the same work if we do not give them the same training and education. If, then, we are to employ the women in the same duties as the men, we must give them the same education.

"To the men we gave, as their education,

**Music and Gymnastic.** We must therefore train the women in the same arts. We must educate them for soldier's service, and treat them in all respects as we do the men.

“But perhaps of all the things which look ridiculous because they are novel, you would say that the most ridiculous would be the women practising gymnastic exercises naked along with men;—not only young women, but old women, like the old men who continue to like such exercises though they are wrinkled and unsightly. Certainly it might appear ridiculous at the present moment. But as we have begun, let us disregard all the scoffs which fine gentlemen might utter at such an innovation. Let us request the scoffers to be serious, and to recollect that it is not long since the Greeks thought, as the greater part of the barbarians still think, that a naked man was an indecent and ridiculous sight. When the Cre-tans first, and the Lacedæmonians afterwards, introduced naked exercises, the facetious persons of that day probably mocked at the practice. But when experience had shewn that it was better to have the body naked than clothed in gymnastic exercises, the reason seeing what was best, corrected the eyes in their view of the ridiculous, and proved that in the sight of all sensible men, there is only one thing which is ridiculous, namely what is bad: and that he who seeks to raise a laugh at anything except what is unreasonable and vicious is an empty fellow.

“But let us consider whether what we propose 4 is possible: and let every man, jocose or serious, examine whether the female human nature is capable of the same exercises as the male; altogether or in part, and especially as relates to war. And that we may not attack when no one defends, let

us consider the reasons alleged by the opposite side.

“They might say, ‘Socrates and Glaucon, you need nobody else to contradict you: you contradict yourselves. When you laid the foundations of your state, you agreed that each person should fulfil that single office for which nature had fitted him.’—‘It is true, we did so agree.’—‘But is there not an extreme difference between the nature of the man and of the woman?’—‘Of course there is.’—‘Therefore to man and to woman must be assigned offices different according to their nature.’—‘Doubtless.’—‘Is it not then a manifest error and contradiction in you to say that men and women should fulfil the same offices, notwithstanding the difference of their nature?’

“Now here is a difficulty that we must get out of, whether we call it great or small. Whether a man tumble into a small pond or into the wide ocean, he must swim for it; and perhaps some dolphin may come and save us, as Arion was saved. Let us look at the argument. We agreed that different natures ought to have different offices, and men and women are of different natures, therefore they ought to have different offices. That is the objection.

“But we must consider the meaning of the proposition, and distinguish, as when we say that different natures ought not to have the same offices, what do we mean by *different* and *the same*? Has a bald man and a long-haired man the same nature or different? We say, different. If then bald men make shoes, are long-haired men to be forbidden to make shoes?—That would be absurd. Why? because we did not mean by *different*, different in *any way*: but different as to their fitness for the office in question.

“So if we find that the nature of the man 5 differs from that of the woman with reference to a certain art or office, we shall conclude that we must assign this art or this office to the one or the other. But if the difference of the two sexes consists in this, that the male begets children and the woman bears them, we shall not therefore consider it proved that the woman differs from the man as to the point in question. And we shall continue to hold that the Guards of the state and the women who belong to them may discharge the same offices.

“Now what is the art or office for which woman has not received from nature the same aptitude as man? Man generally is superior; for the few exceptions are hardly worth mentioning; as weaving, pastry-making, cookery, in which it is a disgrace for a woman not to excel men. But in general the two sexes participate in the same faculties; and the woman, as well as the man, is called by nature to all offices; only in all the woman is inferior to the man.

“Why then should we impose all offices upon men and none upon women? A woman may have a talent for music, or may want that talent; may have a talent for physic, or may not. And so she may or may not have a talent for gymnastic or for war. She may be intellectual or unintellectual; irascible or mild. And so as she may have the same dispositions as our Guards, she may be fit to be one of the guard; just as fit as a man, except in so far as she may be weaker.

“Such women then are to be selected to be 6 the companions of the Guards in place and in duty. And so we have established our first point, that it is not against nature to give music and gymnastic to the women who belong to the Guards. It was

not a mere visionary wish which dictated our law, nor is it an unnatural law. It is rather the present existing state of things which is unnatural.

“As then such a scheme is seen to be possible, we must next inquire if it is beneficial. Now we take the best men to be our Guards, giving them a proper education. We do not take those who are fit to be shoemakers and are educated as shoemakers. And so we must for the same purpose take those of the women who are best. And it is surely good for the city to have the best men and the best women in their places. And this will be brought about by their being educated in music and gymnastic; and so this institution is not only possible but best for the state.

“These women then must strip for their exercises, and must be clothed with their virtue instead of vestments; they must take their share in war and in the other offices of the Guards, only the lighter tasks being assigned to them as the weaker sex. And he who laughs at the sight of naked women, when naked for so good a purpose, ‘plucks laughter, unripe fruit of wisdom,’ [as Pindar says]. He does not know what he is laughing at. He does not know, what has been and will always be true, that what is useful is comely, and that nothing is uncomely but what is mischievous.

“And so we have escaped one great wave which threatened to overwhelm us when we propounded this law, that women should share in the duties of men;—that there should be guards and *guardesses*. This is now allowed to be both possible and beneficial.”

7 There then comes a part of the Platonic Scheme which we can account for only by recollecting the

ethical purpose of the Polity. The Polity was to represent the constitution of the human soul. There are in the Ideal City three classes, the Rulers, the Soldiers, and the Producers, which represent respectively the three elements of human nature, Reason, Pugnacity and Desire. And as the Soldiers were there to represent *one* of the springs of action, they could not, in consistency with the scheme, be themselves moved by *several* springs, such as the Family Affections, the Desire of Property, and the like. These conditions, therefore, Family and Property, were to be excluded in the case of the Soldiers. So far as they are concerned, the whole State is to be regarded as one Family, having their property, and even their children, in common. And Socrates goes on to prove that this part of the institutions of his Ideal State is highly beneficial.

“To convince ourselves of this, let us ask what <sup>10</sup> is the greatest evil in states, the most to be guarded against by the legislature; and examine if what I have proposed does not avert this evil and tend to the opposite good. The greatest evil in a state is that which divides it and makes it several states. The greatest good is that which binds it together and makes it one. And this is produced by the community of pleasure and pain, when the citizens joy and sorrow alike at good and at bad events. And that is the case when the citizens do not speak of *mine* and *not mine*, as applied to different objects; but when all the citizens say of the same, This is mine, and this is not mine, then the city is like one man. So when one finger is hurt, the whole frame of body and soul, united by the governing principle, feels the hurt which affects one part, and we say *the man* has a pain in his finger. And so for any other part, the whole feels the pain or

the pleasure which affects the part. And such is the case with a well ordered state. When any one of the citizens receives good or evil, the whole state sympathizes with him and feels pleasure or pain.

- 11 “And now to apply this to *our* State: let us see if what we have been saying applies more especially to it. In other States, as in ours, there are Governors and People. All these are called *Citizens*; but in other States the Governors are called besides, *Despots*, in most, *Archons* in democratic states: with us, besides being called citizens, they are called *Saviours* and *Guardians*. With us the Guardians call the people their Paymasters and Supporters: in other States the Rulers call them *Slaves*. They speak of Fellow-Rulers, we of Fellow-Guardians. And their Rulers treat each other some as friends, some as strangers. They consider the interest of their friends as theirs; that of strangers as not theirs. But the Guardians, with us, do not regard any of their number as a stranger. Each will think he sees in each of the others a brother or a sister, a father or a mother, a son or a daughter, or the like near relative.

“But they must not be content with giving each other the names of these relations: we must require that their actions should conform to their words. Each must render to those whom they call *father* respect and obedience and deference, or he must be regarded as impious and wicked: and all the citizens will sing in the ears of children from an early age such maxims of conduct to relatives. And thus our State more than another will have joys and sorrows common to all: and thus we shall have in our State what we agreed was the greatest good of a State.”

- 12 He traces yet other results of this unity of in-

terests. He notes that there will be no lawsuits, because no one has any private property; no charges of assault or violence. The more aged will have authority to chastise the younger. A young man will never assault an older man; looking on him as a father, and fearing punishment from his father's brothers. And so there will be no discord. Also the poor will have no occasion to flatter the rich: there will be no embarrassments arising from the expense of education; and from money borrowed for that purpose, and to maintain servants in all kinds of base and unworthy proceedings, which even a blind man may see.

“All this they will escape, and will live a life 13 more happy than that which is reckoned the happiest, the life of the Olympic victors. *They* are reckoned happy for the possession of a small part only of those blessings which our citizens enjoy. Our victory is more beautiful, our public maintenance more complete. For our victory is the safety of the State: our maintenance is a supply of all that life needs for them and their children—a life of rewards and a worthy funeral.

“And you may recollect, perhaps, that some time ago some one, I do not recollect who<sup>1</sup>, reproached us with neglecting the happiness of our Guards, who having it in their power to take all that the other citizens had, really were to possess nothing. We replied that we would examine how far this reproach was well founded when the opportunity occurred: our object then being to make a happy State, not to make one class happy.

“But after what we have now said, do you think that the condition of a shoemaker or any other artisan is comparable with that of our Sol-

<sup>1</sup> Adeimantus at the beginning of B. iv.



diers? which is, as we have seen, superior to that of the Olympic victors. But still I must repeat what was then said: that if the soldier seeks a kind of happiness which takes away his character of Guard: if, discontented with a modest and safe and advantageous condition, a foolish childish fancy impels him to seize more, he will know how wise Hesiod was when he said, 'The half exceeds the whole.'

- 14 "But we must consider whether we can establish in the human race this community of habits, and how it is to be done. The men and women will go to the wars together, and will take with them the more robust of their children; in order that they, like the children of artisans, may see that which is to be their business when grown up; and besides, that they may help their elders in what they can. You must have seen, for example, the son of a potter look at his father when he is working before he touches the wheel himself. In like manner our Soldiers must learn their trade.

"Moreover every animal combats with more courage when its young are present.

"But the young ones will be in danger, you say; and so the race of Soldiers may be destroyed, and the State receive a deadly blow. We must avoid this: though we must run some risk, considering the great advantage to be gained. The children must not go on the most perilous expeditions. They must be under careful and judicious commanders. And they must be provided with wings to fly away in case of need: that is, they must go on light and docile horses, so that if danger pursue, they may ride away with their governors.

"Then as to the discipline in war; the rule must be that he who quits his rank, throws away

his arms, or shows cowardice in any way, must be sent down among the artisans and husbandmen. He who is taken alive by the enemy must be left in their hands unclaimed, and they may do what they like with him.

“But him who has distinguished himself, the boys and young men who follow the army must, on the field of battle, crown with garlands, each placing one on his head. Each must take him by the hand. Each must kiss him and be kissed by him.

“We are following Homer, who makes those 15 who are eminent in war to be rewarded. He says, that Ajax having won renown in the war, received by way of distinction ‘whole chines of beef’ (*Il.* VII. 321), it being regarded as an honour which, besides the glory of it, would increase his strength, and was appropriate to a brave man in the vigour of manhood. And so we will take a hint from Homer; and in our sacrifices and similar solemnities we will honour the brave, with hymns, and with such privileges as we have mentioned; and also with ‘seats of honour, and viands, and goblets often replenished,’ (*Il.* VIII. 162): intending both to do them honour and to make them stronger, women as well as men.

“As for those who die in the campaign, we shall give out that those who die bravely are of the golden race. And we shall believe in Hesiod’s doctrine, that when any of this race die, (*Hes. Works and Days*, 121),

‘They into spirits are changed, earth-haunting, beneficent, holy,  
Mighty to screen us from harm, and of speech-gifted men the  
protectors.’

And we shall consult the oracle as to the funeral rites which we ought to bestow upon those supe-

rior and divine men, and so inter them. And thenceforth shall regard their sepulchres as those of superior beings, and pay them due respect and worship. And the same with regard to other citizens of very eminent merit who die of old age or from any other cause."

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Here the special subject of this digression ends. But Socrates goes on to propose certain Laws of War for his Ideal State, which are remarkable. They are Rules condemning the severe and cruel practices which the Greek States in their wars with each other followed. These Rules thus approach to the more humane Laws of War of modern times.

"As to the conduct of our soldiers towards their enemies: and first, as to the practice of making slaves:—Does it seem right for Greeks to make slaves of the freemen of Grecian cities? Ought they not rather to forbid this practice, and spare their own race, under the fear of being enslaved by the barbarians? They ought not to have in their possession any Greek slaves, and ought to advise others against having any. They might then more easily make common cause against the barbarians.

"Then again; ought they to strip the dead? Is it not a sign of a womanish and paltry mind to regard with hostile feelings the *body* of a dead man, when the real enemy has flown away, leaving only the instrument with which he fought? Are those who thus act any better than dogs which growl at the stone which has been thrown at them, and let the person that threw it alone? We must there-

fore banish the practice of stripping the dead, and preventing the removal of the bodies.

“Neither shall we carry the arms of our conquered enemies to the temples, to dedicate them there: especially the arms of Greeks, for we must keep up good will among Greeks. We shall fear that the temple may be desecrated by trophies won from our own brethren; except, indeed, the oracle should declare otherwise. 16

“Again, as to ravaging the lands and burning the houses of Greeks. We disapprove of both these practices; we would only allow the crop of the year to be carried off. For there is distinction as to a war between strangers, and a war between friends and relatives. The former may properly be called *war*; the latter a *quarrel*. But all the members of the Greek race are brethren and kinsmen to one another, aliens and foreigners to the barbarian world. And therefore when Greeks fight with barbarians we may call it war; when Greeks with Greeks, it is a quarrel. Now when we have a quarrel between parties in a city, if each party ravage the lands and burn the houses of the other, they are looked upon as sinful and unpatriotic: if they had any patriotism, they would not have the heart to mangle their nurse and mother. It is considered, in such a case, that one party cannot in fairness do more than carry off the crop of the other. They ought to feel that they will one day be reconciled. This practice betokens a far more humane feeling than the other.

“Now the City which we are founding is to be a Greek city: therefore its citizens should be gentle and humane. They should be patriotic Greeks, looking upon all Hellas as their common country, and sharing with their fellow-countrymen in the rites of a common religion. They will therefore

regard a dissension with Greeks, not as a war, but only as a quarrel. They will correct their opponents in a friendly spirit, and chastise them without any thought of enslaving them or destroying them—as chastisers, not as enemies.

“And being Greeks, they will not devastate Greece nor burn houses, nor treat all the men, women, and children of a city as their foes. They will confine this name to the few who were the authors of the quarrel. They will push the quarrel only to that point at which the innocent are induced by their sufferings to bring the guilty to justice.”

These suggestions as to the Laws of War are curious and interesting, as approaching to the humanities of modern warfare, and to the principle of regarding as members of one family all *civilized nations*, or all *Christendom*, (for these notions have with us replaced the notion of a *Greek world* with barbarians outside it.) The Dialogue then proceeds to discuss the possibility of such institutions as have been described being really established and worked, and this leads to what I may present as another Digression.

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## REMARKS ON THE CONDITION OF WOMEN IN THE PLATONIC STATE.

THE strange proposals respecting women which Plato delivers, and which I have described in the most general terms, omitting his details, may, as I have said, be ascribed to the imperfection of his analysis of the Springs of Human Action. He had in his City

three classes, the Rulers, Soldiers, and Producers, which represented respectively the three elements of man, Reason, Pugnacity, and Desire. As the Soldiers were there to represent *one* of the springs of action, they could not themselves be moved by *several* springs, such as the Family Affections, the Desire of Property, and the like. A more complete analysis of human nature, in which these latter springs of action are duly recognized, deposes the Irascible or Pugnacious Element from the anomalous ascendancy which Plato assigns to it, and from which, in a great degree, his arrangements respecting women flow.

I have given the *ethical* aspect of the Platonic scheme: but it also offers itself as a proposal for the *political* constitution of a State: a constitution, as was forthwith objected, impracticable and unprofitable. Aristotle's criticism of it in the Second Book of his *Politics*, given from this point of view, is very decisive.

The proposal that women should participate in gymnastic exercises, was one of the points on which the natural repugnance to such exhibitions among the Athenians was likely to be sharpened by the fact that such practices existed already as a distinctive part of the Spartan institutions. We have this feeling expressed in the *Andromache* of Euripides (v. 671, Potter's Translation):

"Nor, were her will

Dispos'd, could one of Sparta's female race  
Be modest, where the virgins quit the house  
And with uncincur'd vests and naked thighs  
Mix with young men contending in the race,  
And share th' athletic sports—not, as I think,  
To be allowed."

# THE REPUBLIC.

## DIGRESSION III.

### OF PHILOSOPHERS AS POLITICIANS.

(*Republic*, B. v. § 18—22. VI. § 1—12.)

THIS Digression offers to us the celebrated assertion of Plato, that it will never be well with the world till philosophers are kings, or kings philosophers. This assertion sounds extravagant: yet it might be deemed a plausible thesis, if by *philosophers* we were to understand really wise men;—men the most able both to select the best objects of political action, and to devise the means of attaining them. But Plato here uses the term *philosopher* in a more especial sense: he means by it one who has made himself master of universal and necessary truths;—according to his own expression, one who *has a knowledge of the really existing*, in opposition to mere *seeming*; of the *always existing*, in opposition to the *transitory*; of that which *exists permanently*, in opposition to that which *waxes, is developed and destroyed alternately*. It will appear by his own explanation that what he means by these phrases is a knowledge of universal and necessary truth, such as the Greeks had then attained to in Arithmetic and Geometry,

and such as he conceived might also be arrived at in Ethics and Politics. He conceived that there might be and must be a Science of the Good; the really existing, permanent, eternal, universal Good, as there is a science of the really existing, permanent, eternal, universal properties of number or of space. He aimed at such a science: he assumed its existence; and he asserted and laboured to prove that the men who possessed such a science were the proper rulers of mankind. This is the subject of the disquisition upon which he enters in the beginning of the Fifth Book, after having described some of the main features of the Polity of his imaginary Commonwealth; and I must give an account of his views and reasonings, compressing and modifying his exposition of them, as I have done with regard to other parts of the work.

Socrates, after saying that he expects what he is going to assert will be received with a tempest of ridicule and incredulity, goes on thus:

“The result to which we aspire can never be obtained, unless either philosophers are the rulers in states, or the rulers of states pursue philosophy freely and fully. Philosophy and Political Power must come to coincide. Those who apply themselves to one of the two pursuits separately must be excluded. Till then, there can be no intermission of the existing evils of states and of the human race; nor can that Polity which we have been describing ever emerge into a possibility and see the light of the sun. But yet I hardly venture to utter such a sentiment as this, knowing how repugnant it is to common opinion. It is difficult for men to see that no other course can bring happiness, either private or public.”

Glaucon replies with a sort of pleasant exagger-



ration, but yet with significance: "Yes, Socrates; you have uttered such a doctrine that there will be a host of men, and those, considerable persons, whom you will have drawn upon yourself in such a rage that they will be ready to fling off their coats that they may use their arms the better, and to take any weapon that they can lay hold of, with which they may run in upon you. Unless you can defend yourself effectually against them, you will have to fight for your life."

Socrates replies, accepting the pleasantry: "And is it not you who have brought me into this scrape, by requiring me to declare my opinion?"

Glaucon says: "I did so, and I did well. And I will not desert you. I will stand by you to the best of my power. I have good-will and good-hope at your service; and perhaps I can help you by answering your appeals better than another would, as you go on in the argument. So reckon upon me in that way; and set about proving to the unbelievers that the matter is as you say."

Socrates answers: "Well, I must try; since you promise me such good help. We must, then, explain what kind of philosophers we mean. It will, we hope, appear, when this has been done, that they are naturally fitted both to philosophize and to rule."

- 19 He then proceeds to point out how many and how admirable are the good qualities that belong to a truly philosophical spirit. "A philosopher," he says, "is a lover of Wisdom. But those who love anything, love it in every kind. Those who love youthful beauty (as you, Glaucon, ought to know) have something to say in praise of every kind of beauty. A snub nose is pretty; an aquiline nose is imperial; a straight nose is regular.

Black haired beauties are noble; those with fair complexions are the children of the gods; those who have a sallow face have the complexion of honey, as their ingenious and passionate lovers have discovered. So the lovers of wine find merit in all wine, and reason in all excuse for drinking. The lovers of honours, if they cannot get to be privy councillors of the state, are willing to take up with being common-council men of their town. If they cannot obtain honour from the many and the great, they seek to get it from the few and the little. He who is a lover, loves all through. So the lover of wisdom loves all wisdom; all kinds of wisdom. He who quarrels with any kind of learning, especially when he is a young man who has not learnt to distinguish between good and bad, is not a lover of learning, and so, not a philosopher. A man who is dainty in his food is not hungry; he is not food-loving but food-quarreling. He who wants to learn everything and is always eager to learn is the philosopher."

Glaucon hereupon suggests: "At this rate, you will have many queer philosophers. Those who are fond of public spectacles are desirous of learning something, in their way; and will be rejoiced to find themselves thereby philosophers. Those who are fond of hearing the choruses at the Dionysian festivals, so fond that they seem as if they had bound their oars to the service, and never miss an occasion either in the city or in the surrounding villages (while they have not the smallest taste for discussions and speeches,) are odd philosophers. Shall we call all these<sup>1</sup> philosophers?"

Socrates says, "No; they are a bastard sort of philosophers."

<sup>1</sup> I omit *καὶ τοὺς τῶν τεχνιδίων*.

“And who,” says Gelon, “are true philosophers?”

20 Socrates replies: “Those who are fond of the spectacle of truth. And to you, Gelon, I may venture to explain this further.

“Good and Bad are distinct and opposite things. Each of them is one definite idea. So, Just and Unjust, Beautiful and Vile, are each a definite idea. But each of these ideas assumes different appearances by the difference of the bodies and acts with which it is associated on various occasions. Now those lovers of spectacles and choruses, of whom we have spoken, and true philosophers, are distinguished in this way. They, the lovers of shows and concerts, are fond of beautiful figures and colours and sounds, and of contrivances which are made by combining these; but their nature is incapable of seeing and comprehending the Beautiful Itself. They who are capable of seeing and dealing with the Beautiful itself are very few. But he who apprehends objects as beautiful but has no apprehension of the Beautiful itself, who cannot even follow if one attempts to lead him to it, is a mere dreamer. For is it not dreaming when a man thinks he takes a thing which is like another, not for *like* but for *the same* with it, [as these persons take beautiful shows for the Idea of Beauty]? But he who is able to apprehend both absolute Beauty and the things which partake of it, and who does not take the things which *have it to be* it, nor it to be things which have it, that man is awake and not asleep.

“And the man who so apprehends things has Knowledge, whereas the other man has only Opinion—the one knows, the other only opines, or thinks he knows. And if the man who, we say, only opines, is angry at what we say of him; and

questions our account of him, we must pacify him and console him, and not tell him that it is merely a disorder which he has.

“ We must tell him, that if he really has knowledge we do not grudge it him; we should be glad to be sure that he does know anything. But we have to ask this question: He who knows anything, does he know something that is, or that is not? Of course something that is: that which is not, cannot be the object of knowledge. That which is universally may be known universally; that which is not anywhere must be universally unknown. But if there be things which are such as both to be and not to be, they must lie between that which is absolutely and that which is nowhere. And Knowledge belongs to that which is; Ignorance to that which is not; and to that which is between, belongs something between Knowledge and Ignorance. Now that which is between Knowledge and Ignorance is Opinion. And thus Knowledge and Opinion have different objects. Knowledge is concerned with that which is;—knows that it is; [Opinion deals with that which is or is not, as occasion determines].

“ But let us consider this a little further. There 21 are powers by which we are enabled to do what we can do, [for example, to know]; as there are powers by which everything does what it does: the vision has a power of seeing; the ear has a power of hearing. But these powers have no colour or figure to which I can so refer, that I can distinguish one power from another. In order to make such distinction, I must look at the power itself, see what it is and what it does. In that way I discern the power of each thing; and that is the same power which produces the same effect; and that a *different* power which produces a different

effect. Now Knowledge—true knowledge or science—is a power; the most manifest of powers. Opinion is also a power. But Knowledge and Opinion, as we have already agreed, are not the same power; for the one is infallible, the other by no means infallible. Knowledge and Opinion, then, must have different objects. Now Knowledge is concerned with what really is, and knows it as it is. Opinion opines only. It cannot therefore have for its object that which is the object of knowledge; for different powers must have different objects. That which is known and that which is opined cannot be the same. But that which is opined cannot be that which is not. Opinion has an object, and that object cannot be something non-existing. That which does not exist is the object of ignorance, not of opinion. Thus opinion deals neither with that which is, nor with that which is not: it is neither knowledge nor ignorance. Now knowledge is the most lucid of all things, ignorance the most obscure. And hence opinion must be more dark than knowledge, more lucid than ignorance. It lies between the two: it is an intermediate thing.

“Thus, as we said before, if there be anything which is of such a nature that it is and is not, it lies between that which is absolutely, and that which absolutely is not; and with regard to such thing there can be neither knowledge nor ignorance, but something between knowledge and ignorance; and it appears that this intermediate thing is what we call *Opinion*.

22 “It remains that we inquire what is this intermediate object, which partakes of both—of being and of not being,—and which cannot be said absolutely either to be or not to be; this intermediate object we shall then assign to the intermediate

power, giving the extreme objects to the extreme powers.

“Now I appeal to that ingenious gentleman who thinks that there is no Absolutely Beautiful<sup>1</sup>, no Idea of Beauty always constant and identical, but who thinks that there are many *beautiful things*: and I ask him whether some of these beautiful things are not sometimes ugly [by comparison with others]. He must allow that they are. And in like manner what is double in one aspect is just as truly half in another. And so things cannot be called great or small, heavy or light, with any more truth than they can be called the opposite. These things, then, are no more what you call them than they are the opposite. They are and they are not, as in the boy's riddle; a bat is a bird and not a bird, a pumice is a stone and not a stone, and so on. Now will such examples serve as the intermediate objects which we want? Or can we find anything better adapted to the purpose? And thus we find that which is esteemed as beautiful by the many (and the same is the case with any other notion) oscillates between the non-existing and the absolutely existing. Now we have already agreed that if we should find any such intermediate thing, it must be the object of Opinion, not of Knowledge. And so we shall say of those who recognize many beautiful things, but who cannot see the Beautiful itself, and cannot even follow one who would lead them to it, that they opine, but do not know the things about which they opine. And the same is to be said of those who recognize right actions, but do not recognize an absolute Rightness; and so of other Ideas. But those who look at these Ideas—permanent and unchanging Ideas—those men really *know*. And

<sup>1</sup> See the *Hippias*.

these men love and delight to contemplate that concerning which they have Knowledge; the others love those things about which they have Opinion. They love beautiful sights and sounds, and like to see them and hear them, but they do not acknowledge the Beautiful itself as existing. We are not then to call these men *Philosophers*, Lovers of Wisdom, but *Philodoxæ*, Lovers of Opinion; however they may dislike the name, which, in truth, they have no right to do: and those are philosophers only who delight in the contemplation of that which really exists, [namely, absolute Ideas].”

We are here carried away from the proposition first announced, that philosophers are the genuine rulers of the world, to a collateral or subordinate proposition, that real philosophers are those who employ their minds upon absolute Ideas, such as the Idea of Beauty, Goodness, Rightness. And a kind of proof is offered that these Ideas are the only objects of real knowledge. This doctrine of the proper objects of knowledge is a prominent portion of the Platonic philosophy.

In order to see the force of Plato's arguments, we are naturally led to ask what he had in his mind in drawing this distinction between Knowledge and Opinion;—what examples had he known of stable, certain, immutable knowledge, which did not depend upon the mutable properties and ambiguous relations of visible objects? and was he thinking of such examples when he wrote the present passage? To this, I think, we may very confidently reply, that he *had* known examples of stable and certain truths, namely, the truths of Arithmetic and Geometry, which are demonstrable, and therefore necessarily certain and unchanging. And that he was in the habit of thinking of such truths when he spoke of real

knowledge; we have evidence in many parts of the Dialogues. In the *Meno* he gives a geometrical proposition at length, in order to illustrate the nature of knowledge. In the *Phædo* he refers to this illustration, as one familiar to the disciples of the Socratic school; and in the immediate sequel of this very discussion on the philosophic character of mind and its formation, he mentions arithmetic and geometry as the appropriate instruments for that purpose. And if we ask whether this distinction is still acknowledged in our own times, we shall find that the opposition of *necessary* and *contingent* truths is still a fundamental point in the most prevalent modern systems of philosophy. If however we ask further, whether necessary truth is attainable in other subjects, as well as in mathematics, we shall find that this is by no means generally acknowledged. And if we further ask, whether stable and certain truths are to be attained by employing our thoughts upon Beauty, Rightness, Goodness, as Ideas which are permanent and immutable, (however confused and wavering may be the opinions of common men concerning beautiful things, right actions, and good sentiments,) we shall find a still scantier assent to the Platonic doctrine. Though the distinction of necessary and accidental truth is generally acknowledged, it is not explained nor expressed in the Platonic manner. Hence many of the arguments which we have been translating, are really not accepted as convincing.

The generally current and accepted philosophy of knowledge does not recognize Ideas as having such a character or holding such a place. In short, the current philosophy of our times does not agree with this part of the Platonic philosophy; and therefore must hold the Platonic phi-



losophy to be false. Those who speak of Plato sometimes seem to overlook this consequence. They speak with admiration of Plato's doctrines, and ascribe to his arguments an incontestable superiority over the arguments on the other side; and yet their own philosophy, when they have occasion to deliver it freely, is utterly anti-platonic, and disregards the arguments which Plato considers as irresistible.

Thus in weighing the doctrine of Plato that philosophers are the fittest men to rule the world, we have to recollect, not only that he means by *philosophers* those who cultivate an especial kind of philosophy; but also, that according to most modern views, that part of such philosophy which applies to Ethics and Politics does not possess the certainty, permanence, and demonstrative force, which Plato ascribes to it.

What Plato here says, in defence of his own especial doctrine concerning Knowledge and Ideas, is, I conceive, not a full and independent exposition of the argument, such as might be given upon a primary and principal occasion for such exposition; but rather a reference to arguments previously more fully delivered upon other occasions, and supposed to be in a great degree known to the persons whom he was addressing. This appears, I think, in the brevity with which various parts of the argument are treated; in the reference made to points to which the argument as here given does not apply; as when while talking of the Idea of Beauty, imperfectly manifested in the ordinary beautiful sights, the Idea of Right or Justice is also maintained, which has no place in such manifestation; and especially in the expression in which the Lover of Spectacles, who had been spoken of as being practically a bastard kind

of philosopher, is again introduced as a theoretical opponent, and spoken of ironically as "that excellent person" (*ὁ χρηστός*); and so also where he speaks of this opponent being angry. Some of these defects of connection I have, for the sake of clearness, modified in the translation.

After the Socrates of the Dialogue has thus explained that philosophers are those who have true knowledge, and that true knowledge consists in the knowledge of that which is permanent and immutable, he proceeds still further to elevate the character of his philosopher by showing what dispositions he must have and what virtues he will acquire. He is thus led to consider the generally prevalent opinion, that philosophers are not well fitted for the government of States, and to give his explanation of the origin of this opinion; and afterwards, to describe the proper culture of the philosophical mind whose cause he thus advocates. These subjects occupy the sixth Book.

"Well, Glaucon," said I, "who are philo-  
 sopher, and who are not, we have made out, though  
 it has been rather a long business to do it. But  
 we could not explain the matter adequately in a  
 briefer compass. We might perhaps have done  
 it better if *that* had been our only object, and if  
 we had not had to deal with this, merely as a  
 preparation for showing how right action and a  
 virtuous life differ from wrong doing and injustice.  
 And now for the consequences of this. Since phi-  
 losophers are those who can apprehend eternal and  
 universal truth, and since those whose thoughts  
 wander among the many and variable appearances  
 which offer themselves on every side are not phi-  
 losophers, which are the fitter to be rulers? Those,  
 plainly, who can best preserve the laws and insti-  
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tutions of States. The question is, as if one should ask whether the blind or those who can see are the better fitted to keep anything. For are not *those* just as if they were blind, who are really destitute of the knowledge of absolute truth; who have no clear idea in their minds, those who cannot refer to such an idea as an authentic written document, and there read what is established as right and good, and when it has been established, keep it inviolate? Shall we make these the guardians of law, and not rather those who know the reality of things, and who have besides as much practical knowledge as the others, and who are not inferior to them in any ordinary virtue? If this be so, they are equal in other things, and have, as their peculiar preeminence, this real knowledge.

“We must then, as we said at first, consider the dispositions which this character implies; and if it appears that these dispositions are also suited to make them rulers, we must acknowledge that they, and no others, ought to be the rulers of states.

2 “Now we must in the first place allow that those who have a disposition turned to philosophy are eager for all kind of learning which may manifest to them this kind of truth which is permanent and eternal, and which is not variable according as objects wax and wane. They must love such truth in every shape, great and small, honoured or despised, as we said before of the lovers of beauty and power. And therefore we see that there is another quality which they must have; namely, the love of truth—the hatred of falsehood—the rejection of lies of every kind. Truth is the close kindred of wisdom; and the philosopher, the lover of wisdom, must be a lover of truth also. The philosopher then cannot be a lie-lover. He

who is a lover of learning must, from his earliest youth, show himself a lover of truth.

“Now when the desires tend strongly in one direction, they are weaker in other directions, like a stream which is drawn into a side channel. And thus when they tend to the acquisition of knowledge, they seek the pleasures of the soul especially as such, and are comparatively indifferent to the pleasures of the body. This must be the case if any one is a lover of wisdom really, and not merely in pretence. Such a one will be temperate. Nor will he be a lover of money. For those things on account of which money is eagerly sought may be objects of desire to others, but not to him.

“Again: there is another point in which you will see the character of a true philosopher. His character will be large and lofty. How can any narrow views find place in a soul which aspires to embrace the whole expanse of things, human and divine? His conceptions are so magnificent that they include all time and all being: how then can he regard human life as any great thing? Such a one then cannot regard death as anything dreadful. A truly philosophical spirit can have no touch of baseness or cowardice.

“Again, a well-regulated mind, free from covetousness, from baseness, from presumption, from fear, cannot be faithless or unjust.

“To determine then whether a mind is truly philosophical, supposing the person to be advanced beyond boyhood, you will consider whether it is just and equitable, or self-seeking and lawless.

“And you will not neglect to consider whether it is willing or unwilling to learn. For no one can learn who finds no pleasure in learning, but considers it as a toil and a trouble. Nor can he ever acquire knowledge if he do not retain what he

learns, but forthwith forgets it. In that case, finding no result from his labour, he will hate both himself and the employment. And thus we cannot reckon an oblivious mind to be truly philosophical: the philosophical mind must have a good capacity of memory.

“Moreover a mind with no love of culture and order can only tend to become ill-regulated. Truth is closely related to order, shuns disorder. We must seek then an orderly and graceful spirit, in addition to other qualities, which shall have such a natural bias, that it may easily be led to the idea of real existences.

“And thus then we have taken a survey of the necessary conditions, all connected with one another, which belong to the soul that is to deal with real existences fitly and fully. Now is there anything to find fault with in a pursuit which can only be followed by a mind which is of capacious memory, fond of learning, graceful, loving, and congenial with truth, with justice, with courage, with temperance?”

Glaucón replies, “No, Socrates; Momus himself, the Genius of fault-finding, could find no fault there.”

“But,” says Socrates, “it is to such minds, completed by education and formed by age, that we would commit the rule of states. Do not you agree with me?”

The claims of philosophers to rule the world undoubtedly appeared to Plato, when presented in this form, to have a great degree of plausibility. Nevertheless, they were not likely to be at once assented to, even by his disciples; aware as they must be, of the very great disfavour with which such pretensions were looked upon by the greater part of their countrymen; and indeed the argu-

ment from such an ideal picture of the best possible intellectual and moral character, in favour of any class of persons who were presumed to possess it, in virtue merely of an ideal classification, must be regarded as very fallacious. Socrates's other submissive auditor, Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon (and of Plato), is represented as expressing his misgivings, though he does not presume to impeach the logical conclusiveness of the argumentation. He says:

“Indeed, Socrates, no one can pretend to controvert your reasonings. But those who listen to such reasonings from you have this kind of feeling: they think that from their not being masters of this method of question and answer, they are drawn onwards, a little at each step: and at last, by the accumulated effect of those small steps, they are led to some great fallacy which is in contradiction with your first assumptions. They think they are like men overmatched by a superior player in a game of chess, and by successive moves brought into a position in which there is no move for them to make. In the like manner, they think that *they* are driven into a corner, and checkmated, by moves, not of chessmen, but of words; while yet the truth is not in this way brought out. This is the case in the present instance. Each of your arguments is such, that we cannot help assenting to each in succession. And yet when we come to look at the fact, if we take the persons who give themselves up to philosophy—I do not mean those who study it merely when young, as a means of intellectual discipline, but those who continue to make it their employment,—they see that the greater part of them become wrong-headed<sup>1</sup>, not to say bad-principled; and

<sup>1</sup> ἀλλοκότους.

that the most harmless of them are made, by this very study which you so highly commend, unfit for public business and useless in practical life."

"On this," says Socrates, "I asked him, Do you think that those who say this are wrong?"

"I do not know," said he; "I should like to hear what you say to it."

"I say," replies Socrates, "that they appear to me to be in the right."

"How then," said he, "can it be reasonable to say that States will never be freed from the evils under which they labour at present, till they are ruled by those philosophers, whom we are acknowledging to be useless to them?"

"The question which you ask," I replied, "must be answered by means of a similitude."

"Well," said he, (ironically,) "I suppose it is a strange thing for you to make use of similitudes."

"Ha!" said I, "you laugh at me, while you 4 do not scruple to involve me in the explanation of a matter so difficult to be explained in any way. Listen then, and judge whether I do not make unsavoury similitudes<sup>1</sup>. For the condition of the philosophers in reference to States is so untoward that it cannot be represented by any simple comparison. We must do them justice by combining many features together, like the painters who join the parts of different animals, a goat and an elephant, or the like.

"Suppose, in a ship, that the steersman is a man stronger and greater than the rest of the crew, knowing something of steering, but rather deaf and rather short-sighted. Suppose that the crew are divided into factions as to who shall steer; every one thinking that he ought to do so, though

<sup>1</sup> γλισχρως εικάζω.

he has never learnt the art, and cannot mention any master from whom he has learnt it, or any time in which he has made it his study; and the crew in addition to this, hold that it is an art which cannot be taught, and are ready to tear in pieces any one who says that teaching is necessary. Suppose these men to be always crowding round the steersman, begging and urging him to commit the helm to them; and sometimes, in order to prevent his committing it to others, killing those others, or casting them out of the ship. Suppose further, that they drug the rightful steersman with mandragora or new wine or some other narcotic, and bind him, and take possession of the ship, and consume its stores, and sail on drinking and revelling as such people would. Suppose further that they call *him* a good sailor, an able pilot, a scientific man, who is clever in devising means of mastering the steersman, either by persuasion or by force; and that they call those useless who have no skill in this. Suppose further, that they pay no attention to the steersman when he tells them that it is necessary to consider the season of the year, the hour of the day, the heavens, the stars, the winds, and all the points that belong to his art, if the ship is really to be steered; and that they do not conceive that a man can know anything of steering, and at the same time maintain that he has such right to steer that he will steer whether certain persons like it or not. Now when this is the state of the ship, do you not think that the True Steersman will be called a stargazer, a trifler, a useless lubber, by the crew in general."

In this strange and celebrated comparison Plato has, as he says, made an accumulation of circumstances of different kinds, which in some points approach to the incongruous and inconsistent. The



leading features of the picture are that there is a person who is the true and genuine steersman, and that the rest of the crew do not acknowledge his claim, and struggle and fight to get the helm into their own hands. In this way the genuine steersman represents the Platonic philosopher who has a rightful claim to rule the state; while his fellow-citizens deny his claim, and make the government of the state the occasion of bloody factions. To this main outline of the image, it is added that the rest of the crew not only do not know the art of navigation, but do not acknowledge that there is such an art, or that it can be taught. This trait reminds us of the arguments so often urged in the Platonic Dialogues, for and against the possibility of teaching good-government as an art. But further: the crew not only overmaster their natural ruler, but ply him with drugs so that he has no longer the use of his faculties. In this case, the philosopher would cease to be a philosopher, the ruler to be a rightful ruler; except that perhaps this process may be meant to represent the distemperature which the philosophical spirit suffers by the ordinary education; a point which is afterwards pursued. But the natural steersman is not only capable of being thus disordered, but he is naturally somewhat deaf and of defective vision. It does not appear to what these traits correspond, unless they be an expression of humility on the side of the philosophic advocate; meaning that he is aware how imperfect his knowledge is, notwithstanding all his study. But then it must be recollected that in proportion to the imperfection of his knowledge is the defectiveness of his right. A deaf and blind steersman, even though he were, as Plato makes him, stronger and taller than the crew, could have no natural right to his position.

But we must at any rate suppose that he has a knowledge of the art of steering superior to the rest of the crew; otherwise his natural right to steer vanishes altogether; and he can no longer be what Plato so often calls him, the true and genuine pilot. Hence the obscure expression describing the steersman's knowledge which Plato uses *must* be so interpreted as to imply that such knowledge is of a superior kind, though in the common interpretations it hardly does imply this<sup>1</sup>.

The application of the image to the argument is obvious enough, as Socrates proceeds to say. "You see," he says, "that the position of the steersman whom we have described in the ship is like that of the philosophers in our states. And hence when a man expresses his wonder that philosophers are not honoured in our cities, place this image before him, and tell him that it would be much more wonderful if they were honoured. Tell him too that in the present state of things, what he says is true, that the most reasonable philosophers are of no use in our cities; but tell him also that for this uselessness he must blame not those reasonable men, but the persons who will not make use of them. For it is not according to nature that the pilot should beg the sailors to be guided by him, nor that the wise should attend at the doors of the rich; [but that sailors should apply to the pilot, and rich men seek the guidance of the wise man]. But the man who so cleverly gave the reason [why the rich do not attend the doors of the wise, but the wise those of the rich; namely, that the wise know what they want, but the rich do not], was wrong; for the truth is, that when a man is sick,

<sup>1</sup> Cousin translates: "Voyant assez mal et n'entendant pas mieux l'art de navigation." Schleiermacher: "Sieht auch wenig und versteht von der Schifffahrt ohngefähr eben so viel."

whether he be rich or poor, he goes to the door of the physician: and every man who has need to be ruled goes to the door of him who knows how to rule him; the ruler, if he is really wanted, has not to ask the others to let him rule them. But political rulers, such as exist now, you may rightly liken to such sailors as we have been speaking of, and the philosophers whom they call visionary and trifling, to the true pilots. And thus the highest kind of human pursuits [philosophy] cannot have justice done it by those who follow a contrary course. But by far the strongest prejudice against philosophy arises from those who pretend to pursue it, and whom, as you say, the assailants of philosophy describe by saying that the greater part are downright bad, and the most reasonable are useless; to which I have agreed.

- 5 "As to the causes of the uselessness of the most reasonable of those who pursue philosophy, we have now explained them. But as to those who are downright bad, as has been said, let us see how they necessarily come to be so; and we shall find that philosophy is not at fault for this. And for this purpose we may start from the point which we made before, when we described the disposition which a person must have to become a philosopher. We said that he was a lover of truth, fond of learning, not content with mere opinion which deals with variable special phenomena, but bent on getting hold of the nature of everything; that thus the mind mingling with its kindred truth, might obtain true life and comfort, which were not to be had otherwise. Such a mind must, we said, have courage, magnanimity, temperance, justice, and the like. You agreed that there was no reply to our arguments; but you turned from them to the fact that some philosophers were useless, and

some were bad men. We have considered the former branch of the accusation, and are now come to the latter. We have to consider how such a disposition as I have spoken of comes to be spoilt, as it is spoilt in most; and even when not absolutely spoilt, escapes imperfectly only, so that the men are simply useless instead of being positively bad. And besides this, you must consider those dispositions which merely imitate the philosophical character, and which being really unsuited to it and unworthy of it, when engaged in a pursuit which is above their powers, fail in the attempt<sup>1</sup>, and thus fasten upon philosophy such a character as you assign to it. This difference I will try to explain.

“Every one, I suppose, will acknowledge that such a disposition as we have described, with a complete aptitude for philosophy in every respect, is a thing of rare occurrence among men. And when these rare cases arrive, we must consider how many things there are which may mar and ruin them. One thing especially must be noticed which may excite your surprise: that the very virtues which we have described have every one a tendency to draw them from philosophy: I mean Courage, Temperance and the rest. And then all such things as are called external goods,—beauty, wealth, strength of body, powerful family connections, and everything of that kind,—still further mar the philosophic mind. This I will explain further. Consider that every living creature, whether plant or animal, requires appropriate nutriment; and *that* at due season and in due place, and the more in proportion as it is the more vigorous: for evil [such as want of food] is more opposite to the nature of that which is good than of

<sup>1</sup> πλημμελοῦσαι.

that which is not good. And thus it stands to reason that the best nature, when supplied with perverted nourishment, turns out worse than bad natures. And thus, Adeimantus, the souls with the best native dispositions, if they receive a bad education, become eminently bad. Do you conceive that great crimes and uncontrolled wickedness arise from a naturally bad disposition? Or do you not rather conceive that they arise from a youthful character spoilt by education? A feeble nature can never produce anything either greatly good or greatly evil. And thus the disposition fitted for philosophy, if it receive a suitable culture, must grow up into every kind of virtue; but if it be not planted in a proper soil and fed with proper food, it must take the contrary way, except some God come to its assistance. Or do you believe, as the many believe, that a few young men are corrupted by the Sophists, and that a few professional Sophists are the sole corrupters? And do you not rather think that those who talk thus about Sophists, are themselves the greatest of Sophists, and it is that they who teach most effectually, and who mould as they please both the young and the old, and men and women, when they give their lessons?"

"And when," Adeimantus asks, "is that?"

"It is," said I, "when they sit crowded together in the public assemblies, or the tribunals, or the theatres, or the meetings of the army, or any other place where multitudes are gathered together; and when they blame one thing or praise another with immense clamour, doing each in the most exaggerated way, and shouting and clapping their hands and stamping their feet, so that the walls of the place and the rocks around echo the sound and double the cries of praise or blame. In

such a scene as this, how do you think that the heart of the young man of whom we have been speaking, is likely to be affected? What special training which he may have received can hold out against this? What principles will not be carried away, as in a flood, by such blame and praise as this, in whatever direction that tends? How shall he escape calling those things *good* and *bad* which *they* call so, and following the pursuits which they follow, and being like them?"

This clear recognition that the public opinion of Athens, with the powerful expression of it to which the constitution and habits of the people gave occasion, was the sophistical power which really corrupted the youth of Athens, and not any technical teaching of the professors of education commonly called Sophists, is a declaration of Plato's very much at variance with the manner in which Plato's commentators speak of these Sophists and their effect. But a full consideration of this subject has led us to the conviction which we formerly expounded, that Plato, in this matter, is right, and his commentators wrong. Socrates goes on to explain still further the irresistible operation of this public opinion.

"I continued, We have not yet described the 7 most powerful part of this machinery. It is that these teachers, these Sophists, when they do not succeed by their words, add to them deeds. You know that they punish those who differ from them with fine, and infamy, and death. Now what private Sophist, do you think, or what number of private men of any kind, can do anything in opposition to such influence. It would be madness to attempt it. No human disposition ever existed or can exist, that can be taught virtue in opposition to this teaching: no *human* disposition, I say: I

presume not to say what divine influence may do. But if any one be saved from this agency, and become what he ought to be while he exists in a city so constituted, you may say that a divine power has saved him.

“To this you must further add, that each of those paid professors whom they call Sophists, and whom they are jealous of, as if they were rival teachers, do really teach nothing but these very opinions of the Many, which they express as their opinions when they are thus assembled; and this they call *Wisdom*. Just as if any one having to manage a great strong wild beast, should study its angers and its desires, and learn how he may coax it and stroke it, and watch when it is fierce and when it is placable, and what makes it the one or the other, and come to understand the noises which it makes on each such occasion, and what voices it attends to from others, which make it quiet or make it savage; and when he has learnt all this by intercourse with the creature and long habit, should call this *wisdom*; and make an art of it, and apply it as education; while yet, all the time, he knows nothing, in truth, concerning its opinions and desires, which of them is good or bad, right or wrong, fair or foul;—should call things the one or the other, according to the dispositions of the great brute;—should call those things *good* which the brute likes, and those things *bad* which it dislikes; and should have no other standard for them: and as to the nature of what is necessary and what is good in reality, and how they truly differ, should have no perception and no power of explaining it to another person. Now does not such a person seem to you a strange instructor?”

“Indeed he does.”

“And yet how is the man better than this, who

thinks it Wisdom to know the tendency of the anger, or of the pleasure, of the multitude of all kinds of persons, brought together in an assembly; whether the matter to be judged of be painting, or music, or politics? If a man once gives himself up to this influence, and brings before them either poetry, or any other work of art, or any ministration for the purposes of the State, and makes the many his arbiters, there is no possible escape for him. He must do what they praise. But as to whether what he does is really and in truth good and right, did you ever hear any such persons give any account which was not ridiculous?"—"Never, and I suppose I never shall hear it."

"Well then, recollecting that it is so, bear 8 this in mind. As to what is absolute rectitude, as distinguished from the many occasional things which are spoken of as right; or as to any other absolute truth, as distinguished from the many variable matters of opinion; can the multitude know it, or bear it, or believe that there are such things? And therefore it is inevitable that philosophers, [whose life is spent in aiming at such knowledge,] must be blamed by this multitude: and also by those individuals who accommodate themselves to the multitude, and make it their business to please *it*. And this being so, what hope can you discern for the philosophical spirit, that it may pursue its tendencies and bring them to a good result?

"And consider again what we have said. We have agreed that aptitude to learn, and capacity of memory, and greatness of mind, and courage, belong to this disposition. Consequently the person so endowed will be first on all occasions; and the more especially if the qualities of his body be accordant with those of his mind. They will there-



fore wish to make use of him, when he grows to maturity, to conduct their affairs: both his private connections and the citizens in general will wish to do this. They will therefore ply him with applications and requests, trying to engage, by urgency and flattery, his influence on their side. What then is such a person likely to become, especially if he be a member of a powerful State, and be, in it, rich and noble, and moreover of a fine and commanding person? Will he not be filled with extravagant hopes, and be led to think himself fit to manage the affairs both of Greeks and of barbarians? And will not this hope buoy him up, and fill him with vast projects, and an empty and irrational conceit? And when he is in such a frame of mind, if any one come to him and quietly tell him the truth, that he is really irrational, and has no true understanding of things; and that such understanding cannot be acquired by any one who will not take pains to acquire it, do you think that, under such unfavourable circumstances, he is likely to listen to the warning?

“And if a particular person, out of regard for his family and from a sympathy of studies, should observe his condition and try to bend and draw him to philosophy, what may we suppose would be the course followed by those who think that his value as an associate and partizan would thus be destroyed? Must we not expect that they would do everything and say everything that was possible to prevent him from being persuaded, and to defeat his adviser, both by private intrigues and by public accusations? How then can such a one follow philosophy?

- 9 “You see then, that I had reason to say that the very endowments of a philosophical character, if they meet with bad nutriment, are a kind of

reason why the person deserts the study of philosophy; and that what are called external goods, wealth and the like circumstances, promote this tendency. And here we see whence arises the destruction and ruin of the characters best disposed for philosophy, those being at any rate few; and that from among such characters arise both those who are the authors of the greatest evils of States, and also, if they take the other bias, those who produce great good: for small natures can never do anything great either for an individual or for a State."

We cannot be mistaken in supposing that through the whole of this discussion of the endowments which fit a man for philosophy, and the dangers which attend such endowments, Plato had in his mind the character of Alcibiades, and Socrates's intercourse with him. The circumstances hypothetically stated are minutely personal: the mental endowments of the embryo philosopher are accompanied by wealth, great family connections, personal beauty. The young man being intoxicated with the attentions used to obtain his partisanship; his forming schemes of ambition which include the barbarian as well as the Grecian world; a faithful friend still trying to win him to philosophy; his being the author of many great evils to his country: and the belief still persisted in by his friend that, notwithstanding all its errors, his was still a noble nature; all these traits give us the picture of Alcibiades and Socrates, drawn by Plato probably a considerable time after the death of both, and therefore when time had been left for forming a calm opinion. Indeed we can hardly imagine that without such an example in his mind, Plato would have framed his bold idea of a highly gifted soul, fitted for the highest intellectual progress, and

thereby constituted the natural ruler of men, though its qualities are capable of being perverted, and *are* perverted, by the seductions of ambition, faction, and self-will.

Socrates next proceeds to describe the pretenders and false philosophers who claim the place thus vacated by those truly fitted for philosophy.

“These persons then, to whom philosophy of more especial right belongs, fall off from it, and leave the space vacant and idle, while they too on their part live a life which is not their true and fitting life. But philosophy, thus deserted by her natural friends, is seized upon by others, who fasten disgrace upon her, and give rise to the reproaches which you lay upon her, of uselessness and mischievousness. Nor are these reproaches undeserved. For others, small men, seeing this place left vacant, and yet full of fine names and large pretensions, rush upon it; as men escaped out of prison rush into the temples. In the same way those who have mastered any little special art leap from that to philosophy. For degraded as philosophy is, still it possesses a dignity above that of any special art. And this is an object of aspiration to many persons, whose minds are feeble (*ἀτελής*), and are, like their bodies, cramped and distorted by the arts and trades which they have followed. They resemble a mean-looking bald<sup>1</sup> blacksmith, who has made money, and has just been released from his bonds; who washes himself in the bath, puts on new clothes, like a bridegroom, and is on his way to marry the daughter of his master, she from poverty and destitution being compelled to accept him. Now in such a case, of what kind can you expect the progeny to be? of course, puny and of a bad race. And when those

<sup>1</sup> Why bald?

who are unworthy of education come to be treated in a way beyond their deserts, will not the result be sophisms and fallacies, and nothing generous or worthy of a true spirit?

“And thus, Adeimantus, small is the number 10 left of those who attend to philosophy worthily. The case occurs when a generous and well-directed disposition, not finding any to corrupt it, remains in its native tendencies: or when a great spirit is born in a small state, and despises and turns from the politics of the place; or turns with disdain from other arts to philosophy. Or they may be restrained from running away by the same kind of bridle as Theages here. For Theages has all other conditions which were likely to make him fall away from philosophy: but his bad health, which keeps him away *from* politics, keeps him *to* philosophy. What keeps me to it is hardly worth mentioning here; since it is peculiar to me, and has been granted to none or few others. It is my divine monitor.

“But of the few who do adhere to philosophy, those who taste how sweet and blessed a thing it is,—seeing fully the madness of the many—that no one almost does anything wholesome in the business of states—that no one can be reckoned upon as an ally in the cause of justice—that he who tries to be so is like a man who falls among a pack of wild beasts, and who will not join in their violence, but is yet unable, by his single self, to resist all these violent natures, and must perish before he can do anything for his friends and the city, and thus become useless;—the philosopher, combining all this in his mind, keeping quiet and minding his own business, holds himself like a man standing under a wall in a tempest of dust and spray, driven by a strong wind; and seeing others filled with

violence, and lawlessness, is contented if he may be allowed to pass through this present life keeping himself pure from violence and injustice, and waits for his dismissal from it, with good hope, calm and resigned."

"Well," said he, "he would find his dismissal, having at least done something."

"But," said I, "not having done much, because he does not fall in with a Polity which suits him. For if he were to be so placed, he will be able to further his own objects, and along with these will bring the greatest blessings to the state.

11 "And thus we have seen how philosophy is burthened with these reproaches, and how unjust they are. And so perhaps we have said enough on this subject. Or how do you think?"

"I have nothing to add," said he; "but when you speak of a polity which suits him, which of our existing polities do you refer to?"

"Not any of them," said I; "one of my subjects of complaint is, that no one of the constitutions of a state now existing is worthy of a philosophical spirit. And hence it is that it is turned away and alienated from them; and like as a seed sown in an ungenial soil, as it grows up, pines and seeks its native place; so this [the philosophical] kind does [under these circumstances] not preserve its proper vigour, but degenerates into another form. But if it once find the best polity, as it is the best in its nature, it will then show that it is, in reality, divine in its origin, and that other characters are merely human, both other dispositions and other pursuits. Of course when I have said this, you will ask what Polity I mean."

"You have not guessed quite right," said he; "that was not what I was going to ask; but whe-

ther it was that Polity which we have been constructing, or some other."

"In other respects," said I, "it is that polity. But I then said that there must always be in the state, some element which should be the cause of the polity, as you, when you were making laws for it, were the cause of the laws. And this was not fully unfolded, in the fear of the objections which you proposed, and which called for a long and difficult exposition: for what remained to be expounded was by no means an easy task. Namely, it was this: In what way a State is to deal with philosophy so as not to spoil it. For great things are precarious; and as the proverb runs, prize projects are hard to execute."

"But at least," said he, "as we have come in sight of this, let the project be carried on to its execution."

"It will not be my want of will," said I, "but with the best will, my want of power must prevent me. But you shall see what I can do; and so shall judge of my willingness. And observe how boldly and fearlessly I set about this explanation, when I begin by saying that the state must set about treating this study [of philosophy] in a way opposite to that now practised. For now, those who do meddle with this study are put upon it when they are children, mixed with their teaching in the farmyard and the shop, and even those who get the most of philosophy, never have then the hardest points of it presented to them; I mean the discussion of principles—Dialectic. And in their succeeding years, if they are willing to listen to a few lectures of those who make philosophy their business, they think they have done much, and that what they thus listen to is something foreign to the business of life.

And as they go on to a more advanced age, their philosophy is extinguished more completely than Heraclitus holds that the sun is at night, for it finds no morrow on which it is re-illuminated. Now [what I recommend is that] on the contrary children and youths should have an education suited to their age, and a philosophy; and that [at an early age] they should have their bodily endowments well cultivated<sup>1</sup>, which at that period are in the fulness of growing power<sup>2</sup>, leaving philosophy as then unnecessary<sup>3</sup>. And that as their age advances, and the mind begins to be perfected, they should be occupied in the discipline of the mind. And at the stage of life when the strength fails, and when men retire from military and political offices, that then they should employ their leisure upon it<sup>4</sup>, and do nothing else, if the object is that they are to live happily, and when this life is over, find in that other, their fitting lot."

The reader of Francis Bacon will not fail here to recollect the way in which he, like Plato, speaks with indignation of the manner in which philosophy is degraded and perverted by being applied as a mere instrument of early education<sup>5</sup>: "So that the great mother of the sciences is thrust down with indignity to the offices of a handmaid; is made to minister to the labours of medicine or mathematics, or to give the first preparatory tinge to the immature minds of youth."

12 "Upon my word, Socrates," said he, "you speak very confidently; but I think that the greater part of your hearers will be still more confident on the other side, and will not yield to the force of your arguments, beginning with Thrasymachus here."

<sup>1</sup> κτωμένους.

<sup>2</sup> ἀδρούται.

<sup>3</sup> ὑπηρεσίαν.

<sup>4</sup> ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι.

<sup>5</sup> *Novum Organ.* Lib. I. Aph. 80.

“Pray,” said I, “do not try to make mischief between me and Thrasymachus, who are just become friends, though indeed we were not enemies before. And be you sure that we shall not desist from our reasonings till we shall either convince both him and the others; or do something in the way of preparation for that other life in which they may resume these discussions.”

“You are making an appointment for an early period,” said he, ironically.

“The interval is nothing in proportion to the whole extent of time. But that the greater part of men are not convinced by these arguments is no wonder. For they never saw in reality what we now speak of [namely a philosopher in power]; but rather a series of set speeches adapted to each other on the two sides; and not as in the present instance coming out spontaneously. But a man in all points of virtue alike accomplished and complete in word and deed, and invested with the power of government in a state which is no less perfect, they have never seen. Nor have they been accustomed to hear good and liberal discourse, so as to seek earnestly in every way the truth for the truth's sake; but on the contrary, discourses artificial and contentious, and tending to nothing but opinion and controversy both in the public courts and in private companies. On this account it was, and with a foresight of this result, I formerly said, what I feared to say, but was compelled by truth to say, that no state nor polity, nor even any individual man, can ever be completely what he ought to be, till philosophers, now so much decried, be compelled, whether they will or no, to take charge of the state; or till the kings and rulers of states, or their sons in the next generation, shall by some divine inspiration catch



a true love of philosophy. How improbable both the one and the other of these results is, I shall not attempt to estimate; for fear we should seem merely to utter vain wishes. Whether this cultivation of philosophy has been so forced upon the rulers of any state in the infinite lapse of past time, or whether it now exists in some barbaric region out of our ken, or whether it shall exist hereafter,—however this may be—we are ready to maintain that this same polity is and will be when the Muse—the due Inspiration—shall take possession of the State. You say that you agree to this, but that the many do not assent. Do not, my friend; so far calumniate the many. They will have a different opinion if any one reasons with them, not as confuting them, but as encouraging them; and if he explains the source of the evil repute of philosophy, and describes, as we have done, both their disposition and their pursuit, that they may know that you do not mean by philosophers the characters whom they think of. If they are so dealt with, you will find that they will think and speak differently. Do you think that any one will make difficulties at what is not difficult, and find fault where there is no fault, if he himself is indulgent and candid? I tell you beforehand that there may be a few who will show such a temper, but not the many. And as you grant this, you must grant also that the causes of the ill-will which the many bear to philosophy are those who disgrace and misrepresent philosophy, and attack the general body of hearers, and discuss the concerns of men in an offensive and  
13 irritating way. For in fact, Adeimantus, those who attend to philosophy have not leisure to look down to the ordinary concerns of men, and to engage in the struggles which fill men with ill-will

and anger. They look at a world in which everything is duly arranged, and always consistent with itself; in which there is no injustice done or suffered, in which everything is in order and proportion; and they imitate and conform themselves to the laws of this intellectual world. For of course when a man lives among a class of objects and admires them, he must necessarily imitate them. And thus the philosopher, living in a world of divine order, becomes himself an example of divine order, as far as a man can be so<sup>1</sup>. And if he should be led to shape according to such models, not himself only, but others also, and to transfer those features to the conduct of men public and private, do you not think he will be a good workman in such a task? likely to produce such effects as temperance and justice; and all public virtue? And if the many perceive that this is so, will they still dislike philosophers and disbelieve us who praise them? Will they not be willing to believe that a state cannot be happy, unless these artists who thus have before them a divine pattern shall make the outlines of the State conform to that pattern? And in order thus to make a true picture of a State, they must in the first place make the canvass clean from previous lines. They would differ from other lawgivers in this; that they would not attempt to deal with either an individual or a state, in the way of making rules and laws, unless they might have it put into their hands clear of existing impressions. And then in order to draw their scheme of a State, they would look carefully at what is right and just and temperate by nature, and what exists in man; and would mix and combine them, adapt-

<sup>1</sup> [διαβολή δ' ἐν πᾶσι πολλή.]

ing the human or man-like to what Homer calls the god-like. And so they would rub out and paint in till they had made the manners of men as much as possible those which God approves. Now shall we not, by presenting to them such a process of painting, persuade those whom you describe as hostile to us, that the State-draughtsman whom we recommended to them, is such a one as this; and though they were angry before at our allowing him to meddle with States, will they not be pacified now? How can they fail to be so? What step of our reasoning can they doubt?—that philosophers are lovers of real and solid truth? No. That their disposition is akin to all that is good? That such a disposition rightly cultivated will not be perfectly good and philosophical? No. Will they then still be savage with us, if we say that till philosophers, as a class, have the command of States, there can be no remission of their existing evils; nor can the Polity which we have been imaging in words become a reality in deed? Let us then suppose them to be convinced and pacified, not partly only, but altogether: that at least they may be ashamed of themselves and own themselves in the wrong.

“But perhaps some one may doubt whether the sons of kings and rulers can become philosophers. And if they do become such, he may think that they will inevitably be overthrown. Now that in general it will be difficult for them in that case to escape ruin, we may allow; but still it may happen that one here and there may be preserved. And one such King-philosopher alone, with a suitable City at his command, is adequate to carry into effect all that is now regarded as improbable. For if the Ruler establishes such laws and such practices as we have described, it is to be

expected that the citizens will obey. Such a constitution is, we are persuaded, possible. And that if possible it is the best, we have already abundantly shown. And thus our legislation which is the best, if it be possible, is, though difficult, not impossible."

When Plato thus dwells with so much complacency and at so much length on this prospect of philosophers being the lawgivers and rulers of states, and of a king or the heir of a kingdom by a rare felicity applying himself to philosophy without forfeiting his power, we are of course led to suppose that he had in his mind the notion of such events as are said to have happened when he was promised by Dionysius, the ruler of Syracuse, the opportunity of putting in execution his ideal plan of polity by the establishment of an actual city according to that plan: and that he was also thinking of the love for philosophy and the esteem for philosophers, and for himself in particular, which Dionysius professed. The events connected with this intercourse of the king and the philosopher are an important part of the history of Plato, and throw a curious light upon that part of his speculations which I have just been presenting to the reader.

Having so far discussed the claim of philosophers, in his especial conception of the term, to political power, the next part of this Dialogue treats of the Education which the philosopher ought to receive, and of the Sciences in which he ought to be instructed. And as the philosopher was to be the great example of intellectual culture, and as the means of intellectual culture are the sciences in their best form, this part of the work really assumes the character of a Survey of the existing state of all Science as it existed in Plato's

time, according to his view. This survey may be compared, in some respects, with the Survey of the state of Science in *his* time which Bacon has presented to the world in his *Advancement of Learning*. We shall in some measure abridge the Platonic survey.

## THE REPUBLIC.

### DIGRESSION IV.

#### OF THE DEGREES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

(*Republic*, B. VI. § 14, &c. B. VII.)

PLATO'S great work was not only intended to exhibit a scheme of Polity and to prove a system of Ethics, but aspired, at least in its digressions (which, as I have said, were perhaps subsequent additions), to propound a system of Metaphysics, and (in the *Timæus*) of Physics, more complete and solid than had yet appeared. The part to which I now proceed is that which treats of the nature and kinds of human knowledge. The connection of this with the last digression is simple. The Ideal state must be governed by philosophers. But who are philosophers? They are those who possess the highest kind of knowledge of which man is capable. But this leads to further questions. What are the kinds of knowledge of which man is capable, and what is the highest kind? These are the questions to which the Dialogue now proceeds. Socrates says:

B. VI. § 15. "The philosophers whom we need for rulers, must then be tested by labour and fear and pleasure, as we have before said; and further, what we omitted then, we must now say. They must be exercised in many departments of learning, in order that they may be able to take in the various kinds of knowledge. We must examine whether they are able to go on to the highest kinds of knowledge; or whether before they attain so high, their powers may fail them, as happens in other exercises."

"No doubt," said he, "they should be so examined. But what are these highest kinds of knowledge?"

"You recollect probably that having distinguished the faculties of the soul into three classes, we established on that ground the nature of temperance, courage and justice; and what each of these virtues is."

"If I did not recollect that," said he, "I should have no right to hear the remainder. Tell it me."

"We said that the best possible way of regarding these things was one more prolix and roundabout, by following which the nature of these qualities might be made evident: but that it was practicable to give a proof depending upon what we had then been saying. You then said that such a proof was sufficient; and so we took a course which was, as seemed to me, deficient in exactness; but whether it satisfied you, you know best."

"It satisfied me in some measure," said he; "and it seemed to satisfy the rest."

"But, my friend," said I, "a proof that lacks anything, however little, of completeness, and is a proof *in some measure* merely, is not satisfactory. Defect is not the measure of anything. No doubt,

such a proof seems sufficient to some persons, and they do not see any necessity of carrying their researches further."

"Yes," he said, "they often have such a feeling in consequence of their want of energy."

"But," said I, "such a feeling is not that which is suitable to the guardians of the constitution of a city, and to the upholders of laws. Such persons therefore, my friend, must go that longer road. They who seek for truth must be prepared for a laborious course, no less than those who practise bodily exercises. If they are not, they will never arrive at the object, the highest and most suitable intellectual discipline."

"But," said he, "is not what we have spoken of the highest object? Is there anything higher and greater than justice and the other virtues which we have been speaking of?"

"Yes," said I, "there is something greater. We must not be content with a second-hand copy of them, such as we have been looking at. We must not lose sight of the most perfect exhibition of them. Would it not be absurd that, in small matters, comparatively of little value, we should bestow the utmost care, labouring to give them the most exact and purest form; and that in the highest matters, we should not require that the exactness of proof also should be of the highest kind?"

"The conception of such a proof," he said, "is most worthy of the subject. But as to this highest doctrine, of which you now speak, of course you cannot suppose that we shall let you off without asking what it is."

"Well," said I, "you are at liberty by all means to ask. You have heard me speak of it no small number of times. But now you will not recollect it; or rather, I believe, you raise the



question again, in order to make work for me. This must be the case. For you have often heard me speak of the Idea of *the Supreme Good*, as the highest point of such doctrine:—that Idea, by the effect of which things that are Just, and all other excellent things, become useful and beneficial. You must know that this is what I have to speak of: and moreover, that we do not yet know in a satisfactory manner what it is. And if this be so, if we do not know this, however much we may know of other things, you know that they can be of no use to us; as you know that nothing can be of any use to us which we acquire, if we do not acquire The Good. Do you think that any acquisition is of any value, if it is not the acquisition of a Good? Or that any knowledge is sufficient, if we do not know what is Good, and are ignorant of that?"

"Of course," said he, "I am aware that it is not."

16 "And this too you know, that the many judge *pleasure* to be the good; but that the more refined speculators hold *knowledge* to be the Good. Now, my friend, those who hold this opinion cannot tell us *what knowledge* they mean; but at last they are obliged to confess that they mean the knowledge of Good, of *The Good*, [the Supreme Good.]"

"Yes," said he, "they put themselves in an absurd position."

"Absurd enough," said I; "for they first attack us for not knowing what is the Good, and then speak to us as if we did know. For they say that it is Knowledge; namely, knowledge of *the Good*; assuming that we know what that addition means, when they utter it."

"That is quite true," said he.

"Well: but those who define the Good to be

Pleasure, are they not guilty of a gross blunder, as well as the other? For are they not obliged to confess that some pleasures are evil? And thus they are obliged to own that that which they define to be The Good may be bad."

The two opinions, that Pleasure is The Good, and that Knowledge is The Good, are brought into opposition in the *Philebus*, as we have seen; and the result there come to is, that neither opinion is true. The cardinal arguments against the one and the other are here brought into a more compact and pointed form than in that former Dialogue. We may suppose that by repeatedly returning to the arguments in the society of his hearers, he was led to put them in neater and shorter shapes. To mark this advance more clearly I have somewhat modified the last expression.

When Plato thus points out the contradiction into which both sides fall—those who hold knowledge and those who hold pleasure to be the greatest good, the object and end of human action—he is only summing up in a more compact form arguments which he had before separately used against the two sides—in the *Charmides* and the *Gorgias* respectively. In the *Charmides*, when Kritias had held that *Sophrosyne* (assumed as the guide of life and way to happiness) was some kind of Knowledge, which he attempted to define, Socrates makes him at last confess that it can neither be the guide of life, nor the way to happiness, except it be the Knowledge of Good. And in the *Gorgias* he had made Callicles acknowledge, though sullenly and reluctantly, that some pleasures are better and some worse, after he had asserted pleasure to be the Good.

The Platonic Socrates continues his account of The Good, with the view of showing that, however

obscure may be our notions of it, the knowledge of it is the qualification requisite for the conduct of States. Such knowledge is that philosophy which men must possess, in order that philosophers may be the natural rulers of mankind.

“There are,” he says, “doubts and controversies about this Good; but all allow what is really good is what we ought to do and desire. Many would be content with seeming justice, or with seeming honesty, even if there be only the seeming: but no one is content with a seeming good. He desires that which is really good. In this case every one rejects mere Seeming, mere Opinion. And thus Good is that which every man’s soul aims at and pursues; and whatever it does, does for the sake of this. The mind of man has a notion and conviction that there is such a thing, though it cannot seize it and determine what it is, nor hold it in a steady apprehension, as it can external objects; and from want of a steady notion of *the Good*, it fails also to get firm hold of the other things which are really good and valuable. Now the Good being so great and so valuable a thing, are we to allow that not only others should be in the dark about it, but even the wisest men in our State, to whom we commit everything? Of course not. If they are ignorant in what way justice and honesty are Goods, justice and honesty will have very poor guardians in the person who is thus ignorant; and I venture to predict that no one will have a real knowledge of justice and honesty without a previous knowledge of *The Good*. But our Polity will be perfectly arranged if there be at the head of it a Guardian who has this knowledge.”

To make the knowledge of *The Good* the condition of the Guardian of Plato’s Ideal Polity,

while such knowledge was still so vaguely and obscurely described, was of course not a satisfactory conclusion, and Glaucon begs for further explanation. This explanation is given in the form of an exposition of the kinds and degrees of knowledge in general. And the account thus given involves the Platonic doctrine, that there is an Idea of Goodness from which everything that is good derives its goodness, an Idea of Beauty from which every beautiful thing derives its beauty; and so on: and that these Ideas are the proper objects of Knowledge as distinguished from mere Opinion. This Platonic doctrine we cannot expect at present to make convincing to the reader; but the comparison by which it is illustrated, and the playful mode in which this is introduced, are deserving of notice. Glaucon is not satisfied, because the question what is the Good—the *Summum Bonum*—has not been answered. He says,

“But *you*, Socrates, whether do you say that Knowledge is the Supreme Good, or Pleasure, or something different from both?”

“Here is a man,” said I, “who is not content with the opinions of other persons. I saw long ago what he was driving at.”

“Why, Socrates,” said he, “it does not appear reasonable that a person who has been studying the subject so long [as you have] should deliver the doctrines which others hold, and not say what he himself holds.”

“But how?” said I; “is it reasonable that a man who does not know, should speak as if he did know?”

“No,” said he, “not that he should speak as if he knew; but that he should be willing to say that he thinks what he does think.”

“But,” said I, “do you not know that these thinkings—these opinions without real knowledge—are stark naught? The best of them are blind, even when they are not false. Those who opine what is true, without a clear apprehension of truth, are like blind men going the right way. And would you have this worthless and blind and helpless opinion [from me] when you may have clear and clever doctrines from others?”

“For goodness’ sake,” said Glaucon, “do not talk as if you were going to end the subject. We shall be satisfied if you give us an account of Goodness, such as you have given of justice and of temperance, and of the other matters which you have discussed. That will satisfy us.”

“Yes,” said I, “that would satisfy *me*: but I am afraid that will not be in my power; and if I try and fail, you will laugh at me. So, my good friends, what The Good is, in its abstract essence, we will leave alone for the present. To make out that would go beyond the limits of the present occasion. But if you choose to listen to me, I will tell you of something which appears to me an offspring of the Good and very like to it. If this does not meet with your wishes, I am ready to quit the subject.”

“O no,” said he, “pray tell us about this offspring: at another time you will render us an account of the parent stock.”

“I wish,” said I, “I could render you such an account of the parent stock, and you could receive it; and that you had not to content yourselves with the offspring of this stock, a sort of interest on the capital; [which, as you know, we call its *offspring*]. This interest then, this offspring of the Supreme Good, you shall have. But do you take care that I do not defraud you without

intending it, and give you the interest in bad money."

"We shall take such care as we can," said he: "only go on."

"Well then, I must begin by reminding you of points that we have already agreed upon on the present occasion and on former ones."

"There are many beautiful things, many good things, and in like manner as to other qualities, which things we describe by such terms [*beautiful, good, &c.*], on account of their qualities. But essential beauty, and essential goodness, and the like, which appear *in* these things, we regard as each a single Idea, [of which these things partake]; and referring things to this Idea, we call them by their qualities. And we hold that the Things can be seen, but not conceived, the Ideas are conceived but not seen.

"Now *with what* do we see these visible objects? With the Sight; and in like manner, with the Hearing we hear audible sounds; and with the other Senses we perceive sensible qualities. But have you ever considered how the Creator of our Senses has constructed the sense of Sight in a richer and more costly way than the other Senses. For when Sound and Hearing are there, there is no need of any third thing to make the sense to hear, the sound to be heard. There is no third thing, without which this cannot take place. And the same is the case with all the senses, but one. That one is the sense of Sight. Even when the Eye is there, and the object, still something more is needed. The Eye may be there, and the owner of the eye may try to use it; and colour may be there in the object; and yet still if there be wanting a third thing, made for this purpose, the Eye sees nothing and the Colours are invisible. The third

thing is what you call *Light*. And thus the Sense of Sight and the quality of Visibility are joined together by a bond of union of the most exquisite kind ;—a thing no less excellent than Light itself, which we identify with the Sun, and hold to be a divinity.

13 “And further, let us consider the relation of the Eye and of Light.

“The Sight, and the organ in which it resides, the Eye, is not the Sun, it is true ; but of all the organs of sense, it is that which is most like the Sun. And the power of vision which it possesses, it has as a derivative power and emanation from the Sun. And the Sun is not the sight but is the cause of sight, and is itself seen by the Faculty of sight.

“Now this being premised, I say that the Offspring of the Good, which the Good has produced in its own likeness, is this Light ; which is, in the Visible world, what the Good itself is in the Intellectual world ; and this Offspring of the Good, —Light,—has the same relation to vision and visible things, which the Good itself has to Intellect and intelligible things.

“This must be explained somewhat further. When the eyes are turned upon objects on which the day light does not fall, but only the light of night, they see not at all or see very dimly, as if they had no visual power ; but when they are directed to objects illuminated by the Sun, they see clearly, and manifest their power of vision. Now consider the Mind as being similarly situated. When it fastens itself upon that in which Truth and Reality shine forth, it apprehends and knows, and is seen to have intelligent power ; but when it turns to that which is light mixed with darkness, the region of things that come and go, it opines

only, its sight is dimmed; it changes its opinions backwards and forwards, and seems as if it had no intelligent power. Now you are to suppose that this power which thus imparts Truth to knowable things, and gives to the knower his power of knowing truth, is the Idea of Good; and you are to conceive it as the cause of Knowledge and of Truth. And these two being such exalted things, Knowledge and Truth, you are to conceive that this Idea is a thing more excellent than they are, and added to them. And as you properly conceive Light and Sight to be like the Sun, but not to be the Sun, so you must conceive Knowledge and Truth to be the nature of the Supreme Good, but not to be either the one or the other of them, that Supreme Good."

This notion that the *Summum Bonum*, which was recognised by all philosophers as the supreme object of human exertion and desire, was an Intellectual Light, which made Knowledge to be Knowledge, and Truth to be Truth, was at any rate a doctrine too lofty and abstract to be accepted at once, even by the eager and docile hearers of the Platonic Socrates. Glaucon is amused at the immeasurable height to which Socrates exalts his Supreme Good.

"You ascribe," he says, "an immense excellence to this Supreme Good, if it is the cause of Knowledge and of Truth, and is itself something higher than they are. You at least do not degrade the Supreme Good and make it to be Pleasure."

"Do not speak profanely," said I, "but regard the image another way. The Sun is not only the origin of the visibility of objects, but is also the cause of their generation, and nutrition, and growth, although in itself it is not generation [or nutrition, or growth]. In the like manner the



Supreme Good not only makes knowable things to be known, but also gives them their existence; though the Supreme Good is not existence, but is something even on the other side of existence, surpassing existence in dignity and power."

19 Glaucon exclaimed, very humorously, "O Apollo! What a surpassing is that!"

"Ha," said I (checking myself), "you are the cause of this seeming extravagance; you who compelled me to give my opinion about this matter."

"O yes," said he, "and by no means stop there, but go on, and give us all the points of this image of the Sun if there are any left untold."

"There are very many left untold; and such as occur to me at present, I will not omit."

The explanation is first given by means of a geometrical diagram; Plato being, as I have already said, fond of such illustrations. He says: "Consider that there are two kinds of things, the *intelligible* and the *visible*: two different regions, the *intelligible world* and the *visible world*<sup>1</sup>. Now take a line divided into two unequal segments to represent these two regions; and again divide each segment in the same ratio. The parts of each segment are to represent differences of clearness and indistinctness; and in the visible world these parts are *things* and *images*. By *images*, I mean shadows, and reflections in water and in polished bodies; and by *things*, I mean that of which these images are the resemblances, as animals, plants, things made by man.

"You allow that this difference corresponds to the difference of *knowledge* and *opinion*; and the

<sup>1</sup> He adds, "The *Oraton*, the visible world, which I will not say is the same as *Ouranon*, *Heaven*, that you may not accuse me of playing tricks with words."

*opinable* is to the *knowable*, as the *image* to the *reality*.

“Now we have to divide the segment which represents intelligible things in this way:—the one part represents the knowledge which the mind gets by using Things as images; the other that which it has by dealing with the Ideas themselves: the one part that which it gets by reasoning downwards from principles; the other, the principles themselves: the one part truth which depends on hypotheses, the other unhypothetical or absolute truth.

“Thus, to explain a problem in geometry, the geometers make certain hypotheses<sup>1</sup> (namely definitions and postulates) about numbers and angles and the like, and reason from them; giving no reason for these assumptions, but taking them as evident to all; and reasoning from them, they prove the proposition which they have in view. And in such reasonings, they use visible figures or diagrams, to reason about a square, for instance, with its diagonals; but their reasonings are not really about these visible figures, but about the mental figures, and which they conceive in their thoughts.

“The diagrams which they draw, being visible figures, are the images of thoughts which the geometer has in his mind, and these images he uses in his reasoning. There may be images of these images; shadows and reflections in water, as

<sup>1</sup> It is plain, I think by the reasoning that Plato by *hypotheses* in this place, means the usual foundations of arithmetic and geometry: namely *Definitions* and *Postulates*. He says, they take as hypotheses (*ὑποθέμενοι*) odd and even, and the three kinds of angles, (right, acute, and obtuse,) and figures (as a triangle, a square), and the like. The *Axioms* of Arithmetic and Geometry belong to the Higher Faculty which ascends to First Principles: but this Faculty operates rather in *using* these Axioms than in *enunciating* them. It knows them implicitly rather than expresses them explicitly.

of other visible things; but still these diagrams are only images of conceptions.

20 "This then is one of the kinds of intelligible things: conceptions, for instance, geometrical conceptions of figures. But in dealing with these the mind depends upon assumptions, and does not ascend to first principles. It does not ascend above these assumptions, but uses images borrowed from a lower region (the visible world): these images being chosen so as to be as distinct as may be.

"Now the other kind of intelligible things is this: that which the Reason includes, in virtue of its power of reasoning; when it regards the assumptions of the sciences as, what they are, assumptions only; and uses them as occasions and starting points, that from these it may ascend to the Absolute<sup>1</sup>, which does not depend upon assumption, the origin of scientific truth. The Reason takes hold of this first principle of Truth, and availing itself of all the connections and relations of this principle, it proceeds to the conclusion; using no sensible image in doing this: but contemplating the Idea alone; and with these Ideas the process begins, goes on, and terminates."

"I apprehend," said Glaucon, "but not very clearly, for the matter is somewhat abstruse. You wish to prove that the knowledge which by the Reason, in an intuitive manner, we may acquire of Real Existence and Intelligible Things, is of a higher degree of certainty than the knowledge

<sup>1</sup> The word is *ἀνωθέτως*, *un-hypothetical*. The Absolute, or first principle of science here spoken of, agrees with what I have called *Ideas* in the *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*. The first principle of Geometry is the Idea of space: from this flow the Axioms and Definitions, and through them the whole science. Reason contemplates such Ideas, and sees the resulting truths, *by Intuition*.

which belongs to what are commonly called sciences. Such sciences, you say, have certain assumptions for their bases; and these assumptions are by the students of such sciences, apprehended not by sense, but by a mental operation, by conception.

“But inasmuch as such students ascend no higher than the assumptions, and do not go to the first principle of truth, they do not seem to you to have true knowledge,—intellectual insight,—intuitive reason,—on the subject of their reasonings: though the subjects are intelligible things. And you call this habit and practice of the geometers and others by the name *Judgment*, not Reason or Insight or Intuition; taking Judgment<sup>1</sup> to be something between Opinion on one side, and Intuitive Reason on the other.”

“You have explained it well,” said I. “And now consider these four kinds of things of which we have spoken, as corresponding to four affections in the mind. Intuitive Reason, the highest; Judgment [or Discursive Reason], the next; the third, Belief; and the fourth, Conjecture or Guess; and arrange them in order so that they may be held to have more or less of certainty, as their objects have more or less of truth.”

“I understand,” said he; “I agree to what you say, and I arrange them so.”

And so the Sixth Book ends.

<sup>1</sup> I put *Judgment* as the translation of *διδραία*; for *νοῦς*, *διδραία*, *πίστις* are all three co-ordinate: they are, respectively, assent to propositions intuitive, proved, probable.

The Diagram which Plato proposes may be thus given :

<i>Intelligible World.</i>		<i>Visible World.</i>	
Intuition.	Conception.	Things.	Images.

And may be further thus expanded :

	<i>Intelligible World, νοητόν.</i>		<i>Visible World, ὄρατόν.</i>	
Object.	Ideas, <i>ιδέαι.</i>	Conception, <i>διάνοια.</i>	Things, <i>ζῶα κ.τ.λ.</i>	Images, <i>εἰκόνας.</i>
Process.	Intuition, <i>νόησις.</i>	Demonstration, <i>ἐπιστήμη.</i>	Belief, <i>πίστις.</i>	Conjecture, <i>εἰκασία.</i>
Faculty.	Intuitive Reason, <i>νοῦς.</i>	Discursive Reason, <i>λόγος.</i>	Sensation, <i>αἴσθησις.</i>	

It will not surprise any reader to find that an attempt to explain exactly the difference between Real Knowledge and mere Opinion should involve abstruse and obscure discussion. Even now, when the speculative world have so long had before them Plato's teaching on this matter, and all that has since been added to illustrate the subject, probably no statement of the nature and limits of this distinction can be found which would be generally assented to. But the scheme which Plato propounds embraces much more than this distinction.

He would teach us to believe in a kind of knowledge which in certainty and clearness ascends as far above the ordinary knowledge which is exemplified in science, as *that* scientific knowledge ascends above the knowledge of mere external facts and objects. This higher knowledge he describes only by comparison. It is the source of all other Knowledge and Truth, as the Sun is the source of Vision, and of life. This higher Knowledge is also identified with that Absolute and Primordial Goodness, from which all that is good derives the quality of being so. And this is the Knowledge which is to elevate the Wise man so far above his fellow-men, that he is their natural and appointed Ruler and Guardian.

This speculation consists of several separate elements. The distinction of various kinds of knowledge, as lower and higher, is the most definite portion of it. Besides that element, there is the doctrine belonging to the Platonic Polity, that the wise man is the natural Ruler of other men. There is also the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, those Primordial Essences which are the source of all qualities in visible and tangible things,—the First Good, First Fair, First True. There is further the illustration of this Primordial Light in the Intelligible world by the operation of the source of Light in the Visible world.

Besides these elements of this Platonic speculation, there is the geometrical illustration. Plato was very fond of geometrical illustrations; and frequently introduces them, though they are always in him of a very simple kind. In the present case he directs his hearer to conceive a line cut into two unequal segments, which are to represent respectively the whole assemblage of objects of thought and objects of sight;—the Intelligible World and

the Visible World. The second of these segments he again divides in the same ratio into two parts which represent respectively Objects, and the Images, Reflections and Shadows of Objects; the two classes of things into which the Visible world may be divided. He proposes to divide the line which represents the Intelligible world in a manner analogous to this; and for that purpose, he makes the two parts of it to be *Intuitions* by which we apprehend First Principles, and *Conceptions* by which we reason to results in the processes of Science. This graphical illustration of the division of knowledge belongs to that which I have spoken of as the most definite portion of this speculation. It amounts to this, that pure knowledge (that is, demonstrable knowledge) consists of two parts, Intuition and Demonstration; and that in mathematical phraseology we may say that Intuition is to Demonstration as Intelligible Things are to Visible Things, and as Visible Things are to their Images.

These analogies are both loose and forced; but, as I have said, so great is the difficulty of making any secure and permanent progress in such speculations, that even now they have hardly been replaced by anything more clear and convincing.

There is at all times great difficulty in selecting a phraseology in which such speculations are to be conveyed: and at the time of Plato, when it was a new thing to treat such subjects at all, and still more to treat them in the general and abstract manner here attempted, the difficulty was much greater. We are not to be surprised, therefore, if we find Plato's expressions on this subject imperfect, wavering, and even inconsistent. The difficulty is especially great of finding any suitable and fixed expression for that higher kind of knowledge, which Plato places above ordinary science,

as being the knowledge of and faculty of knowing First Principles. It is, as Socrates says, in this concluding portion of the Sixth Book, "that of which the Reason (*λόγος*) takes hold, in virtue of its power of reasoning," (*τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει*;) and again, as Glaucon further expresses his apprehension of it, it is "the science of reasoning concerning the really existing and intelligible" (*ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ*<sup>1</sup>). This process of seeing First Principles we commonly call *Intuition*, and oppose to *Reasoning*. Shortly afterwards he calls it *Intelligence* (*νόησις*) as opposed to *Conception* (*διάνοια*), the mode of apprehension on which science depends: nor does he appear to have found an expression which satisfied him better, to describe what he had in view.

It appears certain that Aristotle had in his mind this and similar passages of Plato, when he wrote that remarkable discussion concerning the Intellectual Virtues which we have in the Sixth Book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He there says, that there are five Intellectual Virtues, or Faculties by which the mind aims at Truth in asserting or denying;—namely, Art, Science, Prudence, Wisdom, *Nous*. In this enumeration, passing over Prudence and Wisdom, as Virtues which are mainly concerned with practical life, we have, in the region of speculative Truth, a distinction propounded between Science and *Nous*: and this is further explained (ch. 6) by the remarks that Sci-

<sup>1</sup> Here we are plainly not to understand that we arrive at First Principles *by reasoning*; for the very opposite is the case, that first principles are those not which we reason *to*, but which we reason *from*. The meaning must be, as I have expressed it, that First Principles are those of which the reason takes hold, in virtue of its power of reasoning:—the conditions which must exist in order to make any reasoning possible. These principles, as we have said, are seen *by Intuition*.



ence reasons from Principles, and that these Principles cannot be given by Science, for Science reasons *from* them; nor by Art or by Prudence, for these are conversant with matters contingent not with matters demonstrable; nor can the first Principles of the Reasonings of Science be given by Wisdom; for Wisdom herself has often to reason from Principles. Therefore the first Principles of demonstrative reasoning must be given by a peculiar Faculty; and this must be the remaining Faculty, *Nous*.

What is the English term by which we may best call this Faculty? To answer this question we must ask, What is the Faculty by which we know the Truth of First Principles? Taking the First Principles of Geometry as the most obvious examples of the First Principles of a Science, how do we know their truth—the truth of the Axioms, for example? That we know the truth of the Axioms of Geometry *by Intuition*, is a common and unexceptionable form of expression; but in this expression, Intuition means rather the *process* than the *Faculty*;—rather the act of looking *where* this Truth is to be seen, than the power of Intellectual Vision *by which* we see it. And if we inquire further what is the name by which this Faculty, this power of Intellectual Vision, is known among the speculative writers of our language, I do not think that we shall find any more appropriate or distinctive term used for that purpose than *the Reason*. It is *our Reason* by which we see the Truth of the First Principles of Geometry; and, in like manner, it is *our Reason* by which we see the First Principles of Morality, and of any other Science which involves reasoning from Principles to Conclusions.

But here a question naturally arises; If Science,

as is admitted, involves, and indeed mainly consists of, *reasoning* from principles to conclusions, is not *the Reason* the Faculty which is concerned in Science also? And thus we cannot distinguish Reason and Science, as Aristotle opposes *Nous* and *Science*.

This objection would be true, if the term *Reason* were to be considered as correlative and coextensive with the verb *to reason*; but such is not the ordinary usage. The substantive, *the Reason*, has a wider range than the verb, *to reason*: it implies the Faculty which apprehends the truth of First Principles as well as the Faculty which, by combining First Principles, arrives at derivative results of them. Indeed the Faculty by which we Reason is very often called *the Reasoning Faculty*, rather than simply *the Reason*. Or another expression is used: the process of combining First Principles so as to obtain conclusions,—the process of the mind running from one to another of such Principles—is called *discursus* in Latin, and the *discursive process* in English; and the Faculty by which this process is performed is sometimes called the *discursive Faculty*; and this process of *reasoning* is said to take place *by discourse of Reason*. (The adoption of the term *discourse* to mean any kind of talking, is a later popular corruption of scientific language.)

It appears therefore that if we are to ascribe the Science which is in man's mind to the Reason, we must, for the sake of distinctness, ascribe it to *the Discursive Reason*: while First Principles with the same object of avoiding ambiguity, may be ascribed to the *Intuitive Reason*, and these terms are perhaps the most distinct which we could employ for Aristotle's *Science* and *Nous*, and for Plato's *Science* and *Noesis*.

As Plato thus attempted to make a division of

man's Intellectual powers into two, the higher and the lower;—as Aristotle thus distinguished the power by which we see first Principles from the power by which we reason to conclusions, so in modern times have other writers attempted to establish a similar distinction;—among others, Mr Coleridge. And such a distinction may be well maintained, as we have seen. But Mr Coleridge has attempted to express and record this distinction in the English language by a use of words which is contrary to the usage of good writers, and incapable of being carried out consistently. To the lower Faculty—the Discursive Reason—the Faculty by which we reason—he would assign the term, *understanding*: while to his higher Faculty, which never reasons, but sees truth intuitively, he would confine the name of *the Reason*<sup>1</sup>.

With this proposed distinction he combines other views of the nature of these Faculties; as for instance, that the lower Faculty, the Discursive Reason, is of the nature of the Instinct of Brutes. These doctrines, it may be shown, are quite untenable.

To return to Plato. The doctrines which are thus expounded in the sixth Book of the *Republic* are summed up in a pointed and striking form in the beginning of the seventh Book. We have there the celebrated image of the men confined in a cave who see objects only by means of their shadows: an image which is plainly suggested by the notion already started, that there are lower and higher kinds of knowledge, and that the higher kind bears to the lower kind the relation of the

<sup>1</sup> The result of Coleridge's teaching might be expressed by saying that *the Reason* is that by which we *understand*, and the *Understanding* is that by which we *reason*. But this is neither good English nor good philosophy.

seeing real objects to the seeing their shadows. This notion is followed into definite details, which I shall give; omitting, as usual, the interlocations which do not help the exposition.

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“You may express our views of different de- VII.  
grees of knowledge by the following image. § 1  
Suppose a set of men in a subterraneous cavern, which opens to the day by a long direct straight wide passage; and that they have been kept in this cavern from childhood, fettered so that they cannot even turn their necks, but with their heads fixed so that they can only look from the light towards the lower end of the cave. Suppose further that there is a great fire lit opposite to the mouth of the cavern [so as to throw the shadows of objects on this lower end of the cave], and a road which runs past the cavern between the fire and the captives. Suppose too that along this road runs a low wall, like the partition over which puppet-showmen exhibit their figures. And now suppose that along this wall, and so as to be shown above it, pass men and other figures, some silent, some speaking. You think this a strange imagination. Yet these captives exactly represent the condition of us men, who see nothing but the shadows of realities. And these captives, in talking with one another, would give names to the shadows as if they were realities.

“And if, further, this prison-house had an echo opposite to it, so that when the passers by spoke, the sound was reflected [from the same wall on which the shadows were seen], they would of course think that the shadows spoke. And in short, in every way they would be led to think there were no realities except these shadows.

“Now consider how these captives might be freed from these illusions. If one of them were loosed from his bonds, and made to turn round and to walk towards the light and look at it, at first he would be pained and dazzled by the glare, and unable to see clearly. He would be perplexed, if he were told that what he saw before were non-entities, and that now, being brought nearer to the reality and turned towards it, he saw better than before; and even if any of the passers by were pointed out to him, and made to answer questions, and to say what he is, he would still think that what he saw before was more true than what was shown him now. He would shun the excessive light and turn away to that which he *could* see, and think it more visible than the objects which had been shown him.

2 “But if he were dragged to the light up the steep and rough passage which opens to the cave, and fairly brought out into the light of the sun, he would be still more pained and more angry, and be at first so blinded that he would not be able to see real objects. It would require time and use to enable him to see things in daylight. At first he would be able to see shadows—then the reflected images of objects—and then, objects themselves: and afterwards he might be able to look at the heavens by night, and see the heavenly bodies, the stars and the moon; and finally be able to look at the sun;—not merely at a reflexion of him in water, but at the sun himself, in his own place. And then he might be led to reason about the sun, and see that he regulates seasons and years, and governs everything in this visible world, and is in a certain way the cause of all the things which they in their captivity saw.

“And then when he recollected his first abode,

and the illusions of that place, and of his fellow-captives, he would naturally congratulate himself upon the change, and pity those he had left there. And if there were among them any honours and rewards given to him who was most sharpsighted in scanning the passing shadows, and readiest in recollecting which of them habitually went before and which after and which together, and who hence was most skilful in predicting what could happen in future, he would not be likely to covet these honours and rewards. He would rather say with the shade of Achilles, in Homer, that it is better to be a day labourer in the region of life and day than the greatest monarch in the realm of shadows. He would rather suffer anything than live as he did before.

“And consider this further. If such a one should redescend into the cavern and resume his former seat, his eyes would be purblind, coming out of sunshine into darkness. And while his eyes are still dark and before they have recovered their power, if he had to discuss those shadows with those who had always remained there captive (a state of things which might last a considerable time) he would be utterly laughed at; and they would say that his eyesight was ruined, and that it was not worth anybody’s while to go up out of the cave. And if any one tried to set them at liberty and to lead them to the light, they would, if they could get him into their power, kill him.

“Now this image, my dear Glaucon, is to be 3 applied to the case we were speaking of before. We must liken the visible world to the dark cavern, and the fire which makes objects visible, to the Sun. The ascent upwards, and the vision of the objects there, is the advance of the mind into the intelligible world; at least such is

my faith and hope, and of these you wished me to give an account. God knows if my faith is well-founded. And according to my view, the Idea of the Supreme Good is seen last of all and with the greatest difficulty; and when seen, is apprehended as the cause of all that is right and excellent. This Idea produces, in the visible world, Light, and the Sun the cause of Light; in the Intellectual World it is the cause of Truth and of the Intuition of Truth. And this Idea, he who is to act wisely either in private or in public matters, must get possession of.

“And now, as you agree with me in this view, you will agree with me further, that it is not to be wondered at that those who have advanced into that higher region are not willing to be involved in the affairs of men; their souls wish to dwell for ever in that upper region. Nor is it wonderful if any one coming down from divine contemplations to the wretched concerns of men, blunders and is laughed at: while he is still purblind, and before his eyes are accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled, it may be, to fight in courts of justice or elsewhere, the battle, [not about justice,] but about the shadows of justice, or the images which make the shadows; he is compelled to wrangle about the way in which these shadows are apprehended by those who never had a view of Justice herself. If any one has any sense, he will recollect that there are two kinds of confused vision arising from two opposite sources; that which happens when men go out of light into darkness, and that which happens when they go out of darkness into light: and the case is exactly the same with the mind. And when such a one sees a mind confused and unable to discern anything clearly, he will not laugh without consideration, he will con-

sider whether in that case the mind is darkened by coming out of a clearer light into unaccustomed darkness; or, going from ignorance to clearer knowledge, is struck with confusion by the brightened splendour. And in the latter case he would think that mind happy in its constitution and condition, and pity the other; and if he were disposed to laugh at it, his laughter would be far less in a temper of ridicule than his laughter at him who comes from above below, from the light into the dark."

And thus this celebrated image of the dark cavern with its captive tenants who spend their time in gazing on and reasoning about shadows, is made to illustrate the main points in these discussions of Plato, both about the philosopher's proper place in the scheme of social order, and about the kinds of knowledge which the human mind can attain.

We can hardly doubt, I think, that when he speaks of the truly enlightened man being drawn down from his divine contemplations, and compelled to fight his unequal battle at the tribunal of benighted men;—to fight a battle, about their shadow-notions of justice, with those who have never had a glimpse of the reality—he had in his mind the battle fought by his master Socrates, of which the result had sealed the fate of the master, and given an indestructible bias to the speculations of the disciple. The other points, the explanation of the repugnance of the philosopher to the ordinary affairs of men, arising from his real superiority, must have been intended by Plato to apply to those who, like him, made speculation, not politics, their business, and yet had really the greatest share of true political wisdom.

But Plato does not acquiesce in the conclusion that his Ideal State is to be deprived of the ad-



vantage of being governed by philosophers, who  
4 alone are able to govern it well<sup>1</sup>. A state cannot  
be well governed, he says, either by men unedu-  
cated and strangers to the truth, or by those who  
have spent their whole lives in study: not by the  
former, because they do not understand the scope  
and scheme of human and political life; not by  
the latter because they shrink from meddling with  
practical life altogether; they are already in the  
Islands of the Blest, and are not willing to change  
their abode. But we must compel them to ascend  
to the highest knowledge, that of the True Good,  
and then to redescend to share the labours of these  
poor captives. "What," says Glaucon, "are we  
to be so cruel to them as to make them live a sad  
5 life instead of a glad one?"—"You forget," re-  
plies Socrates, "that each man in the state must  
so live, as most to promote, not his own good, but  
the good of the state. And we may urge further,  
that in other states, men make themselves philo-  
sophers, in spite of public institutions; but we  
make our philosophers to be such for the sake of  
the state. They are to be the queen-bees in the  
hive. We shall say to them, You must descend  
into the common abode, and accustom yourselves  
to its darkness. You will see ten thousand times  
better than the inhabitants of it. You will know  
the meaning of the seemings, because you know  
the true realities. And so the city will be a scene  
of waking men, not a dream in which men fight  
about shadows, as most cities are.

"In most cities men struggle for power, as if it  
were some great good. But the truth is this: a  
city in which those who are fit to rule are not  
eager to rule will have the most of good govern-  
ment and the least of faction."

<sup>1</sup> I omit some sentences for the sake of brevity.

“When we thus exhort them will they disobey us?—It is impossible, for we say what is just to men who are just.”

“This is indeed the Truth,” says Socrates. “Whenever you find that those who are fit to rule are in a condition better than that of those who do rule, you may establish a good government; but when you find that the management of public affairs is sought by poor and needy men, as a means of promoting their own interest, there are the materials of intestine war which will ruin the men themselves and the State.

“But there is no life which inspires a contempt of political success, except a life of true philosophy. We must then consider how we can bring men to philosophy—to a knowledge of that which really is. Now what study produces this effect? We have spoken of Gymnastic and Music; but these cannot answer the purpose. Gymnastic is concerned about the mutable and perishable body. Music teaches habits of harmony and rhythm, but not science. We must therefore have some other study besides this practical music. What studies are those which lead to science?”

This question is answered by a survey of the Sciences, at that time existing or possible, according to Plato's view. These Sciences are Arithmetic, Plane Geometry, Solid Geometry, Astronomy, and Harmonics. I despair of carrying the English reader through the details of Plato's exposition of those ancient Greek sciences, or germs of sciences, presented according to his views of the way in which they might answer his object: but I will give the general import of this Survey, and remarks upon it, as I have already published them.

The view in which Plato here regards the

Sciences is, as the instruments of that culture of the philosophical spirit which is to make the philosopher the fit and natural ruler of the perfect State—the Platonic Polity. It is held that to answer this purpose, the mind must be instructed in something more stable than the knowledge supplied by the senses;—a knowledge of objects which are constantly changing, and which therefore can be no real permanent Knowledge, but only Opinion. The real and permanent Knowledge which we thus require is to be found in certain sciences, which deal with *truths necessary and universal*, as we should now describe them: and which therefore are, in Plato's language, a knowledge of that which really *is*<sup>1</sup>.

This is the object of the Sciences of which Plato speaks. And hence, when he introduces Arithmetic, as the first of the Sciences which are to be employed in this mental discipline, he adds (VII. § 8) that it must be not mere common Arithmetic, but a science which leads to speculative truths<sup>2</sup>, seen by Intuition<sup>3</sup>; not an Arithmetic which is studied for the sake of buying and selling, as among tradesmen and shopkeepers, but for the sake of pure and real Science<sup>4</sup>.

I shall not dwell upon the details with which he illustrates this view, but proceed to the other Sciences which he mentions.

Geometry is then spoken of, as obviously the

<sup>1</sup> The Sciences are to draw the mind from that which grows and perishes to that which really is: *μάθημα ψυχῆς ὀλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν.*

<sup>2</sup> *ἐπὶ θεῶν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως.*

<sup>3</sup> *τῇ νοήσει αὐτῆς.*

<sup>4</sup> He adds, "and for the sake of war;" this point I have passed by. Plato does not really ascribe much weight to this use of Science, as we see in what he says of Geometry and Astronomy.

next Science in order; and it is asserted that it really does answer the required condition of drawing the mind from visible, mutable phenomena to a permanent reality. Geometers indeed speak of their visible diagrams, as if their problems were certain practical processes; to erect a perpendicular; to construct a square: and the like. But this language, though necessary, is really absurd. The figures are mere aids to their reasonings. Their knowledge is really a knowledge not of visible objects, but of permanent realities: and thus, Geometry is one of the helps by which the mind may be drawn to Truth; by which the philosophical spirit may be formed, which looks upwards instead of downwards.

Astronomy is suggested as the Science next in order, but Socrates, the leader of the dialogue, remarks that there is an intermediate Science first to be considered. Geometry treats of plane figures; Astronomy treats of solids in motion, that is, of spheres in motion; for the astronomy of Plato's time was mainly the doctrine of the sphere. But before treating of solids in motion, we must have a science which treats of solids simply. After taking space of two dimensions, we must take space of three dimensions, length, breadth and depth, as in cubes and the like<sup>1</sup>. But such a Science, it is remarked, has not yet been discovered. Plato "notes as deficient" this branch of knowledge; to use the expression employed by Bacon on the like occasions in his Review. Plato goes on to say, that the cultivators of such a science have not received due encouragement; and that though scorned and starved by the public, and not recommended by any obvious utility, it

<sup>1</sup> ὁρθῶς ἔχει ἐξῆς μετὰ δευτέραν ἀξίην τρίτην λαμβάνειν, ἔστι δὲ που τοῦτο περὶ τῆν τῶν κύβων ἀξίην καὶ τὸ βάθους μέτεχον.

has still made great progress, in virtue of its own attractiveness.

In fact, researches in Solid Geometry had been pursued with great zeal by Plato and his friends, and with remarkable success. The five Regular Solids, the Tetrahedron or Pyramid, Cube, Octahedron, Dodecahedron and Icosahedron, had been discovered; and the curious theorem, that of Regular Solids there can be just so many, these and no others, was known. The doctrine of these Solids was already applied in a way, fanciful and arbitrary, no doubt, but ingenious and lively, to the theory of the Universe. In the *Timæus*, the elements have these forms assigned to them respectively. Earth has the Cube: Fire has the Pyramid: Water has the Octahedron: Air has the Icosahedron: and the Dodecahedron is the plan of the Universe itself. This application of the doctrine of the Regular Solids shows that the knowledge of those figures was already established; and that Plato had a right to speak of Solid Geometry as a real and interesting Science. And that this subject was so recondite and profound,—that these five Regular Solids had so little application in the geometry which has a bearing on man's ordinary thoughts and actions,—made it all the more natural for Plato to suppose that these solids had a bearing on the constitution of the Universe; and we shall find that such a belief in later times found a ready acceptance in the minds of mathematicians who followed in the Platonic line of speculation.

Plato next proceeds to consider Astronomy; and here we have an amusing touch of philosophical drama. Glaucon, the hearer and pupil in the Dialogue, is desirous of showing that he has profited by what his instructor had said about the

real uses of Science. He says Astronomy is a very good branch of education. It is such a very useful science for seamen and husbandmen and the like. Socrates says, with a smile, as we may suppose: "You are very amusing with your zeal for utility. I suppose you are afraid of being condemned by the good people of Athens for diffusing Useless Knowledge." A little afterwards Glaucon tries to do better, but still with no great success. He says, "You blamed me for praising Astronomy awkwardly: but now I will follow your lead. Astronomy is one of the sciences which you require, because it makes men's minds look upwards, and study things above. Any one can see that." "Well," says Socrates, "perhaps any one can see it except me—I cannot see it." Glaucon is surprised, but Socrates goes on: "Your notice of 'the study of things above' is certainly a very magnificent one. You seem to think that if a man bends his head back and looks at the ceiling he 'looks upwards' with his mind as well as his eyes. You may be right and I may be wrong: but I have no notion of any science which makes the *mind* look upwards, except a science which is about the permanent and the invisible. It makes no difference, as to that matter, whether a man gapes and looks up or shuts his mouth and looks down. If a man merely looks up and stares at sensible objects, his mind does not look upwards, even if he were to pursue his studies swimming on his back in the sea."

The Astronomy, then, which merely looks at phenomena does not satisfy Plato. He wants something more. What is it? as Glaucon very naturally asks.

Plato then describes Astronomy as a real science (§ 11). "The variegated adornments which

appear in the sky, the visible luminaries, we must judge to be the most beautiful and the most perfect things of their kind: but since they are mere visible figures, we must suppose them to be far inferior to the true objects; namely, those spheres which, with their real proportions of quickness and slowness, their real number, their real figures, revolve and carry luminaries in their revolutions. These objects are to be apprehended by reason and mental conception, not by vision." And he then goes on to say that the varied figures which the skies present to the eye are to be used as *diagrams* to assist the study of that higher truth; just as if any one were to study geometry by means of beautiful diagrams constructed by Dædalus or any other consummate artist.

Here then, Plato points to a kind of astronomical science which goes beyond the mere arrangement of phenomena: an astronomy which, it would seem, did not exist at the time when he wrote. It is natural to inquire, whether we can determine more precisely what kind of astronomical science he meant, and whether such science has been brought into existence since his time.

He gives us some further features of the philosophical astronomy which he requires. "As you do not expect to find in the most exquisite geometrical diagrams the true evidence of quantities being equal, or double, or in any other relation: so the true astronomer will not think that the proportion of the day to the month, or the month to the year, and the like, are real and immutable things. He will seek a deeper truth than these. We must treat Astronomy, like Geometry, as a series of problems suggested by visible things. We must apply the intelligent portion of our mind to the subject."

Here we really come in view of a class of problems which astronomical speculators at certain periods have proposed to themselves. What is the real ground of the proportion of the day to the month, and of the month to the year, I do not know that any writer of great name has tried to determine: but to ask the reason of these proportions, namely, that of the revolution of the earth on its axis, of the moon in its orbit, and of the earth in its orbit, are questions just of the same kind as to ask the reason of the proportion of the revolutions of the planets in their orbits, and of the proportion of the orbits themselves. Now who has attempted to assign such reasons?

Of course we shall answer, Kepler: not so much in the Laws of the Planetary motions which bear his name, as in the Law which at an earlier period he thought he had discovered, determining the proportion of the distances of the several Planets from the Sun. And, curiously enough, this solution of a problem which we may conceive Plato to have had in his mind, Kepler gave by means of the Five Regular Solids which Plato had brought into notice, and had employed in his theory of the Universe given in the *Timæus*.

Kepler's speculations on the subject just mentioned were given to the world in the *Mysterium Cosmographicum*, published in 1596. In his Preface, he says, "In the beginning of the year 1595 I brooded with the whole energy of my mind on the subject of the Copernican system. There were three things in particular of which I pertinaciously sought the causes; why they are not other than they are: the number, the size, and the motion of the orbits." We see how strongly he had his mind impressed with the same thought which Plato had so confidently uttered: that there



must be some reason for those proportions in the scheme of the Universe which appear casual and vague. He was confident at this period that he had solved two of the three questions which haunted him;—that he could account for the number and the size of the planetary orbits. His account was given in this way.—“The orbit of the Earth is a circle; round the sphere to which this circle belongs describe a dodecahedron; the sphere including this will give the orbit of Mars. Round Mars inscribe a tetrahedron; the circle including this will be the orbit of Jupiter. Describe a cube round Jupiter’s orbit; the circle including this will be the orbit of Saturn. Now inscribe in the Earth’s orbit an icosahedron: the circle inscribed in it will be the orbit of Venus. Inscribe an octahedron in the orbit of Venus; the circle inscribed in it will be Mercury’s orbit. This is the reason of the number of the planets;” and also of the magnitudes of their orbits.

These proportions were only approximations; and the Rule thus asserted has been shown to be unfounded, by the discovery of new Planets. This Law of Kepler has been repudiated by succeeding Astronomers. So far, then, the Astronomy which Plato requires as a part of true philosophy has not been brought into being. But are we thence to conclude that the demand for such a kind of Astronomy was a mere Platonic imagination?—was a mistake which more recent and sounder views have corrected? We can hardly venture to say that. For the questions which Kepler thus asked, and which he answered by the assertion of this erroneous Law, are questions of exactly the same kind as those which he asked and answered by means of the true Laws which still fasten his name upon one of the epochs of astronomical history. If he

was wrong in assigning reasons for the number and size of the planetary orbits, he was right in assigning a reason for the proportion of the motions. This he did in the *Harmonice Mundi*, published in 1619: where he established that the squares of the periodic times of the different Planets are as the cubes of their mean distances from the central Sun. Of this discovery he speaks with a natural exultation, which succeeding astronomers have thought well founded. He says: "What I prophesied two and twenty years ago as soon as I had discovered the five solids among the heavenly bodies; what I firmly believed before I had seen the *Harmonics* of Ptolemy; what I promised my friends in the title of this book (*On the perfect Harmony of the celestial motions*), which I named before I was sure of my discovery; what sixteen years ago I regarded as a thing to be sought; that for which I joined Tycho Brahe, for which I settled in Prague, for which I devoted the best part of my life to astronomical contemplations, at length I have brought to light, and have recognized its truth beyond my most sanguine expectations." (*Harm. Mundi*, Lib. v.)

Thus the Platonic notion, of an Astronomy which deals with doctrines of a more exact and determinate kind than the obvious relations of phenomena, may be found to tend either to error or to truth. Such aspirations point equally to the five regular solids which Kepler imagined as determining the planetary orbits, and to the Laws of Kepler in which Newton detected the effect of universal gravitation. The realities which Plato looked for, as something incomparably more real than the visible luminaries, are found, when we find geometrical figures, epicycles and eccentrics, laws of motion and laws of force, which explain

the appearances. His Realities are Theories which account for the Phenomena, Ideas which connect the Facts.

But, is Plato right in holding that such Realities as these are *more real* than the Phenomena, and constitute an Astronomy of a higher kind than that of mere Appearances? To this we shall, of course, reply that Theories and Facts have each their reality, but that these are realities of different kinds. Kepler's Laws are as real as day and night; the force of gravity tending to the Sun is as real as the Sun; but not more so. True Theories and Facts are equally real, for true Theories *are* Facts, and Facts are familiar Theories. Astronomy is, as Plato says, a series of Problems suggested by visible Things; and the Thoughts in our own minds which bring the solutions of these Problems, have a reality in the Things which suggest them.

But if we try, as Plato does, to separate and oppose to each other the Astronomy of Appearances and the Astronomy of Theories, we attempt that which is impossible. There are no Phenomena which do not exhibit some Law; no Law can be conceived without Phenomena. The heavens offer a series of Problems; but however many of these Problems we solve, there remain still innumerable of them unsolved; and these unsolved Problems have solutions, and are not different in kind from those of which the extant solution is most complete.

Nor can we justly distinguish, with Plato, Astronomy into transient appearances and permanent truths. The theories of Astronomy *are* permanent, and are manifested in a series of changes: but the change is perpetual just *because* the theory is permanent. The perpetual change *is* the per-

manent theory. The perpetual changes in the positions and movements of the planets, for instance, manifest the permanent machinery: the machinery of cycles and epicycles, as Plato would have said, and as Copernicus would have agreed; while Kepler, with a profound admiration for both, would have asserted that the motions might be represented by ellipses, more exactly, if not more truly. The cycles and epicycles, or the ellipses, are as real as space and time, *in* which the motions take place. But we cannot justly say that space and time and motion are *more real* than the bodies which move in space and time, or than the appearances which these bodies present.

Thus Plato, with his tendency to exalt Ideas above Facts,—to find a Reality which is more real than Phenomena,—to take hold of a permanent Truth which is more true than truths of observation,—attempts what is impossible. He tries to separate the poles of the Fundamental Antithesis, which, however antithetical, are inseparable.

At the same time, we must recollect that this tendency to find a Reality which is something beyond appearance, a permanence which is involved in the changes, is the genuine spring of scientific discovery. Such a tendency has been the cause of all the astronomical science which we possess. It appeared in Plato himself, in Hipparchus, in Ptolemy, in Copernicus, and most eminently in Kepler; and in him perhaps in a manner more accordant with Plato's aspirations, when he found the five Regular Solids in the Universe, than when he found there the Conic Sections which determine the form of the planetary orbits. The pursuit of this tendency has been the source of the mighty and successful labours of succeeding astronomers: and the anticipations of Plato on this

head were more true than he himself could have conceived.

When the above view of the nature of true astronomy has been proposed, Glaucon says :

“That would be a task much more laborious than the astronomy now cultivated.” Socrates replies : “I believe so : and such tasks must be undertaken, if our researches are to be good for anything.”

After Astronomy, there comes under review another Science, which is treated in the same manner. It is presented as one of the Sciences which deal with real abstract truth ; and which are therefore suited to that development of the philosophic insight into the highest truth, which is here Plato's main object. This Science is *Harmonics*, the doctrine of the mathematical relations of musical sounds. Perhaps it may be more difficult to explain to a general reader, Plato's views on this than on the previous subjects : for though Harmonics is still acknowledged as a Science including the mathematical truths to which Plato here refers, these truths are less generally known than those of geometry or astronomy. Pythagoras is reported to have been the discoverer of the cardinal proposition in the Mathematics of Music :—namely, that the musical notes which the ear recognizes as having that definite and harmonious relation which we call an *octave*, a *fifth*, a *fourth*, a *third*, have also, in some way or other, the numerical relation of 2 to 1, 3 to 2, 4 to 3, 5 to 4. I say “some way or other,” because the statements of ancient writers on this subject are physically inexact, but are right in the essential point, that those simple numerical ratios are characteristic of the most marked harmonic relations. The numerical ratios really represent the rate of vibration of

the air when those harmonics are produced. This perhaps Plato did not know: but he knew or assumed that those numerical ratios were cardinal truths in harmony: and he conceived that the exactness of the ratios rested on grounds deeper and more intellectual than any testimony which the ear could give. This is the main point in his mode of applying the subject, which will be best understood by translating (with some abridgement) what he says. Socrates proceeds:

(§ 11 near the end.) “Motion appears in many aspects. It would require a very wise man to enumerate them all: but there are two obvious kinds. One which appears in astronomy, (the revolutions of the heavenly bodies,) and another which is the echo of that<sup>1</sup>. As the eyes are made for Astronomy, so are the ears made for the motion which produces Harmony<sup>2</sup>: and thus we have two sister sciences, as the Pythagoreans teach, and we assent.”

(§ 12.) “To avoid unnecessary labour, let us first learn what *they* can tell us, and see whether anything is to be added to it, retaining our own view on such subjects: namely this:—that those whose education we are to superintend—real philosophers—are never to learn any imperfect truths:—anything which does not tend to that point (exact and permanent truth) to which all our knowledge ought to tend, as we said concerning astronomy. Now those who cultivate music take a very different course from this. You may see them taking immense pains in measuring musical notes and intervals by the ear, as the astronomers measure the heavenly motions by the eye.

“Yes, says Glaucon, they apply their ears

• <sup>1</sup> ἀντίστροφον αὐτοῦ.

<sup>2</sup> πρὸς ἑναρμόνιον φεράν ὡτα παγήναι.

close to the instrument, as if they could catch the note by getting near to it, and talk of some kind of recurrences<sup>1</sup>. Some say they can distinguish an interval, and that this is the smallest possible interval, by which others are to be measured; while others say that the two notes are identical: both parties alike judging by the ear, not by the intellect."

"You mean," says Socrates, "those fine musicians who torture their notes, and screw their pegs, and pinch their strings, and speak of the resulting sounds in grand terms of art. We will leave them, and address our inquiries to our other teachers, the Pythagoreans."

The expressions about the small interval in Glaucon's speech appear to me to refer to a curious question, which we know was discussed among the Greek mathematicians. If we take a keyed instrument, and ascend from a key note by two octaves and a third (say from  $A_1$  to  $C_3$ ), we arrive at the same nominal note, as if we ascend four times by a fifth ( $A_1$  to  $E_1$ ,  $E_1$  to  $B_2$ ,  $B_2$  to  $F_2$ ,  $F_2$  to  $C_3$ ). Hence one party might call this the same note. But if the Octaves, Fifths, and Third be perfectly true intervals, the notes arrived at in the two ways will not be really the same. (In the one case, the note is  $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{4}{3}$ ; in the other  $\frac{2}{3} \times \frac{2}{3} \times \frac{2}{3} \times \frac{2}{3}$ ; which are  $\frac{1}{2}$  and  $\frac{16}{81}$ , or in the ratio of 81 to 80). This small interval by which the two notes really differ, the Greeks called a *Comma*, and it was the smallest musical interval which they recognized. Plato disdains to see anything important in this controversy; though the controversy itself is really a curious proof of his doctrine, that there is a mathematical truth in Harmony, higher

<sup>1</sup> *πικνώματα ἄττα.*

than instrumental exactness can reach. He goes on to say:

“The musical teachers are defective in the same way as the astronomical. They do indeed seek numbers in the harmonic notes which the ear perceives: but they do not ascend from them to the Problem, What are harmonic numbers and what are not, and what is the reason of each<sup>1</sup>?” “That,” says Glaucon, “would be a sublime inquiry.”

Have we in Harmonics, as in Astronomy, anything in the succeeding History of the Science which illustrates the tendency of Plato’s thoughts, and the value of such a tendency?

It is plain that the tendency was of the same nature as that which induced Kepler to call his work on Astronomy *Harmonice Mundi*; and which led to many of the speculations of that work, in which harmonical are mixed with geometrical doctrines. And if we are disposed to judge severely of such speculations, as too fanciful for sound philosophy, we may recollect that Newton himself seems to have been willing to find an analogy between harmonic numbers and the different coloured spaces in the spectrum.

But I will say frankly, that I do not believe there really exists any harmonical relation in either of these cases. Nor can the problem proposed by Plato be considered as having been solved since his time, any further than that the recurrence of vibrations, when their ratios are so simple, may be easily conceived as affecting the ear in a peculiar manner. The imperfection of musical scales, which the *comma* indicates, has not been removed; but we may say that, in the case of this problem, as

<sup>1</sup> τινες ξόμφωνοι ἀριθμοί, &c.



in the other ultimate Platonic problems, the duplication of the cube and the quadrature of the circle, the impossibility of a solution has been clearly established. The problem of a perfect musical scale is impossible, because no power of 2 can be equal to a power of 3; and if we further take the multiplier 5, of course it cannot bring about an exact equality. This impossibility of a perfect scale being recognized, the practical problem is; what is the system of *temperament* which will make the scale best suited for musical purposes; and this problem has been very fully discussed by modern writers.

After this survey of the Sciences and their use in a philosophical education, Plato proceeds to inculcate the study of *Dialectic*, as the summit and pinnacle of studies which are to have this effect.

I may here also make use of what I have previously written and published.

The survey of the sciences, arithmetic, plane geometry, solid geometry, astronomy and harmonics—which is contained in the seventh Book of the Republic (§ 6—12), represents them as instruments in an education, of which the end is something much higher—as steps in a progression which is to go further. “Do you not know,” says Socrates (§ 12), “that all this is merely a prelude to the strain which we have to learn?” And what that strain is, he forthwith proceeds to indicate, “That these sciences do not suffice, you must be aware: for—those who are masters of such sciences—do they seem to you to be good in dialectic<sup>1</sup>?”

“In truth,” says Glaucon, “they are not, with very few exceptions, so far as I have fallen in with them.”

<sup>1</sup> δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι;

“And yet,” said I, “if persons cannot give and receive a reason, they cannot attain that knowledge which, as we have said, men ought to have.”

Here it is evident that “to give and receive a reason,” is a phrase employed as coinciding, in a general way at least, with being “good in dialectic;” and accordingly, this is soon after asserted in another form, the verb being now used instead of the adjective. “It is dialectic discussion (*τὸ διαλέγεσθαι*) which executes the strain which we have been preparing.” It is further said that it is a progress to clear intellectual light, which corresponds to the progress of bodily vision in proceeding from the darkened cave described in the beginning of the Book to the light of day. This progress, it is added, of course you call *Dialectic* (*διαλεκτικὴν*).

Plato further says, that other sciences cannot properly be called sciences. They begin from certain assumptions, and give us only the consequences which follow from reasoning on such assumptions. But these assumptions they cannot prove. To do so is not in the province of each science. It belongs to a higher science: to the science of Real Existences. You call the man Dialectical, who requires a reason of the essence of each thing<sup>1</sup>.

Plato goes on: “As the Dialectical man can 14 define the essence of everything, so can he of The Good. He can define the idea of the Good, separating it from all others—follow it through all windings, as in a battle, resolved to mark it, not according to opinion, but according to its essence. If he cannot do this he knows nothing of good: he may be misled by some Seeming;—may doze

<sup>1</sup> Ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; (§ 14).

through life occupied by vain dreams, from which he wakes not till his final sleep in Hades overtakes him.

“Men thus versed in such a study we must select for the Rulers of our State.”

- 16 The study of Dialectic is still further urged; and a plan of education is proposed. The most promising youths are to be selected, and when they have followed gymnastic exercises for two or three years, from their twentieth year, they are to study, as combined, the sciences which they studied separately when boys. They are to study them *synoptically*, that they may see their relation to each other and to the nature of real existence. Thus it will appear who is fit for Dialectic: for “the synoptical man is dialectical; and he who is not the one is not the other<sup>1</sup>.”

But we may ask, does a knowledge of sciences lead naturally to a knowledge of Ideas, as absolute realities from which First Principles flow? And supposing this to be true, as the Platonic Philosophy supposes, is the Idea of the Good, as the source of moral truths, to be thus attained to? That it is, is the teaching of Plato, here and elsewhere; but have the speculations of subsequent philosophers in the same direction given any confirmation of this lofty assumption?

In reply to this inquiry, I should venture to say, that this assumption appears to be a remnant of the Socratic doctrine from which Plato began his speculations, that Virtue is a kind of knowledge; and that all attempts to verify the assumption have failed. What Plato added to the Socratic notion was, that the inquiry after The Good, the Supreme Good, was to be aided by the analogy or suggestions of those sciences which deal

<sup>1</sup> I here omit the conclusion of this Book for the sake of brevity.

with necessary and eternal truths; the supreme good being of the nature of those necessary and eternal truths. This notion is a striking one, as a suggestion, but men have always failed, I think, in the attempts to work it out. Those who in modern times, as Cudworth and Samuel Clarke, have supposed an analogy between the necessary truths of Geometry and the truths of Morality, though they have used the like expressions concerning the one and the other class of truths, have failed to convey clear doctrines and steady convictions to their readers; and have now, I believe, few or no followers.

## ADDITIONAL TRANSLATION.

I will give a translation of some of the Sentences which I have omitted in the above abridgement. We have first a remark on the current notion of education, suggested by the image of the cavern.

B. VII.  
§ 4. "If this is true which we have been saying, we must look upon education as a very different process from that which those who profess it as an art represent it to be. They profess to take a mind in which knowledge is not, and to put knowledge into it; much as if any one should put sight into blind eyes. But our similitude teaches us that the power which each person has in his mind—the organ with which he learns—is [not to be created, but] to be turned to use: as the imaginary men cannot turn their eyes from the darkness to the light without turning their whole bodies; so the whole soul is to be turned round, that it may look towards and be able to look at real existence, and the brightest part of real existence, namely, the Real Good. And the education which we want is the art of effecting this turning in the easiest and best way: not the art of creating visual power, but, it being supposed that man *has* such a power, but that it is turned the wrong way, to find means of remedying this. The other virtues of the soul may perhaps resemble those of the body in this; that though lacking at first they may be produced by habit and exercise. But Intellect, it seems, is of a far diviner nature: it never loses its power: but by being turned this way or that, it may become a valuable and useful quality, or on the other hand, pernicious and baneful."

“Have you not,” he goes on to ask his companion, “observed examples of this? Have you not seen, in men who are,” said he, “wicked but wise, how their small intellect<sup>1</sup> sees clearly and acutely that side to which it is turned; showing that their power of vision is not defective, but that it is made the mere minister of wickedness; so that exactly in proportion as it sees more acutely, it does more mischief? Now if from their childhood you had, in such persons, cut away those connate propensities, which like the weights of a net, drag their soul downwards to sensual pleasures;—if you had freed it from these encumbrances, it might have been turned towards the truth, it might, in those very men, have seen the truth more clearly, as it now sees the things to which it is directed.”

We now return to the question of employing the philosopher in the business of ruling the state.

“Is it not evident,” Socrates asks, “and does it not follow from what has been said, that the persons who are to be intrusted with the government of the state, are neither those who have not been rightly educated, and who thus have no apprehension of truth, nor those who have spent the whole of their lives in study:—the former, because they do not keep in view the one true object of life, and direct their actions, public and private, by it:—the others, because they will not willingly take any share in public business, feeling as if they were already, even in this life, in the Isles of the Blessed? It must be our business then, as Founders of the State, to compel the best natures to the employment which we have already described as the greatest of works—to attain to a sight of the real good; to make that ascent [out of obscurity into clear light of which we have spoken:] and when they have thus ascended into the region of light and have really seen, not to allow them to do as they now do: that is, to stay there, and to refuse to re-descend to those captives in the dark, and to share their labours and honours, whatever their value be.”

Glaucon is startled at this proposal of constraining the philosophers to leave their Happy Region. He says:

“What, are we to do them this wrong, and compel them to a worse life, when a better one is in their reach?”

<sup>1</sup> ψυχάριον.

5 "You forget again," says Socrates, "my friend, that the Legislator has it not for his object to make any one class in the state happy to the exclusion of the others, but to make the state as a whole a happy one: and to this object he fits together the citizens by persuasion and by necessity; and makes them impart, each to the common stock, such benefits as they can impart; and he makes the persons of each class such as they are, not that when he has so formed them they may go off each whither he pleases, but that he may use them according to their place in the social fabric. Consider, friend Glaucon, that we do our philosophers no wrong: we ask no more than we have a right to ask, when we desire them to govern and guide the rest of the citizens. We may say to them: In other cities, those who are so instructed in philosophy may perhaps reasonably claim not to be burdened with political labours; for they have obtained their instruction by their own efforts, in spite of their respective cities: it may be reasonable that what thus springs and grows independently, should not pay to any one for its growth and training: but we have cherished and taught you better than the rest, we have made you what you are, in order that you may be the leaders of the rest, the queen-bees in the swarm. And therefore each in his turn must descend into the regions occupied by the general body, and must learn to see those obscure objects: for when you are accustomed to it, you will see them far better than those who have always been there. You will know each of the images, what they are and images of what, because you have seen the true things: the Beautiful, the Just, the Good. And thus the business of our State in your hands will be a business of waking men, not a dream, as the business of states now commonly is; conducted, as it is, by persons who quarrel about shadows, and fight with each other for the office of ruler, as if it were some great good.

"The true state of the case is very different. The State in which those who must rule are least desirous of ruling, is necessarily the state which will be the best governed and the most free from faction. And the contrary will be the case in the state where the leaders are ambitious.

"Well: when our pupils have heard this, will they any longer refuse to take, each his share in the business of our city,

and then, during the greater part of their time, to live in the region of pure light? They cannot. We are giving reasonable commands to reasonable men. Every one will then go to the office of ruler as a necessary duty; very different from the Rulers whom we now have in our cities. In fact, thus it is. If for those who are called to rule the state, you can find a life better than that of a Ruler, it will be possible to have the state well governed. Such a state alone will be governed by the Rich:—that is the truly Rich: those who are rich not in gold, but in the materials of true happiness, a good and rational life. But if those who are poor, and greedy, and destitute of any goods of their own, rush to public affairs, as a field in which they are to get what they want, the city cannot be well governed. The place of Ruler becomes an object of contest: and the war which thence ensues, a domestic and internal warfare, destroys both the combatants and the state.

“And thus you see that the only persons to whom we can <sup>6</sup> trust the government and direction of the State are the philosophers; for they alone are undesirous of power, and yet know how to use it when they have it.”

The Dialogue then proceeds to the survey of the various sciences which, in the opinion of Plato, might be employed in the culture of the philosophical mind. The studies which he conceived to be fitted for this purpose, were, as I have already said, those sciences which deal with necessary and universal truth, not dependent on the information of the senses. Such truths he held to be a knowledge of realities, as distinguished from the mutable, unstable appearances which fill the world of sense.

The process of thus drawing the mind from darkness to light is, he says, a very different matter from turning a counter from the black-side up to white-side up, as boys do at play; and is rather like the task of bringing a soul from Hades to Heaven, which some are said to have achieved. To find sciences which may have this power would be indeed a great matter. We may add that to ascribe such a result to the study of any sciences, either of Plato's time or of our own, would be to exaggerate the effect of intellectual discipline.



# THE REPUBLIC.

## DIGRESSION V.

### THE EXCLUSION OF POETS FROM THE IDEAL STATE.

(*Republic*, B. x. § 1—8.)

IN the Digression on the Education of the Ideal State it is declared (B. III. § 8), that a citizen of that state must not degrade himself by personating any mean or base character, or by uttering any ignoble sentiments; and the reasoning applies to those who write as well as to those who utter such sentiments. Also all unworthy representations of the Gods are forbidden. But poets are not, as yet, altogether excluded from the Ideal State. To reject Tragedy, and still more, to reject Homer, the Bible (as it has been called) of the Greeks, was a step too audacious to venture upon, till some of the bold features of the Platonic City had become familiar to men's minds. But in proceeding with the development of his Idea, Plato was impelled to go further; and found grounds, in his metaphysical doctrines, for the entire exclusion of poets. These grounds I shall give, translating in the same manner as before.

“On looking back at the regulations of our 1 state, among many of those which appear to me to be excellently well devised, that which concerns poetry strikes me as much as any; namely, the rule of not admitting into our state that part of poetry which consists in imitation. Now that we have distinguished the several parts of the soul, that point appears to me more clear than before:

“As I may speak plainly to you, for you will not denounce me to the tragic poets and all the other imitative poets, I venture to say that all such poetry is a poison to the minds of those who hear it, except they be protected by some antidote.

“I will explain myself further; though a love and reverence for Homer, which I have entertained from my boyhood, chains my tongue. In fact one may call Homer the Teacher and Leader of all those beautiful Tragic Poets; but still we must not have a higher respect for any man than for Truth. I must say what I think. Let us then examine the question.

“What is imitation? We may apply here our general method. We are accustomed to say that all the things which have the same name belong to one *kind*. Take any thing for an example. There are many chairs and many tables; but there is only one *idea* of a chair, and one idea of a table. And the artificer who makes each of these pieces of furniture looks to his idea of a chair or a table, and so makes the chairs and the tables which we use. The man does not make the idea, he only copies it.

“But now what do you call an artificer who makes all the things which any of the kinds of handicraftsmen make: and not only all articles of furniture, but all the plants which grow out of the earth, all animals, and himself; and moreover the

earth, the heaven, the gods and all that is in heaven, and all that is in Hades under the earth. You think this must be a wonderful Artist? There may be a workman who can make all these things in a certain sense, and in a certain sense can not. You yourself might make all these things in a certain sense; for instance, if you take a looking-glass and turn it on all sides, you may forthwith make the sun, and the sky, and the earth, and yourself, and animals, and plants, and articles of furniture, such as we have been speaking of. You say that you make their appearances only, not the things themselves. That is just the point I wish to come to.

“And so the painter can make things in the same way; he does not make the real things. He makes an apparent table, not a real table.

- 2 “But the carpenter—does he make a real table? We have just agreed that he does not make that which is essentially a table; but only a kind of table. He does not make the thing that *is*, but only something that is like it. If any one says that the thing produced by any handicraftsman really is, he makes a mistake. The things which are thus produced are dim shadows of the truth.

“Now let us see what is meant by imitation. There are, for instance, three kinds of tables; the first, the essential, ideal one, which God himself makes; then, the one which the carpenter makes; and then, the one which the painter makes. The painter, the carpenter, God: these are the three makers of the three kinds of tables. The one made by God is single, unique: there are not, and will not be, more than one. There cannot be two, or more. If he had made two or more ideas of kinds of tables, there would be a third, the idea of *table* in general; and this would be the real idea

of table. And thus God is the real author of the real table, but not of any particular table, so as to be a table-maker.

“But now the carpenter also makes a table: what is he? He is a table-maker.

“And the painter, does he make a table? No, he imitates a table. And so the man who makes the third copy of the original idea is an *imitator*.

“And so the Tragic Poet, in so far as he is an imitator, is removed in the third degree from the King whom he produces, and from the Truth. And the same may be said of other imitators. This then is imitation.

“And now of the painter:—does he imitate what is in nature the essence of each thing? or does he imitate that which the workman produces? That which the workman produces. And does he imitate these things as they are or as they appear? Thus a table, as it is seen directly or obliquely, is the same, but appears different. Now does painting imitate what is or what appears? Plainly, what appears. It is an imitation of appearance, not of truth.

“And thus the art of imitation is a long way off from truth: and that which enables it to do so much is, that it takes a small part only of each thing, and that part a mere seeming. Thus the painter, we will suppose, represents a cobbler, or some other artizan, himself knowing nothing of the craft; and yet, if he be a good painter he deceives children and ignorant persons, and when the picture is at a little distance, makes them think that they really see a cobbler.

“And we should recollect this in all the like cases; thus when any one tells us that he has met with a man who is master of all crafts, and knows each branch of knowledge better than professional

men ; we must suppose that he who tells us this is a simple person who has come in the way of some impostor, some imitator ; and has been deluded into thinking him a very wise man, from not being able to discern between science and ignorance, reality and imitation.

- 3 “And having laid down these principles, we must consider the case of the Tragedy-writers, and Homer the chief of them. For some persons are constantly telling us that these poets are acquainted with all the arts, all that belongs to virtue and to vice, and even all about the Gods : for they say, a good poet must have a knowledge of the subjects of which he treats, if he is to treat them well : he cannot succeed without such knowledge. We must consider whether those who say this have been imposed upon by the imitation of which we have spoken ; and have admired their works without considering that imitation is the third remove from Truth ; and that a person may succeed in imitation who does not know the Truth, for he has to produce seemings, not realities ;—or whether those persons are right, and that the poets do really understand those things about which they are generally held to write well.

“Let us then consider this. Do you then believe that if any one could produce both things, the reality and the seeming, he would turn away from the former, and apply his life to the latter as if he could do no better ? No, if he were really versed in the knowledge of that which he imitates, he would employ himself about the things themselves rather than about imitations of them. He would try to leave, as monuments of himself, many and good works : he would endeavour to be rather the Praised than the Praiser. It is a far nobler character.

“We say this then. With regard to other arts we do not require Homer or any other of the poets to give an account of themselves. We do not ask if any poet either of ancient or of recent times was a physician as well as an imitator of physician’s discourses, and so restored sick men to health, as Esculapius is said to have done; or left any pupils whom he had taught to be physicians, as Esculapius left his clan: with regard to this and other branches of knowledge, we make no inquiry. But as Homer undertakes to speak about the most important and noble of human affairs—war and the command of armies, and the government of cities, and the education of man—it is only reasonable to turn to him and to ask him this: My dear Homer, if you are not merely the third in place from the Truth, a framer of Seemings of Virtue, (for such we showed that the Imitator is;) if you are as high as the second place, and were really able to say what studies and discipline make men better or worse in public or private occupations; tell us what city has a better government through your means; as Lacedæmon has a better government through the means of Lycurgus; and many other cities, great and small, through many other persons? What city speaks of you as its wise lawgiver who gave them a good code? Italy and Sicily speak so of Charondas; we speak so of Solon; who speaks so of you? No one—not even the Homeric clan. Or what war is spoken of as being carried on when Homer was governor or was general? None. Or again: ingenious men like Thales the Milesian, and Anacharsis the Scythian, have devised useful inventions in the arts or in practical life, what have you invented? Nothing whatever. But if Homer has done nothing for the public, has he in private helped the edu-

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cation of friends who lived in his society? Have they transmitted to their followers a Homeric course of life; as Pythagoras, to the admiration of the world, transmitted to his followers that which is still called the Pythagorean course, by which his disciples differ from other men. Nothing of the kind can be pointed out: and as to the effect of Homer's society on the culture of his companions, the man with the absurd name, Kreophilus, Fleshlover, was more absurd in his manners than in his name, if the stories about him are true: he is said to have used Homer very scurvily.

4 "No. If Homer could really teach men to become better; if he had not only the power of imitating but of knowing on such matters, would he not have had a large following? would they not have honoured and loved him? Protagoras the Abderite, and Prodicus the Keian, and many others, persuade their hearers, by their conversation, that they cannot manage either private or public affairs, unless they take these teachers for their guides: and in virtue of this wisdom of theirs are so much admired, that their hearers do all but carry them about on their heads. If then Homer could have taught men virtue, men would not have allowed him and Hesiod to go about reciting their verses from city to city; they would have taken them to their homes as something more valuable than gold: or if they could not persuade them to go there, they would have followed them wherever they went, to catch from them their lore till they had learnt it all.

"And thus we hold that all the poets, beginning with Homer, are imitators of the Seeming of Virtue, and the other things of which they speak; but have no hold of the Truth. He is, as we have just said, like a painter who paints a seeming cob-

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**EXCLUSION OF POETS FROM THE IDEAL STATE. 333**

bler, ignorant himself of cobbler's craft, and painting for ignorant spectators who judge of what they see only by shape and colour. In like manner the poet uses the terms of the various arts as the colours with which he paints, knowing nothing of what he describes, except as an imitator; and so to those who receive the words, delivered in metre and rhythm and melody, he seems to speak well, whether he speak of cobbling or campaigning or of anything else: such is the charm of those elements. For if the poet's words were divested of those colours (metre, rhythm and melody), and brought forth nakedly, they would make a poor show. They are like those faces which have nothing to recommend them but the bloom of youth; and are unlovely when that bloom is gone.

*poetry  
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“But let us go a little further. The painter paints, we will say, a bit and bridle. The artizans who make these are the smith and the leather-cutter. Does the painter know how the bit and bridle ought to be made? Even the smith and the leather-cutter who make them do not know; only the man who is to use them, the horseman. And in every art it is the same. There are three persons with three degrees of knowledge; he who uses, he who makes, and he who imitates.

“And the excellence and beauty and rightness of every article—and of every creature—and of every act—depend on the use for which it is made or intended. He therefore who uses each of these must know best about it. He must interpret to the maker what is good or bad in his work, with reference to its use. The flute-player will explain to the flute-maker what are good flutes for playing, and will tell him what makes them good; and the maker will conform to his instructions. The player, having knowledge, will pronounce concern-



ing good and bad flutes; the maker, having faith, will make them. The maker of the article will have *right opinion* concerning its goodness and badness, by intercourse with the user of it: the user will have *knowledge*. But the imitator—will he have the knowledge of the user? will he have the right opinion of him who is taught by the user? He will have neither. A pretty imitator then he will be! Yet he will imitate the thing, not as knowing what is good or what is bad; but what appears good to the ignorant many, that he will imitate.

5 “And so we have, I think, sufficiently established that the imitative artist knows nothing of the things which he imitates. His imitation is not earnest, it is child’s play; and mere imitators are all who write Tragic Poetry, whether it be in iambs (Tragedies,) or in hexameters (Epics).

“But again: let us consider on what element in man this poetry operates. Consider the things that operate on the sight. The same object appears of a different size as it is far off or near, and appears crooked or straight, concave or convex, according as you see it in the water or out of the water, on account of the effect of colours in producing illusion; and thus we are deceived and misled. And to this affection of our nature the painter appeals, and other artists whose purpose is to deceive. And the best remedies for these illusions are the arts of reasoning, numbering, and weighing; so that we may be guided not by appearance but by the faculty which numbers, weighs, and measures; and this is the office of the rational part of the soul, and its testimony is often opposed to that of appearances.

“Now we may have two different judgments about the same thing. But the same part of the mind cannot at the same time form two different

judgments about the same thing. Therefore the part of the mind which judges without measure must be different from the part which judges by measure. Now the part which judges according to measure is the Reason, the most excellent part of the Soul, therefore the opposite part is an inferior part of the Soul. And thus painting and the imitative arts in general are in their work far removed from the truth, and appeal to a part of the Soul far removed from Reason—an inferior part. The inferior art appeals to the inferior part and produces inferior works.

“And as this is true of the sense of light, so is it by probable analogy of the hearing, and of poetry.

“But let us not trust to the probable analogy of painting, but consider the case itself, and consider to what part of the soul poetry appeals. Consider it thus. Imitative poetry represents, we say, men in a course of action, either compulsory or voluntary, and as being in happy or in unhappy circumstances, and hence giving themselves up to joy or to sorrow. Now in such circumstances, is a man at one with himself? On the contrary, is he not generally in contradiction and conflict with himself, forming at the same time two opposite judgments, as we supposed just now in the case of vision? Such contradictions and conflicts are universal. Now in such cases, a good man who meets with any misfortune, the loss of a son, for instance, or any other precious thing, will bear it better than another man. He will not feel no grief, for this is impossible, but he will moderate his grief. And will he struggle with his grief better when he is in the presence of men like himself, or when he is alone? He will bear it better when he is seen by others. When he is solitary, he will utter things

*My 27th*

which he would be ashamed to have heard: and do things which he could not bear to have seen.

6 “Now the faculty which bids us banish such grief is Reason and Law: the part which impels us to grief is Passion. And as these impel us opposite ways, they must be opposite things. The one of them tells us that it is right to keep our calmness in calamity; not to rebel, since we know not what is really evil and what good, and repining will not help us; and that nothing on earth is worth so much grief; and also that grief prevents our taking the wise course of action, which is to play according to the fall of the dice, as we do at backgammon, and make the best of it: not, like children, to place our hand upon the place that is hurt, and spend our time in crying out: rather to accustom ourselves to apply the best salve to the wound, and drive away mourning by mending it. This is the counsel of our better part, our reason.

“The other part of us which leads us to dwell upon the recollection of our suffering, and impels us to insatiable lamentation, we must regard as irrational, cowardly and base.

“But this element, the violence of grief and indignation, offers a large and varied matter for imitation; while the sage and tranquil character, remaining always like to itself, is neither easy to imitate, nor when imitated, easy to apprehend, especially for that miscellaneous audience which fills our theatres. It is an imitation of a sentiment which is foreign to their nature.

“And thus the imitative poet must not appeal to that part of the soul nor try to please it, if he is to obtain the applause of the many. He must appeal to the part which feels grief and indignation, which is varied and imitable.

“And thence we had reason to condemn him;

and to place him in the same class with the painter. He has this in common with him, that he produces only works which have no value as representations of the Truth; which appeal to an inferior part of the Soul, not to its highest element. And so we cannot admit him into our well-ordered city, which is to be governed by wise laws. For he stirs up and excites the bad part of the Soul, and so overthrows the rule of the reason. He is like a man who in a State gives power to the bad citizens and destroys the good ones. So the Imitative Poet makes a bad polity in the Soul of each individual, indulging the irrational and deceivable part of it, and presenting to it Seemings and keeping the Truth away from it.

“But we have not yet mentioned the heaviest charge which we have to make against poetry. Sad to say, it corrupts good men in general with very few exceptions. For consider this: when we, the best of us, hear those passages of Homer or of any other tragic poet which represent a hero in affliction, bewailing his lot in a long speech, uttering lamentable cries, beating his breast, we feel a sort of pleasure to which we give ourselves up: we sympathize with the hero and admire the poet for producing this impression upon us.

“But when we have any grief of our own we conceive that it concerns our honour to take the opposite course, to be firm and tranquil, as the part which beseems a man; regarding as only fit for women that behaviour which we praised before.

“Now was that admiration reasonable? Is it fit that when we see a man doing what we would not think right to do, what we should be ashamed of doing, we do not regard it with repugnance but with pleasure? And then we must recollect that ?

that part of our Soul which we have to subdue in our own calamities, that part which is hungry for tears and lamentations and would be insatiable of them (that being its nature), is that part which is fed and indulged by the poets. And when we attend to them, that other part of us which is by nature the most excellent, from the want of due discipline and habit, relinquishes its control over the lachrymose part: forsooth the soul is only a simple spectator of the woes of another, and feels that there is nothing base in praising and pitying another man who, though a good man, being in grief, laments somewhat unseasonably, and so it is a gainer to the extent of the pleasure which it receives, and would not lose this by condemning the poem. In fact few persons reflect that we must apply to our own case that which we feel in the case of others. If we foster the pathetic element towards extraneous sorrows, we cannot easily restrain it in our own.

“And the same thing may be said of the ridiculous. If you listen, not only without aversion, but with amusement and delight, either on the comic stage or in conversation, to jests which you yourself would be ashamed to make, you will produce the same effect as in the case of the pathetic. The desire of enjoying a laugh, which you before restrained for fear of being charged with buffoonery, you now indulge freely. You have fostered it at the comic theatre and you bring it home with you, and have a tendency to turn all your business into comedy.

“And the same is true with respect to bodily desires, and anger, and all the passions of the Soul, pleasurable or painful; all these will in our practical life be affected by the way in which poetical imitation deals with them. Poetry fosters and

feeds them and makes them the mistresses of the Soul, when she ought rather to let them die away for lack of nourishment and leave the Soul mistress of herself, if we are to be happy and virtuous, not wicked and miserable.

“And so, O Glaucon, when you fall in with some admirers of Homer, who say that the poet has educated Greece, and that he deserves to be read over and over again that we may learn how to govern, and how to conduct human affairs well, and may regulate our whole life by his aid; we must have the greatest good will and regard for those who hold this language, and we must grant to them that Homer is the greatest of poets and the first of tragic writers: but at the same time we must recollect that we are not to admit into our City any poetry except hymns to the gods, and eulogisms of great men. For as soon as you admit the voluptuous muse either in the form of Epic or of Lyric poetry, you will have reigning in the state, pleasure and pain, instead of law and reason, which are at all times and in all things the best guide.

“And so much in the way of justification of our having banished from our City poetry, being such as it is. The reason of the thing required us to do so. And that poetry may not accuse us of any special want of culture and kindness in doing this, let us recollect that there is an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry. There are many well-known passages which testify to this ancient dissension—*The yelping cur which at its master barks*—and, *Mighty is he in the vain talk of fools*—and, *The lordly mob of god-wise folks*—and, *Poor are those subtle thinkers*—and a thousand others are records of an old opposition between the two.

“But nevertheless let us protest that if imitative poetry, and poetry which has pleasure for its aim, can prove to us by good reasons that it ought not to be excluded from a well-governed state, we shall receive it with open arms. For we are conscious of feeling the force of its charms. But we must not betray the cause of truth, as it seems to us. And, my friend, do not you too own the seductions of this enchantress, especially when you see her in Homer?”

“Indeed I do,” said Glaucon.

“And so we must admit her to defend her cause before us, in Ode or in any other metre. We ask nothing better than to hear on her part official defenders, who without being poets, are lovers of poetry, who may plead her cause in prose: and may prove that she is not only pleasant, but profitable in public and in private life. We shall be the gainers if she is proved to be profitable as well as pleasant.

“But if this cannot be done, we must, my friend, imitate those lovers who, when they have found that their love is injurious to them, tear themselves away from the object of their affection, whatever pain the effort may cost them. Thanks to the love of Poetry which has been engendered in us by the excellent institutions of our City (Athens), we shall rejoice to have her shown to be beautiful and true. But so long as she can make no good defence, we shall hear her, protecting ourselves against her enchantments by the reasons which I have been giving, and so save ourselves from falling back again into passion for her which held us in our youth, and which still holds so many. We shall have our conviction that such poetry is not real earnest, and does not really contain the truth. We must guard against it as a thing dan-

gerous to our *internal* polity, and listen to it with caution. And such is the view we must have of poetry.

“The stake is great, Glaucon, very great, and 9 far beyond what appears at first sight: the alternative being, to be a good man or a bad man: and we are not to relinquish justice and virtue for honour or wealth or power, nor even for poetry.”

This ends the digression on the exclusion of poets, and the Dialogue then turns to the subject of the immortality of the soul, as I have already presented it.

And thus I have given the substance of the various parts of the Dialogue of the *Republic*.





**THE TIMÆUS.**



## INTRODUCTION TO THE TIMÆUS.

EVERYBODY who has read anything of Socrates, as represented by Plato, must recollect the very remarkable passage in the *Phædo*, in which the dying philosopher describes the grievous disappointment which he had experienced when expecting from physical science a solution of the riddle of the universe and man. "When I was young," he said, "it is not to be told how eager I was about physical inquiries, and curious to know how the universe came to be as it is: and when I heard that Anaxagoras was teaching that all was arranged by MIND, I was delighted with the prospect of hearing such a doctrine unfolded. I thought to myself, if he teaches that Mind made everything to be as it is, he will explain how it is best for it to be, and show that so it is. He will tell me whether the earth is flat or round, and, whichever it is, will show that it is best so; whether the earth is in the middle, and if in the middle, that it is best there: how the sun and the moon move, and with what velocities, and how it is best they should so move; and so of all things. Great was my hope: equally great was my discomfiture. For as I went on, I found that the teacher made no use of *Mind* in his explanations, but spoke of airs and ethers and waters as the causes of things, and the like follies. The case seemed to be as if any one were to say that Socrates does all his acts by Mind; and then having

to explain why I am now sitting here, should say that I have certain bones and muscles, and that the muscles move the bones and bend the legs, and so, I am made to sit. Whereas the true state of the case is, that the Athenians have thought it best to condemn me to death, and that, in consequence, I think it best to sit here. For, by the dog, if it were not so, these bones and muscles would long before now have carried me to Megara or into Bœotia, on the ground that *that* was best."

The passage is, as I have said, familiar to all readers; but it has an aspect which is not familiar, and which, so far as I know, has not been noticed by the commentators. Plato, it seems, as a disciple of Socrates, wanted a philosophy of the Universe, which should show that everything is best where it is and as it is;—a kind of physical Optimism. He could not be satisfied without such a philosophy. Mechanical causes were good for nothing, if he did not see why they were used by the Ruling Mind. The doctrine of a Ruling Mind was mutilated and incoherent, if it was not shown to arrange all things for the best. But Plato became himself a master, and delivered to *his* disciples a large and comprehensive philosophy: did his philosophy contain anything to satisfy this demand? He solved, or was deemed to have solved, many of the Socratic problems: did he solve this? He too held that Mind ruled the Universe; was he prepared to show, that it ruled each part for the best? He was fond of physics, which Socrates had held in small esteem; could he produce a scheme of physics which should justify his preference? Was he able to construct the system of optimism which was the crying want of the Greek mind, and especially of his mind?

Optimist schemes of the material universe, such

as Plato thus aspired to, have often been yearned for and aimed at by men of natural piety; and have not unfrequently been propounded by bold and versatile reasoners. Some schemes of this kind have found no small acceptance among men for a considerable time: recommended, no doubt, generally, in a great degree by the confidence with which they undertook to satisfy the yearnings of which we have spoken; but also recommended, in the most successful cases, by taking up into the body of the scheme a large portion of the then attainable knowledge concerning the universe and the laws by which it is governed. The optimist system was made a framework on which the optimist teacher hung his pictures of sun and moon and stars, and earth, and air and water, and animals and man. And those who have constructed such systems have generally been impelled to do so by having possessed themselves of some striking points of physical knowledge, which might, as they conceived, be regarded as exemplifying their doctrine of all things made for an end and for the best end<sup>1</sup>. Now did Plato at any time possess much knowledge of this kind; and if so, did he then try to construct a system which should satisfy the cravings which, according to his account in the *Phædo*, pressed so importunately upon the inquiring and philosophical spirit?

To this question the answer is, that Plato *did* arrive at a considerable number of striking doctrines concerning the laws of the universe and the parts of which it consists; notices of which doctrines are to be found in various of his writings, especially in the Seventh Book of the *Republic*. And further, that we *have* an optimist scheme of the world, constructed so as to take in an extraordi-

<sup>1</sup> Descartes, Leibnitz.

nary quantity of these physical doctrines, presented to us in that which is a late, perhaps his last work, the *Timæus*; and thus Plato at the end of his philosophical life answered the question which, according to him, Socrates had asked in vain at the beginning of his.

The *Timæus* then was an attempt to invest with theological value, all the knowledge of nature which Plato had acquired or thought that he had acquired. The natural knowledge was there first, and was, so far as it was true, something positive and permanent: it was a knowledge that in nature, the thing was *so*, and no otherwise: the theological view of this knowledge, the reason *why* the thing was so, was, it may be, something personal and temporary; something that though it satisfied Plato, might not have satisfied Socrates, and may not satisfy us. The theological interpretation of natural laws depends upon many elements; upon our theological ideas, feelings and assumptions; upon physical laws invested with a moral aspect by means of verbal generalisations: upon the perception or non-perception of ontological difficulties and of their solutions. It is to be observed that we are very far from saying that such interpretations are not necessary and true. They *are* necessary and true; for theological ideas, and the use of words, and ontological relations are necessary conditions of man and of truth. But the changes in philosophical language which imply and which produce differences in ontological doctrines, affect also, in their deepest abysses, our theological philosophy; and hence in a treatise of theological philosophy removed so far from us in its time and its thoughts as is the *Timæus*, we may expect to find difficulties and obscurities. Accordingly, the *Timæus* has always been regarded as one of

the most difficult and obscure pieces which antiquity has bequeathed to us. I wish to see what light will be thrown upon it by regarding it in the view which I have indicated, as an attempt to give a theological, or as we may call it, a teleological aspect to all the knowledge of the universe to which Plato had attained, or thought that he had attained: and also, to include in the same scheme and use for the same purpose, the knowledge *concerning knowledge* itself which he conceived to be established.

The first of the philosophical doctrines which is embodied in the scheme delivered in the *Timæus* is of the last-mentioned kind, the doctrine concerning the nature of knowledge. There was, as we have repeatedly seen in the course of the Platonic Dialogues, a fundamental distinction asserted by Plato between two kinds of knowledge;—real knowledge and seeming knowledge. This distinction was not of that vague kind which the phrases just used would imply in English; and it is, in truth, very difficult to find in English phrases which can be steadily appropriated to express this distinction. The Greek phrases used for this purpose by Plato contained the record of previous doubts and difficulties, and of the solution of those, which the school of Plato conceived itself to have attained. The difficulty was, How is any knowledge of things possible, since all things, all objects of sense, are in a perpetual flux? How can we know what any thing *is*, when nothing *is* any thing—really and permanently? And the proof that there must be a solution to this difficulty was furnished by the truths of geometry: these are true, really and permanently, as we feel and know. And the object of Plato was, to obtain truths of this kind and order upon other subjects. The dis-



inction between these two kinds of matters was described by terms which implied the contrast of the permanent and the transitory character;—the terms *οὐσία* (*being*) and *γένεσις* (*becoming, coming into being, generation*). Perhaps we may be understood if we distinguish these two kinds of objects of knowledge as *permanent existences* and *transient phenomena*. The former belong to the *intelligible world*, the latter to the *sensible world*; the former are the objects of *knowledge* properly so called; the latter, of an imperfect kind of knowledge, *δόξα*, which we may call, as English writers have often called it, *opinion* or *belief*; and in using this term, we must recollect that it is intended to imply that in such cases we do not *know*, we only *opine* or *believe*. The truths which we know are *eternal* truths; they can never change, or cease to be truths. They are always, and are always the same. Hence truth of this kind may be called *the Identical*; while propositions concerning phenomena are of diverse and variable kinds, and may be called *the Manifold*. And such phraseology as this being established and adopted, we are to see how it is woven into the texture of the cosmogony delivered in the *Timæus*.

## THE TIMÆUS.

THE opening of the *Timæus* announces it as a continuation of the *Republic* in a somewhat unexpected manner. Socrates had, in the *Republic*, told the long story of his conversation at the Bendidian Festival in the Piræus; but to whom had he told it? It appears now that the persons to whom his account was addressed were Kritias, Hermocrates, Timæus, and a fourth unnamed person whom Van Heusde supposes to be Plato. His account given to those four persons, is, according to the image so frequent in Plato, spoken of as a banquet which he had set before them; and they are now, according to the laws of this conversational hospitality, bound to give him a return-banquet. This is implied in the opening of the Dialogue.

Soc. "One, two, three. But, my dear Timæus, where is the fourth of you who were my guests yesterday and are to be my entertainers to-day?"

TIM. "He is prevented by an indisposition which has attacked him, Socrates: he would not willingly have been absent from this meeting."

Soc. "Then is it not your business to take upon you his responsibility in his absence?"

TIM. "Certainly: and so far as my powers go I shall not be wanting. For it would not be proper that this company having been well entertained by

you yesterday, the rest of us should not be willing to give a banquet in return?"

SOC. "And do you recollect what it was that I said to you in my discourse?"

TIM. "We recollect part, and what we do not recollect you will now remind us of. Or rather, if it does not inconvenience you, give us a short summary of what you said, that we may have better hold of it."—SOC. "I will do so."

Socrates then proceeds to give a brief description of the imaginary polity which he had constructed: with its peculiar arrangements. He then goes on to say that having constructed his City, he should like to have it represented as in action; and that he knows nobody more likely to be able to give him such a representation than his present companions, Timæus and Kritias. Kritias gives a hope that he may be able to comply with the desire of Socrates, by calling to mind the account of the island of Atlantis which one of his ancestors had heard from Solon, Solon having received it from the priests in Egypt. This legend I omit at present, as it connects itself more naturally with the subsequent discourse of Kritias. But it is proposed that Timæus, as the best skilled in astronomy and the one who has most studied the nature of the universe, should first give his exposition, beginning with the generation of the world, and ending with the creation of man. After that, Kritias is to take men, thus brought into existence, and moulded by the laws of the Platonian polity, and to give an account of their doings. Upon this Socrates says:

"I am likely to have a return-banquet of a complete and splendid kind. It is, then, Timæus, your business now to begin, of course first according to usage invoking the Gods."

TIM. "Certainly, Socrates; all who have any good sense, at the outset of any undertaking, small or great, ask for the blessing of the Gods. We then who are about to discourse concerning the universe, how it was generated, or how it is un-generated, must, if we are not quite wrongminded, pray the Gods and Goddesses that we may say what is agreeable to their will as well as acceptable to you. And so much for them and you; and for myself I must pray that I may be able to explain clearly what I mean, so that you may best understand it.

"In the first place," Timæus proceeds, "we must, in my opinion, make this distinction: What is that which always *is* and is never generated; and what is that which is always being generated and never is? For the former, being always identical, may be apprehended by an intellectual act involving reason; the latter, being generated and destroyed, and never really being, is apprehended by mere opinion involving irrational sensation.

"Again; whatever begins to be must necessarily be produced by some cause; for nothing can have its generation without a cause. And *that* the Maker whereof constructs it, looking to and using as a Model that which is always the same, and expressing *its* idea and power, must needs come out beautiful: but that whereof the Maker looks to the transient and mutable, using a generated model, will not be beautiful.

"Now as to the Heavens or the World, or whatever any one chooses to call it—we are willing to adopt the name—

"Concerning *that*, then, we must first enquire—as it is understood that we must first enquire concerning everything—whether it has existed always, having had no beginning of its being; or

has been generated, and come into being, starting from some beginning.

“ We must answer; It has come into being, for it is an object of sight and touch, and has a body; and is thus an object of sense; now all objects of sense are apprehended by Opinion involving Sensation, and are among the things which are generated and come into being: and the things which are generated, are produced by some Cause.

“ Now as to the Maker and Father of this universe, to discover him is a hard task; and having discovered, to make him known to all is impossible. But this we must enquire about him; Whether of the two kinds of Model just mentioned the Maker of it had in view when he made it;—whether that which is always the same, or that which is transient and mutable.

“ It is evident that he looked to the Eternal Model: for the World is the most beautiful of things, and He is the most excellent of Causes. And thus the world is created and constructed on the model of that which is apprehended by reason and thought, and is always the same: it is necessarily true that this world is the likeness or image of some such model. Now it is a main point to begin at the natural beginning of things. We must then distinguish [in our discourse] between the model and the image of the model, that so our discourse may have a resemblance to that of which it is the exposition. When then we have to speak of that which is permanent and stable, and manifest to the intellect, our discourse should be stable and secure from objection and refutation, as far as discourse can be. But with regard to things which are indeed fashioned after that [eternal model] but are merely images of it, our discourse may be like them; [that is, not certainty,

but probability.] For as permanent existences are to transient phenomena, so is truth to mere belief.

“Since then, O Socrates, many men have delivered many opinions concerning the Gods and the generation of the universe, if we do not show ourselves able to give an account of these which is everywhere in complete consistency with itself and perfectly rigorous, do not be surprized; but if we give you accounts which are inferior to none in probability, you must accept them favourably; remembering that both I the speaker and you the judges have only the nature of man; so that if we get hold of a scheme which has probability in its favour, we must not seek for anything more.”

This prologue, besides presenting the philosophical basis of the system now to be expounded, is intended to prepare the hearer for demonstrative and mathematical processes with regard to the highest principles of the system, and at the same time to bespeak indulgence for the arbitrary and fanciful explanations which are given of many points of detail. This is assented to by the person addressed; and an interest in the sequel expressed by a very usual metaphor.

Soc. “Very good, Timæus. We will receive your expositions on the footing which you propose. And now we have heard your prelude with great satisfaction: so let us have the hymn which is to follow it.”

The next point is that there is Mind or Intellect pervading the world, the doctrine which had been propounded, and so unsatisfactorily followed out, by Anaxagoras. This is thus proved, somewhat of poetical diction being apparently assumed.

“Let us now tell for what cause the Maker of 10 this creation and this universe made it as it is. He

was good; and he who is good grudges no advantage to any creature. Being thus free from envy, he willed that the universe should be good like himself: and this, the special ground of the creation and the world, which we receive from the wisest philosophers, we may most properly accept.

“And God, thus desiring that all things should be good, and nothing evil, so far as might be, and receiving the visible universe in a state, not of rest, but of disorderly and irregular motion, reduced it out of disorder into order, judging that this was every way better than that. It was not and it is not allowable for the supremely Good to do anything except what is most excellent (*κάλλιστον*, most fair: most beautiful). And reasoning on this ground, he found that among visible things, a work without mind or intellect is in no case upon the whole superior to that which has Mind: and he found too that Mind could not exist without Soul, [Intellect without Life.] And following this reasoning, he constructed the Universe, placing a Mind in its Soul, and a Soul in its Body, that the work which he produced might be most excellent and most good. And thus according to the most probable view, we may say that this world is, in truth, by the providence [and intention] of God, a Living, Intelligent thing.”

In order to follow this reasoning, we must recollect that the Soul expresses the principle of animal life, and the Mind or Intellect, the principle of thought and reasoning. We see, as in so many passages of Greek philosophy, how much depends on the adjective *καλόν*, and how difficult it is to find an English word which will bear the stress of the argument. We see also the assumption of a chaos preceding creation, and, as it seems, independent of the Creator.

The next point to be established is, that there is only one such world: and here we seem to have the notion (which we have already explained) of visible things being made after a model in the Intelligible world, somewhat briefly and obscurely introduced.

“This being established, we must next say 11 after the likeness of what model<sup>1</sup> the Creator constructed the world. Certainly we shall not think that it can have been made like any special animal: for that which is like a thing so imperfect, could not be itself excellent. But we may conceive that it was made after the likeness of that [model] of which [the models of] all other animals, their kinds and the individuals, are parts. For that [Intelligible Model] includes and comprehends in itself all the intelligible animals, as this [visible] world includes us and all other visible animals. And thus God, determining to make one visible thing like the most beautiful and most perfect of intelligible things, constructed it containing within it all the animals which share in a common nature.

“But have we rightly spoken of one heaven [one world], and were it better to speak of many and infinite worlds?

“Of one: since it is made after the model. For that [model] which includes all Intelligible animals, cannot exist along with a second. For then, [to have a model really including all,] we must have one including those two, of which they would be parts; and then the universe would be rightly made after the likeness of this Including [model], not of those Included. And thus that the world, by its unity, should resemble the supremely perfect animal [or living thing], the

<sup>1</sup> Of what *animal*, says the received text.



Creator did not make either two or an infinite number of worlds; but, on the contrary, this world is and ever shall be the one created world."

The question, whether there are many worlds, was much discussed among the ancient philosophers, as we learn from Aristotle and others. The argument here used is, as we see, rather philological than philosophical; namely, that since the universe, according to the Idea of it, included *everything*, there could not be more than one universe.

So far, Timæus has not carried us into any of the special mathematical or physical reasonings of the ancient systems. But we now come to the doctrine of the four elements, which is treated so as to depend upon certain arithmetical and geometrical theorems in the highest degree subtle and curious; probably, recent discoveries and favourite speculations in the school of Plato. These I must try to explain; and first of the arithmetical doctrines.

The Greek mathematicians were familiar as we are with the doctrine that straight lines being represented by numbers, a plane was represented by the product of two numbers, its length and its breadth; and a solid, by the product of three numbers, its length, breadth, and thickness. But they had founded upon this a distinction with which we are no longer familiar. They supposed the numbers thus multiplied to be *prime* numbers only; and hence they called the product of two prime factors a *plane*, and the product of three prime factors, a *solid*. Now these definitions being established, there followed this proposition, which is the one of which Plato makes use, in order to prove that there must be four elements.

Between two *plane* numbers, there can be one

mean proportional; between two *solid* numbers, there cannot be one mean proportional, but there may be two.

Of course, rational numbers only are admitted; and further, to make the proposition true, the plane numbers must be squares, and the solid numbers must be cubes. And then, the truth of the proposition is easily seen<sup>1</sup>.

This being premised we can follow the argument:

“The created world must be corporeal, visible and tangible. But nothing can be visible without fire: and nothing can be tangible without being solid, nor solid without earth. And thus when the Creator began to construct the body of the world, he constituted it of Fire and Earth.

“But two things cannot be well conjoined without a third. There must be some bond between the two to hold them together. And that is the fairest bond which as much as possible makes one thing of itself and of the two connected. And this end is best attained by proportion.”

He then proceeds to state the rule of proportion in general terms; but it is in this form more obscure than in its application, which is as follows:

“If then the body of the universe were a plane without depth, one mean term would have sufficed

<sup>1</sup> Thus between 4 and 9, there is the mean proportional 6. Between 8 and 27 there are two mean proportionals, 12 and 18; but the one mean proportional would be  $6\sqrt{6}$ , which is irrational.

And this is easily seen, in general, that between  $a^2$  and  $b^2$  there is one mean proportional,  $ab$ : between  $a^3$  and  $b^3$ , there are two mean proportionals  $a^2b$ , and  $ab^2$ : but the one mean proportional would be  $ab\sqrt{ab}$ , which is irrational, because  $a$  and  $b$  are prime numbers.

to bind together the two parts and itself. But this is not so. It must be of the nature of a solid, and solids can be connected by two means, but never by one. Hence God put Water and Air, as mean terms between Earth and Fire; and made them, as far as might be, have the same relation one to another; so that as Fire was to Air, so was Air to Water; and as Air to Water, so Water to Earth; and thus he bound together the Visible and the Tangible world. And thus the body of the universe was constituted of elements four in number, and existing in mutual proportion: and thus there was a friendship among the parts, so that it is bound together and is not capable of being dissolved, save by that which bound it."

Next, it has in it no principle of dissolution.

"Of these four elements, the constitution of the world took in the *whole* of each element. The Maker constituted it of the whole of the Fire and the Water and the Air and the Earth, leaving no part of any, nor any force [arising from them] on the outside of his creation. Having this purpose, first, that the world might be a *perfect* thing composed of perfect parts: further, that it might be *one*, there not being left any elements of which another might be made; and further, that it might be exempt from disease and decay; on this principle, that the elements which constitute bodies, cold and hot, and everything which exerts forces of that kind, if they approach them from without and act on them in an irregular manner, dissolve them; induce disease and decay, and make them perish. On this account, and on this principle, he made one whole [world] of so many wholes [that is, elements] to be perfect, free from disease and decay."

Next, the reason is given why the world is in form a sphere.

“Further; he gave to it the form which be-seemed and suited its nature. For that Living Thing which was to include in itself all other living things, the suitable form must be that which includes in itself all other forms. Accordingly he made it spherical, the form which is in all parts at an equal distance from the center, perfectly round and even, the figure which is most perfect, and everywhere like itself, deeming that the like was far more beautiful than the unlike. He made it with a smooth outer surface, free from any projections, for good reasons. For it needed not eyes, since there was no visible thing left outside; nor ears, for there was no audible thing. There was no external air, which it needed to draw in; nor did it need any organ to take in its food, or to reject it after digestion; nothing came in to it for there was nothing without it. It had in itself all the materials of action and passion; for its Maker judged that it was better it should be independent, than that it should need anything from another. He judged that it was useless to furnish it with hands, since it neither had to take hold of anything nor to defend itself: or with feet or any other instrument of locomotion. For he gave it the kind of motion which best suits its form; that kind of motion of *the Seven*, which is most connected with Intellect and Thought; [namely a motion of revolution.] And thus he made it to revolve turning on itself, in its own place, and suppressed all the other six motions, [by which it might have moved from one place to another:] and thus as it had no need of legs and feet he gave it none.”

The *six* motions here referred to are: upwards,

downwards, backwards, forwards, to the right, to the left. The remaining one, the seventh, revolution on an axis, is the motion of the heavens. The reasonings by which it is shown what shape the world is *not*, must appear puerile to us; and perhaps are intended to represent the teaching of physical science in a form suited to young persons.

The next step is to infuse a soul into this spherical world.

- 12 "And thus the God ever existing, so reasoning concerning the god that was to be [namely the material world,] made it on all sides smooth and even and equally distant from the middle, a structure whole and perfect, of whole and perfect parts. And further, he introduced a soul into the middle of it, and diffused it through all its parts, and even beyond, so as to include the material frame in the soul."

The text adds: "and constituted one heaven, solitary and alone, a circle turning in a circle, and by its virtue capable of itself sustaining itself and needing no other thing: itself known to itself, at one with itself; and thus, a happy god." This addition encumbers the progress of the exposition, and looks like a remnant of an exposition in a copious and periphrastic poetical style; which, indeed, is the air which belongs to a large part of this discourse; and supplies an explanation of its frequent repetitions and its protracted constructions. And this notion is further supported by the occurrence of expressions rather poetical than philosophical; as here where the material universe is called *a god*. The exposition of the Soul of the World thus proceeds.

"Though we now, after speaking of other things, proceed at last to speak of this Soul, God

did not thus make it last of all. For he would never have permitted the elder member of this union to be ruled by the younger. We, guided in a great degree by chance, speak of this and that in a random order: but he formed the soul older than the body, in date as in virtue, the mistress and ruler prior to the ruled."

And now we have speculations somewhat abstruse concerning the nature and constitution of this Soul of the World: the object of which seems to be, in the first place, to make the Soul of the World something distinct both from Matter and from Intellect; and in the next place, to introduce the arithmetical doctrines concerning harmony which had obtained a place in the Platonic school.

"He constituted it of the following elements and in the following manner. Of the Indivisible and Eternal Essence, and of the Divisible and Corporeal, he made a third kind, composed of the two; intermediate between the Identical and the Manifold. Though the Manifold was repugnant, he united it by force with the Identical; and mixing these with the [Intermediate] Essence, and making one substance of the three, he then divided this substance into such parts as was convenient, each mixed of the Identical and the Manifold and the [Intermediate] Essence.

"And he began his division thus: he took one part from the whole; and then another, double of the first, and then the third, one and half times the second, and triple of the first; and the fourth, double of the second; and the fifth, triple of the third; and the sixth, eight times the first; and the seventh, twenty-seven times the first."

We have thus the series, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27. And further, the author proceeds to speak of inter-

mediate terms inserted between the terms of this series, which produce very complex relations, but obviously, as I have said, are intended to represent certain ratios which occur in the system of musical harmony. This part of mathematics is unfamiliar, even to mathematicians; I cannot therefore hope to make it intelligible to popular readers. Those who have attended to the mathematical doctrines of Harmonics will understand that the subject is pursued into some complex parts of those doctrines, when they are told that mention is here made of a ratio of which the terms are 243 and 256; that is, the 5th power of 3 and the 7th power of 2; the ratio nearly of 17 to 18; and therefore something less than our semitone, which is 15 to 16.

But the question naturally occurs, what have these harmonical ratios to do with the Soul of the World? And the answer seems to be, as suggested by the context, that harmony belongs to the soul of man, as appears by his perception of harmony: that therefore harmony belongs to the soul of the world: that the soul of the world is its principle of motion: and that therefore these harmonical ratios must have something to do with the motions of the heavens. We know that the fascination of this assumption was not exhausted at the time of Kepler, if it be so even now. But perhaps we may regard these numerical doctrines here as one of the ways in which attempt is made to include in the theology of the *Timæus* all that was known of nature, and especially all mathematical laws.

What follows is a more distinct example of this attempt, since it refers to ordinary astronomical constructions.

“Taking the substance so constituted, he split

it in two, through its whole length, and applying the middle of the one part to the other, he crossed them like an X, and bending them into circles fastened them to themselves and to each other at the part opposite to their place of crossing."

We have here a description of the equator and ecliptic on a celestial globe, crossing at opposite points at a certain angle (23 degrees) and going separately round the globe. These are now to be put in motion.

"He involved them both in a rotatory motion in one constant direction, without change of place, and made one of them the exterior circle (the Equator), the other the interior circle (the Ecliptic.)

"The external motion he *inaugurated*, (I use this term to express a strange poetical word here used, *ἐπεφήμισεν*) of the nature of the Identical; the internal motion, of the nature of the Manifold. The Identical was made a motion lateral to the right; the Manifold, a motion in the diagonal, to the left. But he gave the superior power to the revolution of the Identical and the Like; for it alone he left undivided; but the internal revolution he split in six places, and thus formed seven unequal circles, each according to the distance of the double and the triple, there being three of each kind, and ordered the circles to go opposite, some to others; three of them alike in velocity, but the other four unlike to the others, and each to the other, yet still in proportion."

The astronomical system here indicated is that which makes the heavenly bodies revolve round the earth in the following order; the Moon, the Sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. They are all carried round by the diurnal motion



of the heavens; but besides this, and in the opposite direction, moving obliquely to the diurnal motion, and nearly in the direction of the ecliptic, they have their separate motions, by which the Moon moves round the heavens in a month, the Sun, Mercury and Venus in a year; Mars, in nearly two years; Jupiter, in nearly twelve years; and Saturn, in nearly thirty years.

The principle of the motion of the world is, as I have said, the Soul of the World; and this Soul, the author had just said, was formed before bodily things. In the next paragraph he repeats this declaration, and proceeds to apply it in a manner so obscure that I shall not attempt to explain it. He says:

- 13 "When the constitution of the Soul of the World had been framed as the Constitutor designed, he then placed the whole bodily frame within it, the centre of the one at the centre of the other. And the Soul diffused through all to the extremest heaven, and embracing it in a circle, and revolving in itself, made the divine origin of an unbroken and intelligent life to continue through all time. And the body of the heaven was visible; but the soul was partaker of reason and of the harmony of things intelligible and eternal, produced by the most perfect Being, and itself the most perfect of created things."

The strain is here so poetical that we cannot wonder if the further philosophical exposition of consequences becomes obscure. It is stated that in some way or other this revolution of the heavens gives rise to and is a criterion of Opinion and Knowledge.

The next step is to introduce the generation of Time. He still proceeds in the same poetical strain.

“When the Father who had generated this saw 14 here an image of the Eternal Gods, he rejoiced, and in his joy sought to make the world still more like to its model. And as the model is an Eternal Living Thing, he sought to make the universe like unto it, as far as may be. But the nature of that Living Model was eternal, and it was not possible to give this character fully to a generated thing. Therefore he devised a moving image of that fixed eternity: he made the heavens to be, by their structure, (reckoning by number going on to infinite), a likeness of that eternity which is fixed and one; and this we call *Time*.

“Days and Nights and Months and Years, which did not exist before the heaven was made, the Creator made to have their origin with the heaven; all these are parts of Time; and so are *was* and *will be*, which are sometimes erroneously applied to eternal existences of such a thing. We say that it was, and is, and will be; but according to mere reason we ought only to say it *is*: while *was* and *will be* may be said of things whose generation takes place in time. They involve change. But that which is always the same does not grow older or younger with time. They never can be said to *begin to be*, nor to *have been*, nor to *be again*, nor any of these assertions which their changeable character makes applicable to objects of sense. These are all forms of Time, the image of Eternity, revolving according to number.”

This, though it sounds very abstract and lofty, has really a definite sense, when we take as our illustration that which I have no doubt suggested the speculation, the truth of geometry. These eternal truths can only be rightly expressed by *is* or *are*. The three angles of a triangle *are* equal to two right angles. But this refinement with

regard to the verb *to be* is pursued further. He says:

“Further: such expressions as this: the past *is* past, the present *is* present; the future *is* future; the non-existent *is* non-existent; are none of them exact. But perhaps the present is not a suitable occasion to follow out this kind of accuracy.”

He then resumes his cosmogony, describing the material part of the system as he had before described its motions.

“Time then was brought into being along with the heavens, in order that being born together they may be dissolved together, if there ever is to be a dissolution of them; and Time was made after the image of Eternity, that it might resemble Eternity in its power. For the model [of the world] *is* through all eternity; and the world itself through all time is *having been* and *being* and *about to be*.

“This being in the divine reason and purpose with regard to the generation of Time, in order that Time might be, there were created the Sun and the Moon and five other Stars, which are further named Planets (Wanderers) to define and record the numeration of Time. And God, when he made their bodies, placed them in the revolutions of the Manifold, seven bodies to the seven revolutions; the Moon, in the revolution nearest the earth; the Sun in that which is next; Vesper and the star called Mercury, in the circle which revolves at the same rate as the Sun, but has an opposite and independent motion, whence the Sun and Vesper and Mercury overtake one another and are overtaken by one another.

“As to the other stars, if any one should undertake to enumerate all the reasons of where he placed each and why, the discourse would be longer

than would be worth the while. Perhaps at some future time of leisure it may be fully pursued.

“But when each of the stars necessary for the production of Time had been placed in its proper revolution, and their material bodies bound with intelligent ties, they became living things, and learnt their prescribed course; their oblique motion according to the Manifold being included in and governed by the motion of the Identical. Some went round in a greater, and some in a smaller circle; those which went in the smaller circle going faster, those in the larger circle, slower. And by the motion of the Identical, those that went round the quickest, seemed to be overtaken by those that went round the slowest, though they really overtook them. For as this motion carried with it all the circles, so as to make each of them describe a spiral, on account of their going two opposite ways at the same time, those which removed the slowest from this motion, which was the most rapid, appeared most near to it.”

This is somewhat obscure; but it explains the general fact that the motions of the slowest of the planets, Jupiter and Saturn, are not overmastered by the diurnal motion of the heavens. That the apparent paths of the planets in the heavens may be described as *spirals* is quite true. These spirals are often in our own time delineated on star-maps. We have now a further step: the light of the sun.

“That there might be a conspicuous measure of the quickness and slowness of the eight revolutions, God lighted a luminary in one of the revolutions, the second from the earth, which we call *the Sun*: a luminary to shine through all the heaven and such that the animals, whose nature fitted them to do so, might partake of number; counting by the revolutions of the Identical; and so, and

for this end, were Night and Day, marked by the period of the principal and most intelligent of the revolutions. The *Month* was marked when the Moon had finished her period and overtaken the Sun; the *Year*, when the Sun had completed his circle.

“With regard to the periods of the other heavenly bodies, they are not noted by men, except by a few; and men accordingly have not given them names, nor determined their numerical relation to each other: so that to say the truth, they do not regard them as being measures of Time; being complicated, as they are, in their number and variety. Yet it is possible to mark by them the completion of the Perfect or *Great Year*, when all the eight periods have completed their revolutions and come to coincide again with their first departure, measured by the revolution of the Uniform and Regular motion. On this account then were made the stars which have their courses in the heavens, that they may resemble, as closely as may be, the perfect and intelligent life of the Eternal Nature.”

In the next place, the Fixed Stars are to be spoken of; and they are made Living Heavenly Things, connected with Fire as birds with Air, fishes with Water, and quadrupeds with Earth. We may still admire the ingenuity with which a kind of symmetry is preserved in the scheme.

- 15 “Thus, up to the generation of time, he made things after the likeness of the original model. But while there were no living things in the world, the likeness was incomplete. He proceeded then to remedy this defect, by imitating the model. The Supreme Mind then, contemplating the essence of what *animal* or living thing is, and how many Ideal kinds there are, directed that there should be in reality so many and such. Now these

kinds are four: one, Heavenly Beings or Gods; another, Winged Things, which fly in the air; the third, creatures that inhabit the waters; the fourth, land animals or quadrupeds.

“For the heavenly creatures then, he formed their nature mostly of fire: that they might be bright and beautiful; and imitating the [ideal] Universe, he arranged them in a circular manner. He gave the collection the most perfect kind of intelligence, that it might move in consonance with the Universe; he distributed it round the heavens, that, adorned by it, the world might be really a *Cosmos*. He gave each of these Gods two motions, the motion of rotation uniform and steady, the result of uniform and steady intellect, and a motion backwards, overmastered by the motion of the like and the identical; but he suppressed for them all the other five motions, and made them stand still so far as those motions are concerned, that so they might be as perfect as possible. This, then, is the origin of the Fixed Stars; the Planets we have already explained.”

We now come to a passage which has given rise to a controversy whether Plato held the doctrine of the earth's motion round its axis.

“The Earth, our nurse, wound as she is round the axis which passes through the world, he made the guardian and fabricator of Night and Day, the first and oldest of the Gods who are born within the heaven.”

The phrase which describes the Earth as “wound round” the axis of the world has been translated by some as if it meant *revolving* round the axis; and thus the Earth would be the fabricator of day and night by her rotatory motion.

Mr Grote has published an interesting Dissertation, in which he gives it as his opinion that

Plato does, in this passage, assert that the Earth revolves, along with the axis of the world. The doctrine which he ascribes to Plato is, however, not the doctrine that the Earth by its revolution causes the apparent diurnal revolution of the Fixed Stars, while they are really at rest: for he grants that Plato affirms that the celestial sphere of the stars really moves round and produces the succession of day and night. But Mr Grote conceives that though to account for the succession of day and night by this motion of the celestial sphere, and to account for it by the rotation of the Earth, be really two alternative doctrines which cannot consistently be held together; yet that Plato did not see this, and really held both of them.

I find it difficult to believe that Plato did hold these two inconsistent doctrines. I cannot conceive any reason *why* Plato should hold the rotation of the Earth round an axis, except in order that he might thereby account for the apparent diurnal motion of the heavens; just as for the planets, he holds the circular motion of the Identical with the oblique motion of the Manifold, in order to account for the apparent motions of the planets. If the motion of the Earth did not help his astronomical system, it would seem that he had no temptation to adopt it at all.

But on the other hand, Aristotle understands him as holding the motion of the Earth, and it is equally difficult to understand how Aristotle could fail to apprehend his meaning; especially as his own opinion is opposite.

The passage which follows appears to imply that material models representing these arrangements and movements of the heavenly bodies existed among Plato's contemporaries. He says:

“Concerning the choral dance of these stars,

their approach to each other, the cycles in which their circles return into themselves, and, in their conjunctions, which of the Gods are near each other and which are opposite, the way in which some pass before others, and thus, which and at what time some are occulted, and then shine forth again, and produce fears and give signals to the wise, of what is to happen—this it would be a vain attempt to tell, without having before our eyes some imitative representation of these things. And so we have said enough of the Gods visible and generated.”

He then discusses the received mythological theology briefly, and perhaps hardly respectfully. He says:

“To speak concerning the other Divinities and to tell their generation, is a task beyond our powers. We must on this subject assent to those who have in former times spoken thereon; who were, as they said, the offspring of the Gods, and who doubtless were well acquainted with their own ancestors. We cannot refuse to give credence to the children of the Gods, though they make their assertions without any demonstrable or probable proof. As they discourse to us of matters belonging to their own family, we must believe them, as the Law directs. Let then the genealogy of the Gods be and be acknowledged to be that which they deliver. Of Earth and Heaven the children were Oceanus and Tethys; and of these the children were Phorcys and Kronos and Rhea and all that followed these; and from Kronos and Rhea were born Zeus and Hera [which we commonly translate Jupiter and Juno], and those who are regarded as brothers and sisters of these, and others their offspring.”

We now come to a piece of Plato's own my-



thology: the object of which seems to be to separate those parts of his system which he had hitherto delivered, and which he conceived to be deduced from such abstract truths as were a proper foundation, from the sequel of his cosmogony, which he regarded as more arbitrary and precarious, and transient, namely, the production of mortal beings. Hence the act of creation is no longer exercised by the Supreme Being, but by the subordinate Gods.

“When, then, all the Gods had been brought into existence, both those which move round in manifest courses [the Stars and Planets] and those which appear when it pleases them [the Mythological Deities], the Creator of the Universe thus addressed them: Gods and Sons of Gods of whom I am the author and the father, produced by me, you are indestructible because I will it...My will is a more powerful bond than the natural ties by which your elements are held together. Learn now my commands. Three races of mortal creatures remain to be made. Without them the heavens will be imperfect, for they will not contain all kinds of living things. But these must not be made by me, for if they were, they would be equal to the Gods. In order then that mortal creatures may be, and this world may be really a Universe, do you apply yourselves to the creation of animals, imitating the exercise of my power as shown in creating you. And as these are to have a divine element in them, to lead in the way of justice those who will follow it, this I will bestow. The rest do you perform, adding a mortal part to the immortal; make animals; make them grow by food, and when they die, take them to you again.

“He said, and in the vase in which he had before mixed up the Soul of the Universe, he made a second mixture of the same elements, yet

no longer so pure, but of inferior composition. And out of this he gave Souls to the Stars, to each, one, and placed this soul in its vehicle, and taught it the laws which it must obey; and by thus scattering and sowing it through the universe, among the organs of time (the planets), prepared the way for the birth of a creature which might worship God."

This passage adds obscurity in its grammatical structure to obscurity in its philosophical import. Cicero, among whose works is a translation of the *Timæus*, gives a turn to this passage which seems to suit better the general turn of the exposition than the ordinary reading does: he says, "Scattering and sowing souls through the universe, that in the course of certain intervals of time, an animal might arise fit for the worship of God." But with all the light that we can obtain, the exposition of Plato's psychology and metempsychosis which is here given is obscure; and, what is not generally the case in this discourse, obscure from brevity and abruptness. It is implied that the animal just spoken of, which can worship God, is man; and then we have the account of the production of various attributes of humanity.

"Human nature being twofold, the better kind was that which was afterwards called *man* [in opposition to woman]. These souls were necessarily inserted in bodies, and as bodily parts were added or taken away, there arose sensation, and love mixed of pleasure and pain, and fear, and anger, and the other passions. And if man mastered these, he was to live justly, but if he was mastered of them, unjustly. And he who had lived well his appointed time, was to return to the habitation of his own congenial star, and to have a happy and suitable life. But if he failed of this, in his

second birth he was to become a woman; and if he were still evil, he was to pass into other animals according to the kind of evil which he did; and going from state to state of punishment, should find no end till he yielded himself to the movement of the Identical and Uniform in himself."

This last condition is obscure enough, and is not made less so by the way in which it is further expanded: namely, "till doing this, and triumphing thus by reason over the crowd and heap of parts of fire and water and air and earth, which, tumultuous and irrational, had grown into him, he should come into the form of his first and best habit."

Leaving this description of the conditions under which souls were disseminated through the universe, we go to other details.

"Having thus proclaimed his laws to all, that he might have no blame for their future evil doings, he sowed some of this Soul in the Earth, some in the Moon, and some in the other bodies which are organs of time (the Planets). After this dissemination, he charged the younger Gods to fashion mortal bodies, and whatever else human souls might need; and then to guide this creature as best they might, except so far as it might be itself the cause of its own evils."

The exposition now proceeds to a fanciful analogy between the movements of the heavens and the movements of the human soul. Of the movements of the heavens, the uniform diurnal motion, *the Identical*, represents the rule of Reason. The sway of the Passions is imaged by all other motions.

- 18 "He, when he had ordered all this, rested in his accustomed repose: and his children attended

to his plan. They took the immortal basis of a mortal animal [which had been given them], and imitating the great artificer, they borrowed portions of the elements of the world, fire and earth and water and air, and they fastened them together, not with those indissoluble bonds by which their own natures were framed, but with small nails too fine to be seen, and thus they made them each into one body; and they established the revolutions of the immortal soul in a body subject to the influx and efflux of matter. And these steady revolutions, thus involved in a powerful stream, were not either masters or mastered in any constant way; but were dragged this way and that by momentary impulses, so that the whole animal had all the six motions, and moved forwards and backwards, and to the right and to the left, and upwards and downwards. And besides the impetuosity of the stream which brought the nutriment of the animal, still greater disturbance was produced by external agencies; when a portion of fire, or solid earth, or water, or air acted on it from without, and thus, through the motions of the body, operated upon the Soul. And these operations we call *sensations*. And these disturbances, combining with the motions of the souls, produced great irregularities, impeding and counteracting the governing motion of the Identical, and deflecting the motion of the Manifold, so as to destroy its harmonical relations; so that though it could not quite break up these movements it deranged and confused them. Hence when they appeared to be going one way they were going another; as when a man standing on his head mistakes right for left and left for right. And thus when they deal with external things, they apply the notions of the *same* and *different* in a false and inverted

way, so that there is in them no steady and governing motion. But when the external sensations possess the *whole* of the Soul, then the regular motions which are really mastered appear to master the others."

That is, when passion governs the whole of the Soul, it carries the reason with it; and thus reason and passion go the same way, though a wrong way; and reason which seems to govern, is really carried away captive. This is an ingenious novel application of Plato's fanciful astronomical analogy of the Soul in an extreme case. To return to the more normal case:

"On account of this prevalence of external influences, the Soul is now-a-days, as at the beginning it *was*, unintelligent when it is first placed in a mortal body. But when the stream of nutriment by which growth is produced, is moderate, and the revolutions of the Soul proceed in the right direction, and become more confirmed as time goes on, then the circles turn in the right way, and men call things *the same* and *different* as they really are. And so the man may become perfectly sound and whole: but if he neglect this opportunity, after an incomplete life he returns to Hades. But let us return to our more proper subject."

The more proper subject is the construction of the human body, and of other parts of the material world. In translating the above mythological and psychological doctrines I have simplified and abridged the style: but I believe I have given the import of the assertions.

"The creative Gods, then, took the two revolutions of which we have spoken, and imitating the spherical form of the universe, they put them into a spherical body which we call *the head*, the most divine part which governs all the rest. To

this they gave the whole of the body as a servant, seeing that it must share in all the body's motions. And as it had to move along the uneven earth, in order that it might not have to roll along the ground, but might be able to surmount the hillocks and rise out of the hollows, thus gave it a travelling vehicle. This is the reason why the body is long, and has four long limbs, curiously contrived and jointed; and by means of these it can go into every place, carrying with it the habitation of the divine and sacred part of man: and that is the reason why all men have arms and legs.

“And again: the Gods thinking that the front was more honourable and beautiful than the back, made us so that generally we go forwards. And the front was to be made to differ from the back. And so they put the face on that side of the head; and placed there instruments for the intelligence of the soul, and gave this front part the task of leading and governing the rest.

“And of the organs, first they made the light-bearing eyes: after this plan. They made a material thing of that part of Elemental Fire which does not burn but sheds a mild light, like the light of day; (as *hemeros, mild*, is like *hemera, day*.) They made this Elemental Fire, as it resides in us, to beam forth smooth and dense through all parts of the eye, but made a close sieve of the middle of the eye, so that it might stop all the coarser part and only let the pure part through. And thus when the light of the day meets the light which beams from the eye, then like meets like and makes a homogeneous body; the external light meeting the internal light, in the direction in which the eyes look. And by this homogeneity like feels like, and if this beam touch any object or any object touch it, it transmits the motions

through the body to the soul, and produces that sensation which we call *seeing*. But when night comes, the homogeneous external light is absent, and the visual beam is cut off. The internal light issuing forth finds nothing homogeneous in the air on which it falls, as containing no fire; and so is itself changed and extinguished. It sees no longer, and tends to sleep. And the eyelids which the Gods had constructed to protect the eyes, aid this tendency. For they confine within us the force of the fire, which then calms and soothes the internal movements, and when they are soothed quiet comes, and with quiet, dreamless sleep. But if some of the stronger motions remain in one or another part of the frame, they produce within us likenesses of external objects, according to the part which they affect, and thus give rise to dreams."

This notion of the process of seeing would of course give rise to the same results as the notion now received, that the light by which vision takes place proceeds (reflected) from the objects in straight lines which we call *rays*. All the properties of Catoptrics (the doctrine of reflected light) might be established on these principles; and in fact many of them were established at an early period by the Greek geometers. We have still extant a treatise on Optics by Euclid, who lived a little later than Plato, and was of the Platonic school; and others of subsequent periods. The introduction of the properties of concave mirrors in the *Timæus*, which follows the passages that I have been translating, exemplifies what I said at the beginning, that this treatise was intended to include all the extant mathematical and physical knowledge; for the final causes of natural events and laws, the more prominent professed object of the *Dialogues*, are very little, if at all, illustrated

by such properties. The proofs of the properties of concave mirrors are nearly the same as those which we now give, using the fire and the visual beams, instead of the light and the rays of which we now speak in such demonstrations; and having the proofs more vague than ours are, mainly from the want of diagrams, which Plato does not give, but which his commentators supply. I must abridge this passage, modifying the phraseology in the manner which I have suggested:

“As to the images produced by mirrors and by smooth surfaces, they are now easily explained. The light that proceeds from the face (as an object of vision) and the light that proceeds from the eye become one continuous ray at the smooth surface; but the right is represented as left and the left as right, by the way in which the rays fall. But if the smooth surface of the mirror be elevated to the right and left, so that the ray from the right falls on the left, and the ray from the left falls on the right, then the right is the right in the image, and the left is the left. And if this concave mirror be turned lengthways, the top appears as the bottom, and the bottom as the top for the same reason.”

We then come to a more distinct statement that final causes are really the main subject of this discourse.

“This then is what we have to say of secondary causes, which God uses as instruments in working out the *Idea* of the *Best*. And these are by the most regarded not as second causes, but as the real causes of things; such causes as make them cold or hot, or solid or fluid, and the like. But these second causes are not capable of reason and intelligence; that which alone can possess intelligence we call Soul. And soul is an invisible



thing; while material things, fire and water and air and earth, are all visible bodies. And he who has any due appreciation of Mind and Intelligence, will try to discern *First Causes* in Intelligent Nature; and those causes which are put in motion by others by some necessary connexion, and move others by the like connexions, he will call *Second Causes*. And this is what we must do. We must attend to both kinds of causes; both those which, acting with Intelligence, produce what is good and fair: and those which, destitute of Intelligence, produce their effects blindly.

20 “We have then explained the Second Causes of vision, and how the sight has such powers as it has. But now we must speak of the main use of all this contrivance, and why it was given to us by God. The sense of light, in my opinion, derives its greatest value from this: that no such thoughts as we have expressed concerning the universe could have been conceived, if we could not have seen the stars and the sun and the heavens. But as it is, Visible night and day, and the revolutions of months and years, give rise to Number, call up the conception of Time, and impel us to inquiry concerning the Universe. And hence we are led to Philosophy, the greatest good which the gods have given us or will ever give, to the human race. This I call the greatest good arising from the sense of light. Other advantages of an inferior kind, why should we dwell upon? He who is not a philosopher, if by the loss of sight he lost those inferior advantages, would be wrong to lament them [for, he intimates, his greatest loss would be the want of philosophy]. But this let us say: the true cause why God devised the faculty of sight, and gave it to us is, that looking at the movements ordained by Intelligence in the

heavens, we might use them to discern the movements of our own Intelligence. For these are similar to those; so far as disturbed movements can be to undisturbed. And studying this, and following a participation in the natural rectitude of reason, we are to imitate the unerring movements of the Divine Mind and rectify the erring movements of our minds.

“And about Sound and the sense of Hearing we have the same remarks to make. They are given us by God for the same purpose and with the same tendency. Discourse has the same object, and contributes mightily to the same end. And as to the use of the musical property of sound, the perception of it is given to the ear for the sake of Harmony. And harmony has movements sympathetic to the movement of the soul; and thus he who applies Music rightly, will find it useful, not for an irrational pleasure only, as men now use it. It is given as a means of bringing the irregular movement of the soul into harmony and symphony with itself. And for the same reason was the sense of Rhythm given; to control the irregular and ungraceful habits which most persons need to have corrected.”

Plato afterwards makes it his business to pursue this doctrine of Final Causes into other parts of the human frame. But before doing this, he turns back to a more recondite and abstruse speculation, the essential differences of those parts of the world which he had already called *Elements*. And here, in accordance with what I have already said, that I suppose one of his objects to have been to introduce into this his system of the world all the mathematical knowledge to which he and his contemporaries had attained, I conceive his purpose was to give a cosmical application to

the geometrical doctrine which he and his school had established, that there are and can be only, five regular solids—the *Platonic Bodies*, as they are sometimes called. He teaches that the four elements have, for their essential forms, four of these geometrical figures. In order to carry out this notion, he has to suppose a first matter, a *materia prima*, which is moulded into these different kinds of matter, earth, air, fire and water. This notion, added to his previous doctrine of an ideal type of every material thing in nature, makes an abstruse scheme, which he introduces and expounds with an amount of preface, preparation, and apology, which show how strongly he felt the difficulty of such exposition. We shall find however that each step of the exposition has its meaning and its purpose.

- 21 “In what we have hitherto said, we have, with few exceptions, explained things which are constructed with Intelligence: but we must add to our exposition the things which are produced by Necessity; [that is, by the necessary properties of their materials.] For the creation of this world was produced by a mixture of Necessity and constitutive Intelligence. Intelligence prevailed over Necessity, and induced it to guide the main parts of the world to the Best; and in this manner Necessity submitting to the direction of wisdom, the universe was first framed. And if any one will expound the state of things as it really is, he must in his explication include a mixture of this irregular course. We must therefore go back again and begin at the beginning. We must examine what, before the creation of the heavens, was the very nature of fire, water, air and earth, and what their previous attributes. No one yet has done this. Men have begun as if they knew

what is fire, and each of the other elements, and then we assert that they are the Principles of the universe, or, as we say, the *Elements*. But a little reflection will show that they are not elements of the universe as letters are elements of a word, nor even as syllables are." He means that these elements are to be resolved into other more fundamental elements, which, as we shall see, are triangles.

He then proceeds to disclaim the pretension of giving a complete account of the formation of the universe; pointing probably to the atomist school—Leucippus and Democritus and the like—who professed to explain everything by the concurrence of atoms.

"The principle, or the principles of all things, or any opinion which may be entertained on this subject, we shall not now undertake to tell: for this reason, that in the present course of discussion it is difficult to say what I think on that subject. You are not to expect this of me; nor do I persuade myself that I could undertake so large a task. But as I said at first, I will aim at a probable account: and shall hope to give you an account as probable as any which has been given; and going back to the beginning, I will endeavour to speak of the parts and their connexion."

The gravity of this task is shown by an introductory prayer.

"Here in the outset we invoke God, the preserver from absurd and incoherent notions, to guide us to the doctrine which is probable, and so we again begin our exposition."

He then proceeds to the basis of his new exposition, which, as I have said, includes a First Matter, as well as the Ideal Model and the Visible Copy.

22 “This new beginning of our discussion concerning the Universe must take a wider division than the first time. We then distinguished two things, which were on that occasion insufficient for us;—the one laid down as the Model or Paradigm, a thing intelligible (an object of intellect) and unalterable; a second, the Imitation of the Model, generated (brought into transient being) and visible (an object of sense). We then required nothing more than these two. But now our course of reasoning leads me to speak of a third thing—hard to explain and to understand. Of what nature is this? you ask. It is of such nature as to be the Receptacle, and, as it were, the Nurse of everything. I must endeavour to explain it more clearly.

“I must begin by saying, that we are accustomed to speak of fire and the rest, as really different, one from the others. But we cannot really hold fast any firm and sure distinction by which one thing is water more than fire, or one element more than another. That which we call water, when condensed, as we think, becomes, as we see, stone, and earth: when it is rarified and evaporated, it becomes air; and air afterward becomes fire; and fire condensed and extinguished again takes the shape of air; and air condensed and thickened becomes mist and cloud; and when these are more compressed, they become running water; and from water again are formed earth and stones. And thus these elements form a system returning into itself in their generation. And then, as these do not retain the same aspect, is it not absurd to maintain that any one of them is one thing and not another thing? This we must not do: we must rather say thus: When we see a thing, as fire for instance, pass from one condi-

tion to another, we must not say *this* is fire, but this appearance is the appearance of fire; and so of water, and the rest. We are not to say *this* or *that* is fire, as if the thing indicated had a permanent nature, like a geometrical figure; we are to say that it has for the time assumed the appearance of fire. But that material in which each of these seeming elements appears and is again lost, we say *is* this or that. But we are not to say that this or that *is* hot or cold, or black or white; but only that they appear so."

This doctrine approaches very near to the modern doctrine of secondary qualities depending on primary ones. I have abridged Plato's exposition of it. But the similitude which he adds brings us nearer to his especial doctrine.

"We must try to make this clearer. If any one were to make all kinds of shapes of gold, changing the material constantly out of one shape into another, and if he were to show us one of these shapes and ask what it is, it would be a much safer and truer answer to say that it is gold than that it is a triangle or a square. We cannot say that it *is* one of these, for it changes from one of them to another; but if any one were to say it has the shape of a triangle or a square, we might be satisfied with the answer. The same is to be said of that thing which takes the shapes of all bodies. It has always the same nature; while it assumes the aspects of all things. But its own form is not that of any of the things which are made of it. It is the material which receives the impress of each different thing; and these different things are the impressions and imitations of eternal models, as we shall afterwards explain."

I have here perhaps brought out the doctrine of a *First Matter*, of which all things are different

*Forms*, a little more distinctly than Plato has here expressed it: but there can be no doubt that this is his doctrine. And thus we are brought to the distinction of Matter and Form, a distinction which plays an important part in all philosophies which attempt the analysis of the phenomena of the world. The fundamental antithesis of philosophy in this shape, as in all shapes, is at the same time inevitable and unintelligible:—necessary to assume, and impossible to conceive. For we see that the same Matter may assume different forms. Water may become ice or steam: and if ice, why in some larger meaning of the word *Form*, may it not also by a change of the form of its elements become gold or oil? All difference of things may thus be conceived to arise from a difference of Form in their elements. But if so, what is the Material which thus takes different Forms? We cannot conceive Matter without some Form; and yet for the purpose of our explanation, it is necessary that we should do so. The very use of the term *Matter* suggests the necessity of its having some Form. We cannot conceive Matter which is capable of all Forms, but has, as yet, received none. And Plato in fact does not here use the word *ὑλη*, *Matter*, nor speak, as we have spoken, of a First Matter. He employs various metaphorical phrases, some of which we have here had:—the thing, which he says is very hard to express, is the Receptacle, the Nurse, the Mother of all things: the Wax or Clay in which the impression is made. At times he seems to confound it with mere space; and Aristotle says that in the *Timæus*, and in the unwritten doctrines of Plato, *space*, *place*, *matter*, the *Indefinite*, all mean the same thing.

In the treatise entitled *Timæus the Locrian*,

which seems to be an attempt to construct an original of Plato's *Timæus*, such as the Pythagorean Timæus may be supposed to have written in the Doric dialect, we have this identity more distinctly expressed. It will be worth while to translate the beginning of this treatise.

"Timæus the Locrian thus said<sup>1</sup>: That there are two Causes of all things: Mind, the cause of things which are made according to reason: Necessity, the cause of things which happen by force according to the powers of bodies. And of the former, the Cause is of the nature of Good, and is called God, and is the principle of what is Best, but the consequents and co-operating causes are referred to necessity. And thus the Universe is constituted of Idea, Matter, and Sensible Objects, the offspring of the other two.

"The former, the Idea, is ungenerated and unchanged, permanent, of the nature of the Identical: intelligible, and the paradigm of things created, which are in constant change. But matter (*ὑλη*) is the impressible material, the Mother and Nurse, and is the source of generation of the third kind of being. For receiving the likenesses (of the Idea) into itself, and as it were being moulded on them, it produces all created things.

"And this Matter, he said, was eternal, but not unchangeable: and itself formless and figureless, but recipient of all form. And as constituting bodies, this matter was divisible, and of the nature of the Manifold.

"And Matter they call Space and Place. And thus there are two opposite Causes; of which the Idea has the relation of the Male, and of the

<sup>1</sup> *τῶς ἔφα*, the Pythagorean *αὐτὸς ἔφα*, "the Master said."



Father: Matter, of the Female, and of the Mother. And the third kind of thing is the offspring of these.

“And these things, being three, are known in three ways: the Idea, by Intellect, as Science; Matter, by a bastard reasoning; for we cannot yet attain to discern it directly, but by analogy; and the Products of these by sensation, and opinion.”

24 The Platonic *Timæus* contains a statement nearly identical with this.

“For the present then we must conceive three kinds of things: that which is made, that in which it is made, and that after the likeness of which it is made: and of these we may liken the recipient (the matter) to the Mother: that after which it is made, to the Father; and that produced between the two to the Offspring.”

We have now other similitudes to explain the nature of the First Matter.

“We must comprehend that as the image must appear with endless varieties of kind, that in which the image is to be fashioned must be fitted for its office, by being free from all the forms which it is afterwards to receive from without. For if it had any of the forms which are to be impressed upon it, when it had to receive an opposite impression, or any other, it would render the image ill, retaining traces of its own form. It must be free from all form in order to receive all forms: as those who fabricate sweet smelling fluids take as their bases a fluid destitute of all smell, or as those who would make impressions on a soft substance, remove all previous impressions and make the surface as smooth as possible. And thus this thing in order to receive completely the likeness of the eternal models, must by its nature be free from all form.

“And hence this mother and receptacle of all visible and sensible things, we do not call earth, nor air, nor fire, nor water, nor anything produced from them, or from which these are produced. It is an invisible and formless thing, the recipient of everything, participating in a certain way of the intelligible, but a way very difficult to seize. And of this matter, fire is the burning part, water is the wet part, and earth and air are the earthy and airy parts.”

So far I think it must be allowed that the assumption of a first matter has not much helped Plato to an explanation of the differences of the four elements. Accordingly, he seems to feel that 25 he has still his part to begin; and goes back to his fundamental principles to prove that there must be some real difference, because intelligence and opinion are two different things: that is, that because there must be a science of nature, there must be something which can be the object of science. And he again asserts the necessity of 26 eternal and indestructible ideas, of transitory objects of sense copies of these, and of the eternal space, which affords a seat to all generated things: perceptible by a bastard reason, independent of the senses, and which we see as it were in a dream. And yet once more he re-states this doctrine of 27 three kinds of things, and says that these three things, Essence, Space, and Change existed before the heavens were made. But he now begins to describe the process of creation in a manner which is curious.

“The Nurse of production, moistened, touched by fire, receiving the forms of earth and air, and the consequent influences, became manifold, and the powers which acted in it not being in equilibrium, but swaying this way and that, moved

the different kinds of things this way and that, so that they became separated.

“As in a winnowing machine used for cleaning the corn from the chaff, the things in it are shaken, the heavier fall in one place, the lighter in another, and settle there: so the four kinds of things being shaken in the receptacle, were divided by being shaken; the like being separated from the unlike, the like coming together, and so the different things occupied different regions. Before this they were in disorder and confusion. And thus, when God set about ordering the universe, fire, water, earth and air had some traces of their form, but were in the condition which belonged to the absence of deity. And taking them in this state, God made them distinct in form and number. And now let us try to tell you what this distinction was; using language out of the usual course of custom. This I may venture to do, since you are not strangers to the methods of mathematical science, and such I must needs use in this exposition.”

I conceive that we are here arrived at the point to which in this part of his system, Plato has been all along tending;—the theory of a difference of the four elements, arising from their being the first matter in four different geometrical forms, namely, four of the five regular solids.

The properties of these solids are not easy to prove in a very simple way; Plato's mode of dealing with them is unnecessarily complex; so that I believe it will be best to give some of his results only; those which most mark the relation of his to other systems of philosophy.

The five figures of which we have spoken are solid figures having three *dimensions*, as it is termed by geometers;—length, breadth, and depth;

and Plato begins by claiming this as an argument for his theory.

“First, that fire, earth, water and air are bodies, 28 is evident to every one. Now every kind of body must have depth (as well as length and breadth), and that which has depth must be inclosed by planes.”

It might be expected that he would proceed to treat of the properties of these solids as solids: but this he does not do. He considers their surfaces only, remarks that their surfaces must be composed of triangles—for every plane can be resolved into triangles—and goes on to distinguish different kinds of triangles,—isosceles, right-angled, equilateral, and the scalene triangle which is the half of an equilateral. And he reasons entirely upon the surfaces of the solids, these surfaces being thus divided into triangles. He says:

“These triangles we assume to be the principle of fire and of the other elementary bodies; proceeding according to probability combined with demonstration. As to the higher *principles of these principles*, God knows them, and man, who is sufficiently dear to God to be allowed to know them.”

Meaning, of course, that he does not pretend to any ulterior and more fundamental analysis. He then proceeds to say on what grounds he will select the bodies which he asserts to be the forms of the four elements.

“We must see what are the four kinds of bodies which are most perfect, and which being unlike one to another, are capable of being separated into parts and thus made one out of another. If we can discover this, we shall have the proof of the generation of earth and fire, and the intermediate elements which are there by rules of proportion:” as was shown in a former part.

He then proceeds to point out what he regards

as the most beautiful form of triangle, which is the half of an equilateral triangle. The supreme beauty of this figure he asserts very emphatically: referring perhaps to contemporary controversies.

“Why it is so, it would be long to tell: but if any one can discover and demonstrate that this is not so, we offer a friendly prize.”

He then proceeds to speak of the other condition which the elementary bodies are to fulfil; namely, that they must be capable of decomposition and recombination. This we must explain in detail further on. He remarks that these are the four kinds of bodies, but that three of them only are capable of being resolved into one another. This is a defect in the theory; but even this possibility of analysis and synthesis so far is obtained only by interpreting analysis and synthesis in a very unexpected manner, as we shall see. But he proceeds first to explain more precisely the nature of the four bodies. This may be expressed much more simply than he expresses it, for he divides the faces of the solids into triangles in a manner which complicates their generation. I shall therefore here simplify his exposition.

29 “The first kind is formed of four equilateral triangles, of which three angles being united form a solid angle; and there will be four such angles, and the figure will be a regular tetrahedron.

“The second kind is composed of eight equilateral triangles, which form solid angles consisting of four plane angles, and then we have a regular octahedron.

“The third kind has twenty faces which are equilateral triangles, and twelve solid angles, bounded each by five plane angles.

“The fourth kind of body is the cube, contained by six square faces.

“There is a fifth combination, the pentagonal dodecahedron. This is not the figure of any of the elements, and God used it in figuring the Universe.”

The occurrence of these five regular bodies suggests to him a question as to the plurality of worlds.

“A person carefully reflecting on what has 30 been said, might doubt whether there are an infinite number of worlds, or a finite number. The first is the opinion of an ignorant man: but whether there be worlds one or five, might be more reasonably doubted. Our opinion is that there is but one: others may think differently.”

That is, it being determined to use this doctrine of five regular solids in cosmogony, it might be doubted whether it should be made the basis of a theory that there are five worlds, or that there are five elements, or, as Plato asserts, four elements with an outstanding geometrical solid.

Having taken this latter course, Plato has to distribute the four solids among the four elements. And in doing this, I must say that his reasons are quite as philosophical and conclusive as that of the assertors of atoms in our own time.

“Having settled the four kinds of bodies we must distribute them among fire and earth and air and water. And to earth we must give the cubical kind; for of the four kinds, the earth is most stable and most plastic. It must be that which has the steadiest basis: and the square is a surer basis than a triangle.”

It does not appear how Plato conceived that the cube conformed to the condition of plasticity; but it is true that the cube alone is the figure of which an assemblage can be put together so as to fill space.

“In giving this form to earth we best preserve probability; and to water, the least mobile of the other forms, and the most mobile to fire, and the intermediate form to air: also, the smallest form to fire, and the greatest to water, and the intermediate to air. And again; the most acute to fire, and the next in this respect to air, and the third to water.

“That, then, which has the fewest bases, must be the most mobile, and piercing, and the sharpest, and the lightest, as being composed of the fewest parts: and the second in these respects must be the second; and the third, the third.

“Let then according to right reason and probability the solid pyramid [the tetrahedron is a triangular pyramid] be the element and seed of fire. And the second in order (the octahedron) let us call the element of air. And the third (the icosahedron) the element of water.

“And these elementary particles of each kind we must conceive as so small that singly they are invisible, but masses of large numbers of them are visible.

“And the proportions of their numbers and motions and other powers were arranged by God, according to the necessity which obeys reason (as has been said), and so were fitted together and harmonized.”

We then come to the analysis and synthesis of these elements. And here we find that in order to carry out his notion of resolving one element into parts and recomposing these parts as another element, he is compelled to understand this resolution and recomposition in a way very different from that which we should have expected, from his laying so much stress, in the outset, on the consideration that the elements must have solid

figures. We should have expected that he would show how a tetrahedron for instance may be resolved into solid parts which can make up a cube: and the like. But this he does not do; nor indeed is it geometrically possible. What he does is to take the surfaces of the solid figures, as if they were hollow boxes; and to show how, retaining each face unbroken, these surfaces may be separated and made into other hollow boxes. In this way it is clear that as the tetrahedron, octahedron, and icosahedron have all faces which are equilateral triangles, they may to a certain extent be converted into one another. The cube cannot enter into such conversions, for a square cannot be made up of equilateral triangles.

“As the consequence of all that we have said 31 concerning the kinds of which the elements are composed this seems probable: Earth, if it meet with fire and is divided by its sharp points, might be carried about, either in the fire in which it was dissolved, or in a mass of air or of water in which it happened to be, until falling in with parts of its own kind, they should be fitted together and again become earth: for it could never become another kind.

“But if water be separated by fire, or by air, it may become one body of fire and two of air.

“And the particles of air arising from the dissolution of one body might become two of fire.”

These assertions sound strangely like anticipations of the propositions of some atomic theory, such as that of modern chemists. But if we apply the mode of explanation which I have announced, we shall see that these are obvious numerical truths. Water consists of particles which have twenty sides, all of them being equilateral triangles. If these be divided into two eights and four,



they make two octahedrons and one tetrahedron, that is, two particles of water and one of fire.

And these particles of air, which have eight sides, may become each two particles of fire which have four sides. And the same explanation applies to the other examples.

“And again, when fire is taken up in air, water or earth, and overmastered by their resistance, its relative quantity being small, and is broken up, two particles of fire may be united in one of air; and if air be broken up, two particles and a half of air may make a particle of water.”

We have then some further consequences asserted, depending upon the principle that like cannot produce any change in like; and upon the motion of one element whose particles are smaller and fewer, being conquered by another, whose particles are larger and more numerous; and thus from fire may come air, and from air water. And thus the particles, by the motion of the receptacle, are driven into the places where similar particles are. But these properties are not so definite as those already mentioned, and the account of them need not be dwelt on. He then goes on: [I simplify and abridge a little:]

“And thus are formed the simple bodies or first elements. And the different kinds of things which occur are formed from the combination of these elements. And some have smaller, some larger elements, and hence a number of species of things belonging to each element.

- 32 “Again, as to the motions of these elements. In uniformity (that is, a space filled with particles of one kind) there can be no motion. There can be no motion without a mover and a moved; and these must be things of two different kinds. The elements in separating themselves into kinds, have

not finished their movements. They are all contained in the spherical universe which compasses them on every side, and will not allow a void space to exist.

“The bodies formed of the largest particles leave larger void spaces between their particles, those formed of smaller particles leave smaller. The motion of condensation pushes the smaller particles into the interstices of the larger. The smaller separate the larger, the larger compress the smaller; and thus each get into their allotted place. Fire is the most diffused as the most attenuated; air the next; and so on. And thus the inequality being constantly kept up, there is and always will be constant motion of the elements.”

He then proceeds to explain how different kinds of bodies are constituted of these first elements; and this explanation, though undoubtedly fanciful and arbitrary, is by its ingenuity and extent worthy of being placed by the side of any atomic hypothesis hitherto propounded. The part which we have just quoted, in which mention is made of an element composed of smaller particles filling up the interstices of the larger particles, is curiously like the hypothesis of Descartes concerning the primitive constitution of the Universe. I will take the points separately.

What is Light?

“There are several kinds of fire: Flame, and 33 that which, issuing from flame, does not burn, but gives Light to the eyes; and that [Heat] which, when the flame is extinguished, remains in the bodies which have been enflamed.”

What are Mists and Clouds?

“There are several kinds of air. The most pure part which is called *ether* (which makes a clear sky), and the more turbid which is mist and

gloom, and other the like things without names, formed by the irregularity of the triangles."

Why does water melt and freeze, grow hot and cold?

"Water is divided into two kinds, the fluid and the fusible. The *fluid* kind, containing small and unequal particles, can easily be moved by itself and by other bodies, on account of the inequality of its particles (according to a principle already asserted). The *fusible* kind composed of large and equal parts, is more stable, heavy and compact on account of its uniformity; but when, fire entering it and dissolving it, it loses its uniformity, it partakes more of motion, and becoming easily mobile, and pushed by the contiguous air against the earth, it *melts*, as we call the destruction of the mass, and *flows*, as we express its movement on the ground. And again, when the fire escapes out of it, and the surrounding air, pressed by it, compresses the fluid mass, and fills the places which the fire had occupied, and concentrates it; the fluid thus compressed, resuming its uniformity, when the fire, the cause of inequality, is removed, is again made throughout like to itself. This departure of the fire we call *cooling*, and the condensation which follows we call *freezing*."

What is Gold?

"Of all the substances that we call *fusible water*, (it appears that all fusible substances are kinds of water,) that which is formed of the smallest and most uniform particles in the most condensed state, a peculiar kind, known by its shining and yellow colour, is Gold, the most precious of treasures, condensed by its passage through the rock. The matrix of gold, which on account of its density is very hard, and is blackened, is called *Adamas*.

What are the other Metals?

“The kind of fusible water which is formed by the union of parts almost as small as those of gold, has several kinds, more dense than gold, and including a small part of fine earth, so as to be harder, but lighter on account of having large interstices within. One kind of this shining and compact fusible water is *brass*. But when the earthy part which is mixed with it, when by age it is separated from it, and becomes itself visible, it is called *rust*.

“And it would not be difficult to go on with the like explanations, if any one, following the aspect of probabilities for the sake of recreation, digressing from the study of eternal essences, should seek a harmless pleasure, and a prudent and moderate amusement. So for the present let us go on with the like probable accounts of things.”

What are Hail, Snow, Frost?

“When fluid water is separated from fire and air, it becomes more uniform and is compressed by the elements which have left it, and thus made rigid. That which is so affected at a height above the earth is called *hail*: that upon the earth, *ice*. And that which is only half rigid, above the earth, is *snow*; but that which is condensed upon the earth, from dew, is called *hoar-frost*.”

We then come to vegetable matters. What are Wine, Oil, &c.?

“The numerous kinds of water, mixed with each other, and strained through the plants which the earth produces, are, as a general class, called *juices*: and being different on account of different mixtures, form kinds of which many have no names. But four of these kinds which contain fire, being very noticeable, have received names.

One is *Wine*, which warms the body and the soul. The kind which is smooth, and divides the visual light, and is hence bright and shining and glossy to see, is the class of *Oils*: Pitch, and Castor Oil, and Common Oil, and other substances of like qualities. That which opens the ducts of the mouth, and thus produces sweetness, is called *Honey*. That which dissolves the flesh, and is of a foam-like burning quality, is distinguished from other juices and called *Opium*."

- 35 We have next the different kinds of earths explained in the same way: stones, some of which, composed of equal and uniform parts, are transparent and beautiful. Then potter's clay, then *nitre* (*λίτρον*) and *salt*, substances dear to the gods.

Afterwards we have bodies composed of earth and water; and the reason why some things are soluble by water, and others fusible by fire. Of the latter kind are *glass* and fusible stones; of the former, *wax* and *gums*. These I shall not give in detail.

Next we have the explanation of the sensations produced by different bodies. The account of the sensation produced by fire is quite in the manner of the atomic physiologists of the last century.

- 36 "We have almost completely explained the way in which different things are produced by common and interchangeable elements; we must now try to explain the causes of the sensations which they produce. We must throughout suppose a capability of sensation; and yet we have not yet explained the nature of the flesh and its accompaniments, and the mortal part of the soul. We cannot explain the nature of the thing sensible without speaking of the sentient: nor of this without that. Yet we cannot go on with both together. We must therefore take one first and then

go back to the other. We will then first speak of the operation of body on soul.

“First, why we call fire *hot*, we may see in this way: we must consider the penetration and cutting of the body which it produces. For that it is a *sharp* feeling, every one knows. And if we recollect the nature of the particles of fire, we shall see that it produces this effect by the smoothness of its sides, the acuteness of its angles, and the velocity of its impact, which make it penetrating and piercing whatever it falls upon. And thus it is fitted to cut and mince our bodies, and this is what we call *hot*; *thermon*, hot, resembling *kerma*, mince.

“The opposite sensation is easy to explain, but we will not omit it. Among the fluids which surround the body, those of which the particles are largest, press and expel the smaller, but not being able to take their places, they compress the humid parts; and this produces a conflict and a struggle, which is called a *shudder*, and the sensation is called *cold*.

“We call that *hard* to which our flesh yields: that *soft* which yields to our flesh.”

We then come to the discussion of a point 38 which has had great importance in physical philosophy at all times, and is still a puzzle for beginners; the distinction of heavy and light, up and down. Plato had completely got over that prejudice of the reality of this distinction which stands in our way when we begin to teach the rotundity of the earth. Whether his opinions as to the cause of the ascent of light bodies were exactly true, is a matter of controversy. We shall see what he says.

“The qualities of *heavy* and *light* must be explained by explaining *up* and *down*. It is quite

an error to suppose that there are two regions, just opposite; *down*, to which bodies having any mass are carried, and *up*, to which everything goes with reluctance. For the heaven being spherical in shape, its extreme parts are all equally distant from the center, and the center is everywhere opposite to the circumference. This then being the case, it is quite inappropriate to speak of up and down. For the middle cannot be said to be either up or down: it is in the middle. And the circumference cannot have a middle; as all its parts are alike, no one can be more middle than the opposite. When a thing has all its parts alike, how can we apply opposite names to the parts?

“If there were a regular solid body in the middle of the universe, it would not be carried towards any of the extreme parts, on account of the uniform condition of all its sides. And if any one were to walk round this body on its surface, he would come into a position with his feet opposite to his former position, and stopping at different places, he would call the same part of it now *up* and then *down*. And thus to divide the spherical universe into two regions, *up* and *down*, is absurd.

“What then is the origin of these terms, *up* and *down*, and what we mean by them, we must now explain; and for that purpose we make the following supposition. If into that region of the universe where the fire is mainly placed, and to which it is carried, any one were to ascend, (having the power to do this,) and were to take portions of the fire and put them in the basins of a pair of scales, and were to raise the balance by force, and lift the fire into a region (*ἀέρα?*) strange to it, it is plain that the smaller portion of the fire would yield to this force more easily than the larger. For the same force being

employed in raising the two, the smaller must needs yield to this force more easily, the larger less easily: and this latter would be said to be heavy, and to tend downwards; the former, to be light, and to tend upwards. And the same applies to the place where we are. If here upon the earth we take separate parts of the earth, or of earthy substances, and lift them by force into a region strange to them, both will incline to their like: but the less will obey the force more readily than the larger. And we call this *light*, and call *upward* the direction in which we force it to go: and the opposite to this, *heavy* and *downward*. And thus these kinds of things have their different properties because the regions where the mass of them is collected are different. For two things of which one is heavy in one place, and the other in an opposite place, and one which goes upwards in one place and the other in another, go opposite ways, or oblique to one another. But what we are to bear in mind is, that the direction towards *the like* makes each element *heavy*, and the region to which it thus tends, *down*; and the opposite, the opposite."

The account of *up* and *down* as directions to and from the center of the universe, which Plato identifies with the center of the earth, is in conformity with our modern views. But *heavy* and *light* Plato conceives as qualities which result from the tendency of each element to its own region; and hence air and fire tend to go upwards and water and earth downwards. A more correct view is that lightness is merely a lesser degree of heaviness, and that light bodies ascend because they are extruded by heavier bodies which descend. Some of the Greek philosophers had obtained this truer view.



- Plato goes on to explain the nature and causes of other sensations; as *agreeable* and *painful*, and the like. These are explained by the largeness and smallness, quickness and slowness, mobility and immobility, contractions and expansions, and other qualities, of the particles, and of the parts
- 38 which they assail. In this way it is explained why the soft parts of the body are very sensitive, the hard parts, as bone and hair, less so. And again, proceeding to special parts and organs of the body, why tastes are bitter, sour, sharp: what
- 39 are bubbles: what is fermentation and leaven: what is sweet.
- 40 The same kind of explanation is applied to odours; all odours, he says, are more subtle than water and more coarse than air, which he illustrates by the experiment of one man breathing the air expired by another, which is, he says, without smell.
- 41 He then speaks of hearing; quick motions, he says, produce an acute, slower, a grave sound: even motions, a smooth sound, the opposite, a rough one. He then takes the subject of visual impressions, which, as a further specimen of this philosophy, I will translate more at length.
- 42 "There is a fourth kind of sensation, in which we must distinguish many varieties which exist, which collectively we call *colours*; a kind of light which flows from bodies and agrees and conspires with the light from the eyes, so as to produce the sensation (of vision). Concerning the visual light we have already spoken. And with regard to colours, this is a reasonable account. The particles which proceed from bodies and fall on the vision are, some less, some greater, and some equal in size to those which proceed from the vision. Those which are equal are not perceived by sense, and

we call them (the bodies) *transparent*. The greater and the lesser particles contract and expand the visual light, in the same way that hot and cold things do the flesh, and bitter and sharp things the tongue; and *white* and *black* is the same opposition in another kind of organ. And thus what expands the visual light is *white*, that which contracts it is black. But when the external light expands the visual light up to the very eyes, and opens the passages of the eyes in a forcible way, it melts them so that there flows from them that mixture of water and fire which we call *tears*. And when the visual light, itself a kind of fire, comes out to meet the other, and this inner light leaps forth like a flash of lightning, while the light which is entering from without is extinguished by the humidity, and when all kinds of colours are formed by this conflict, we call this *dazzling*, and the body which produces this effect we call *bright* and *shining*. And the intermediate kind of light which comes to the humidity of the eyes and is mixed with it, but is not shining, when the splendour of the fire traversing the liquid produces a colour like blood, we call it *red*. And the shining part mixed with red and with white becomes *yellow*: but the proportions of this mixture, even if one knew them, it would not be worth while to announce, since it would be impossible to give the exact proportion and the demonstrative reason for it.

“Red mixed with black and white is *purple*; and *brown* is produced when black is mixed with these, more burnt. *Orange* is produced by the mixture of yellow and brown: *grey* a mixture of white and black: *wan* is a mixture of white and yellow. White joined with brightness and falling upon full black produces *blue*; blue mixed with white produces *pale green*; orange mixed with

black, *dark green*. The other colours are evident from these, namely, by what mixtures the explanation may be given. But if any one speculating on these subjects were to put them to the test of trial, he would show an ignorance of the difference of the human and the divine nature: for God can mix things together into one and then separate the one into many, having at the same time the knowledge and the power; but man is not able to do either the one or the other of these things, nor ever will be able."

There are several curious points in this passage. The colours we can only identify in a general way, by their usual meanings and their mixtures. The relation of mixture is here intended to rest upon the general appearance of the colours. Plato, as we have seen, protests against any attempt to verify it by trial, as something which shows an ignorance of the real nature of knowledge. This sentiment serves to show how slowly the notion of experimental philosophy came into view. Sciences, according to Plato, had to do with mathematical relations of which the relations of visible things were dim and imperfect approximations. The phenomena might suggest the true theory to the philosopher, as in the case of astronomy: but if they did not do this at once, it was vain to hope to approach nearer and nearer to the truth by continued and persevering observations of the phenomena.

We may remark, however, that the classification and arrangement of colours, as the result of the mixture of other colours, is even yet in an incomplete and unsatisfactory state; and we have not any such arrangement which will stand the test of experiments of all kinds.

It is well known that the modern supposed

analysis and arrangement of colours was so far unsatisfactory to Göthe that he revived the ancient doctrine of Aristotle. This is however materially different from the scheme of Plato.

Plato then proceeds to terminate this part of his subject in a manner which still further illustrates his notion of the nature of science and its objects.

“All these things existing in this manner from 43 necessity, the artificer of the most beautiful and best of works (the world), taking them from the collection of the things that are, when he created that complete and perfect God (the world), used, as causes that were to minister to his purpose; and in doing this, he himself wove in *good*, as an object, into the texture of these existing things. And thus we must distinguish two kinds of Cause, the Necessary, and the Divine; and must seek the divine in everything, for the sake of a happy life: (this search being our greatest good.) This we must do so far as our faculties admit. And we must also study the necessary causes for the sake of these divine causes, considering that we cannot without those former proceed to these latter at which we aim; cannot either conceive or attain them.”

We see that Plato is still true to his general purpose. Man has to endeavour to learn how all things are made for the best. But the necessary properties of things, mathematical properties and the like, are to be used as steps in the reasoning by which we obtain our optimist system. This opinion is neither unreasonable nor extravagant: though the necessary properties with which he deals are, in this instance, very arbitrarily and fancifully assumed and applied.

“And now,” he says, “having, like careful workmen got our materials collected in these two

kinds of cause, out of which we are to weave the rest of our discourse, let us go back to the beginning, and rapidly run over the course which has led us to this point, and try to add a fitting conclusion to what was said before."

He then resumes briefly his account of the creation of things by God, and of the manner in which He committed the creation of man's mortal frame to the subordinate Gods; and proceeds to a survey of the parts of the human body on his usual principles. I abridge the earlier part.

- 44 "These things being at first in disorder, God established measure and proportion among them. Till he had done this, there was no real distinction of elements, as fire and water. God reduced them to order, (that is, by establishing mathematical distinctions among them,) and then employed them to form the universe. He himself was the artificer who formed the divine creatures; but the construction of mortal creatures he committed to the subordinate Gods his offspring."

This statement we already had in a former place, before the distinctions of the elements were spoken of. He proceeds with the description of this subordinate creation, the construction of the mortal part of man. This is given in very poetical phrases.

"These Gods, imitating Him, and receiving from him the immortal principle of the soul, fashioned and fitted to it the whole body as its vehicle; and then joined to the immortal part another different kind of soul, the Mortal Soul, a part which contained inevitably formidable attributes; Pleasure, the most seductive temptation to evil, and Pain, that expels good; and further, Rashness and Fear, blind guides; Anger, so hard to be counselled; and Hope easily drawn onwards by the unreasoning senses and exposed to the as-

saults of every liking. And mixing them together according to their necessary qualities, they composed the mortal soul.

“And then, careful not to pollute the divine part more than was absolutely necessary, they gave to the mortal part a habitation in another part of the body (than the head); constructing an isthmus and boundary between the head and the breast, the neck, to separate them.

“In the breast, and what is called the chest, they placed the mortal soul. And as one part of this was better and one worse, they separated the cavity of the body into two parts, as into a man’s chamber and a woman’s chamber, putting the diaphragm as a partition between them.

“And the part which involved Courage and Anger, a contentious portion, they placed nearest the head, between the diaphragm and the neck, that it might take counsel of reason, and in common with it, might restrain the desires, when they were disposed to rebel against the superior authority residing in the acropolis:” (the reason, residing in the head.)

This notion of anger being a useful ally of reason against desire, we have already had, as a leading part of the doctrine of the *Republic*. Plato goes on still further to give an anatomical locality to the psychological sentiments. First, as to the use of the Heart.

“The heart, the centre of the veins and the <sup>45</sup> source of the all-pervading blood, they placed in the guard-chamber of these satellites of the reason; in order that when the fierceness of anger was roused by news brought from the reason, that any unjust act was committed, through external influences without or through the desires within, every sensitive part of the body might swiftly, through

those passages (the veins), become aware of the commands and threats of the reason, and might leave the better part of us to exercise its authority."

Next, as to the use of the Lungs.

"As a provision for the palpitation of the heart in the expectation of danger and in the excitement of anger, the Gods, knowing that the fire of the bodily frame would produce these swellings of passion, contrived the mechanism of the lungs, and annexed it to the heart, making its substance soft and bloodless, and besides, full of cavities like a sponge, that it might receive air and fluid, and might cool and refresh and soothe the heat of the heart. For this end, they made the passages of the windpipe open into the lung, and wrapped it round the heart like a soft cushion, that when passion arrived at its vehemence, the heart, beating against an object yielding and cooling, might be relieved and made better able to obey reason in the middle of indignation."

Then the Stomach is explained.

- 46 "As to the part of the Soul which has an appetite for meat and drink and the things necessary for the body, they placed it in the part between the diaphragm and the navel: establishing there a sort of rack and manger to feed the body. They tethered it there, as a kind of wild beast indeed, but one which must be fed, if the human race is to exist. They placed it there, that feeding at its manger at a distance from the deliberative part, it might produce the least trouble and disturbance, and might allow it to deliberate in quiet, as to what was best for the good of all."

The account of the Liver is curious; and is obviously suggested by the practice of examining that part in beasts sacrificed, and drawing from it an augury of the future.

“The Gods, knowing that the stomach could not understand reason, and that if it felt any sensations, it was not natural for it to care for the reasons of them, but that it would be mainly led away by images and phantasms, both by night and by day, they contrived the liver and placed it near the stomach. They made it dense and bright, and sweet and yet containing a bitter: in order that the natural power proceeding from the intellect, being reflected here as in a mirror which gives types and visible images of things, might produce fear when that power should come in a menacing form, and might then use the bitter part and mix it with the whole liver, and produce bilious colours, contracting it and making it rough and wrinkled; and partly by curving the great lobe out of its straight position and contracting it, partly by obstructing and closing the ducts of the liver, might cause pain and loathing: and again, that when it should present images of an opposite kind, by a serene influence arising from intelligence, it should leave the bitter part in quiet, so that it should have no disposition to move or to assail the opposite nature, and should use its natural sweetness to act upon it; and that making all its parts straight and smooth, it might make the part of the soul which is near the liver become tranquil and calm: and that thus it might give during the night a due tendency to divination in sleep, since it had no participation of reason and wisdom.”

All this description of the liver in the Greek forms a single sentence, full of poetical phrases, and with the clauses loosely and confusedly connected with each other. The leading thought appears to be, that the liver is the seat of those feelings from which the power of divination arises; suggested, perhaps, as I have said, by the sacri-



cial ceremonies of the time. That the capacity, existing in some men, of those fits of enthusiasm which rhapsodists and diviners manifested, was regarded by Plato as something far inferior to the use of reason, we know from the *Ion*. The same subject is here pursued. And the faculty is here also represented as an inferior part of the human constitution.

47 “The subordinate Gods who framed us, bearing in mind the commands of their Father, when he commanded them to make the mortal race as perfect as possible, thus arranged even the bad part of us, that it might have some touch of truth, and so they here placed the divining faculty. And we have a sufficient proof that God gave this faculty from consideration for the weakness of reason in man. For no man in full possession of his reason is seized by a true inspired impulse such as leads to divination, but only when his faculties are chained by sleep, or turned into a devious path by disease or an enthusiastic nature. But it is the task of a rational man to understand these notices, to recollect dreams sent in sleep or visions presented by an enthusiastic nature, and to search the meaning of all these phantasms, and to determine what they signify and to whom, of good or evil, past or present.

“But he who has felt these transports, and still more he who is still under their influence, has it not for his office to judge of what he sees or hears; for as was well said long ago, to know what belongs to one’s self and to do it, and to know one’s self, is for a wise man only.

“And hence law and custom appoint a class of prophets or expounders, as judges over the inspired enthusiasts. Some call these, as well as the others, *Diviners*; not knowing, what is true, that they are

the expositors of the enigmatical utterances and visions of others: they are not properly Diviners, but may be called Prophets, or Expounders of what is uttered under enthusiastic inspiration.

“And so the liver was what it is and where it is, for the sake of divination. And it is in the living body that it offers the clearest indications of its office; but when deprived of life, it becomes blind, and is too obscure to indicate anything clearly.”

This remark appears intended to throw doubt upon the practice of divining by the liver of sacrificed beasts. It is difficult to find appropriate expressions; for to call persons *diviners* who require expositors to explain the meaning of the visions which they see and the voices which they hear, is somewhat at variance with our usage.

There is still one more of the viscera to be spoken of, the Spleen. It is thus explained.

“The constitution and seat of that one of the viscera which is in the neighbourhood of this on the left side, is to keep the liver clean and bright, like a plastic mass always ready to be moulded, a mirror always ready to return images. And hence when any impurities are engendered about the liver, the spleen purges them; and receives them all into its hollow and bloodless texture; and thus filled with this excrement it becomes morbidly large; and again, when the body is purged, it diminishes and subsides to its previous state.

“And thus, as to the Soul, its mortal and its 48 divine part, where it is seated and in what connection, and on what accounts, we have declared; with exact truth, we cannot venture to assert, except some God should give us the assurance. We must be content to assert what is probable, and we

do so the more confidently the more we consider the subject."

He then proceeds to speak of the other parts of the body.

- 48 The bowels :  
 49 The brain and spinal marrow :  
 50 The bones : The flesh :  
 51 The nerves, that is, the tendons of the muscles,  
 and the muscles :  
 52 The mouth : The lips :  
 53 The hair of the head. This may be translated  
 as a specimen.

"The head it was not well to have either with a covering of bare bone, on account of the excess of heat and cold in the different seasons, nor again to allow it to be made dull and insensible by a thick covering of flesh. Therefore the flesh was not quite dried up, so there was formed upon it a rind which we call the *skin*. This skin, on account of the moisture of the brain, formed all round, and grew and met and formed an enclosure surrounding the head. The humidity rising through the surface of the skull, moistened it and gathered the moisture to the crown of the head, in a sort of knot. The sutures were of all varied forms, as they were produced by the periods of the soul and the power of nourishment; when these more struggled with each other, greater, when less, smaller. And the divine artificer pricked this skin all over with fire, and as the moisture exuded, the moist and warm parts went off, but the part which was mixed and which was the origin of the skin, being carried upwards by its impulse, went far beyond the head, having a fineness corresponding to the pricking; but on account of the slowness of its growth being repelled by the surrounding air, it took root within the skin. And by the action of these causes the

hair was produced as we see it on the skin; flexible like it, but harder and more dense by the condensation of each hair, which as it removed from the skin was cooled and condensed.

“And thus the Artificer made our heads hairy, by the operation of the causes which have been explained; intending that instead of flesh, the hair should, for the safety of the brain, be a light covering to it, and a shade and shelter against summer and winter: while it did not prevent the sensibility of perception.”

It is also explained why men have nails on their fingers.

“In the complicated structure of tendons, bone 54 and skin, which constitutes the fingers, a portion, mingled of each, was dried and became a hard skin, having the nature of all the three: and it was so constructed by these accessory causes; but the supreme reason was, that it was so made on account of future purposes. For those who made us knew that at a future time there should be made, from men, women and other animals; and they knew that the greater part of these creatures would have occasion for nails, for various uses. And thus in the formation of man, they inserted a sketch of nails. Such are the purposes and the motives for which they produced the skin, the hair and the nails.”

The next point noticed is the provision of vegetables as food for man, to prevent his wasting away for want of fire and air. In consistency with the character of Timæus as a Pythagorean philosopher, vegetables only are spoken of as the food of man. He says, (I abridge):

“The Gods, compounding a nature allied to 55 the nature of man, but with other forms and sensations, made a second kind of living things, trees

and vegetables, which at first were wild, but are now tame, that is, cultured. For all that has life may be called a living thing; and the kind of which we now speak has a share of the third kind of soul which is placed between the diaphragm and the navel: and this has no intelligence, but has pleasurable and painful perception: and can move about itself, but cannot change its place."

We have now a long explanation of the course of the blood: "The Gods," says Timæus, "made two channels along the back, one on the right and one on the left, along the back-bone." The course of the veins and arteries is described in a way, as may be expected, very inexact, but interesting to those who would trace the early history of anatomy. The blood is formed from the food, by a complicated process, in which the lungs are described as a bag made like a basket for catching fish; and in which, by respiration, the blood is strained from the food.

This matter of respiration is resumed and treated more in detail. One main point aimed at is to explain the inspiration of the breath without assuming a vacuum, which is the ground on which  
58 the explanation here proceeds: "since," he says, "there is no void into which the air in motion can enter." And this difficulty is solved by assuming a circulation, so that the air goes in one way at the same time that it goes out another way through the rare parts of the flesh; and this motion, alternated in opposite directions, is respiration.

59 The cause of this motion is the heat or fire which is strained from the air by the tissue of the lungs, and produces the drawing in and sending out of the breath.

60. The same is asserted to be the cause of the effect of cupping-glasses, and of the action of swal-

lowing: naturally, for these are effects of the same kind, which by other schools were referred to the operation of a void. He adds, the same is the cause of the motions of bodies thrown towards the sky, or along the earth, and of sounds, whether they travel quick or slow. (Of course all motions must depend on this condition of motion.) The same, he adds, is the cause of the motions of waters, and of the fall of the thunderbolt, and of the effects, so much wondered at, of Amber and of the Heraclæan stone; (motions, as we now say, produced by electricity and magnetism). In all these cases there is really no attraction: there is no void: but there is a circular movement by which each part comes to its new place. (It is curious to see the early repugnance to the doctrine of attraction.)

In speaking of sounds here, he cannot omit the occasion of saying that the relation of grave and acute sounds produces an impression which, while it is a pleasure even to unintelligent persons, supplies to the intelligent a joy, resulting from the imitation of the divine harmony in mortal movements.

He then explains that the blood is red, because 61 it results by extracting from all aliments the triangles which contain the nature of fire.

And that while man is young, the triangles 62 which belong to it are sharp, and conquer and divide the triangles of the aliments. But when the frame is old, its triangles are blunted, and can no longer so well assimilate the nutriment.

“Finally, when the ties which hold together the triangles of the spinal marrow no longer hold, they relax the ties of the soul; and, she so loosed, according to her nature, gladly flies away; for all that is contrary to nature is painful, and what is according to nature is pleasant. And so it is that

death from disease or wounds is painful; but that which arrives at the end of old age according to nature, is the most painless of deaths, and is indeed rather accompanied with pleasure than with pain."

He then enters upon a still more technical part of physiology, the origin and kinds of diseases. He does not however begin by treating it as difficult. He says:

- 63 "Whence diseases arise, is now evident to every one. For since there are four elements of which the body is compounded, Earth, Fire, Water and Air, the excess or defect of these, and their transposition from their own place to another, or a wrong kind of each element, since there are different kinds of each,—these are the causes of diseases."

He then goes on to resume the formation of flesh and nerves, marrow and bones: and adds,

- 64 That when all this goes on regularly, there is health; when otherwise, disease.

When the solution of the flesh sends a corrupt fluid into the veins, there are produced biles, ichors, and phlegms. Biles are black or yellow, but all are rightly included under the name of *bile*. Phlegms are sharp or white.

- 65 And all these things are instruments of disease. Diseases are of various kinds. They may be divided as proceeding from air, phlegm or bile. Air produces tetanus and opisthotonus: and, thereupon supervening, fever. White phlegm falling upon the head gives rise to the sacred disease (epilepsy).
- 67 All that is called inflammation arises from bile, mixing with the blood and disturbing its fibres. If strong enough it penetrates to the marrow and sets the soul free; but if not strong enough for this, it yields, and is repelled into the belly, and escaping

from the body, like fugitives from a seditious city, causes diarrhoeas and dysenteries, and the like.

When the body is diseased by the excess of fire, fever results; excess of air produces quotidian fevers; of water, tertians; of earth, quartan fevers.

“So much for the maladies of the body: those 68 of the mind result from these. There are two kinds of maladies of the mind, Derangement and Ignorance. When any one has either of these, it is to be called a disease. We must reckon excessive pleasures and pains as the greatest of diseases in the soul. Excessive joy or fear prevents a man from seeing rightly, and deprives him of reason. So, excessive sexual desire. People so affected are erroneously regarded as voluntarily bad, they are really diseased. No one is bad voluntarily. Every man becomes what he is by bad habit of body or bad education. And these mischiefs may happen to any man in spite of any will of his own.”

So the evil humours of the body may disorder the soul, producing manifold forms of melancholy and dejection, of rashness and cowardice, of obliviousness and ignorance.

And add to these, when polities are made by men thus ill constituted, and corresponding doctrines circulated publicly, and the studies which should be the cures of these evils in the young men are neglected, then all become bad through two great involuntary causes.

The main cause is in the parents rather than in the children, in the educators rather than the educated; and it is therefore important to endeavour by education and study to remove the evil and promote the good. But this is a matter for another discourse.

And the counterpart to this, the cure of dis- 69 eases of the body and mind, is a proper object of



attention: for it is better to speak of good than of evil. All good is beautiful, and the beautiful must be a matter of proportion. Hence an animal to be good and beautiful must be proportioned. We attend to proportion in small matters but neglect it in the greatest. With regard to health and disease, virtues and vices, no proportion or disproportion is more important than that of the body and soul, to which we pay no attention.

A great body and a small soul, a great soul and an ill-made (as a long-legged) body, disturbs everything.

There is one way of safety for both, that the body shall not move without the soul, nor the soul without the body, so that helping each other they may be balanced and sound.

The mathematician, or any one who pursues serious studies for the intellect, must be directed also to take care of the motions of the body, by joining therewith Gymnastic. And he who forms the body's habits, must join therewith motions of the soul, using Music and all philosophy to make the man truly good and beautiful.

70 And thus all parts must be improved alike, imitating the general frame of things. The body must be exercised, to prevent food and drink from harming it. If any one imitates that which we have called the Nourisher and Nurse of all, shaking all things into their proper places, and removing things which are hostile to one another, he will avert war and maladies, and will produce health.

Of all motions, that is best which is of itself and in itself; for this is most congenial to the intellectual part, and to the motion of the universe. Other kinds are worse in order: worst of all is that which is exerted by other bodies in the body quiescent and lying at rest. Hence gymnastic is best,

next the motion of a vehicle or a ship. The third kind, purgation by drugs, is useful when necessary, but to be avoided by a wise man. For diseases which are not extremely dangerous are not to be encumbered by drugs; diseases are like animals—each has a certain time to continue. The triangles of each last a certain time. So if we disturb the progress of diseases, the small become great, and one becomes many. And so such things are to be managed by diet, not by drugs.

And so much for the animal composed of body 71 and soul.

And again he returns to the Soul, and the three habitations of the three different kinds of Soul. They are to be kept in harmony.

That which is the most perfect, God has given to us as a divine guide (*δαίμων*). It inhabits the highest part of us, and by its congeniality with heaven lifts our body upright.

The movements which are in relation to the nature of the divine part are to be regulated by studying the harmonies of the universe.

He proceeds to mention, very briefly, as he 72 says, how other animals are formed, namely, by metempsychosis. But this part of the speculation has rather the air of moral satire than of physical hypothesis. Thus, he says, that cowards, at their next stage of being, become women, and gives an account of their organization. And the account of the men who become birds is understood to be a satirical description of the philosophers of the Ionic sect.

“The family of birds, clothed with feathers instead of hair, is formed from those harmless men of light natures, who speculate about the skies, but think in their simplicity that the sense of sight is the best judge about such matters.”

We have seen how contrary this opinion is to Plato's own view of the nature of science.

“In like manner quadrupeds spring out of the men who never occupy themselves with philosophy at all, and pay no attention to the heavens, because they never use those motions of the soul which take place in the head, but obey that Soul which resides in the chest. In consequence of these habits, their forelimbs and their heads incline to the earth, as being earthy; their back is long by the effect of indolence.

“And to the most stupid, God has given a still greater number of feet, that they may crawl still nearer the earth. These are reptiles.

“The fourth kind, fishes, is produced from those who are still more stupid; who are not even worthy to breathe pure air; they live in a heavy and turbid fluid, water.

“And here we end our discourse of the Universe. Thus has that world been formed which contains in it all animals, mortal and immortal; including all visible things, itself a living visible thing: a God the object of the senses, image of that God who is the object of the intellect, greatest and best, perfect in beauty and structure, the one only-generated Heaven.”

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#### ADDITION TO THE TIMÆUS.

I have omitted in my translation the part of this Dialogue in which Kritias gives an account of the manner in which Solon received in Egypt the legend of the island of Atlantis. I postponed that passage, thinking that it would come in more suitably as an introduction to the Dialogue entitled

*Kritias*, if that Dialogue be received as genuine. The connexion of these Dialogues is as forming successive parts of a very large design. In the *Republic*, Socrates describes the best possible polity of a State; in the *Timæus*, that philosopher describes the optimist scheme of the universe; in the *Kritias*, that Athenian politician undertakes to give a history of the best polity when in a course of action. But the *Kritias*, as we possess it, is a Dialogue which, with reference to this, its professed object, is of no value; and if it be Plato's at all, is a mere introductory fragment. The other introductory narrative contained in the body of the *Timæus* is noticeable, and is often referred to. I shall therefore briefly translate it. After Socrates has recapitulated the main points of the Polity, it is agreed that *Timæus* and *Kritias* shall continue the discourse, as has been said. *Kritias* goes on:

“Listen, Socrates, to a story, strange yet quite <sup>4</sup> true, which Solon, the wisest of the Seven Wise men, told. He was a great friend of Dropidas my great grandfather, as he himself mentions in several parts of his poems; and *he* told it to my grandfather *Kritias*, who in his turn told me;—that this city of ours did many great things which have gone into oblivion: and one thing especially, which we might relate as a proper return to you; and as a kind of hymn to the goddess, suitable to the festival.”

Socrates asks what it is.

KR. “It is an old story: for *Kritias* was then near ninety, and I was only ten. It was a public festival, and our elders set us youths upon making verses for prizes: and one of our tribe, perhaps by way of pleasing *Kritias*, chose Solon for the subject of his eulogy, and said that besides being so wise in other things, he was the most noble of poets.

The old man Kritias was delighted at this, and smiling said; Yes, Amynander, if he had not practised merely poetry as by-play, but had set about it in earnest; if he had worked out the legend which he brought from Egypt, and had not been turned aside by civil feuds; he would not have been inferior to Hesiod or Homer or any of the poets.—‘What was the subject, O Kritias?’ said he.—‘A great event in the history of this city, now forgotten.’—‘Pray tell it us from the beginning what Solon said, and from whom he heard it.’

- 5 “There is, he said, in Egypt, at the head of the Delta, where the Nile divides into two branches, the Nome or District called Saïs; the inhabitants of which acknowledge, as their protectress, a goddess whose Egyptian name is Neith, who, as they say, is the same as the Athenê of the Greeks. The people are very fond of the Athenians, and Solon was held in great honour among them. He asked their priests many questions, and found that what he and the Greeks in general knew was nothing in comparison with *their* knowledge. When he went back to ancient histories about Phoroneus and Niobe, and the deluge of Deucalion and Pyrrha, and their progeny, and tried to calculate backwards the period of these events; an old priest said to him: ‘Solon, Solon, you Greeks are for ever children: there is not an old man among you.’ And he replied, ‘How do you mean that?’

“You are all young, he answered, in your minds. You have no ancient traditions or time-hoary doctrines in them. And the reason is this. There have been many destructions of the human race, and will be many more;—the greatest, caused by fire and by water; shorter interruptions, by other causes. Your story about Phaeton—how that he tried to drive the chariot of the Sun his

father, and could not keep the right track, and so burnt up the earth till he was himself killed by a thunderbolt—this sounds like a fable; but the real meaning is, that in the course of the revolutions of the skies, at long intervals, there comes a catastrophe when the things on earth are destroyed by fire; and then those who live high up in mountains and in dry places perish, rather than those who live near rivers and the sea: and our Nile, which is such a benefit to us in other ways, is our salvation in such a case. And on the other hand, when the Gods send on the earth a deluge of water to purify it, those who are occupied in the mountains, herdsmen and shepherds, are saved, while the inhabitants of your cities are swept into the sea by the rivers. But our plains are never inundated by showers, so that we have preserved our most ancient monuments. There are always men upon the earth; but with you, when the important events in their history have been recorded in letters or otherwise, there comes some watery catastrophe from the heavens, and leaves nobody but the illiterate and ignorant among you, and you have to begin again from the beginning, knowing nothing that has happened in old times. Such stories as you have been telling us, Solon, sound to us like children's tales. You speak of one deluge only: there have been many. You do not know that the noblest race of men that has lived was in your region, though you and all your countrymen derive your origin from a small remnant of those revolutions. For in ancient days, Solon, before the great destruction, that which is now Athens, was the greatest in war and the best governed in peace of all cities that have ever been heard of.

“When Solon heard this, he was greatly interested, and entreated the priests to tell him the 6

whole history of those ancient progenitors of his race. This, said the priest, I am quite willing to do, for the love of you and of our common country, and especially out of respect for the goddess who has been the guardian both of your city and of ours—Athens, offspring of the earth and of Vulcan, and this our Saïs a thousand years later. Subsequently to the establishment of our city, our books speak of a period of eight thousand years: and with the laws and the noblest exploits of the Athenians during these nine thousand years I am going to entertain you."

The priest then proceeds to relate, on the authority, as he says, of their ancient books, some features of polity, belonging in common to the ancient Athenian city and to the land of Egypt as it then existed; these being also features of the Platonic polity, and thus tending to identify Plato's imaginary city with Solon's traditionary city: especially the distinction of *castes* or hereditary trades, which resembles the division of classes in the Platonic polity.

"You will see, he says, if you make the comparison, that there is a great resemblance between your former institutions and our present ones—the class of priests; that of artisans in which each trade is kept separate; that of herdsmen, that of hunters, that of husbandmen: and again, the soldiers, who are soldiers and nothing else. And the arms which we use, the spear and the shield, (we having adopted them first of all Asiatics,) are the same which you use; the goddess (Athenê) having taught you and us the use of them: And again, you know how much the study of science has been encouraged:—from the study of the universe to soothsaying and medicine, and also the sciences that follow these."

He then describes this original Athens as especially favoured in its climate, disposition, and laws; and proceeds to recite events which look like an anticipation of that cardinal portion of Athenian history, the Persian wars.

“By this city there were many and great deeds done, which you may read of with admiration; but one in especial, surpassing the rest. This your city checked an overbearing invasion of Europe and Asia, which came upon them from the Atlantic sea. For that sea then contained, outside of what you call the Pillars of Hercules, an island greater than Libya and Asia, and from this island there was a passage to other islands, and so, to the continent beyond. For the sea within the Pillars is really only a small inlet, and that other sea is really the ocean, and the land that surrounds it really the continent.

“Now in this island of Atlantis, there was a great government of kings who ruled over the whole island, and other islands, and part of the continent, and extended their sway within the straits to Libya and Egypt, and in Europe as far as Tyrrhenia. This empire collected its forces and attempted to subjugate both you and us, and all within the straits. And then, O Solon, your city showed itself illustrious for virtue and strength in the eyes of all mankind. For holding the first place in military skill and courage, she at first stood at the head of the Hellenes in the contest, and then, when they from necessity left her to fight the battle alone, being thus reduced to the extreme of peril, she gained the victory, erected her trophies, saved her allies from slavery, and restored to freedom, without seeking any reward for herself, all within the Pillars of Hercules.”

Having thus reached the climax of the legend,



the actors are disposed of in a very summary and complete manner.

“Afterwards great earthquakes and deluges took place, and in one terrible day and night, all your army was swallowed up by the earth; and in like manner the Isle of Atlantis sunk in the ocean, and was seen no more. And hence it comes that the sea in that region is impassable and un-navigable, the island having in sinking left an immense body of mud in the water.”

This, Kritias says, is the story which he has recovered from the traces of it left in his youthful memory, and he proposes to pursue the story into detail, as a way of satisfying Socrates's desire of seeing his imaginary city in action. To this purpose Socrates cordially assents.

In the Dialogue entitled *Kritias*, which is one of the Platonic Dialogues, there is a further declaration of a purpose to represent a perfect State in action; but, as I have said, the Dialogue, or that part of it which remains, is of little or no value as a performance of this purpose, and is indeed probably not Plato's writing.

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